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One US senior marine notes that “military cultures are like great ocean liners or 
aircraft carriers: they require an enormous effort to change direction”. Indeed, in 
most nations, military cultures are known for their resistance against change. The 
military ethos, which includes features such as absolute obedience, hierarchy, 
collectivism, and sacrificing oneself for all, makes military cultures less likely to 
adopt liberal and democratic values. In this regard, Turkey is in an interesting 
position in that military culture has constantly experienced transitions between three 
different identities: revolutionists, guardians, and depoliticals. The first identity is 
modernist, progressive, and staunchly secular; the second is more conservative, less 
tolerant of the notion of individual rights and liberties, and more likely to maintain 
the status quo; the third is being politically neutral, committed to civilian supremacy, 
and likely to work in harmony with the politicians. Indeed, because of the role it 
played during the Liberation War, the military has had an unwritten legitimacy in 
national politics as the nation builder. Related to this, the military’s privileged 
position in the eyes of the people has enabled any change in military culture to make 
fundamental changes in politics. Yet, if one observes most cases of civil-military 
relations, one may see that the relationship between militaries and states tends to 
follow a stable, positive, or negative path regarding democratisation. But in the 
Turkish case this relationship does not draw a steady line. Rather, it can show very 
different results depending on time and developments. Hence, the main purpose of 
this thesis is to identify the relationship between military culture and Turkish politics 
regarding our five civil-military models: the positive-undemocratic, negative-
undemocratic, positive-democratic, negative-democratic, and variable relationships. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The leading founder and first president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, once stated that the Turkish military should be considered as “the soul and 
basis” of the national institution.1 Indeed, if one observes Turkey and makes a short 
investigation about its culture, history, and politics, one would see the military’s 
importance in Turkey. Perhaps because of this special position, the Turkish nation is 
defined as a “military-nation” by the experts. The impact of militarism is easily 
observable in Turkish language, idioms, customs and traditions, religion, 
celebrations, and even in children’s street games. The close ties between the military 
and society actually go back to the time of the earliest Turkish tribes (around the 
fourth century BC). In Central Asia, the Turkish ancestors were living a nomadic life. 
Accordingly, the members of the tribes were raised within military discipline to 
make their community resistant against the harsh conditions of nature, and possible 
conflicts. The historical sources report that both men and women were expert sword-
wielders, riders, and archers. Due to this soldierly discipline, the tribes did not 
produce a separate armed unit. Every member of the society was simultaneously a 
warrior. Conceivably, this warrior lifestyle has made militarist values highly 
dominant in the later Turkish states. The military had also been the core institution 
within the first Turkish-Islamic states: the Seljuks and the Ottomans. 
The strong impact of militarism in national culture caused the military to become 
politically keen and active. Especially, during the declining years of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Janissaries army often attempted rebellion against the state’s authority. 
Eventually, the undisciplined behaviour of the Janissaries led them to be replaced by 
                                               
1 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk (The Speech), Ministry of Culture, 1927. 
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the new units, which were trained under a more secular and progressive system by 
imitating the methods used in the European military academies. The positivist 
environment within the military academy led the officers to experience a major 
mental revolution. The young officers tended to believe that the backwardness of the 
state was derived from the traditional religious law (sharia), the powers of the 
religious class (Ulama), and the absolute authority of the Sultan. This changing 
worldview caused the officers to become politically more active. The strong protest 
from revolutionist officers and civilian intellectuals, forced the authoritarian Sultan 
Abdulhamit II to twice declare a constitutional monarchy, and to eventually leave the 
throne. Especially, after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and re-declaration of the 
constitutional monarchy, the Sultan became a symbolic figure. Nevertheless, in the 
wake of the 1909 and 1913 coups d’état, the liberal environment that had been 
created after the 1908 revolution declined. Especially, after the 1913 coup d’état 
(known as the Raid on the Sublime Court), the revolutionist officers ruled the state 




WWI marked the end of the Ottoman Empire. Being on the defeated side, the 
remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire – now comprising the modern Turkish 
territory – was shared between the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, France, and 
Armenia. On 19 May 1919, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – a revolutionist officer – 
organised the resistance known as the “Turkish Independence War” by collecting 
active and retired officers, as well as local guerrillas. At the end of this process, he 
managed to found the modern Turkish state. Following the war, Atatürk changed 
                                               
2 According to the leading civil-military scholar Samuel Finer, the Committee of Union and Progress 
era was an ‘indirect-complete’ military regime; see: Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback, 
Transaction Publishers, 2002 edition, p.202. (The first edition was in 1962.) 
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Turkey’s image from a theocratic monarchy to a secular republic. He implemented a 
series of reforms to make Turkey a modern Western-orientated state. Among the 
most important of these reforms, one may mention abolishing the Caliphate and the 
monarchy, replacing sharia with the modern civil law, the equality of women and 
men before the law, the enfranchisement of women and their right to stand for 
election, the replacement of Arabic letters with the Latin alphabet, the adoption of 
modern dress instead of religious and traditional dress, replacing the state’s official 
religion (Islam) with the principle of secularism, and declaring Turkey as a Republic 
vested in the hands of public sovereignty. Atatürk’s reforms were formalised under 
six principles as the main state doctrine: Republicanism, Secularism, Nationalism, 
Populism, Statism, and Revolutionism.
3
 Even during his lifetime, these principles 
were deeply embedded in military culture as “unchangeable tenets” of the new 
Turkish republic. Thereafter, the military intervened in democracy four times (1960, 
1971, 1980, and 1997) by indicating that the Kemalist principles were at risk. During 
these interventions, the revolutionist identity of the military began to change toward 
a more conservative tendency, which can be defined as “guardianship” of the status 
quo. Ultimately, the military’s strong supervision over politics lasted until the end of 
the 2000s. 
In 1999, Turkey was officially accepted as a potential candidate for membership of 
the European Union. Especially, under AKP (Justice and Development Party) rule, 
the military’s powers were restricted in order to meet the EU criteria. Since 2011, the 
AKP government has been taming the military into a subordinate position. Indeed, 
the military’s rapid depoliticisation was something which could not have been 
predicted. Despite events such as the EU negotiations, the 2007 website 
                                               
3 In Turkish: Cumhuriyetcilik, Laiklik, Milliyetcilik, Halkcilik, Devletcilik, Inkilapcilik. 
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memorandum, and the Ergenekon-Balyoz indictments accelerating this process, the 
experts have not been able to give a certain answer why or how the military stepped 
back. Is it a tactical manoeuvring to hide praetorian tendencies, or is there a change 
in the institution’s mentality toward depoliticisation? What may be its future 
outcomes? Under the current conditions, these questions cannot be answered in a 
satisfactory way. But, if one considers the deep relations between the military, 
society, and politics, any change in military policies is likely to make important 
changes in national politics. From among the plethora of explanatory factors that 
have been used in analysing Turkish civil-military (CIV-MIL) relations, this thesis 
employs military culture as the main explanatory notion. While coding the nature of 
the relationship between military culture and politics, the thesis also aims to 
understand whether or not there is a change in military culture toward political 
neutrality. 
In general, military culture can be defined as the main ethoi – including ideas, 
beliefs, symbols, rituals, and values – that shape the worldview of a nation’s 
military.
4
 These ethoi shapes the officer’s main positioning toward outside events. 
Military cultures can be a combination of several factors, including social culture, 
strategic concerns, historical experiences, and religious values. Due to the existence 
of more than one “resistant” factor, they are likely to be rooted very deeply and 
cannot easily be changed. Even in the greatest national revolutions, militaries have 
                                               
4 Indeed, the Cambridge Dictionary defines the word ‘ethos’ as: ‘The set of beliefs, ideas, etc. about 
the social behaviour and relationships of a person or group’. Hence, it is possible to use the word in a 
more comprehensive format than Snider’s. Thus, this thesis uses martial ethoi to refer to every type of 
variable, including ideas, norms, values, beliefs, ideals, ideologies, rituals, objects, persons, 
disciplines, and similar factors that create the dynamics of military cultures. For an exact dictionary 
meaning of the word see: Cambridge Dictionary, Ethos, Cambridge University Press, 2016. Available 
at: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/ethos (The plural form of ethos is ‘ethoi’, which 
is also used throughout the thesis when different sets of ethos combine together. ‘Professional Ethos’ 
is always used in singular form to refer to the combination of aforementioned norms and principles. 
On the other hand, ‘military ethos’ or ‘military ethoi’, and ‘martial ethos’ or ‘martial ethoi’ are used in 




tended to be the institutions which do not experience much change. One senior US 
marine, General Paul Van Riper, defines this resistant nature by stating that “military 
cultures are like great ocean liners or aircraft carriers: they require an enormous 
effort to change direction”.5 Indeed, there are well-known cases that may evidence 
the unwavering nature of military cultures. For instance, the strong Prussian 
discipline, namely rational understanding and professional mentality, remained in the 
German armies for a long time without change.
6
 Similarly, the ancient Samurai 
culture of the earliest Japanese warriors led the first modern Japanese armies to be 
highly political.
7
 Also, the liberal and democratic ethoi that have been embedded in 
the armies of the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) prevent these armies 
from interfering in civilian matters. Yet, these cases do not mean that military 
cultures never change; they may change, but doing so generally involves long 
processes. However, some extraordinary events, such as revolutions, war 
experiences, economic deadlock, technological innovations, and charismatic 
leadership, can cause more sudden changes. 
Turkey is a remarkable case, which can provide significant academic clues for how 
military culture can emerge, and under what conditions it may experience changes. 
That is to say, since the first decade of the nineteenth century, Turkish military 
culture has seen transitions between three identities, namely: revolutionism, 
guardianship, and depolitical. The earliest example of this division was the strife 
between the Mekteplis and Alaylis that began in the late nineteenth century. After the 
1908 revolution, the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy continued to exist between the 
Unionist (Ittihatci) and the Saviour (Halaskar Zabitan) officers. Accordingly, after 
                                               
5 General Paul Van Riper, USMC, July 1995. Quoted in: M. Williamson, The Future of American 
Military Culture: Does Military Culture Matter?, Orbis, 2000: 28. 
6 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Oxford University Press, 1957, pp.30-34, 99-100. 
7 Ibid., 123, 125, 135. 
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the 1913 coup d’état, the revolutionist officers gained a permanent victory over the 
monarchist officers and, eventually, led the nation to a republican regime.  
Indeed, since the beginning of the parliamentary regime in 1908 – or, in its 
traditional title, the Second Constitutional Monarchy – Turkey has been an arena of 
strife between the liberals and monarchists. Thus, the military could not stay away 
from this development, and became involved as ‘the principal actor’. Especially, the 
period between 1908-1913 saw a power struggle between the supporters and 
opponents of the new parliamentary regime.
8
 More or less, this strife became 
embedded in Turkish political culture and military culture and continued to be 
present under different names and ideologies in the later terms. 
Related to the arguments above, the history of the Turkish military is infamous for its 
internal political disagreements. If one observes the history, there is always one 
group that is more conservative or moderate and another group that is more radical 
and revolutionary: the Janissaries versus Nizami Cedit; Mekteplis versus Alaylis; 
Unionists versus Saviours; Republicans versus Monarchists; Juntaists versus 
Democrats; Nationalist Kemalists versus Moderate Kemalists; and so on. These 
examples can be broadened under different names and groupings. Thus, many strict 
mechanisms have been established within the military to remove officers who have 
political interests. The vital point here, for the purpose of this research, is that the 
dominant group within the military used every opportunity to eliminate the opponent 
group either by side-lining or expelling them. Interestingly, the direction of Turkish 
politics also changed in step with the dominant group’s political purposes.  
                                               




At this point, I have contextualised the ongoing identity strife within the military as 
‘crossing identities’, because, within this thesis, we will see an ongoing power 
struggle between two different ideologies that dominated military culture since the 
beginning of twentieth century. Sometimes, these ideologies will be blurred by alien 
ideologies and will become intertwined with each other. As was suggested by 
Samuel Huntington (1957), most scholars tend to perceive military ideologies as 
‘conservative’ with respect to their hierarchical, disciplinary, and altruist ethoi.9 The 
uncertainty of the enemy’s next step, according to Huntington, makes militaries 
highly sceptical and causes them to demand large armies. Conversely, the anti-
militarist nature of liberal societies makes them opponents to large militaries and 
conscription. For these reasons, militaries tend to be conservative. Yet, the Turkish 
case disproves Huntington in that a liberal, secular, and modernist officership class 
guided Turkey through a similar universal process as the modern secular-democratic 
European states. Following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, 
democratisation and secularisation became the main tenets of military discourse. In 
the second half of the twentieth century, the Turkish military intervened in politics 
four times to maintain the secular and democratic characteristics of Turkey and 
created essential tools to make Turkey a modern capitalist nation state.  
Theoretically, military identity and its relationship with political ideologies should be 
the research area of military culture studies. Yet, in the literature, the studies in this 
vein are relatively limited. As was the case with Huntington, many scholars tend to 
see militaries as naturally conservative and status quoist. At this point, one of the 
earliest studies to place an emphasis on the progressive and modernist side of 
military cultures was by Amos Perlmutter (1977). In his classic, Military and Politics 
                                               
9 Huntington (1957), see: the political ideologies and militaries in Chapter 4. 
8 
 
in Modern Times, Perlmutter separated the characteristic features of modern armies 
into three: ‘revolutionary’, ‘praetorian’, and ‘professional’. According to his theory, 
the revolutionary militaries act together with a political revolutionary party with 
which they share the same revolutionist ideals; and after the revolution, the military 
subordinates itself to the party. That is to say, the revolutionary military shares the 
same ideology with the pioneer party of the revolution.
10
 In other words, it is not 
always true that they are conservative and traditionalist, as Huntington suggested. 
Instead, they can be liberal, socialist, fascist, or religious depending on the character 
of the regime.  
The praetorian armies, on the other hand, are traditionally closer to Huntington’s 
categorisation, in that they tend to be traditionalist, praetorianist, and anti-
Communist.
11
 As one can see from this scheme, there are similarities between 
Perlmutter’s model and the Turkish case. Yet, unlike Perlmutter, I preferred to use 
‘guardian’ instead of ‘praetorian’ given the speciality of the Turkish case. Although 
Perlmutter’s definition of praetorian mostly explains the second stage of Turkish 
military culture, still there are some differences. This is because, in Turkey, the 
identity change after the 1950s was not completely against the revolutionist ideals of 
Kemalist ideology. The military still preserved its commitment to secularism and 
democratisation; but, given the NATO influence, anti-Communism and capitalism 
are also embedded in Turkish military culture while eliminating the left-orientated 
officers from the military. 
The high political nature of the Turkish military, on the other hand, should be 
analysed by taking into account two motives: the first motive is the impact of 
                                               
10 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians and 
Revolutionary Soldiers, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, p.9-17. 
11 Ibid. (see Table 1.1, p.16). 
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militarism within the society; the second motive is the revolutionary ethos, which 
penetrated into military culture during the declining years of the Ottomans. Perhaps 
these motives caused both civilians and officers to consider the military as the 
“principal” institution of the state. Indeed, there is some historical evidence that 
supports this belief, because the military has always undertaken important roles in 
every attempted revolution, sometimes being the “organiser”. Indeed, Atatürk 
himself recalled this opinion as the national perception when he said “the Turkish 
nation has always looked to its military … as the leader of the movements … to 
achieve its lofty national ideals”.12 On the other hand, this line of national perception 
has perhaps had negative impacts on Turkey’s political culture.13 In other words, 
strong commitment to the military and militarism may be one reason that made 
civilians “hesitant” and made the officers “confident”, especially during national 
deadlocks. 
By and large, the institutional behaviours of the Turkish military should be analysed 
by defining the aforementioned revolutionary ethos that has been rooted in its 
culture. This ethos has perhaps left a self-perception or, rather, a dogmatic belief that 
the officers should take responsibility whenever politicians were incapable of 
governing the state. Again, this possible perception can be the outcome of the 
militarist past of the Turkish nation, as well as the values and meanings that the 
people have imposed on the military centuries ago. In every act of the military, one 
can see the impacts of this revolutionist self-perception. Nonetheless, given the 
aforementioned reasons, changes in military culture tend to affect Turkish politics 
                                               
12 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk’un Soylev ve Demecleri (The speeches and statements of Atatürk), 
Ankara: The Institute of the History of Turkish Revolution, 1952. 
13Political culture can be seen as a concept to define beliefs, ideas, assumptions and emotions that 
govern the political behaviour of people within a political system. See: Jo Freedman, ‘The Political 
Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties’, Political Science Quarterly (1986), Vol. 101, 
No.3, Fall 1986, pp. 327-356. For a detailed analysis of the political culture concept, see: 65-68. 
10 
 
radically. As a result, the purpose of this thesis can be summarised as exploring the 
origins, characteristics, and outcomes of the relationship between military culture 
and Turkish politics. While discussing the complex and continuous relations between 
military, state, and society, the thesis will also seek for the answers to questions such 
as: Why does military culture show changes from time to time? What kind of 
political factors trigger changes in the officer ethos and what kind of factors have 
started current military depoliticisation? The thesis will be divided into seven 
chapters. The first four chapters will give the purpose and theoretical and conceptual 
backgrounds of the thesis. The subsequent chapters will analyse the process under 
three different case study headings: Revolutionism (1908-1945); Guardianship 
(1945-1999); and Toward Depoliticisation? (1999-2013). Within this first chapter, 
the general framework of the thesis will be outlined. Firstly, the chapter identifies the 
main research questions. Secondly, it defines the suggestions, contributions, and 
methods of the thesis. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Gap: The military’s role in Turkish politics has been analysed by a large variety 
of disciplines including history, sociology, politics, and international relations, as 
well as security and strategy. These studies have explored several factors to explain 
the complex relations between the military, politics, and society in Turkey. Yet, 
when one examines the literature, one may observe that the number of studies that 
have used military culture as an explanatory factor is relatively limited. Hence, this 
study aims to make a contribution to the field by employing military culture as an 
explanatory factor with reference to Samuel Huntington’s definition of professional 
military ethic. Accordingly, the key research question, for which an answer will be 
sought, is this: 
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KEY RESEARCH QUESTION: What is the relationship between military culture 
and Turkish politics? 
Definition: The key question connects with five analytical models that have been 
developed to define CIV-MIL relations. Hence, the research question directly 
addresses these models by questioning which of these five best defines Turkey. The 
models are positive-democratic, negative-democratic, positive-undemocratic, 
negative-undemocratic, and variable. These models are particularly developed to 
consider the military’s relationship with democratic regimes. Related to this, military 
culture is taken as the leading aspect that shapes a military’s attitude toward 
civilians. Definitions of these models will be given in the subsequent parts of this 
thesis. While discussing the relationship between military culture and Turkish 
politics, the questions below will also be evaluated: 
 How can one define military culture? How it is related to CIV-MIL relations? 
 What is the definition of professionalism in CIV-MIL relations? How should 
a professional military behave in a democratic regime? 
 What are the foundations of Turkish military culture? 
 Has the Turkish military depoliticised? And, if so, what may the driving 
factors be? 
1.3 WHY THE RESEARCH IS IMPORTANT 
1.3.1 Why Military Culture? 
Military culture is an explanatory factor in CIV-MIL relations which aims to explain 
that relationship by analysing the “traditions, values, customs, and leadership 
12 
 
behaviours” of the militaries.14 Although scholars have used similar definitions, such 
as “military ethic”, “military honour”, “military style”, “military tradition”, and 
“organisational culture”, none of these descriptions completely meet the meaning 
that has been imposed on the military culture. This is because military culture is 
more specific than organisational culture (since the latter can refer to any type of 
organisation), and more comprehensive than ethic or tradition (these two terms 
perhaps represent several parts of military culture, but not the whole). Military 
culture can briefly be explained as a combination of several martial ethoi which 
bring its members a basic perception of “self” and “others”. These ethoi can be 
referring to several values, ideas, ideals, sacred objects and persons, and rituals, as 
well as political ideologies. The martial ethos tends to be shaped by various internal 
and external stimulants, namely, historical experiences, bureaucratic interests, 
strategical concerns, and political culture. Thus, military culture can be employed to 




The military culture concept has had an increasing influence in the CIV-MIL 
literature since the 1990s, especially in the United States.
16
 Yet, in Turkey, military 
culture has not been broadly analysed. Rather, scholars have focused on various 
areas of military sociology, such as masculinity, life in the barracks, homosexuality, 
discrimination, non-Muslims, the military mentality, ideology, values, ideas, ideals, 
and similar aspects. Although all of these concepts are related to military culture, 
none of them represent military culture on their own. Rather, military culture is a 
                                               
14 Peter D. Feaver, ‘Civil-Military Relations’, Annual Review Political Science, 2, 1999: 211-41, 
p.233. For the importance of the military culture variable in determining a nation’s civil-military 
relations, for instance, it can be seen in: Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p.11. 
15See: Anthony King, ‘Toward a European Military Culture?’, Defence Studies, Vol.6, No.3, 
September 2006, p.259. 
16 Feaver (1999): 233. 
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comprehensive concept which comprises all of these constituent parts and so shapes 
officers’ political behaviour. Although there are several works that discuss military 
culture, this coverage tends to be limited to the form of short paragraphs or chapters, 
as well as small booklets. Hence, this thesis has a distinct difference to these other 
works in that it analyses the concept not only more substantially but also more 
theoretically, by taking into account relevant academic works. Additionally, this 
thesis examines military culture’s relationship to CIV-MIL relations under a 
systematic discipline. That is to say, the thesis divides military culture into three 
categories (revolutionary, guardian, and depolitical) by considering the Turkish 
case.
17
 Additionally, the thesis separates the relationship between military culture 
and politics into five models (positive-democratic, negative-democratic, positive-
undemocratic, negative-undemocratic, and variable) regarding its impact on 
democratic regimes. 
Military cultures tend to be in mutual interaction with civilian, political, and strategic 
cultures. Hence, this variable puts “the role of culture (both civilian and military)” 
into the centre of relevant researches.
18
 In advanced democracies, military cultures 
are dominated by a professional ethos. Professional ethos refers to the rooted beliefs, 
ideas, and ideals that prevent militaries from interfering in politics, and convince 
them to consider civilian supremacy as part of professional discipline. Conversely, in 
political armies, military cultures are dominated by an ideological ethos. The 
                                               
17 For a relatively similar categorisation see: Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: 
On Professionals, Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers, pp.9-17. (As aforementioned, in this 
dissertation, revolutionary acts are also categorised under the title of ‘praetorian’ in that, according to 
my classification, both guardian and revolutionist armies are considered interventionist; the difference 
is that the revolutionist officers intend to create a new regime while the guardians aim to protect the 
current regime and the status quo. In addition to this, in my categorisation, the military ideology and 
its relationship with the regime type are taken as the main criteria. However, Perlmutter employs other 
variables such as conscription, hierarchical status, and corporatism while he is making his 
categorisations, which I did not take into account. For further debate on this issue see: Chapter 3.  
18 Feaver (1999): 233. 
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ideological ethos can be appeared as a rooted belief, ideal, or loyalty to a certain type 
of political view. This ideological ethos can be both written and unwritten, or a 
mixture of both. For instance, in Turkey, military ideology has “rhetorically” 
appeared as Kemalism (Atatürkism), which is driven by the six principles: 
Secularism, Republicanism, Nationalism, Statism, Revolutionism, and Populism.
19
 In 
China and the Soviet Union, the ideological ethoi were formed according to the party 
doctrine of the Communist Party. In the Indonesian army, the ideological ethos is 
embedded in the state doctrine ‘Pancasila’, and in the Japanese army, before World 




There is large variety of scholarly debates around the main CIV-MIL problems, such 
as “what a professional military is” and “what separation of powers is”. Some of the 
works in this area concentrate on normative factors, while some others focus on 
rational factors.
21
 This thesis follows the first path by employing Samuel 
Huntington’s normative theory. In his landmark study The Soldier and the State 
(1957), Huntington argues that a professional military should have its own 
autonomous area apart from the civilian world, and should stay politically neutral 
and passive. Huntington titles this normative discipline as the professional ethic. The 
professional ethic enables the military to develop expertise within its own field, 
increasing its combat effectiveness.
22
 
One important purpose of the thesis is to bring a different approach to the CIV-MIL 
puzzle by connecting the military culture variable to Huntington’s professional ethic. 
                                               
19 Walter Posch, ‘Ideology and the Ongoing Crisis in Turkey’, European Union Institute for Security 
Studies. Available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/de/publikationen/detail/article/ideology-and-the-
ongoing-crisis-in-turkey/ (accessed: 13 June 2007). 
20 For the details see: Chapter 2. 
21 Feaver (1999): 212-213. 
22 See: Huntington (1957): 83. 
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As aforementioned, military cultures are shaped by a specific martial ethos, which 
then shapes officers’ general worldview. These ethoi emerge, develop, and are 
embedded within long processes and are not changed easily. Given the role that they 
have played in history, identifying the military ethoi is especially important in order 
to understand Turkish politics. The role that the Turkish military played in the 
nation’s history was summarised by Atatürk with these arguably “idealist” words: 
“leading the nation for achieving its lofty goals”.23 
The political activism of the Turkish military developed many centuries ago. 
Beginning with the earliest Turkish states, the strong influence of militarism in 
Turkish societies, and the militaries’ roles as nation builders, can be observed. The 
strong linkage between society and military caused soldiers to be politically keen, 
and ideologically divided. As a result of this political nature, and the variety of 
different worldviews, military culture has experienced transformations between 
revolutionism, guardianship, and depoliticisation. Yet again, this thesis argues that 
the military’s “half-unofficial” political legitimacy does not only come from laws 
and regulations.
24
 It also comes from the values and meanings that the Turkish 
society imposed on the military and militarism centuries ago. Both the officers and 
civilians seem, perhaps reluctantly, to have accepted this legitimacy. 
In addition to the militarist values of society, the victory in the Liberation War 
further increased the military’s importance in the eyes of people. As has been 
suggested by the birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002) in the CIV-MIL 
                                               
23 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, The speeches and statements of Atatürk, Ankara: The Institute of the 
History of Turkish Revolution, 1952. 
24Although there are some regulations in the military’s Internal Service Act (1961) and the 
constitution which impose on the military the duty to protect the nation against internal and external 
enemies, these regulations are very open to subjective interpretations. The military has tended to use 
these regulations as an ‘excuse’ to intervene. Hence, ‘half-unofficial’ seems to be the right word to 
describe this case. 
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literature, the military has had a type of “unwritten legitimacy” in politics as being 
the “nation builder”.25 Accordingly, the military declared that the protection of 
Kemalist principles is its duty before anything else. Arguably, the main factor behind 
this perception is the rooted, dogmatic belief that “politicians care for their own 
personal interests before the national ones”. Therefore, politicians were “not 
trustable” and had to be supervised by the military, whether they were doing their 
duty appropriately or not.
26
 
Briefly, one cannot define military culture without considering the militarist past of 
the nation. These two concepts (military culture and civil culture) are deeply 
intertwined. The words of Ilker Basbug and Isik Kosaner (former chief commanders) 
support this argument: 
The fundamental source of power… (for the Turkish military) … is 




The TAF cannot be compared to the armed forces of any other 




                                               
25 See the comparison between the Algerian Army and the Turkish army in: Kees Koonings and Dirk 
Kruijt, Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy, London and New 
York: Zed Books, pp.179, 201. 
26 Salih Akyurek, Serap Koydemir, Esra Atalay, Adnan Bicaksiz, Sivil-Asker Iliskileri ve Ordu Toplum 
Mesafesi (Civil-Military Relations and the Distance of Military and Society), Ankara: Bilgesam Press, 
2014, p.216. Textual Note: For Turkish sources referenced in this thesis, I have given firstly the 
original Turkish titles, and then appended their English translations in brackets. For subsequent uses 
of the same sources, they appear only by their English translations. In the bibliography, I give only the 
original titles. For the sources that have been translated into English in commercially available/official 
editions, I have preferred the English titles. Additionally, for those sources that are globally known by 
their original titles, such as Nutuk and Mein Kampf, I have used these original titles. Lastly, as Atatürk 
is at the very heart of this thesis, I have used the Turkish spelling in at least this instance; for other 
‘non-English’ names, titles, and phrases, I have favoured the ‘Anglicised’ spelling to prevent 
confusion.  
27 Zeki Sarigil, ‘Civil-Military Relations Beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey’, 
Turkish Studies, 12, No. 2, 2011, p.274 (emphasis by the author). 
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These speeches evidence the notion that commanders put forward so-called “strong 
emotional ties” between the military and society in order to seek public support 
against politicians. To put it simply, when considering whether one should apply 
military culture to analyse Turkish CIV-MIL relations, one can draw on the ex-Chief 
of the General Staff Hilmi Ozkok’s statement below: 
The Turkish military has some unwritten rules, because some rules 
are not decided by laws and procedures. (But) both sides (can 
discuss) whether those unwritten rules can change or not…29  
(Hilmi Ozkok, 2007) 
In this statement, Hilmi Ozkok talks about some “unwritten rules”, distinct from 
written ones, and he implies that implementing civilian supremacy is only possible 
by taking into account these rules within a mutual agreement. These unwritten rules 
can be taken as the combination of the main ethoi that create military culture. Thus, 
decoding this set of military ethoi can be beneficial toward a sufficient understanding 
the Turkish CIV-MIL relationship. 
                                                                                                                                     
28 The Turkish General Staff, ‘Isik Kosaner’s speech at the Chief of Staff’s Transfer of Duty 
Ceremony’. Available at: 
www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2010/org_isikkosaner_d
vrtslkonusmasi_27082010.html> (accessed: August 27, 2010). (In English, ‘Commander in Chief’ is 
generally used as a title for the top person in the military. However, in the Turkish army there are two 
different positions: ‘Baskomutanlık’ and ‘Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı’. The title of Baskomutanlık was 
held by the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire and is now used by the President of the Republic of Turkey. 
Baskomutanlık refers to the ultimate commandership of the Turkish army and is a higher position than 
the Genelkurmay Baskanı. Baskomutanlık also became the position of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during 
the Liberation War. Therefore, Baskomutanlık has been translated as ‘the Commander in Chief’ and 
Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı was translated as ‘the Chief of the General Staff’ throughout the thesis, to 
show the difference between the two titles).  
29 Ozkok makes this statement in an interview with the journalist Fikret Bila. The full text of the 




1.3.2 Why Turkey? 
One of the purposes of this thesis is to bring a different approach to the CIV-MIL 
discussion by connecting Huntington’s professional ethic to the military culture 
concept. Hence, the evolution of the Turkish military from political activism to 
depoliticisation can present a variety of examples in that context. When one observes 
the history, one may see the impacts of strong militarism in the Turkish societies. 
The earliest Turks were living a nomadic life and were being trained, from their 
childhood, as warriors. Both men and women learned how to use weapons and how 
to ride horses. Hence, militarism, sympathy for soldiers, and the profession of 
soldiery were deeply embedded in Turkish culture centuries ago. Also, historians 
note that the early Turkish communities did not have a specific military class – every 
member of society had to be a warrior simultaneously. This militarist tradition was 
also inherited by the successor Turkish states, including the Seljuks, Ottomans, and 
modern Turkey. Therefore, both the Turkish academics and military authorities 
regularly use the definition of “military nation” to indicate that military culture and 
civilian culture are mixed with and intertwined with each other. 
Due to the aforementioned reasons, the military has remained as politically keen and 
active since the earlier Ottoman centuries. Yet, the developments during the 
declining years of the Ottoman Empire brought radical changes within military 
culture by turning it into a revolutionary army. Starting from the seventeenth century, 
the Ottoman armies began to become outdated compared to the European armies. In 
contradiction to the developments in science and technology in Europe, the Ottoman 
Empire, under the strict oppression of traditionalism, entirely closed its doors to 
modernisation. Discipline and order had collapsed in the military. The decline of the 
army continued until the removal of the traditional Janissaries army. 
19 
 
After the removal of the Janissaries army in 1826, the modern military units were 
arranged according to the European system. The reforms in the education system, 
technology, and the art of war started a mental secularisation among the young 
officers. In particular, the movement known as the “Young Turks”, which combined 
revolutionist officers and civil intellectuals, opened the path toward founding the 
current, secular Turkey. The Young Turks firstly forced Sultan Abdulhamit II to 
declare a constitutional monarchy by carrying out the 1908 revolution.
30
 Then, they 
overthrew him, after suppressing the monarchist 31 March 1909 rebellion. Indeed, 
the 1908 revolution brought a short-term experience of democracy to the Ottoman 
state with a constitution, parliament, different parties and a symbolic monarch. 
However, the 1909, 1912, and 1913 coups d’état blocked this process while 
increasing the influence of the military. Especially, after the 1913 coup d’état 
following the Sublime Court Riot, the state was ruled by a half-military dictatorship. 
Through the support of revolutionist officers, the secular CUP (Committee of Union 
and Progress – Ittihad ve Terakki) party suppressed opponents by applying to 
authoritarian methods. The dictatorship of the CUP ended in 1918 following the 
defeat of the Ottoman state in WWI. 
Immediately after the defeat in WWI, a military elite organised the Turkish 
Independence War (1919-1923) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 
and managed to establish current Turkey as a secular republic. Accordingly, 
Turkey’s political system rapidly changed, after a series of reforms. Among the most 
important reforms were the abolition of the monarchy, adopting the secularism 
principle, the equality of women and men before the law, the enfranchisement of 
                                               
30 For a very detailed analysis of the 1908 revolution, together with its causes and consequences see: 
Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey. 
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women and their right to stand for election, and adopting the Latin alphabet and 
Western dress. 
Theoretically, Atatürk kept the military away from political strife during his lifetime, 
but also he managed to hold full authority over the commanding elite by applying 
political manoeuvrings. Nevertheless, the military’s role in founding Turkey and its 
deterrent image as “guardian of revolutions” can easily be observed. Founding 
fathers Atatürk and Ismet Inonu were, indeed, retired commanders of the Liberation 
War. Also, the coercive power of the military was occasionally used during the 
implementation of the revolutions. Thus, in the further chapters, historical examples 
will often be given to indicate the military’s role in the Turkish revolution. 
During the Cold War years, the military’s political activism began to give it a more 
conservative and authoritarian image, as the “guardians of the status quo”. In 
particular, a claim of responsibility for protecting the regime that they had founded 
became observable in the military discourse. Similarly, the six principles of Atatürk 
appeared as a kind of “military ideology” in their statements.31 The Turkish military 
has intervened in democracy four times since the Independence War – in 1960, 1971, 
1980, and 1997 – by stating that it was its constitutional duty to “guard” Kemalist 
principles.
32
 Nonetheless, starting from the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the 
military was tamed by the European Union (EU) reforms. The process of 
depoliticisation accelerated after the unsuccessful website memorandum (2007) and 
the Ergenekon-Balyoz Indictments (2008-2010). Especially, during Necdet Ozel’s 
tenure as Chief of the General Staff (2011-2015), the military completely stopped 
                                               
31 Walter Posch, ‘Ideology and the Ongoing Crisis in Turkey’, 2007.  
32 After the 1960 military intervention, the military authorities regulated Article 35 of Internal Service 
Act, which gave the military the duty of protecting the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish 
constitution. The article was redesigned in 2013 by limiting the military’s responsibility to defending 
the state against external threats. 
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giving political statements by working in harmony with the government. In this 
regard, the military has ostensibly appeared as “professional” in Huntington’s term, 
which is similar to the Western models. However, the question of whether the 
Turkish military has actually been professionalised or not is still debatable. Given the 
freshness of the case, sufficient empirical data for answering this question is limited. 
Hence, at this stage, I will employ Huntington’s theory more as a criterion by which 
to compare the Turkish military’s level of depoliticisation to the professional armies 
in West. Again, because of the difficulty of predicting whether the Turkish military 
has actually been professionalised or not, I will define this last stage of military 
culture as “depoliticised” (or “depolitical”) instead of “professional” to prevent 
confusion. While making this classification, I will also seek for an answer as to 
which one of the objective or subjective models best explains the current 
depoliticisation.  
Overall, Turkey provides the researcher with varied case studies to analyse the nature 
of military cultures and their relationship with Huntington’s professional ethic. The 
transition periods – from revolutionism to guardianship, politicisation to 
depoliticisation – can be supportive in understanding how the officer ethoi have 
emerged, developed, and changed, and under what conditions they can evolve toward 
Huntington’s professional ethic. 
1.3.3 Why Huntington? 
Throughout the thesis, Huntington’s definition of professionalism and his ideas of 
CIV-MIL separation will be taken as the main theories to test depoliticisation in 
military culture. There is one general and one specific reason for choosing 
Huntington. The general reason is that Samuel Huntington’s definition of 
professionalism, in his work The Soldier and the State (1957), stands in a special 
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position within the relevant academic debates.
33
 His definition was not only one of 
the earliest contributions to the literature, but it also opened a new theoretical field. 
Before Huntington, military professionalism tended to be understood as meaning a 
well-trained, disciplinary, and technically expert army.
34
 Therefore, for instance, 
Prussian military discipline was exemplified as a model of professionalism. 
Arguably, the relationship of professional officers with politics had not been much 
analysed, academically, under a theoretical framework.
35
 Huntington made a new 
contribution to the understanding of professionalism, which requires officers to be 
ethically above politics, and neutral.
36
 His objective control model offered that an 
autonomous expertise area should be created for the militaries. By this means, the 
officers will be professional and will not interfere in the civilian sphere. This theory 
can be understood as separation of powers by drawing certain borders between 
civilians and militaries.
37
 After Huntington’s thesis, there was a sudden increase in 
relevant works. Most of the subsequent theories have been developed by taking 




One may easily observe that Huntington’s theory always comes onto the agenda at 
some point when scholars analyse CIV-MIL relations. Arguably, Huntington defines 
                                               
33 As an example to evidence how Huntington’s professionalism is used as the main definition in the 
literature see: Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in 
the Age of Democracy, Zed Books, 2002: 17; Suzanne C. Nielsen, ‘American Civil–Military Relations 
Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State’, 
International Affairs 88, No.2, March 2012: 369. 
34 See: Peter D. Feaver, ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol.23, No.2, Winter 1996:149-178, p.158. Also see: 
Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers, p.ix. 
35 Perlmutter (1977): 32. 
36 Feaver (1996): 158. 
37 Huntington (1957): 83-85. 
38 See: Feaver (1999): 212 (Although military subordination had always been the main case since the 
earliest CIV-MIL studies, Huntington’s work in 1957 might be taken as the first study which broadly 
analysed the paths to military depoliticisation by employing a theoretical framework. Also, 
Clausewitz’s On War (1876) has had a special place in the literature. But his work mostly 
concentrated on political nature of war and militaries; rather than civil-military separation). 
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the most ideal CIV-MIL model, which normally can be very hard to implement, even 
for the most mature democracies.
39
 Due to the military’s political nature as a security 
organisation, and its close relations with the politicians, it is highly contested 
whether or not it is likely to block military partiality in politics. If it is possible, what 
can be the best way for achieving and maintaining this? At this point, scholars have 
developed several criticisms against Huntington by arguing that, in several countries, 
professionalisation of the militaries could not prevent them from politicisation.
40
 
Considering the aforementioned criticisms, this thesis argues for Huntington’s 
professionalism by taking into account the concept of military culture. That is to say, 
the officers should adopt the professional ethos as a mental discipline, and should 
stay in their own, autonomous area. The military’s institutional subordination to 
civilians may be maintained through the ministries of Defence or Security. To 
achieve this aim, a professional ethos should be embedded in military culture 
irreversibly. The injection of a professional ethos into military culture can be 
achieved in several ways. First and foremost, the education curriculum in academies 
may be shaped according to the civilian supremacy principle.
41
 This practice should 
be supplemented by regular inspection, by civilians, over the education in academies. 
Naturally, civilian supervision should be limited to the lectures and course books 
related to politics. By this way, Huntington’s ideal can be achieved and maintained, 
because, unless the officer absorbs political neutrality as a mental discipline, he can 
still engage in political strife despite what he has received from professional training 
                                               
39 See: Desch (1999): 4, 14. 
40 For instance: the Chilean army (late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries) and Greek and Turkish 
armies (after NATO membership). The criticisms of Huntington will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
Hence, a short introduction only has been given in this chapter, to provide an outline of the issue. 
41 Indeed, the leading civil-military scholar Samuel Finer argues that ‘professionalism’ is not strong 
enough by itself for maintaining civilian control, because the military should also absorb the idea of 
‘the principle of the supremacy of civilian power’, which, according to Finer, is a different concept to 
professionalism. See: Samuel Finer, Man on the Horseback (2002 edition with Jay Stanley’s new 
introduction), Transaction Publishers, p.28. For a detailed argument of the subject, see Chapter 2. 
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in academies. Perhaps this is the reason why some armies still remained political 
after having professional military training. This line of thinking also requires the 
separation of professional mentality from professional training, because the former 
refers to a normative discipline while the latter refers to a technical expertise in a 
certain profession. 
Additionally, the specific reason for choosing Huntington is the case study’s 
relevance. The Turkish military has had long-term relations with the Western armies. 
Starting from the Ottoman Empire’s last decades, the officers considered the Western 
system as an ideal model for increasing military effectiveness. After the foundation 
of Turkey, the military’s long-term flirtation with the Western military system 
continued through NATO membership. During the Cold War era, the Turkish 
military was in close relations with the American military. Both armies conducted 
mutual operations and campaigns. Naturally, Turkish officers benefited from the 
professional ethos of the American military. Professionalisation in the young officers 
became observable shortly after NATO membership. Indeed, this change created a 
mental gap between the younger and older officers during the early 1950s. Close 
partnership with the NATO armies has continued during the post-Cold War era. In 
the literature, one can notice that most of the relevant scholars take Huntington’s 
writings into account while analysing the Turkish case. More interestingly, the same 
approach is not only used by the academics but also by the military authorities. The 
former Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug argues that Huntington’s 
professionalism, and his objective control model, should be the military’s main goal, 
for a better democracy in Turkey: 
According to Huntington, the most effective control over the 
military is “objective control”. Objective control means rendering 
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the military a professional institution and thus putting a distance 
between the military and politics... (The military’s duty is) 
determining the military’s needs and formulating policy options 
and proposing them to the civilian government, and implementing 
the relevant decisions made by the government.
42
 (Ilker Basbug, 14 
April 2009) 
Basbug’s speech, excerpted above, can be taken as the military’s formal view, as he 
was the supreme commander of the military at the time. Basbug explicitly considers 
that Huntington’s objective control model is an ideal blueprint for democratic CIV-
MIL relations. He agrees with Huntington by maintaining that the military should 
isolate itself from politics, by staying within its own, autonomous area. The 
relationship with politics should be limited to implementing the duties given by 
politicians and submitting regular reports about military requirements. That requires 
the military to give its ideas about current issues, but leaves the last word to civilians. 
1.4 WHAT ARE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS 
RESEARCH? 
1.4.1 Propositions 
The main suggestions that the thesis aims to address are as follows: 
P1 There is a mutual interaction between military culture and Turkish politics. The 
nature of this relationship can be very variable in terms of regime type, and it can 
make either positive or negative impacts on democracy. 
Definition: 
The primary suggestion of the thesis is to evidence the variable interactions between 
military culture and Turkish politics by observing their impacts on democracy. 
                                               
42 See: Chapter 7. 
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Employing the relevant historical examples, by considering the typology of five 
analytical models, the thesis will investigate the changeable relations between these 
two variables. As will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, military 
politicisation can bring different results at different times. Turkish military culture 
shows a changeable nature regarding its approach to politics. Firstly, the military 
founded the republic and established the democracy – but then it has frequently 
violated that democracy. This paradoxical situation indeed presents the researcher 
with important clues to understand the nature of military cultures. The changing 
trends within military culture with regard to its three different identities – 
revolutionism, guardianship, and depoliticisation – and their reflections on changing 
Turkish politics will give us varied case studies, to analyse how the officer ethoi 
emerges, develops, and roots itself in military cultures, and how this rooted ethoi 
shapes the officer’s approach to politics.  
P2 According to Atatürk, the military’s separation from politics and its 
subordination to civilians are necessary for maintaining a stable parliamentary 
system and effective military power. 
Definition: 
The secondary suggestion of the thesis is Atatürk’s idea of separating the military 
from politics. This is an important issue for Turkish CIV-MIL relations. Since the 
Independence War (1919-1923), Atatürk has been the symbolic and connective 
figure of military culture. After each military intervention, the military defended its 
actions by stating that it was their constitutional duty to protect Atatürk’s reforms 
from internal and external threats. Hence, Atatürk’s main ideas about the relevant 
issues will be analysed in the further chapters to discover whether the military was 
right or wrong, while rooting their actions on a Kemalist legacy. The CIV-MIL 
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scholars in Turkey have different theories about Atatürk’s ideas on military 
politicisation and the guardianship of revolutions. By considering his speech in 
Konya (1931), one group of authors suggest that, according to Atatürk, the Turkish 
military is the “ultimate” guardian of revolutions. The details of this speech will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. On the other hand, a second group of scholars contend that 
Atatürk believed in the necessity of CIV-MIL separation. This thesis also defends the 
second group’s view. That is to say, Atatürk was against military involvements in 
politics. There are varied examples to evidence this idea. Atatürk’s sayings, writings, 
and practices give us clear ideas about his main views on that issue. The most well-
known evidence is Atatürk’s ‘Speech to the Youth’ (1927). In that speech, Atatürk 
directly speaks to the next generations by stating that the guardian of the Republic 
must be the Turkish youth, not the military. Other than this speech, there is other 
evidence, which will be presented in the relevant chapters. Accordingly, Atatürk’s 
ideas on the theory of war, soldiery, militarism, and CIV-MIL relations will be 
broadly evaluated by comparing them with the relevant scholars’ ideas, including 
those of Huntington and Clausewitz. 
P3 Huntington’s objective control model can be a more sustainable model of civil-
military relations by injecting the professional ethos (normative professionalism) 
into military cultures. This requires the officer to accept political neutrality as a 
primary obligation for a stable democracy. After embedding a liberal and 
democratic ethos, the officer perceives military depoliticisation as a crucial part of 
professional mental discipline. 
Definition: 
Huntington’s separation theory has been discussed extensively by the following 
scholars. The scholars have made their own contributions either by defending or 
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criticising Huntington. Nonetheless, Huntington’s theory has remained the most 
influential one in the relevant studies. Even the critical thinkers have had more or 
less similar results with Huntington.
43
 The reason for this is that Huntington built his 
theory by considering a number of factors, such as social values, foreign affairs, 
military culture, political culture, and institutional mechanisms.
44
 As a result, it is not 
easy to develop a new theory with completely neglects his opinions.
45
 
One problem with Huntington’s theory tends to be the methodology.46 In other 
words, how to embed a professional ethic into an officer’s mind. Huntington claims 
that separating civilian and military spheres will maximise military professionalism, 
and a professional ethic will emerge as a natural result. That is to say, the 
institutional autonomy of the military in its own separate place also reduces its 
political interests.
47
 At that point, the critical thinkers are consistent in assuming that 
Huntington developed his theory by taking into account the American model. The 
strong liberal ideals in that society perhaps enable this system to work without 
serious challenge.
48
 However, in the developing nations, such as those of Latin 
America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, this system can be problematic, because 
both the civilian and military cultures of these nations have just begun to absorb the 
democratic and liberal ethoi. Naturally, it may take some time for these nations to 
implement a Western type of democracy. Indeed, Huntington himself mentions in 
The Soldier and the State that the American military adopted professionality in its 
                                               
43 Feaver (1999): 212. 
44 Definitions similar to Huntington’s, such as ‘military ethic’, ‘military mind’, and ‘military 
tradition’, more or less meet with the ethoi that shapes military cultures. Additionally, for the 
inclusiveness and importance of Huntington’s theories, see: Feaver (1996): 158; and Desch (1999): 
10. 
45 Feaver (1999): 212. 
46 According to Feaver, not only Huntington but all CIV-MIL literature is rich in terms of case studies, 
but they are relatively weaker in methodology. See: Feaver (1999): 236. 
47 Huntington (1957): 83-85. 
48 For the traditional American approach to military, militarism, and liberalism see: Huntington 
(1957): 156, 304, 309, 311-312. 
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current form after experiencing several incidents, such as the American Revolution 
and their Civil War.
49
 
This thesis aims to bring a different approach to Huntington’s theory, by connecting 
it to the military culture concept. Normally, Huntington’s theory suggests that the 
civilians should also avoid interfering in the military’s autonomous area in order to 
maintain the objective civilian model. If civilians cross the border and intervene in 
military affairs, that would be subjective control.
50
 The paradox is that, even in an 
ideal democracy, civilians should sometimes intervene in military affairs in order to 
maintain military subordination. Huntington and the other scholars accept this 
reality. Even in the Western systems, including that of the US, civilians intervene in 
military affairs if necessary. As a result, a complete separation is unlikely, even in 
democracies. In this regard, by considering the relevant arguments, I made the 
distinction of normative and technical professionalism. Normative professionalism, 
which refers to a professional ethos – composed by the principles of political 
neutrality and supremacy of civilian power – should be the main aspect that should 
be absorbed by militaries to maintain objective control.  
At this point, I consider that the education of officers should be the primary area that 
civilians should regularly inspect, because the military academies are the primary 
institutions that create, maintain, and preserve the traditional ethoi of military 
cultures.
51
 For this reason, it can be risky to hide military education from civilian 
supervision completely. Inspecting the military curriculum in the academies is not 
against Huntington’s objective control, in that the civilians should only follow the 
                                               
49 See: Huntington (1957): 161, 203, 211, 254-261. 
50 For a similar evaluation on Huntington’s objective and subjective models, for example, see: Feaver 
(1999): 227. 
51 See: Janowitz (1960): 127; Peter H. Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, Journal of Military 
History, Vol.72, No.1, January 2008: 37. 
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instructions that are related to politics. The important thing is the context of political 
textbooks and political argumentations in the lecture rooms. 
In summary, this thesis argues that ethical approach is still the most sustainable 
solution to the CIV-MIL problems.
52
 While this thesis agrees with Huntington’s 
definition of professional military ethic, it also brings an additional suggestion to his 
objective control model by assuming that embedding a professional ethos into 
military cultures can strengthen separation of powers. The main reason for that, even 
the most advanced institutional control mechanisms can be inadequate to prevent 
military disobedience, in that the militaries have coercive weaponry power and there 
is not any stronger force which can prevent the militaries’ arbitrary moves. As a 
result, the civilian control -as Huntington suggested- tends to be an ethical issue than 
an institutional and legislative one. Hence, the officers should absorb a professional 
ethos in the military academies to see the necessities for military subordination in a 
democratic regime. That is to say, military curriculums should be designed according 
to democratic and liberal ideals, to convince officers that military subordination is a 
primary obligation for both an ideal democracy and combat effectiveness. Naturally, 
this method is preferable for the nations who make efforts toward a better 
democracy. In a rapidly democratising society, civilians should supervise the military 
curriculum regularly, to ascertain whether the instructions are confirming with 
democratic principles or not. 
                                               
52 Huntington suggests that the ideas of ‘military ethic’ and ‘professionalism’ are universal concepts. 
He assumes that, as far as ‘military function’ stays as the same, military ethic will be an objective 
criterion by which to test military professionalism without looking at time, conditions, cultures, and 




1.4.2.1 Conceptual Contribution 
The first contribution of the research is to the study of military culture and concept of 
professionalism with reference to the Turkish case. Military culture can be defined as 
a combination of martial ethoi, which are shaped through history by inside and 
outside stimulants. These stimulants can cover a large area, including national 
experiences, religious values, geopolitical positions, and institutional interests. These 
ethoi shape the officer’s worldviews and reactions to outside stimulants. Military 
culture is also significant in determining militaries’ political positions between 
praetorian and professional identities. Praetorian is a term that came from the 
Roman Empire to describe political armies. The term refers to a group of elite forces 
known as the “Praetorian Guard” protecting senior officers. Often, members of the 
Praetorian Guard were rebelling and overthrowing the Empire. Hence, the term 




On the other hand, professionalism in military culture can be defined as adopting a 
professional ethos, which requires a normative absorbance of political neutrality and 
depoliticisation. By and large, the main conceptual contribution of the thesis is 
bringing a different approach to professionalism in military culture by separating it 
into two, namely normative and technical, with reference to Samuel Huntington’s 
theory of professional military ethic. In other words, after defining the concept of 
military culture as regards relevant theoretical debate, this thesis aims to explore the 
relationship between military culture and two different aspects of professionalism by 
observing the Turkish case.  
                                               
53 For a more detailed analysis see: Chapters 2 and 3. 
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According to Huntington (1957), military depoliticisation should be achieved by 
absorbing a moral code: the professional military ethic. The professional ethic 
requires the officer to stay politically passive and neutral by implementing the duties 
given by the civilian rulers. On the other hand, Huntington’s theory has been strictly 
challenged by subsequent scholars, although it retains its influential position. The 
main criticism to Huntington is taking the American military culture and social 
values as the main criteria and applying them to every case in order to build a 
universal theory. The critical approaches suggested that Huntington’s model was not 
comprehensive enough to explain the cases in the Third World states due to these 
states’ different social values and historical experiences. For instance, the 
professionalisation of the Turkish and Greek armies after joining NATO did not 
prevent them being involved in politics and carrying out coups d’état. Additionally, 
Huntington’s suggestion that the United States would adopt a more anti-liberal policy 
throughout the Cold War became wrong. The United States preserved its liberal 
rhetoric in its foreign discourse until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, the 
latter developments oblige one to reconsider Huntington’s theory. Indeed, one may 
still claim that the theory of Huntington brings the most effective way for 
maintaining civilian supremacy. Yet, the different social and political structures of 
different nations can seriously harm the practicability of this model.  
There are several alternative approaches to Huntington’s theory. According to Morris 
Janowitz (1960), keeping the military in an isolated space, as suggested by 
Huntington, disregards the political nature of militaries. Instead, Janowitz suggests 
that the professional military should be, at the same time, the “nation’s army” 
(citizen soldier ideal) by integrating itself into the society and by absorbing its social 
values. By this means, the military members would learn that they should be 
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subordinated to the civilians for the common national benefits (professional military 
honour). Additionally, Feaver offers a mutual contract between the civilian and 
military authorities to prevent the military from “shirking”. Anthony King, on the 
other hand, defines military professionalism as a moral attitude that motivates its 
members to act professionally to protect their pride toward other group members 
(professional military pride).  
One common aspect that reconciles the critical thinkers with Huntington is that most 
thinkers take military professionalism as a normative issue rather than an institutional 
or legislative one. The main reason for that is the military’s weaponry power. Since 
there is no institution more powerful than the military within a nation, only 
institutional and legislative mechanisms can stop a potential threat from the military. 
The only solution, because of the aforementioned reasons, is absorbance of a 
professional ethos by the military cultures that effectively prevent them from 
disobedience. On the other hand, the critics show that the variables that create a 
professional military ethic should be reconsidered and, if necessary, should be 
enlarged. As mentioned above, Janowitz offers a code of “professional honour”, 
which prevents militaries from political involvements. Similarly, King argues that a 
code of “professional pride” obliges military members to act professionally. Samuel 
Finer, on the other hand, argues that the major weakness of Huntington’s theory is 
his negligence of “the principle of supremacy of civilian power” which is, according 
to Finer, a different and distinct moral ethos than Huntington’s professional ethic and 
should also be absorbed by the military members.  
At this point, by considering the arguments above, the thesis will separate the 
definition of professionalism into two: normative and technical professionalism. The 
normative professionalism refers to the principles of political neutrality, political 
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passivism and the principle of supremacy of civilian power. The technical 
professionalism, on the other hand, refers to an advanced level of technical combat 
power, military discipline, and expertise in the art of war. In the literature, despite 
some authors, such as Anthony King and Morris Janowitz, stressing the normative 
and technical sides of professionalism, still there is not a distinct conceptual 
separation of these two elements.
54
 In addition to this, the thesis enlarges 
Huntington’s professional military ethic by taking into account the military culture 
variable and the relevant critical approaches. Again, this thesis equates normative 
professionalism with the cultural absorbance of a ‘professional ethos’, which is 
defined as a combination of political neutrality, passivism, and the principle of the 
supremacy of civilian power.  
Last but not least, since the foundation of the Republic, Turkish military culture has 
experienced changes between revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical identities. In 
this regard, another conceptual contribution is positioning military culture at the 
centre of the CIV-MIL problematic in Turkey. Despite there being a number of 
varied works about the topic, the social and cultural nature of the Turkish military 
needs further analysis in order to understand the military’s relationship with Turkish 
politics. In the world literature, military culture has been an important explanatory 
factor to solve puzzles about related issues. The number of related works has been 
continuously increasing. Yet, in Turkey, the concept has not been observed in detail. 
Indeed, the concept has been mentioned only rarely by Turkish CIV-MIL scholars. 
Although there are some works on military sociology in Turkey, this thesis still has a 
                                               
54 According to the civil-military scholar Anthony King, both Huntington and Morris Janowitz 
consider professionalism as a combination of practical expertise and a moral ethic. King also argues 
that sometimes the divide between technical and professional military expertise cannot be clear. See: 
Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 
University Press, 2013, pp.342-343. 
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relative difference, with its central focus on military culture as an ontological 
concept. 
1.4.2.2 Analytical Contribution 
The second contribution of this thesis is the analytical classification. The thesis 
separates military culture and its relationship with CIV-MIL relations into a typology 
of five different models regarding democratic regimes: the positive-democratic, 
negative-democratic, positive-undemocratic, negative-undemocratic, and variable 
models. Positive-democratic refers to cases in which both civilians and militaries 
know their lines and work in harmony. This one is arguably the closest to 
Huntington’s objective control. Negative-democratic refers to the military being 
politically passive, but where the impacts of this passivity tend to be negative in 
terms of consolidating and maintaining democracy. Positive-undemocratic is the 
model wherein the military involves itself in politics for founding a new democratic 
regime or for preserving an existent one. Negative-undemocratic refers to cases 
where the military is politically active and its politicisation undermines democracy. 
Lastly, the variable model can be a combination of more than one model at the same 
time. Also, the variable model can be seen in highly political armies when there were 
strong ideological differences amongst the officers. These ideological divisions can 
affect democracy either positively or negatively, depending on time and conditions. 
While deciding which one of these five models best explains CIV-MIL relations in a 
given case, the researcher can investigate the history of the regime from beginning to 
end; or, rather, the researcher can separate the history of the regime into several time 





Studies on the Turkish military are mostly based on comparative, historical, and 
discourse analysis methods. In addition to this, some works apply surveys and 
interviews. This work also follows that path. Starting from Chapter 5, comparative 
historical analysis is employed on three different case studies: ‘Revolutionism’; 
‘Guardianship’; and ‘Toward Depoliticisation?’ The consequences derived from the 
case studies will be discussed through the empirical chapters and in their 
conclusions. Additionally, the findings will be shown in analytical tables, which can 
be seen at the end of each case study. Analytical schemes will be prepared according 
to the five models: positive-democratic, negative-democratic, positive-undemocratic, 
negative-undemocratic, and variable. The data collection for the three case studies is 
based on articles, archives, books, journals, newspapers, official websites, 
documentaries, and interviews with experienced former military figures and 
academic authorities carried out by the author of this thesis. In addition to this, a 
formal request – which is available in the Appendices A – for interviewing active 
officers and observing the current military curriculum was made to, but refused by, 
the Head Command of the Turkish Armed Forces.
55
 
1.5.1 Comparative Historical Analysis 
The thesis employs comparative historical analysis to answer the research questions. 
The main reason for choosing this method is the historical nature of the topic. 
Comparative historical analysis can be defined as a social science method that 
analyses historical events by bringing rational explanations to them. These 
                                               
55 The request letter and the original copies of information that have been provided from the military’s 
archive room are attached to the Appendices together with their translations. Interviews have been 
conducted with retired officers, politicians, and journalists. Some of the data collected from the 
interviews is used in the following chapters. A signature from the interviewees was provided to be 
used when required. The research has been made under the guidance of the ethical rules of the 
University of Bath. 
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explanations can be made by comparing the relevant case studies with each other, 
from different periods of times.
56
 In this way, the researcher can build a specific 
theory, and can explain it by referring to the present time. Therefore, this method is 
suitable with regard to the research goals. By employing comparative historical 
analysis, the aim is to indicate the dynamics of Turkish military culture, its 
interaction with Turkish politics, its transformations within different decades, and its 
relationship to the current depoliticisation of the Turkish military. Comparative 
historical analysis needs more than one case study with which to make 
comparisons.
57
 Hence, the thesis will separate the historical analysis into three case 
studies, as follows: ‘revolutionism’ (1908-1945); ‘guardianship’ (1945-1999); and 
‘toward professionalism?’ (1999-2013). 
1.5.2 Analytical Framework 
The type of relationship between military culture and Turkish politics will be 
identified in the empirical chapters (Chapters 5-7). The identification of this 
relationship will be made according to the five analytical models (positive-
democratic, negative-democratic, positive-undemocratic, negative-undemocratic, 
and variable). To do that, relevant periods of each case study will be analysed under 
the titles ‘analysis’ according to the normative and technical elements of professional 
military culture and Huntington’s objective and subjective models. Additionally, the 
findings that are derived from each chapter will be shown in an analytical chart, 
which can be found at the end of each case study. The analytical chart will be 
                                               
56 See: James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.13-14. 
57 See: ibid. 
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prepared according to some criteria, including the types of military culture, state 




The first chapter briefly introduced the research questions, the methods, and the 
contributions of the thesis. The main purpose of the research is to identify the type of 
relationship between military culture and politics in Turkey. To make a tangible 
identification, the thesis suggests five types of CIV-MIL relationship, namely 
positive-undemocratic, negative-democratic, positive-undemocratic, negative-
undemocratic, and variable. To explore which one of these models best defines 
Turkey, the thesis will be divided into seven separate chapters. The second chapter 
will analyse the relevant literature about military culture and CIV-MIL relations. The 
third and fourth chapters will discuss the main tenets of military culture in Turkey. 
With this approach, the first four chapters will provide essential background to 
answer the research question. Consequently, the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters 
will empirically test the type of relationship with regard to the five models which 
have been mentioned. 
Military culture increases its popularity within CIV-MIL studies as an explanatory 
factor which aims to understand military behaviour by analysing martial ethoi, 
namely customs, values, ideas, and ideals. According to the relevant studies, military 
culture can be used to explain each type of internal and external military behaviour, 
including politics. On that point, the Turkish case still requires an extended 
theoretical analysis, as the relevant scholars have not analysed the military culture 
concept within a detailed format. Indeed, the Turkish military’s evolution from a 
                                               
58 The analytical tables will be prepared according to Atatürkist principles, because they are both the 
founding dynamics of Turkey and the basis of its military discourse. 
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highly political structure to a Huntington type of professionalism presents 
researchers with a wide variety of examples with which to test how, and under what 
conditions, the military culture emerges, changes, and affects CIV-MIL relations. 
By and large, the thesis aims to make contributions in two areas: conceptual and 
analytical. The conceptual contribution is putting the military culture variable into 
the centre for understanding the Turkish military’s praetorian and depoliticised 
behaviours. Political passivism in military culture is defined regarding Samuel 
Huntington’s theory of professional military ethic. The intended purpose is analysing 
the relationship between military culture and professional military ethic with 
reference to the Turkish case. Additionally, the thesis separates the definition of 
professionalism into two: normative and technical. Normative professionalism refers 
to the idea of political neutrality and passivism. On the other hand, technical 
professionalism refers to the high level of expertise in combat power and the art of 
war.  
The analytical contribution, on the other hand is to the civil-military studies. The 
thesis identifies a typology of five different civil-military relationship models as 
regards its impact on democracy namely positive-democratic, negative-democratic, 
positive-undemocratic, negative-undemocratic, and variable. Positive-democratic 
refers to the case in which the military is subordinated to the civilians, and 
democracy works without a remarkable problem. Negative-Democratic happens 
when the military is depoliticised but the regime became vulnerable to the civilian 
abuses. Positive-Undemocratic is the case when the military involves in politics to 
establish a democratic regime or to protect an existed democracy. Conversely, 
Negative-Undemocratic refers to the situation when the military undermined or 
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destroyed democracy. Lastly, Variable is the case when more than one of these 




CHAPTER 2: DEFINITION OF MILITARY 
CULTURE: THEORIES AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Institutional cultures can comprise various ethical rules which give the relevant 
organisation a distinct character. That rooted character leads the organisation to 
adopt a consistent behaviour toward outside stimulants. Hence, the outside observer 
can more or less determine the institution’s next step by taking into account its 
culture. These ethical rules are generally shaped around the institution’s foundation 
purpose, and the experiences it has gained. All institutions – among them big 
companies, civil institutions, state foundations, and sports clubs – have certain 
ethical rules. These rules can be written or unwritten. Hence, the military, being the 
main institution for national security, cannot be excluded from this general rule. 
Indeed, militaries tend to have very strong values, beliefs, norms, and ideals which 
are rooted deeply due to the experiences that they have had for many centuries. 
Additionally, militaries are very different to other institutions, because their members 
should be ready to die for the national interests, if necessary. To send somebody to 
die necessarily requires a highly strict, disciplined, and different education. Thus, 
military cultures are extensively enveloped with the ideas of altruism, collectivism, 
self-sacrifice, patriotism, and masculinity. Mostly, the ideas, beliefs, values, symbols, 
and rituals in the barracks are constructed to convince soldiers that “dying is more 
honourable than living under specific circumstances”. Hence, one can likely observe 
major incompatibilities between democratic values and military cultures.
59
 
Nevertheless, in a democratic regime, the military should be subordinated to the 
                                               
59 Huntington (1957): 309 
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civilians, because militaries have coercive powers, and they have the potential to use 
this power against the elected civil authorities. Therefore, political scientists have 
developed theories to find the best solution for preventing officers from interrupting 
the natural progress of democracy. Among the relevant studies, Samuel Huntington’s 
milestone The Soldier and the State (1957) has a distinguished place. His definition 
of professional officership and his theory of objective control became inspirational 
for the works that followed. Huntington argues that the best way of separating 
civilian and military domains is to professionalise officers. Staying within its own 
area, the military adopts a professional ethic and remains politically neutral. The 
increasing professionalism of officers also strengthens the military’s combat power. 
As a result, this chapter has three targeted contributions which are related to the 
issues that have been mentioned above. Firstly, it will define the theoretical 
backgrounds of the military culture variable, under the guidance of relevant scholarly 
debate. Additionally, the main martial ethoi that shapes military cultures will be 
elaborated. Secondly, the chapter will discuss Huntington’s theory of professional 
officership and objective civilian control. In this way, the aim is to discuss how 
Huntington’s ideas can be connected to the military culture concept in order to 
maintain military subordination. Lastly, the chapter will compare Huntington’s 
theories with those of the other critical scholars. By doing this, the chapter will 
explain why Huntington’s definition of professionalism is used in this thesis, what its 
strengths and weaknesses are, and what this thesis aims to contribute to Huntington’s 
theory. To implement these contributions, the first part of the chapter looks at the 
definition and main ethoi of military culture. Then, the chapter will define the 
professional ethos in military culture, by taking into account Samuel Huntington’s 
opinions. Thirdly, the chapter will compare Huntington’s theories with those of the 
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other CIV-MIL scholars. Lastly, a final evaluation will be carried out by recalling the 
main ideas and contributions that derive from this chapter. 
2.2 DEFINITION OF MILITARY CULTURE 
Before giving a definition of military culture, it may be helpful to explain what 
culture is as a sociological term. Culture is defined as rooted values, ideas, norms, 
ethics, traditions, and beliefs that, over time, have created a worldview for a group or 
organisation and have led them into action.
60
 Culture may comprise “unwritten but 
largely accepted rules” and create a typical lifestyle for the members of that 
organisation, which transfers from one generation to the next.
61
 Hofstede defines 
culture as “the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another”.62 Culture is a learned 
process, it is not inherited. It originates from environmental factors, not from 
biological ones such as genes.
63
 Similarly, if one makes a comprehensive definition, 
military culture is a combination of rooted norms, values, ideas, beliefs, and ideals 
that give officers a general worldview and shape their behaviours toward outside 
stimulants. Military cultures tend to be affected by civil, political, and strategic 
cultures.
64
 In other words, customs, traditions, religious values, vulnerability of 
                                               
60 Christopher Dandeker James Gow, ‘Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping’. In: Small Wars 
and Insurgencies, London: Department of War Studies, King’s College, 2007, p.59. Also, see: Dale R. 
Herspring, ‘Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture: The Russian and 
American Cases’, Public Administration Review 71, No.4, July 2011: 521. Quoted from: Edgar 
Schein, ‘Organizational Culture and Leadership’, 2004: 226; Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Political 
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62 Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organisations: Software of the 
Mind, Mcgraw-Hill Education, 1991, p. 5. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Feaver (1999): 233. 
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geographical position, historical experiences, and dominant ideologies of political 
cultures may all be determinative.
65
 
Military culture can also be referred to by similar terms such as “organisational 
culture”, “military tradition”, “military ethic”, “military ethos/ethoi”, “military 
honour”, “military style”, “army culture”, “military doctrine”, and similar.66 Yet, 
“military culture” gives arguably a more comprehensive connotation, combining all 
of the relevant concepts such as “ethic”, “tradition”, “ethos”, and more within. In 
other words, the term can be associated with any kind of activity that has a military 
involved.
67
 In all types of organisations, whether civil or military, the members may 
gain stable characteristic behaviours distinct from the rest of society, because they 
have been living in the same environment for long time.
68
 However, within military 
organisations, these differences tend to be stronger than in civil ones, because their 
members do not only work in the military bases, but they also live there with their 
                                               
65 All of these factors can be important in the emergence of military culture. Samuel Finer (1962) 
explains military involvement in politics with the level of a nation’s political culture. Additionally, 
Colin S. Gray (2007) defines ‘strategic cultures’ of nations as a combination of military/organisational 
cultures, public cultures, and historical and geographical variables. Therefore, all these political, 
cultural, and strategic values can be evaluated as intertwined and co-dependent. Colin Gray implies 
that national disasters such as wars may be triggering the change in cultures. Religious factors can 
also be explanatory in understanding military cultures, because some armies glorify war due to the 
‘martyrship’ concept. For instance, both the Ottoman and Turkish armies are culturally affected by 
Sunni Muslim beliefs. For these reasons, there have been strong criticisms against the Turkish army 
claiming that non-Muslims and Alevis are not allowed to enter the military, and they are faced with 
discrimination during their compulsory military service. Additionally, Islamic references can be seen 
in the military trainings and campaigns that glorify martyrship. Related to this, Atatürk often applied 
religious symbols during the Liberation War to increase the military’s motivation. Similar examples 
were also seen during the Korean War (1950) and the Cyprus War (1974). For a detailed analysis on 
the case see: Chapter 3. Also see: Schein’s definition quoted in Don M. Snider (1999): 14. 
66 For instance: Morris Janowitz uses the term ‘the code of professional military honour’ to identify 
the martial ethoi that specifies how an officer ought to behave. See: Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 
Free Press Paperback, 1960: 215. According to Janowitz, the code of professional military honour 
requires the officer to be above politics and committed to the status quo. Also, the officers cannot be 
members of political parties and they cannot explicitly show partisanship (ibid.: 233-234, 374). 
67 Anthony King, ‘Toward a European Military Culture? ’ Defence Studies, 6, No.3, September 2006: 
259. For instance, Dandeker, et al. (2007) make a comparison between the Swedish and American 
militaries, regarding their reaction to peacekeeping operations, by taking into account their military 
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 Additionally, they are trained in specific schools and academies, and dress 
in the same uniforms. As Samuel Huntington noted: 
People who act the same way over a long period of time tend to 
develop distinctive and persistent habits of thought. Their unique 
relation to the world gives them a unique perspective on the world 
and leads them to rationalize their behaviour and role.
70
 
The institutional character of militaries enables them to have a collective 
consciousness, which is different to that of other organisations because it compels 
their members to be involved in violence, to kill and, if necessary, to die.
71
 In other 
words, “the management of violence” is the major characteristic of military culture, 
which completely sets it apart from other organisational cultures.
72
 
Naturally, military culture plays a major role in shaping how its members perceive 
the environment, and how they adapt themselves to tackle possible future threats.
73
 
Therefore, “culture is to an organisation what personality is to an individual”.74 It is 
possible to make a separation between formal and informal rules that shape military 
culture. The former leads the organisation’s vision, policies, and missions in ways 
that are stated in their formal announcements and legal procedures.
75
 The latter 
describes the shared values, beliefs, and historical myths, which are unwritten, which 
generally shape the identical patterns within the military.
76
 In particular, military 
schools have a determining role in the creation of these unwritten rules. In the 
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military schools, officers find themselves in a very different environment, which is 
entirely different than the civilian one with strict rules and discipline. After a short 
period of time, officer candidates adopt the lifestyle inside the military schools, and 
their personalities are shaped by the basic patterns of the military institution. After 
graduating from the academy, these patterns become an indispensable part of their 
lives. The repetitive behaviours of the officers, followed each day in the military, 
also affect their social life in the civil world, even after they retire.
77
 
2.2.1 Main Characteristics of Military Culture 
Military culture is a combination of several elements that oblige its members to adopt 
a distinct behaviour. As observed from the civil-military literature, it is possible to 
investigate armies under three categories regarding their relations with politics and 
status of regime, namely, revolutionist, guardian, and professional armies.
78
 The 
revolutionist and guardian armies can also be grouped as “politically active armies”, 
while professional armies are grouped as “politically passive armies’. On the other 
hand, one should consider that this type of politically passive armies mostly represent 
the normative side of professionalism, because some armies who have strong 
technical professional education can still be politically active if they did not absorb 
normative version of professionalism.  
In addition to this, the militaries which founded a new state or changed the extant 
political structure can be classified as revolutionist armies. Accordingly, the 
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militaries which act as watchdogs of the existing regime can be classified as 
guardian armies. Some thinkers can unite revolutionist and guardian armies under 
one group, named praetorian.
79
 Praetorian armies can take over the rule of state 
directly or indirectly; therefore, the ruling types that they established following their 
interventions are formalised by names such as guardian regime, veto regime, 
authoritarian regime, semi-authoritarian regime, and similar.
80
 Amos Perlmutter’s 
work The Military and Politics in Modern Times (1977) is one of the earlier 
contributions to the field which emphasised both the progressive and conservative 
sides of interventionist armies by considering their political ideology and relationship 
with the status of the regime.
81
 Unlike Perlmutter, I employed ‘praetorian’ for both 
revolutionist and guardian armies and defined the second stage of Turkish military 
culture as ‘guardian’. I explained the reasons of making this distinct categorisation in 
Chapters 1 and 3. Therefore, I do not go into details in this section. On the other 
hand, the militaries idealised by liberal democratic states are known as professional 
armies, implementing their tasks as a profession in which they become experts in 
military science, and ethically avoid involving themselves in politics. This type of 
army is formalised by Samuel Huntington in his landmark work The Soldier and the 
State (1957) and this definition involves both normative and professional sides of 
professionalism.  
Don M. Snider’s categorisation of “key elements of militaries” may be helpful in 
seeking to define the main ethoi of military culture. Snider mentions “a professional 
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ethos” as one of his four elements; however, this thesis imposes on the term “military 
ethos” a more comprehensive meaning than Snider allows for, which comprises all 
the elements that shape an officer’s behaviours. According to Snider, the first 
element is discipline, which refers to “the orderly conduct of military personnel”; it 
aims to “minimise the confusion and disintegrative consequences of battle by 
imposing order on it”.82 The hierarchical system “obey-command chain” is the 
natural result of discipline and order within the militaries. Normally, hierarchy can 
be observable in all organisations; however, none of them tend to be as strict as in the 
militaries. The lower ranks have no right to hesitate or give their personal opinion 
after their superiors gave a command, which may include killing or dying.
83
 
Therefore, even in the beginning, military culture distinguishes itself from civilian 
equivalents. 
The second one is a professional military ethos, which, according to Snider, can be 
defined as “a set of normative self-understandings”, which defines the “profession’s 
corporate identity”, “its code of conduct”, and its “social worth”.84 If military culture 
is dominated by the professional ethos, the military tends to remain politically 
passive and neutral.
85
 The professional ethos can be defined as the absorbance of a 
set of principles, namely political neutrality, political passivism, and civilian 
supremacy, which oblige the military members to stay in their barracks for the sake 
of democracy. Conversely, if military culture is dominated by an ideological ethos, 
the military can form itself into a guardian or revolutionary role. The ideological 
ethos, therefore, can be seen as rooted political beliefs, ideals, and commitment to a 
certain type of ideology. For instance, professional military ethos in the US army is 
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affected by American society’s republican values, such as liberty, equality, and the 
dignity of the individual. The American ethos requires the military to be used for 
external defence and to be subordinate to the civilians.
86
 On the other hand, 
Huntington (1957) argued that Japan (before the end of Second World War) had “the 
most political army” in the world, because their moral code of Bushido, which is 
inherited from the ancient Samurai warriors, glorifies militarism, nationalism, and 
authoritarianism – ideas that were similar to the Japan state ideology. The similarity 
between military ethos and political culture enabled the Japanese military to involve 
itself in politics.
87
 With regard to the Indonesian army, the military ethos is 
embedded in the state ideology, which is known as Pancasila, and the doctrine of 
Dwifungsi. The former is a combination of five principles: “belief in one god”; 
“national unity”; “social justice”; “civilised humanity”; “democracy by consensus”; 
the latter is based on the acceptance that the military is the founder of the Republic.
88
 
The third characteristic shown by Snider is “military rituals”. These rituals have a 
significant role in combining military units under a common identity. Snider quotes 
James Burk’s definition to define rituals: 
These ceremonies and etiquette make up an elaborate ritual and 
play the role that ritual typically plays in society: to control or 
mask our anxieties and ignorance; to affirm our solidarity with one 
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Military weddings, retirements, and funerals mark the life cycle of 
soldiers just as bugle calls and formations at dawn and dusk mark 
the passing of the soldiers’ working day. Such rituals mark 
collective identity and group affiliation, forge a common identity 
and symbolise a common fate…90 
One can observe that the symbolic language used in these ceremonies is specifically 
designed to imply militarist references, such as altruism, self-sacrifice, brotherhood, 
and perhaps military supremacy. The fourth element is “cohesion and esprit de 
corps”. Military cohesion refers to perceptions such as “feelings of identity” and 
“comradeship” among the military units, while “esprit de corps” refers to “feelings of 
commitment”, “interdependency”, “mutual support”, and “pride”.91 
Another significant aspect in militaries is “symbols”, which play a connective role 
among its members. There can be different examples of symbols, such as words, 
gestures, pictures, flags, and heroic figures. For instance, the Duke of Wellington and 
Admiral Horatio Nelson for the British; George Washington for the US; Charles de 
Gaulle for the French; and Atatürk for the Turkish militaries.92 The symbols can 
easily be observed by outsiders in the organisation’s practices.93 Hence, one is likely 
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to observe a close relationship between rituals and symbols, in that the former has 
strong references to the latter. 
In all social groups, symbols and rituals play a significant role in producing 
collective values.
94
 Through the rituals, the common values gain holiness, and the 
members of the social groups commit themselves to these values. The groups 
periodically repeat these rituals to prevent a fragmentation.
95
 The military members 
commit themselves to their colleagues and use certain unifying symbols to create a 
common culture.96 The example of Admiral Nelson indicates how a symbolic figure 
became a unifying “key totem” for the British Navy. Although the British military 
has changed a lot since 1805, it still preserves the Nelson figure to protect its cultural 
background.97 
One visible impact of these repetitive symbols and rituals for the militaries is their 
negative effects on change. Military traditions and acceptances are not easily 
changed, because these routine practices and lifestyle make the officers inadaptable 
to changes. As previously noted, military cultures are like slow moving machines 
that require enormous effort to change direction.98 Yet, some extraordinary factors 
may trigger rapid changes in military cultures. These extraordinary changes may be 
technological improvements, transformation in social culture, wars, and charismatic 
leadership.99 
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In summary, military cultures have a determining role in a number of issues, 
including: how officers interact with each other; how they conduct their tasks; how 
they perceive the civil world; what their expectations from the civil world are; and, 
lastly, how they should treat civilians.100 The main difference separating military 
cultures from all others is that the values they gained in the military do not only 
affect their occupational life, but also their private life. However, that case slowly 
tends to change with the definition of modern and post-modern army, when soldiery 
is begun to be considered a “profession” rather than a “lifestyle”, as it was called in 
the past.101 
2.3 HUNTINGTON’S CONTRIBUTIONS 
Due to the aforementioned reasons, sharp differences may emerge between civil and 
military cultures. Indeed, the differences between these two can be deeper in 
democracies, because militaries are founded on hierarchy and obedience, as opposed 
to the liberal and equal values of democratic theory.
102
 Moreover, militaries are also 
different to civilian organisations due to their management of violence. Yet, 
subordination of the military to civilians is a fundamental requirement in democratic 
regimes. Accordingly, CIV-MIL literature has been developed to enable and 
maintain this subordination. As aforementioned, this thesis analyses the puzzle by 
connecting the military culture variable to Huntington’s professional ethic. Hence, 
before discussing the suggestions of the thesis, it may be helpful to look at 
Huntington’s opinions on the relevant issues. 
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2.3.1 Huntington and Professional Ethic 
Before stating how Huntington defines professionalism, it may be helpful to see how 
the term is understood by an ordinary person. The interviews that have been carried 
out for the purpose of this thesis have indicated that the term is understood in two 
different ways: 
 The soldier who does his job just as others in other professions. 
He/she is paid regularly and maintains his/her job permanently, until 
retirement age. After retirement, he/she also has a retirement salary. 
(Technical definition.) 
 The soldier who just focuses on doing the tasks which are given to 
him such as: combat and training. He does not interfere in civilian 
spheres, which are defined in the legal procedures, and he remains 
politically neutral. He can give advice only when required by the 
civilians. (Normative definition.) 
The third option can be a mixture of these two. In other words, a professional, 
salaried soldier avoids involvement in political interests. Huntington’s definition is 
also a mixture of both of the above understandings. Nevertheless, he gives more 
importance to the normative side of the definition in The Soldier and the State 
(1957). According to Huntington, a professional man “is an expert with specialised 
knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour”.103 Just as with other 
professions, officership has its own technical specialists. Hence, Huntington argues 
that military subordination can be maintainable by professionalising it within its own 
autonomous area. In other words, civilian control can be achieved by separating the 
civilian and military spheres. Civilians will enable military subordination by 
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professionalising the military. That does not necessarily mean that the military 
should be entirely apolitical. It can give advice, especially in matters of security – but 
only when required to do so by the civilians.
104
 
The main difficulty against the separation of powers derives from the close ties 
between military and politics. The German philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-
1831) defines war as the natural result of an unsolved political crisis, because it starts 
when diplomatic solutions become unsuccessful, and when politicians leave their 
place to the generals.
105
 Related to this, philosopher Oswald Spengler notes that “life 
is a drama of war which includes every person on earth including soldiers; thus no 
soldier can be separated from politics”.106 Hence, each soldier may have political 
views of their own. Especially, militaries have always remained in close contact with 
politics and politicians due to their natures.
107
 Consequently, none of the militaries 
can be entirely apolitical. In the words of CIV-MIL scholar Robin Luckham: “being 
non-political is a different kind of politics”.108 Huntington also accepts that officers 
may have their own social, economic, political, or religious ideas. As a solution, he 
offers that military members should design their minds according to the professional 
ethic. The professional ethic requires a certain objectivity, impartiality, and political 
passivism to increase combat effectiveness.
109
 Huntington defines the professional 
military mind as “disciplined, rigid, logical, scientific; but not flexible, tolerant, 
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After Huntington, the relevant works gained a new momentum. The authors 
following him were divided into two different groups: the first group focused on 
ethical and normative concerns; the second focused on rational and legislative 
ones.
112
 Indeed, the best way for civilian control should naturally be a combination of 
both legislative and normative factors. That is to say, militaries should absorb 
civilian supremacy as a normative discipline, but they should also be restrained by 
several regulations. Yet, ethical considerations are arguably more determinative than 
legislative regulations, in that militaries are the strongest institutions in states, due to 
their coercive weaponry, and they always conceal the potential of intervening in 
regimes and dissolving governments. Although state authorities need their military’s 
power to protect themselves from external threats, there is always a risk that the 
threat can turn to them from the same institution that they created for protection.
113
 
Additionally, in some cases, officers can be better educated and more capable than 
civilians in many respects. Accordingly, in some cases, military intervention in 
politics can be on behalf of the state. Thus, what kind of motivations can prevent 
officers from involving themselves in politics, even when they believe that they 
should be involved? At this point, the importance of ethical discipline comes into the 
agenda. According to CIV-MIL scholar Douglas Bland (1999), a disciplined military 
should protect the state without giving harm.
114
 Similarly, an army without discipline 
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can create serious problems by “exaggerating the threats”.115 Hence, we argue that 
Huntington’s suggestion of embedding a professional military ethic is the most stable 
and maintainable solution to the issue. 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to bring a different approach to Huntington’s theory by 
connecting it to the military culture variable. That is to say, the professional ethos 
(normative aspects of professionalism) should be embedded in military cultures. The 
professional ethos can be defined as democratic and liberal values that are absorbed 
by officers. This ethos motivates officers with a strong belief in the requirement of 
political passivism and civilian supremacy for the sake of democracy. In the words of 
Peter D. Feaver, professional ethos leads officers to think that “civilians have a right 
to be wrong”.116 Thus, one sustainable way of raising professional officers can be by 
designing the education curriculum in the academies according to a professional 
ethos. Naturally, the curriculum, discussions during the lectures, and the instructions 
of officer trainers should be inspected by civilian authorities regularly. However, this 
supervision should be limited to the instruction related to politics. Accordingly, this 
line of inspection should not be seen against objective control, since lectures about 
politics are directly related to the civilian sphere. 
2.3.2 Huntington and Military Culture 
In The Soldier and the State, Huntington uses the descriptions “military ethic” and 
“military mind” to formalise a set of ethoi that affect the military profession.117 
Basically, there are similarities between Huntington’s military man and the basic 
tenets of military culture discussed previously. Essentially, Huntington sees “the art 
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of fighting” as a natural phenomenon of humanity since ancient times; but the 
military profession, he assumes, is a modern development, which separates modern 
officers from the ancient fighters.
118
 According to Huntington, the “military ethic” 
should consider humankind in a Hobbesian way, which is naturally egoist – 
motivated by personal pleasures such as wealth and power. “Conflict” and 
“violence” are natural results of his biological evolution. Additionally, Huntington 
argues, humankind is naturally weak and limited. Hence, our weaknesses compel us 
to act together and institute organisations under discipline and leadership. In this 
regard, the military should be seen as an institution that aims to suppress individual 
fears, and which compels its members to implement their tasks professionally, 
without failure.119 The uncertainty of the enemy’s next act makes the military man 
sceptical toward humankind.
120
 Thus, the military opinion of men is pessimistic. 
Although mankind may have attributes such as “goodness”, “strength”, and “reason”, 
it also tends to be “evil”, “weak”, and “irrational”.121 Perhaps because of this 
pessimistic framework, Huntington defines militaries as the organisations that are 
culturally closer to conservative ideology.
122
 
In accordance to the ideas above, Huntington considers that the military man 
indicates the importance of group as against the individual. Egoism must be the 
biggest enemy of the soldier. Humankind is a social animal, and it only survives 
within groups. Its members may only overcome their weaknesses and gain moral 
satisfaction by joining into an organic body.
123
 Naturally, “loyalty” and “obedience” 
should be the key norms of military mind, because, when the soldier receives an 
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order from his commander, he does not have a right to argue, to show hesitation, or 
to reveal his own ideas.
124
 Therefore, it is possible to say that the army man must be 
a “man of logic”, not a “man of emotions”, in order to implement the tasks he has 
taken. Hence, Huntington gives the Prussian army as a typical example of 
professionalism, with their “scientific” and “rational” training. In this regard, 
Huntington associates the Prussian army with strong professional characteristics, 
namely “superb technical competence”, “high intellectual achievement”, “and 
unwavering devotion to duty”.125 
2.3.3 The Ways of Civilian Control 
According to Huntington, there are two different ways for implementing civilian 
control over the militaries: the subjective and objective models. 
2.3.3.1 Subjective Civilian Control 
This is based on maximising civilian power. Subjective control enables civilian 
supremacy by minimising military power and maximising civilian power. The 
civilian groups can be governmental institutions, social classes, or constitutional 
forms. There are several difficulties of this model, because conflicting interests of 
civilian groups can prevent them from combining their powers against militaries. 
According to Huntington, the best way for implementing subjective control is to 
enhance the power of one civilian group at the expense of other civilian groups.
126
 
2.3.3.2 Objective Civilian Control  
This model is based on maximising military professionalism. Professional behaviour 
and attitudes are adopted and the military accepts soldiery as a profession. 
Huntington defines this model as the opposite of the subjective model. He argues that 
                                               
124 Ibid.: 73. 
125 Ibid.: 99. Also see: Perlmutter (1977): 31. 
126 Huntington (1957): 80-81. 
59 
 
the subjective model achieves civilian control over the military by civilianising the 
military and making it “the mirror of the state”, while the objective model achieves it 
by militarising the military and making it a “tool of the state”. The antithesis of 
objective civilian control is military participation in politics, in that civilian control is 
minimised while the military increasingly intervenes in politics. In other words, 
objective civilian control is “the recognition of autonomous military 
professionalism”, while subjective control is “the denial of an independent 
military”.127 Objective control is occasionally referred to as “Huntington’s 
Normative Theory” by scholars.128 The objective civilian model professionalises the 
military and makes it politically impartial. Huntington interestingly notes that 
objective civilian control was not yet very common, even in the Western 
democracies during the period in which he was writing the book. The main reason 
for that is that civilians tend to subordinate militaries to their own “interests and 
principles”.129 
2.3.4 Main Criticisms of Huntington 
Huntington explained American CIV-MIL relations as a conflict between “functional 
imperatives” and “the social imperatives” that began with the Cold War.130 
Functional imperatives refers to the external threats that the country came up against, 
while societal imperatives refers to the constitutional structure and the ideological 
background of the society.
131
 The main functional imperative for the United States 
during the Cold War was the Soviet threat, which forced it to have larger military 
units. On the other hand, the social imperative was the liberal anti-military ideology 
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of the American people, which had been seen an obstacle against having larger 
militaries. As a solution, Huntington offered that the Soviet threat would weaken the 
liberalist ideology and push decision-makers to practise more conservative policies, 
to defend the nation against the Soviet threat.
132
 However, this suggestion of 
Huntington’s became incorrect through the later years of the Cold War. The 
politicians did not adopt conservative policies; in contrast, they promoted liberalism 
to the developing countries, but they did not lose the Cold War. The Soviets became 
the losing side, dissolving in the end.
133
 Therefore, Huntington’s failure in predicting 
the future of the United States’ Cold War policy became one of the main criticisms 
against his work by subsequent authors. 
Another critique to Huntington focuses on his efforts to create a general theory by 
taking the American system as a template. The dominance of liberal and anti-
militarist legacy in the society enables the separation of forces in the United States. 
But, in the other cases, maximising professionalism cannot be a solution.
134
 For 
instance, the professionalisation of the Turkish and Greek armies following NATO 
membership made them more political, in contrast to what Huntington said. Indeed, 
these two armies made coups d’état: Turkey in 1960 and Greece in 1967.135 
Accordingly, the professionalisation and modernisation of the Chilean Army at the 
end of nineteenth century caused it to be politically more active in the following 
century.
136
 A similar thing happened to the Indonesian Army during the 1950s.
137
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According to Finer, the main weakness of Huntington’s thesis is, indeed, his 
negligence of the principle of supremacy of civil power, which Finer assumes is a 
distinct and separate concept to the definition of professionalism, and is obligatory 
for maintaining military subordination. Hence, Finer argues that the idea of civilian 
supremacy should also be absorbed by the officers.
138
 
As has been mentioned at the beginning of this section, there should be two different 
definitions of professionalism – one technical and the other normative. Sometimes 
military trainings do not involve both. That is to say, members of a military can have 
strong technical training in the academies, colleges, and barracks, but that does not 
mean that they also have certain ethical instructions to accept civilian supremacy as 
part of their professionality. Doubtless, most militaries have some ethical rules about 
politics. Still, the intensity of these rules may not be strong enough to subordinate the 
military. This is the main reason why this thesis suggests regular civilian supervision 
over military education. In this way, civilians can observe whether the instructions 
are strong enough to enable political neutrality or not. The politicisation of the 
Turkish, Greek, German, Japanese, Chilean, and Indonesian armies evidence this. 
The aforementioned armies had, perhaps, a strong professional training in technical 
terms, but arguably their trainings were not strong enough to keep them politically 
neutral. For example, the Prussian Army was regarded as a model professional army 
during the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries due to its discipline and 
technical capabilities. But the same army was not associated with political neutrality 
and passivism. Rather, the German Army, as the inheritor of the Prussian Army, was 
also associated with a strong level of political power.
139
 Thus, these examples may 
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lead one to think that technical professionalism is different to ethical 
professionalism. Sometimes one army cannot have both at the same time. 
2.4 ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
Due to the criticisms that have been mentioned above, several authors came up with 
alternative theories. In particular, regime changes and the end of Cold War 
accelerated efforts for building a more comprehensive theory.
140
 The most well-
known work after Huntington is The Professional Soldier (1960) by Morris Janowitz. 
Janowitz argued that technological innovations and sociological changes offered the 
militaries a more political role than that described by Huntington. Janowitz argued 
that the military accepts civilian supremacy not only because of the “rule of law or 
tradition” but through the military’s absorption of “self-imposed professional 
standards” (professional military honour) and “meaningful integration with civilian 
values”.141 Therefore, unlike Huntington, Janowitz considers that the military does 
not have to isolate itself from the civilian sphere; rather, the military should be 
integrated into society’s demands to implement its tasks professionally. Through this 
means, civilian control over the military will be achieved. Thus, the military has to 
increase its political interests due to changing circumstances, and needs to be closer 
to civilian values and procedures.
142
 
                                                                                                                                     
WWI, the German military were deeply involved in politics.) Also, for the politicisation of Japanese 
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After Huntington, Janowitz has also received criticisms from subsequent scholars. 
One common critical approach to both Huntington and Janowitz was published by 
James Burk, in ‘Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations’ (2002). This article 
contends that Huntington’s theory fails to explain how democratic principles and 
values will be preserved.
143
 Huntington, according to Burk, made the mistake of 
assuming that the United States would adopt a more conservative policy to protect 
itself from the Cold War’s risks, because the United States continued to support 
liberal policies.
144
 Secondly, Janowitz’s “Citizen Soldier” idea has some fallacies, 
because that theory – which is normally intended to protect democratic values by 
integrating the military into society – does not explain how this will be achieved in 
the absence of mass mobilisation.
145
 Accordingly, the idea of training professional 
forces under a political education programme for national and transnational aims is 
unrealistic.
146
 In summary, Huntington’s theory mostly focuses on protecting 
democracy, but does not offer enough of a solution on how to protect democratic 
values. Conversely, Janowitz focuses on preserving democratic values, but neglects 
the issue of protecting democracy.
147
 Therefore, there are two paths – choosing one 
of these two theories or creating a unified theory which gives equal importance to 
both democratic regime and democratic values.
148
 
Another alternative approach is the principal-agent approach by Peter D. Feaver, 
which suggests that the civilians should be the “principal” and the military should be 
the “agent”. That is to say, the principal must have the authority over the agent to 
prevent possible disharmonies. On the other hand, it is sometimes problematic to 
                                               
143 Burke, ‘Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol.29, No.1, 
Fall 2002: 7-29, p.13. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Burk (2002): 14. 
146 Ibid. 




maintain this authority in that the agent has weapons and coercive power.
149
 
According to Feaver, Huntington’s and Janowitz’s theories were written during the 
first quarter of the Cold War and are consequently not sufficient bases on which to 
build civilian supremacy in the post-Cold War era.
150
 Feaver argues that the military 
should be strong enough to protect the state from external threats, but it should not 
use its powers to destroy its own society, which indeed it has to protect.
151
 Thus, 
Feaver contends, the state mechanisms should be created in favour of the civilians, to 




In this regard, Feaver argues that there should be a “contract” between the civilian 
principals and the military agents for using military power to defend civilian 
interests. After the contract is made, the civilian principals regularly monitor the 
military agent to ensure that they follow the civilian directives. In this way, the 
civilians can prevent any potential abuse of power by the agent.
153
 Feaver puts 
forward two concepts “working” and “shirking” to follow the status of CIV-MIL 
relations. Shirking happens when the military neglects its responsibilities and when 
the civilians have lost supervision over the agent. Conversely, working means the 
agent acts in the way that the principal demands from it.
154
 Therefore, the principal’s 
responsibility is to monitor the agent, whether it is working or shirking, in order to 
maintain professional CIV-MIL relations. However, Feaver also maintains that the 
military may sometimes disagree with the civilians, but that this does not mean 
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“shirking”, because the civilians should consider the military’s advice to a certain 
extent.
155
 Related to this, Rebecca L. Schiff’s Concordance Theory (1995) argues 
that military subordination should be achieved by cooperation between three actors: 
“the military, the political elites and the citizens”.156 This cooperation should be 




Alternatively, Finer analyses the case by observing political cultures of states. In his 
classic work The Man on Horseback in 1962, he argues that the states with 
“traditional and rooted democratic cultures”, such as the advanced democracies in 
the West, do not allow their militaries to interfere in civilian affairs. Conversely, 
coups and military regimes are mostly visible in the states with “lower political 
cultures”, due to the lack of respect of the society toward the governmental and legal 
institutions of the state.
158
  
Indeed, throughout the thesis, I occasionally refer to political culture as a significant 
variable that determines the nature of military culture and its relationship with 
civilians. Hence, at this point, it may be beneficial to give a clear definition of 
political culture. Principally, political culture refers to a set of beliefs and values that 
determine a society’s political orientations.159 In other words, political culture is a 
concept that defines beliefs, ideas, assumptions and emotions that govern the 
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political behaviour of people within a political system.
160
 The notion of political 
culture suggests that political behaviours and preferences of each individual are not 
the result of random developments but are the consequences of empirical historical 
experiences, emotions, symbols, and values that fit together, create a meaningful 
whole, and transfer from one generation to the next.
161
  
Accordingly, political culture might be affected by a number of variables such as 
security concerns, geopolitical positions, and social values. Especially, the national 
security and the level of trust or distrust toward other states have crucial importance 
in constructing political culture.
162
 Hence, one may explore a close relationship 
between military culture and political culture.
163
 For instance, the Soviet threat and 
its policy of reaching hot waters had a crucial impact in the Turkish political and 
military cultures. That is to say, while anti-Communism increased its influence after 
the end of World War II, an overwhelming majority of Turkish people saw the 
United States as a trustful partner against the Soviet threat. Related to this, the 
Turkish military culture was deeply influenced by the anti-Communist ideology, 
especially after NATO membership.  
On the other hand, there is a well-known work by Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond 
(1963) that separated political cultures into three – parochial, subject, and 
participant – by considering the people’s political roles and their level of 
participation in the policy making. In the parochial political culture, the people do 
not have a remarkable understanding of the political system and political actors do 
not have differentiated specific political roles. In this model, the political 
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participation tends to be low. This model is arguably applicable to the primitive 
societies and has major similarities with the Finer’s definition of “minimal” political 
culture. The subject political culture, on the other hand, is observed in monarchies or 
semi-independent (subject) states. In this model, people are more aware of the 
political system but their influence and participation are limited. Lastly, in the 
participant model, people’s participation in politics is high and people have a 




On the other hand, Finer’s theory offers a positive relationship between high political 
culture and high democratic culture, as opposed to the close relations between low 
political culture and authoritarian regimes. Related to this, one may see similarities 
between Finer’s categorisation of “immature and mature political cultures” and 
Almond and Vera’s “parochial, subject and participant political cultures”. Parochial 
military culture meets with Finer’s categorisation of “minimal” and perhaps “low” 
political cultures, which are likely to be seen in primitive or authoritarian regimes. 
Subject political culture, on the other hand, is likely to be seen in the societies 
wherein people have a relative influence in policy making, which can be seen in 
“low” and perhaps “developed” political cultures according to Finer’s categorisation. 
Subject political culture, therefore, can be positioned in a specific place between 
democratic and authoritarian regimes. Lastly, participant political culture meets with 
“developed” political culture, according to Finer’s categorisation, which is seen in 
democratic regimes. 
Overall, by taking into account Finer’s theory with reference to the definitions of 
Almond and Vera, one may argue that the militaries of the experienced democracies 
                                               




are more likely to embed the professional ethos into their military cultures than are 
the authoritarian or developing regimes. Additionally, as has also been mentioned 
before, Finer criticises Huntington by arguing that professionalism by itself is not 
strong enough to keep the military politically passive, in that the principle of the 
supremacy of the civil power should also be absorbed by the military. According to 
Finer, the principle of civilian power is not part of the definition of professionalism 
but is a separate matter. Finer defines the absorption of the civilian supremacy 
principle by quoting these words, “both formally and effectively, the major policies 
and programmes of government … should be decided by the nation’s political 
responsible civilian leaders”.165 On the other hand, in contrast to Finer’s argument, I 
consider that absorbing the principle of civilian supremacy is one vital requirement 
of military professionalism and, therefore, it should also be embedded in military 
cultures together with the other principles that create professional ethos. 
In addition to the above mentioned studies, there are some scholars who have 
analysed the impacts of internal and external threats. An early classic, The Garrison 
State (1941) by Harold Laswell, focuses on the impact of external threats in 
implementing civilian supremacy. When there is a foreign threat, such as war, enemy 
attack, or invasion, the militaries are likely to interfere in state matters by considering 
security excuses, and can create “garrison states”.166 Nevertheless, according to 
Stanislaw Andrzejewski’s (1954) Military Organization and Society, the opposite 
situation can also be problematic. In the absence of external threat, the military can 
show more interest in domestic politics.
167
 There is also an alternative suggestion by 
Michael Desch’s (1999) Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security 
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Environment that explains the military subordination by finding a balance between 
the external and internal threats. According to this suggestion, there should be a 
relationship between “the strength of civilian control and the levels of internal and 
external threat”. Thus, high levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat 
cause stronger civilian control, while high levels of both threats lead to poor civilian 
control; low levels of external threat and high levels of internal threat result in weak 
civil control, while low levels of both threats cause mixed civilian control.
168
 
Lastly, Douglas Bland’s A Unified Theory of Civil Military Relations (1999) focuses 
on creating a general theory, which should be applicable to different cultures and 
geographies. According to Bland, one reason that prevent authors from developing a 
unified theory is that they focus too much on preventing “coups d’état” and neglect 
other variables. This situation creates a misperception such as “no coup means no 
problem”.169 Indeed, the outline of a grand theory has been given by Feaver. A 
unified theory, according to Feaver, should have certain characteristics to be 
successful, such as: it should crucially “separate the civilian and military spheres”; it 
should briefly “explore the dynamics that give civilians power and control over 
military”; it needs to make “a clear definition of professionalism”; and, finally, it 
should be “empirically probable”.170 The ultimate goal of the unified theory is to give 
a response to “all the problems” of CIV-MIL relations under one model. 
Nevertheless, Bland argues, this is a difficult task to achieve; because this kind of 
theory needs to be applicable for all state models, and needs to revise itself as regards 
the ever-changing circumstances of global politics.
171
 Bland’s suggestion is the 
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shared responsibility which asserts that military subordination should be sustained 
through the sharing of responsibility between civilian leaders and military officers. 
That means that both civilians and the military leaders have responsibilities for the 




2.5.1 Why Huntington? 
As explained in the introductory chapter, this thesis employs Huntington’s definition 
to explain professionalism in CIV-MIL relations. Additionally, any transition 
between praetorian to professional within Turkish military culture is evaluated 
according to Huntington’s theory. There are distinct reasons for doing that: not least, 
his definition of “professional military ethic” arguably preserves its dominant 
position in the literature.
173
 Although it has several weaknesses, and has faced 
serious challenges, none of the subsequent theories have been as influential as 
Huntington’s over subsequent scholars.174 
Among the various criticisms, perhaps the most important one for the purpose of this 
thesis is Huntington’s assumed mistake in equating professionalism with 
depoliticisation. Some states such as Greece, Turkey, Indonesia, Germany, Japan, 
and Chile witnessed a high level of military politicisation after their armies had 
professional training. However, there is one point that perhaps most critics do not 
take into account. Huntington’s theory is a normative theory. That is why he defines 
it as professional military ethic. Indeed, Huntington himself argues that any military 
can be apolitical.
175
 However, members of the military can remain politically passive 
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and neutral by adopting the professional ethic.
176
 To prevent confusion, perhaps it is 
beneficial to make two different definitions of professionalism, namely technical and 
normative. The former refers to professionalising in the military profession, 
including combat skills, strategy, art of war, and so on. The latter refers to staying 
politically neutral and absorbing the civilian supremacy ideal.
177
 Sometimes, some 
militaries cannot have both technical and normative professionalism at the same 
time. Perhaps, for instance, the politicisation of the Turkish and Greek armies after 
benefitting from the technical expertise of the NATO armies can be explained with 
this reality. Despite these two armies technically having experienced a sudden 
improvement, perhaps they could not completely absorb the professional ethic, as 
defined by Huntington. 
Lastly, most of the approaches described by the subsequent scholars had already 
been argued by Huntington. For example, Huntington took into account the impact of 
external and internal variables by functional and social imperatives before Finer, 
Lasswell, Desch, and Andrzejewski.
178
 Also, a similar argument to the mutual 
responsibility, concordance, and mutual contract of Bland, Schiff, and Feaver had 
been made by Huntington, because his objective model requires a “complex 
balancing of power” and a “recognition and acceptance” of military autonomy in its 
own professional area.
179
 Lastly, Huntington argues that the dominant ideology 
within a state can affect its CIV-MIL relations in a positive or negative way. Thus, if 
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one conceives a possible linkage between the dominant ideology and the 
aforementioned foundations of political culture, one may also assume that the 




After elaborating the background literature related to military culture and CIV-MIL 
relations, it may be worthwhile to remember the main propositions of this thesis on 
relevant issues. Firstly, military culture can be defined as a combination of several 
martial ethoi, which are based on specific ideas, norms, values, beliefs, and ideals 
that shape the institution’s behaviour toward internal and external variables. Hence, 
military culture can be applied for analysing every type of military activity. The 
martial ethoi that shapes military culture plays a significant role in determining the 
military’s position between praetorianism and professionalism. This chapter argues 
that those militaries that are dominated by a professional ethos are more likely to 
preserve their political neutrality and passivism. 
Indeed, the professional ethos is more or less similar to Huntington’s definition of 
professional military ethic, which enables the achievement of objective civilian 
control over militaries. However, unlike Huntington and Finer, I also consider the 
absorbing of the principle of the supremacy of civil power as one crucial requirement 
of professional military ethos. In addition to this, this chapter brings a different 
approach to Huntington’s theory by explaining it under the guidance of the military 
culture variable and by separating professionalism into two, namely normative and 
technical. In other words, Huntington’s idea of professional ethic and objective 
civilian control can be more sustainable and effective by embedding the professional 
ethos into military cultures. One effective way of implementing that can be the 
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preparation of the military curriculum according to the professional ethos.
181
 The 
professional ethos – the combination of democratic-liberal values, civilian 
supremacy, political passivism, political neutrality, and military subordination – can 
be absorbed by officer candidates in the military academies. The same absorption can 
be made by non-commissioned officers in the military colleges and by the privates in 
the barrack trainings. 
Additionally, the military curriculum can be extended with relevant theories about 
CIV-MIL relations, including Huntington’s ideas.182 In this way, the officers can be 
aware of relevant scholarly debate, and perhaps they can find opportunities to make 
their own theoretical contributions to maintain civilian supremacy. In my interviews, 
I have seen that the retired officers do not know much about Huntington’s 
professionalism and other CIV-MIL theories. This proves that, at least in Turkey, the 
military academies were not giving theoretical instruction until more recent years.
183
 
Indeed, Janowitz (1960) suggested that the civilian values of the nation should be 
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absorbed by the officers through a “meaningful” integration.184 However, imposing 
civilian values on the military, according to Huntington, tends to be a subjective 
civilian control, in that civilians maintain military subordination by civilianising the 
military, through imposing their own civilian values. Hence, although Janowitz 
offered an effective solution to the problem, we assume that integrating with civilian 
values is not vital to maintain military professionalism. Rather, as Huntington 
offered, it would be sufficient to make an instruction to the officers that political 
neutrality and commitment to civilian supremacy are part and parcel of officership. 
Lastly, this type of injection of professional ethos may require a stable supervision 
by the civilian authorities to prevent shirking. This supervision should be limited to 
the instructions that are relevant to politics, to prevent subjectivity in CIV-MIL 
relations. Naturally, this kind of supervision may be more applicable in the advanced 
democracies, in that accountability and transparency would be higher than in 
developing democracies. 
Accordingly, the thesis suggests a typology of five different CIV-MIL relationships, 
by taking into account the relevant literature. This typology has been made by taking 
democracy and democratisation as the main determining criteria. The first model is 
the negative-undemocratic relationship, which emerges when political armies 
involve themselves in politics with the purposes of overthrowing or protecting the 
government or the regime. These military interventions make democratic elements 
unlikely to develop. Related to this, this model usually causes long-term rule by 
military juntas. Thus, there is a negative relationship between military politicisation 
and democracy. There are many examples of this model, such as the Dirty Wars in 
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Argentina, the Pinochet regime in Chile, and Fujimori’s rule in Peru, which are 
infamous for their strictly authoritarian nature and human rights violations.
185
 
The second model is the positive-undemocratic relationship, which refers to the case 
in which the military is politically active but the impacts of this political activism are 
positive in regard to the development of democratic elements. This model can be 
seen both in revolutionary and guardian armies who involve themselves in politics 
for establishing a democratic regime, or for preserving the democratic elements of 
state. This type of relationship is, arguably, not as common as the negative-
democratic relationship, though there are still some examples. For instance, the 
Algerian coup in early 1992 against the Islamic Salvation Front can be given as one 
example.
186
 Additionally, the Brazilian army’s removal of the Emperor Pedro II and 
establishment of a republic in 1889 is an example of the positive-undemocratic 
model.
187
 Similarly, the Chilean army’s efforts for expanding public services, 
incorporating labour organisations into the political system, and creating a national 
constabulary between 1924 and 1932 is another example of military-backed 
democratisation.
188
 There are also other revolutionary coups in the Middle East, 
whereby monarchies were replaced by republican regimes, but which were 
subsequently turned into dictatorships. Examples include the Egyptian revolution in 
1952, the Iraq revolution in 1958, the Libyan revolution in 1969, and the Iranian 
revolution in 1979.
189
 It is not likely that these revolutions can be associated with the 
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positive-undemocratic relationship due to their long-term undemocratic results. 
Furthermore, in some revolutions such as Guatemala’s October Revolution (1944), 
the Mexican Revolution (1910), and even the French Revolution (1789), it is likely 
to encounter revolutionary officers, and a strong military support both in fighting and 
administration, who connected their powers with the civilian groups. But these kinds 
of cases are unlikely to be taken as military revolutions, because still in the 
background there is an organised and impulsive big civilian force (villagers, 
labourers, miners, civil institutions, intellectuals, merchants, etc.).
190
 As a result, the 
restriction of Sultan’s powers by the Young Turks, foundation of Turkey as a secular 
republic, and then the military’s several attempts at protecting democracy, can also 
be given as examples of this model.
191 
The third model is the negative-democratic relationship, in which militaries adapt 
themselves to professionalism with Huntingtonian terms, though this does make a 
negative impact on democracy. Due to military depoliticisation, democratic 
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Organization, 68, No.02, March 2014: 417-418. 
190 For the Guatemalan Revolution, its democratic results and the roles of revolutionist soldiers and 
civilians in the revolution see: Jim Handy, ‘National Policy, Agrarian Reform, and the Corporate 
Community during the Guatemalan Revolution, 1944-1954’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Cambridge University Press, 1988: pp.1,5. Also see: Cindy Forster, The Time of Freedom: 
Campesino Workers in Guatemala’s October Revolution, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001: 33. 
For the Mexican Revolution and the role of villagers, miners, workers, agrarians and so on in the 
armed rebellion see: John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the 
Mexican Revolution, University of California Press, 1987, pp.12-14. And for a comparison between 
Turkey’s 1960 military coup d’état and post-revolutionary process in Mexico see: Finer (2002): 197-
204. 
191 See: Koonings and Kruijt, Political Armies, 2. (This work argues that examples of armies that 
paved the way for democracy are very limited, and that the Turkey of Atatürk is one example. The 
other cases which fit this criteria, according to the author, are Peru under the Velasco government 
(1968-75) and Nigeria from 1966 until the end of its civil war.);  Nil Satana, 2007, p.365. It is 
necessary to mention that the 1908 Young Turk Revolution had a considerable support from civilians. 
Indeed, according to Aykut Kansu (2001), the revolution was started after civilian protests against 
Sultan Abdulhamid’s oppressive rule and policy of high taxes. However, one should also consider that 
following the unsuccessful 1909 counter-revolution by the monarchists, the revolutionist wing of the 
military began to increase its influence as ‘the guardians of the parliamentary regime’ and eventually 
they became the motor force of the Turkish Revolution. The details of this process will be discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
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mechanisms become open to vulnerabilities. The reason for that can arguably be – in 
particular in the younger democracies (with immature political cultures), which have 
been founded by military support – that the democratic system may not be fixed 
easily, and often needs military supervision. Therefore, when the military have 
stepped back from politics, democracy can easily be challenged by the extreme 
ideologies. The short-term political passivism of the Turkish military in the early 
1950s and the Democrat Party’s increasing authoritarianism, as well as the current 
military depoliticisation and the AKP’s alleged non-democratic implementations, can 
be given as examples of this model.
192
 
The fourth model is the positive-democratic relationship, which can be summarised 
as this: military cultures adopt the professional ethos and democratic mechanisms 
work properly to block any possible challenge to the regime. In these types of 
regimes, political cultures tend to be higher (i.e. mature political cultures). As a 
result, this type of relationship enables Huntington’s objective control model to be 
implemented. The advanced democracies managed to build this type of relationship a 
long time ago. For instance, in the United Kingdom and United States, it is hardly 
possible for the militaries to disobey civilians and to involve themselves in any type 
of praetorian act against the government. This is because, in these states, the liberal 
ethoi of the society, such as civilian supremacy and freedom of opinion, are deeply 
embedded in the military cultures.
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192 For the Democrat Party’s alleged anti-secular implementations see: Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 
State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, Walter de Gruyter, 1988: 123-124; for an 
argument about the alleged AKP oppression of the media as well as bans on YouTube and Twitter 
see: Murat Akser and Banu Baybars-Hawks, ‘Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Model of 
Neoliberal Media Autocracy’, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 5, No. 3, January 
2012: 302-21; Kristin Fabbe, ‘Doing More with Less: The Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
Turkish Elections, and the Uncertain Future of Turkish Politics’, Nationalities Papers, 39, No.5, 
September 2011: 664-665. 
193 Don M. Snider, ‘An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture’, Orbis, 43, No.1, 2000: 17. 
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The last model is the variable relationship, which defines the cases in which the 
relations follow a more complex trend by experiencing two or more of the 
aforementioned models. In other words, military culture does not follow a stable line, 
and its interactions with society and politics change a lot. Normally, each nation’s 
CIV-MIL relations can experience periodic changes. The difference described by the 
variable model is that the changes happen more often than usual, and do not follow a 
stable line. Indeed, when there is an internal conflict (factionalism) within the 
military, two or more of the mentioned models can be seen simultaneously.
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Turkey’s military culture changing between the revolutionist, guardian, and 
depolitical identities can be given as one typical example. Lastly, to understand 
which of the aforementioned models best suits with a case study, the researcher can 
follow two ways. In the first way, the researcher can divide the nation’s history into 
different time periods depending on the changes in politics and analyse each period 
separately. In the end, the researcher can make a general suggestion by taking into 
account the results that came from each period. In the second way, the researcher 
analyses the nation’s history from beginning to the end without dividing and makes a 
general suggestion. Accordingly, this thesis will follow the first way in the empirical 
chapters: Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
As was mentioned in the introductory section, this chapter has aimed to bring three 
main contributions. The first contribution is the theoretical definition of military 
culture. Basically, military culture is a combination of specific martial ethoi, namely 
values, ideas, and ideals, that has been embedded in the institution and which shape 
                                               
194 For the variability of military ethos and existence of more than one military culture simultaneously 
in the same army see: Wilson (2008): 18. Additionally, for the existence of different factions within a 
military and their inconsistent impacts on civil-military relations, see: Desch (1999): 16-17. 
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every officer’s responses to inside and outside stimulants. Additionally, military 
cultures can be affected by regime changes, wars, national deadlocks, social and 
political cultures, geographic positions, and religious values. In the political armies, 
military ethos may offer further roles than that of defending the state. These roles can 
change depending on time and conditions, such as protection of regimes, ideologies, 
or the military’s own institutional interests. Conversely, in the professional armies, 
military ethoi are shaped to enable political neutrality, passivism, and civilian 
supremacy. Additionally, by taking into account the military culture variable and its 
impact on CIV-MIL relations, the chapter has suggested five typologies of CIV-MIL 
relations regarding military culture and its impacts on democratisation. The positive-
undemocratic relationship refers to cases in which the military is politically active 
but its impact on democratisation is positive. The negative-undemocratic 
relationship refers to cases in which the military is politically passive but where the 
impacts of this passivism tend to be negative to democracy. The negative-democratic 
relationship denotes cases wherein that the military is politically active and its 
impacts on democratisation are negative. The positive-democratic relationship 
describes cases where the military is politically passive and its passivism strengthens 
the democracy. Finally, the variable relationship refers to cases where more than one 
of the aforementioned relationships occurs at the same time, or within different 
times, with periodic frequency. This typology will also be our main criteria while 
answering the main research question. In other words, the empirical chapters 
(Chapters 5, 6, and 7) will divide Turkish history into different time periods, and will 
associate each period with the relevant one of the five types of relationships. At the 
end of Chapter 7, a general evaluation will be made. The changes in each time period 
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will also be shown in an analytical chart, which will be available in the final part of 
each section. 
The second contribution of this chapter is in defining Huntington’s theory of 
professionalism and its relationship with military culture. That is to say, the 
professional ethos that is meant to be in military cultures can be better identified by 
taking into account Huntington’s normative theory. In his landmark study The 
Soldier and the State (1957), Huntington proposed that civilians should create an 
autonomous area for soldiers and maximise their professionalism. By isolating the 
military in a separate, independent domain, the aim is to weaken the military’s 
interests in politics. As a result, civilians would enable an objective control over the 
military in which both sides would know their autonomous limits and not intervene 
in each other’s autonomous spheres. That separation will necessarily bring a 
normative discipline, which was defined as the professional ethic by Huntington, 
which restricts officers from mixing their political interests with their job. Similarly, 
the professional military mind and professional ethic, in Huntington’s terms, can be 
taken as the main martial ethos that leads a professional military culture.  
On the other hand, Huntington’s theory received severe criticisms by the subsequent 
scholars because in some cases, professionalism with technical terms did not prevent 
officers from political interests. Hence, this thesis separates professionalism into two 
namely technical and normative professionalism. Technical professionalism refers to 
an advanced level of combat power and technique, high discipline and expertise in 
the art of war. Normative professionalism, on the other hand, refers to the principles 
of political neutrality and passivism. Sometimes one army cannot have both versions 
of professionalism and can be politically active despite having a professional training 
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in the academies. In this regard, the professional ethos that is meant to be in military 
cultures -predominantly- refers to the normative side of military professionalism.  
The final contribution of the chapter is to bring to Huntington’s theory a different 
approach, by explaining it with the military culture variable. That approach can be 
summarised as embedding the professional ethos into military culture to keep the 
military in its own autonomous area. By considering Finer’s criticisms of 
Huntington, the chapter also considers the absorption of the principle of the 
supremacy of civil power as one essential part of the professional ethos. We also 
argue that education systems of militaries should be the civilian authorities’ primary 
focus, in order to embed the professional ethos into military cultures. By dominating 
military curriculums with the professional ethos, namely the combination of 
democratic-liberal ethoi, political passivism, military subordination, and civilian 
supremacy, the officer candidate will consider political neutrality as one fundamental 
part of professional officership, and will defer from interfering in civilian affairs. 
Additionally, the military curriculum might be extended with the relevant CIV-MIL 
theories, including Huntington’s objective control. In this way, officers can be aware 
of relevant scholarly debate and may involve themselves in a brainstorming process 
by making their own contributions. Additionally, we argue that civilian inspection 
over military academies can be extended in a way to prevent shirking. However, 
civilian supervision may be limited to those instructions that are related to the 
civilian domain, to prevent subjectivity in civilian control. 
Lastly, the first and second chapters have defined military culture and the martial 
ethoi under the guidance of Huntington’s theories and relevant CIV-MIL scholarly 
debate. Hence, the third and fourth chapters will focus on the Turkish military and 
military culture by applying the main conclusions that have been derived from the 
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first two chapters. The next chapter aims to define the martial ethoi of the Turkish 
military, the roles and meanings that have been imposed on its military culture by 
Turkish society, as well as Atatürk’s own ideas about war, officership, CIV-MIL 




CHAPTER 3: CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH 
MILITARY CULTURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first and second chapters analysed the relevant literature about military culture 
and civil-military relations. The relevant scholarly debates define military culture as 
a combination of specific martial ethoi, namely the ideas, rituals, vales, ideals, and 
beliefs that shape the institution’s every type of reactions toward inside and outside 
stimulants, including politics. These ethoi are created, developed, and rooted in the 
military through history. Military cultures can be affected by a number of variables, 
including social-political culture, wars, national crises and victories, leader figures, 
geopolitical concerns, and religious values. Due to the existence of more than one 
resistive variable, military cultures root deeply and are not changed easily. At this 
point, Turkish military culture becomes an interesting case, with its military culture 
changeable between three different identities: revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical. 
Hence, this chapter aims to make three contributions which are related to the 
mentioned points. 
The first contribution is to identify the martial ethoi that creates Turkish military 
culture. To do this, the chapter will firstly review the relevant literature. Then, it will 
continue by observing the main military ideas, rituals, symbols, and life in barracks. 
In this way, the chapter aims to explore what the main ideas and beliefs are that give 
the Turkish military a strong political character. The second contribution is related to 
Atatürk. The ideas of Atatürk about military culture, officership, war, and civil-
military relations will be analysed by taking into account Huntington’s and 
Clausewitz’s ideas. In this way, it aims to explore which identity – revolutionist, 
guardian, or depolitical – best fits with Atatürk’s original ideas. The third 
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contribution of the chapter is to analyse the assumed close linkage between the 
military and society. That is to say, the so-called military-nation assumption, namely 
the roles and meanings imposed on the military by the people, and the so-called 
unwritten political legitimacy that was offered to the military by society, will be 
broadly discussed. As a result, this chapter and the next chapter will give the reader 
essential background about Turkish military culture and will prepare the foundations 
for the empirical process. 
3.2 TURKISH MILITARY AND OFFICER ETHOI: 
IDEAS, RITUALS, SYMBOLS AND LIFE IN THE 
BARRACKS 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In the Turkish CIV-MIL literature, there are several important studies on military 
sociology. Most of these works do not directly mention “military culture” as a 
complete concept. Rather, they focus on specific considerations of military culture on 
issues such as masculinity, homosexuality, women officers, conscription, rotten 
reports, non-Muslim soldiers, lives in barracks, militarism, and so on. Although most 
of these terms are related with military culture, still none of them can meet the 
military culture concept alone. This is because military culture is a more general and 
unified concept, which also shapes the meanings that are given to these terms. In the 
world literature, military culture has become an applicable variable in recent decades. 
Especially, the research project by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
for defining “American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century” has been an 
important development for the relevant studies.
195
 This research project aims to 
explore “how traditions, values, customs, and leadership behaviours of the military 
                                               
195 Feaver (1999): 233. 
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influence military effectiveness”.196 Additionally, the same research explores a 
mutual interaction between military and civilian cultures.
197
 Similarly, Turkey can be 
shown as one characteristic example of how civilian and military cultures can shape 
each other. However, the related works about the Turkish military are still relatively 
limited. 
Some of the well-known studies about Turkish military sociology can be mentioned: 
Mehmet Ali Birand’s Emret Komutanim! (Yes Sir!, 1987), which summarises the 
officer’s worldview, life in barracks, and the perception of self and others; Ayse Gul 
Altinay’s comprehensive academic work The Myth of the Military Nation (1971), 
which analyses “militarist” appearances in Turkish culture and their reflections on 
gender and education. In this work, she sociologically analyses the concept of 
“military-nation” and considers the concept as a “myth”. Additionally, Iletisim 
Press’s Erkek Millet Asker Millet (Men’s Nation Soldier’s Nation, 2013) analyses 
masculinity, the behaviour toward homosexuality, life in barracks, and the close 
relations between the military and society. That work is a combination of numerous 
articles by a group of writers including Murat Belge, Baris Coban, Ayse Gul Altinay, 
Omer Turan, Senem Kaptan, Alp Biricik, Nurseli Yesim Sunbuluoglu, Salih Can 
Aciksoz, Tanil Bora, Zulal Nazan Ustundag, and Arus Yumul. Bilgesam Press’ Sivil-
Asker Iliskileri ve Ordu-Toplum Mesafesi (Civil-Military Relations and the Distance 
between Military and Society, 2014) is another notable work that makes attributions 
to Turkish military culture. That work is written by Salih Akyurek, Serap Koydemir, 
Esra Atalay, and Adnan Bicaksiz. Also, Gareth Jenkins’ Context and Circumstance: 
The Turkish Military and Politics (2001) includes sections about military ethos, the 
military-nation concept, and its historical role. Lastly, 2000’li Yillara Girerken Turk 





Ordusu (Turkish Military into the 2000s, 1999), published under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Culture, includes a specific chapter titled ‘Turkish Military 
Culture’.198 
3.2.2 Ideas, Rituals, Ethoi and Symbols 
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, there are officer ethoi which shape 
military culture. Similarly, in the Turkish case, there are certain beliefs, ideas, rituals, 
and behaviours of the Turkish military which are traditionally stereotyped and 
generally practised without questioning. Most of these ethoi are similar to the ones 
that can be encountered in any military. Firstly, the Turkish officers are considered as 
being sceptical against politicians.199 This suspicion is based on the military’s alleged 
consideration of only itself being able to know “what is wrong or what is right for the 
state”.200 Most of these assumptions about the military are based on the Young 
Turks’ revolutionist legacy, in that the officers consider themselves more capable 
than most politicians, and do not trust their decisions. The words of Mehmet Ali 
Birand, who is a very famous journalist and a researcher on civil-military relations in 
Turkey, evidence this: 
                                               
198 Cited in: Ayse Gul Altinay, The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in 
Turkey (Palgrave Macmillan New York, 2004): 2. (Altinay notices that the book was introduced by 
the Minister of Culture, not by Minister of Defence, which is an important point in seeing how 
military and national cultures are intertwined. Additionally, she quotes the Minister’s words: ‘Turks 
have been known as a military nation throughout history’; ‘The Turkish military is synonymous with 
Turkish national identity’.) 
199 Tanel Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy ’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 40, No.1, 2004: 131. 
 200 Salih Akyurek, Serap Koydemir, Esra Atalay, Adnan Bicaksiz, Civil-Military Relations and the 
Distance of Military and Society, Ankara: Bilgesam Press, 2014: 265; Aylin Güney and Petek 
Karatekelioğlu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects’, 
Armed Forces & Society, 31, No.3, April 2005: 443; Nasser Momayezi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in 
Turkey’, International Journal on World Peace, 15, No.3, September 1998: 25; Tanel Demirel, ‘The 
Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980’, Armed Forces & Society, 29, No.2, 
January 2003: 263. 
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[F]or the officer, the politics is not a very clean job, honesty is not 
something that can be seen very often. Even the individual interests 
can be considered more important than the national interests.201 
Indeed, rhetorically, the Turkish officer is loyal to the democratic regime, and they 
believe that the best regime is democracy.202 Accordingly, the military authorities 
never accept that coups and military regimes are the right things for a stable state. 
Therefore, they intensively reject the ideas that they are juntaists (or guardians); 
rather, they prefer to be titled as the “revolutionist army of Mustafa Kemal”.203 
According to one famous retired officer Erol Mutercimler, while “juntaist” (darbeci) 
gives a negative connotation, “revolutionist” (ihtilalci) makes a progressive 
impact.
204
 The officers suggest a specific type of democracy, which is entirely 
different to the civilian’s world. The officers imagine a system that is a mixture of 
the military life and military thinking. That means an extremely well organised, well-
disciplined society, in which each citizen only works for the good of their nation 
which can, arguably, remind one of socialism or equalitarianism.205 The scholars 
generally confer upon the ideal democratic regime in the officers’ minds the name 
“rational democracy”.206 Umit Cizre Sakallioglu argues that: 
                                               
201 Mehmet Ali Birand, Yes Sir!, 10th ed., Istanbul: Milliyet Press, 1987, p.115. 
202 See: Demirel, ‘The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene’, 256. 
203 Ibid., 264; Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 132. (The author particularly stresses the Turkish 
military’s opposition to long-term military rule.)  
204 Erol Mutercimler, quoted in Ceviz Kabugu, 7 March 2014. (Erol Mutercimler is a retired major; he 
was among the alleged suspects of the Ergenekon case who was later released, and he gave lectures 
about Atatürk, his revolutions, and his principles in several universities and wrote biographical books 
about Atatürk. I also attended his lectures during my university education. He made a comment in 
Hulki Cevizoglu’s programme Ceviz Kabugu, a famous TV discussion programme about politics in 
Turkey. He argues a difference between ‘revolutionism’ and ‘juntaism’ by making the mentioned 
comment.) 
205 Birand, ibid.: 132. 
206 According to the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori (1987) “rational democracy” is a 
terminology which means preferring ‘rational interests’ to ‘liberal ones’. Accordingly, in the Turkish 
case, the military considers itself as the guardian of Atatürk’s six ‘constitutional principles’, and it 
assumes that the state policies should be made according to these six principles, which is the ‘rational’ 
way of preserving ‘national interests’. For rational democracy also see: Mehran Kamrava, ‘Military 
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The military defines the civilian world as the place of instability, 
clumsiness, populism, irresponsibility, passion for promotion and 
administration, corruption and imprudence.207 
Secondly, in the military, the commanders demand a strong level of loyalty, 
obedience, and a sense of altruism. The nation is considered above everything, even 
above the family. The soldier should sacrifice his life with happiness for his country 
if there is a necessity. These expectations can clearly be seen in the “the oath of the 
military academy”: 
I swear on my honour that, during the times of war and peace, in 
the land, sea and sky, always and everywhere I will serve my 
nation and republic with honesty and happiness, and will obey the 
laws and regulations and my commanders, and I will appreciate 
the honour of soldiery, the glory of the Turkish flag as more sacred 
than my life, and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the nation, 
republic, and duty if necessary.208 
In the same sense, Mehmet Ali Birand notes these speeches of the commanders in the 
military: 
                                                                                                                                     
Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East’, Political Science Quarterly, 115, 
No.1, March 2000: 73; Güney and Karatekelioğlu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military 
Relations’, 443; Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, ‘The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: 
The Recent Turkish Experience’, Armed Forces & Society, 26, No.4, July 2000: 650; Demirel, 
‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 127-128. (The author argues that the Turkish military mentality is not 
praetorian; conversely, they support democracy, but act in an ambivalent way, because there is a lack 
of trust in civilians.) 
207 Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, Muktedirlerin Siyaseti: Merkez Sag – Ordu – Islamcilik (The Politics of 
Sovereigns: Central Right – Military - Islamism), Iletisim Press, 2014 (3rd ed.), p. 67. 
208 Birand (1987): 54-55. 
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You will devote yourself to the state without any condition. You will 
only think of the nation and subordinate your family and 
yourself.209 
According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the ethoi which are mostly referenced within the 
military are: “Military knowledge, general culture, cleanness, honesty, honour, 
loyalty, full of love to the nation and country, absolute loyalty to Atatürk’s principles 
and the refusing of all other ideologies…”210 Mehmet Ali Birand evaluates this 
situation with these words: 
They try to create an ideal Turk, a Turk who does not have any 
weakness … wise, durable, honest, hard-working and 
disciplined.211  
The writer maintains that the officer candidates in the military academy often listen 
to these words: 
You are an officer, you are different, superior… never forget that 
you are above everything and everybody … you are trained here as 
superior and wise … devote your life to your country with 
happiness, altruist and honest … As a Turkish soldier you are 
different than your civilian friends and other officers in the 
world.212 
Birand argues that the officer candidate seriously begins to consider himself different 
to the civilians: 
                                               
209 Ibid.: 22. 
210 Ibid.  
211 Ibid.: 60-61.  
212 Ibid.: 80-81. 
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In his final year, the officer candidate begins to see himself 
different … deeply commits to the military and his friends.213 
In addition to these statements, when one observes the barracks and military 
academies one can see that the most of the military personnel think that they are not 
only different to the civilians, but that they are also different to all other militaries in 
the world. The Turkish officers claim that, unlike other militaries, they do not 
consider their duty just as a “profession” but also as an “emotional responsibility” to 
protect the state.214 
Also, there are religious references in the military. Although, following the 
foundation of the republic, the military has been titled as the “guardian of 
secularism”, it is still possible to observe the references from Islam and even the 
ancient Turkish religion Shamanism. The primary reason for that can arguably be to 
motivate troops during warfare. Being a “martyr” is a sacred place according to 
Muslim beliefs, and its reward has been promised as “Heaven”. Therefore, the 
military applies to the religious concepts, particularly during war time, and does not 
completely remove them from the barracks. For instance, the nickname for a Turkish 
soldier is “mehmetcik”, which is a different name for the prophet Mohammad, and 
the barracks are known as “the prophet’s houses” among the public. In the masts of 
each warship, there is a Quran hidden on the top. The meals start with a prayer and 
soldiers start to attack during warfare by shouting the name of “Allah”.215 Indeed, it 
is likely to assume that Atatürk himself was provided with these religious symbols. 
                                               
213 Ibid.: 81-82. 
214 See the statement of an officer who was instigator during 1960 Junta in: Tanel Demirel, ‘The 
Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980’, Armed Forces & Society, 29, No.2, 
January 2003: 255-256.  
215 Omer Turan, “Esas Durus!’: Kısla Deneyimleri ya da Turkiye’de Zorunlu Askerligin 
Antropolojisi’ (‘‘At Attention!’: Experiences from the Barracks or the Anthropology of Compulsory 
Military Service in Turkey’), in: Erkek Millet Asker Millet (Men’s Nation Soldier’s Nation), Istanbul: 
Iletisim Press, 2013: 326. 
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Atatürk’s rising image as a war hero after the Gallipoli Campaign and his increasing 
leadership in the military, as well as the ‘Gazi’ title that he had after the Sakarya War 
(1922), which is a sacred religious rank for those who were wounded in the holy war, 
can be considered as the elements that strengthened Atatürk’s legitimacy as the 
leader of the nation. 
3.2.3 Personal Observations in the Military Barracks 
If I were to draw my own subjective ideas, I was in the military service as a sergeant 
between December 2006 and May 2007. Therefore, I had first-hand experiences by 
observing rituals and symbols. My observations largely confirm the arguments that 
have been discussed thus far. Most of the rituals are the same as in all other 
militaries, such as routinely waking up at the same hour, having breakfast, trainings 
and chanting, several marches which glorifies being a “Turkish soldier”, sacrificing 
yourself for “the good of nation” and “loyalty to Atatürk”. Most of these rituals are 
applied to inject the common military ethoi to the soldiers without questioning. The 
Turkish flag, Turkish nation, Atatürk and his principles are sanctified by these 
repetitive rituals and ceremonies. Atatürk is, naturally, the greatest symbol who 
connects the whole organisation under the same ideal.216 However, according to my 
personal observations, only some of the officers – particularly those with the higher 
ranks – had a clear idea about Atatürk and his ideas. Most of the non-commissioned 
officers and soldiers did not really know much about Atatürk’s principles, and were 
not taking them very seriously. Their commitment to Atatürk was mostly procedural, 
as a type of obligation to obey without questioning. Having conversations about 
politics and religion were formally prohibited. The books that were read by the 
                                               
216 Other than Atatürk, there are also other symbolic figures. For example: for the air forces, the first 
woman Turkish combat pilot and Atatürk’s daughter Sabiha Gokcen; for the naval forces, Admiral 




soldiers were inspected. Formally, apart from the ones in the military library, books 
about politics and religion were not allowed, but the soldiers were occasionally 
bringing these types of books to the barracks discreetly, and were reading them. 
As with all militaries, there were many references to the sacredness of self-
sacrificing, obeying the commanders, completing the soldierly duties, and loving the 
nation in every corner of the barracks. There were mentions and depictions about the 
warrior character of the Turkish nation, and the idea of the military-nation, which 
offered that the “Turkish nation are soldiers, they put their country above everything 
and sacrifice their life with happiness for their country if necessary”. Additionally, 
the military was like a school for the people who came from rural places and 
villages; some were even learning reading and writing, how to eat with forks and 
spoons, and how to take responsibility in society. Perhaps that aspect is one of the 
reasons which enable a close tie between the military and every class of society. 
There was a tolerance toward the religious people in the barracks. There were small 
mosques and people might go to prayer when they needed. However, normally, 
praying and other religious practices were allowed only in the mosque. Outside the 
mosque, in the barracks, there was a serious secular discipline. The soldiers were 
cautious when they were speaking about religion, and most of them were still 
worried when they were praying – even within the mosque – because of strict secular 
inspection. Additionally, there have always been claims that the Alevis and non-
Muslims feel isolation because of the majority of Sunni Muslim soldiers in the 
barracks. According to these assertions, the Alevis generally tend to hide their 
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identity. Accordingly, some claim that there is still discrimination toward non-
Muslims in the military and the reasons behind that should be explored.217  
As a result, it is not easy to make a clear prediction about the military’s political 
interests by observing life in barracks. In the barracks, talking politics and religion 
are not tolerated by the superiors. In addition to this, the commanders are also careful 
to prevent themselves from talking differently to the formal state ideology of 
Kemalism. On the other hand, my observations date back 10 years, before current 
era, and I do not know whether or not any change has happened recently in the 
military’s general restrictions and tolerations on these issues. Other than the political 
issues, the aforementioned main characteristics of Turkish military culture can be 
observed easily by everybody. 
3.3 MILITARY AND IDENTITY: THE LEGACY OF 
ATATÜRK 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Protecting Atatürk’s principles and revolutions have been indicated as the main 
reason behind military interventions. Kemalist references can easily be observed in 
the military discourse during the periods of junta rule.218 However, the juntaist 
officers omitted an important reality while carrying out these interventions. The 
coups d’état were indeed against Atatürk’s ideals. Atatürk explicitly states his target 
of separating the military from politics in both his statements and practices. 
Therefore, the military was already acting against Atatürk’s principles when it 
carried out the first coup d’état. Yet, the scholars on the relevant issue are divided 
into two groups. One group suggests that the military’s guardian legacy comes from 
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Atatürk, because in a speech in Konya he directly offered this duty to the military. A 
second group suggests that Atatürk was against military politicisation; hence, 
military interventions cannot be associated with the Kemalist legacy. This thesis also 
defends the idea of the second group. Atatürk clearly indicates his belief in military 
subordination and civilian supremacy. Therefore, the military’s so-called idea of 
“protecting Atatürkist legacy” by coups d’état is a misjudgement from the start. The 
following process will suggest several evidences to show Atatürk’s main opinions 
about the issue. Additionally, Atatürk’s general ideas about militarism, military 
profession, the military-nation idea, and CIV-MIL relations will be evaluated by 
taking into account Huntington’s and Clausewitz’s ideas. 
3.3.2 Three Different Identities: Revolutionism, Guardianship, 
Depolitical 
In Turkey, the military interventions have made different impacts depending on 
period and regime type. Some involvements, such as the 31 March 1909 Event and 
the Liberation War (1919-1923), led to the foundation of a secular regime. 
Conversely, some had opposite impacts; for instance, after the 1980 coup d’état, the 
Islamic movement was strengthened. Additionally, there were times that the military 
remained politically passive. Therefore, it is beneficial to analyse military culture 
under three different categories: revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical. 
According to William Hale, the historical legacy of the Turkish military has three 
main aspects: firstly, the military have been deeply associated with the state since the 
early years of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, a new belief emerged during the last 
years of the Ottoman Empire that suggested that the only way of achieving 
modernisation was accepting the military officers as the leaders of the modernist 
movements, because these officers were well informed about contemporary ideas and 
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technology; and thirdly, the legacy of Atatürk and the republic, which offers that the 
military should remain in their barracks and only if the state security is under risk 
should they intervene in politics.219 If one observes Hale’s categorisation, one may 
see that he gives the main pillars of the three different identities. The first one is 
guardianship, which refers to the traditional Ottoman legacy of maintaining the status 
quo – protecting the thrown and sharia regime. The second group refers to the 
revolutionist tradition of the Young Turks, in which military officers had a 
perception that they should be the leaders of modernist attempts. The last one is 
depolitical status, which is the continuation of the Kemalist tradition of separating 
the military from politics. 
As is also illustrated in Chapter 1, the members of these three identities have been in 
a constant struggle for dominance. The beginning of this conflict dates back to the 
strife between the supporters of the parliamentary regime and the monarch, which is 
traditionally known as the Mekteplis and Alaylis conflict. Other than these two 
conflicting groups, there were a limited number of politically neutral officers. After 
the foundation of modern Turkey, these two conflicting ideologies were blurred by 
alien ideologies including socialism, ultra-nationalism, and capitalism. Hence, I 
contextualised these conflicting and intertwined ideologies with the title of ‘crossing 
identities’. Indeed, the relationship between identity politics and the militaries should 
be one crucial research area of military culture studies. Yet, the studies on that aspect 
are still limited. According to Janowitz (1876) and Huntington (1957), the militaries 
are ideologically closer to conservatism because of their hierarchical, authoritarian, 
                                               
219 William Hale, The Military and Politics in Turkey: From 1789 to today, Istanbul: Hil Press, 1996; 
There is an alternative approach to Hale’s categorisation, which was made by Guney and 
Karatekelioglu. Guney and Karatekelioglu argue that there are three historical legacies: the Young 
Turk tradition, the Liberation War, and Kemalist principles. But the Liberation War and Kemalist 
heritage can indeed be taken as the same legacy (see: Guney and Karatekelioglu, 2005: 442).  
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sceptical, and communitarian nature.
220
 Accordingly, Huntington argues that the 
militaries are ideologically against liberalism because of the liberals’ anti-militaries 
tendency. At this point, the Turkish case disproves Huntington’s approach, because a 
secular and liberal officer elite led Turkey through a similar democratisation and 
secularisation process with the Western states. In other words, after the Young Turk 
Revolution in 1908, the revolutionist officers became the watchdogs of the new 
parliamentary regime and guarded the regime against the monarchist officers. After 
the foundation of Turkey, secularism and democratisation became the rhetorical 
tenets of military culture. Indeed, the military intervened four times by claiming 
responsibility to protect the secular and democratic dynamics of Turkey. In addition 
to this, by creating the OYAK and imposing a liberal economy during the Cold War 
years, the military undertook the principal role for leading Turkey into a modern 
capitalist state. As a result, the Turkish military has shown a character distinct from 
most praetorian armies.  
Indeed, unlike Huntington and Janowitz, Amos Perlmutter (1977) stresses both 
progressive and conservative sides of political armies by separating them into two: 
revolutionary and praetorian. Yet, praetorian is not an exact title for describing the 
conservative transformation within military culture because the Turkish military 
continued to maintain its commitment to the founding philosophy of Turkey. 
Normally, Perlmutter argues that a praetorian army should act oppositely to the 
existing regime and benefit from a weakening status quo and anarchy. However, in 
contrast to what Perlmutter said, the Turkish military has never completely lost its 
ties with the Kemalist ideology; rather, it has aimed to bring an alternative 
interpretation to Kemalism by the Turkish-Islam synthesis and a more capitalist 
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system. As a result, guardianship will be the word for defining the second stage of 
military culture, which has similarities with Perlmutter’s praetorianism but is not 
completely the same. In this second stage of military culture, capitalism and anti-
Communism are also embedded in the military as new ideologies, alongside 
Atatürkism, to maintain Turkey’s belonging to the Western bloc during the Cold War 
years. Yet, unfortunately, although the military maintained its discursive 
commitment to Atatürk’s principles, most of their acts conflicted with these 
principles, and secularism did not go further than creating an excuse for the military 
to maintain a capitalist system and the military’s economic privileges.  
In modern Turkish history, the foundations of revolutionist transformation might be 
extended back to the earliest military reforms, namely the foundation of the 
Muhendishanei Bahri Humayun (the Navy Engineering of the Empire) in 1773, 
under the governance of Sultan Mustafa III. The establishment was opened with the 
aim of conveying Western military technology to Turkey.221 This was followed by 
the modern military academies in the nineteenth century. The new military schools 
rapidly increased the young officers’ level of education, and made important changes 
in their worldviews about religion, sharia, secularism, and liberalism. Most of the 
graduated officers began to think that the main reason behind the state’s decline was 
religious influence. The fatwas and propaganda of the Ulama against the Western 
reforms were blocking any progressive attempt within the state.222 The changing 
worldviews pushed the young officers to show interest in politics, because they 
                                               
221 For the reform attempts see: Theo Farrell, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, 
Technology, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002: 47-53. In this book, the author shows the exact date of 
such modernising attempts as the Austrian defeat in 1717. 
222 The historical background of the military modernisation will be elaborated in Chapter 6: ‘Origins 
of Modernist Culture’. 
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began to think that only they had enough capability to liberate the state.223 As a 
result, revolutionary orientations began to emerge within the military. The officers 
showed interest in Western literature, philosophy, and science. The developments in 
those years created a tradition which has lasted until the twenty-first century. That 
tradition is the military’s Western-orientated, secular, and revolutionist legacy. 
Additionally, the military considered itself responsible for protecting secularism 
whenever there was a challenge. Conceivably, because of these reasons, Mehran 
Kamrava (1998) explains the culture of the Turkish military as ‘too deeply ingrained 
in secularism’ among the officers.224 Principally, the revolutionist officers had shown 
several efforts to interfere in politics through the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Yet, these efforts – such as the First Constitutional Monarchy era – had 
remained relatively weak or unsuccessful. Hence, the Young Turk Revolution in 
1908 can be argued as the first significant and successful political attempt by the 
revolutionist officers. For this reason, I began the revolutionary period in 1908 and 
extended it until 1945.  
On the other hand, starting from the Cold War, the military began to adopt the 
aforementioned conservative character. Hence, the process from the 1945s to the 
AKP has been identified as guardianship. Inside the process, the military has faced 
allegations of authoritarianism, human rights breaches, and oppression. Arguably, 
through the impact of NATO, the military was influenced by anti-Communist 
ideology.
225
 Only the 1960 intervention had a more revolutionist character which was 
                                               
223 Heper and Evin, State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, 119. (The author notes 
that the military, with the support of a civil bureaucratic cadre, became the pioneer of the modernist 
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made for building a better democratic regime, but its long-term effects became the 
opposite of what had been intended.
226
 Perhaps these interventions protected the 
regime from excessive ideologies, including sharia, Communism, and Fascism. 
However, they could not make any stable contribution to the future of democracy. At 
some points they even became very harmful. Accordingly, the military’s politically 
active status continued until the late 2000s. 
3.3.3 Atatürk’s Legacy and the Military 
The military statements before the previous coups d’état claimed constitutional 
responsibility for protecting Atatürk’s revolutions. Therefore, the military authorities 
have never described their political involvements as “illegal” moves. Hence, it can 
now be beneficial to observe the origins of this perception. In other words, did 
Atatürk offer a guardianship role to the military? What kind of developments led the 
military to claim this guardianship? As has been noticed before, secularisation of 
military began before Atatürk’s time. Indeed, Atatürk himself was a member of the 
revolutionist Young Turks movement. Yet, his ideas and practices during the last 
years of the Ottoman Empire give explicit clues about what he thought on the 
military profession, military culture, and civil-military relations. Hence, this section 
and the following two sections will discuss Atatürk’s opinions on the relevant issues. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s military career started in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. Even within the academy, it is known that Atatürk and some of his friends 
founded a secret committee to proselytise their opinions in politics with a manuscript 
newspaper.227 Atatürk explains the situation with these words: 
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227 Patrick Kinross, Atatürk, Hachette UK, 2012, 18. 
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It was the time of the Sultan Abdulhamit II … we were extremely 
worried for the future of the nation … the only cure for the officer 
candidates was … organising a pioneer force … (for saving the 
state)…228 
Atatürk commanded the Turkish armies in a number of battles including the Libya 
War (1911-1912), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the First World War (1914-1918), 
and finally the Turkish Liberation War (1919-1922). During these wars, he had 
opportunities to observe different regions of the Empire. After the foundation of 
modern Turkey on 29 October 1923, his revolutions, ideas, and principles were 
embedded in military culture. The relevant sources indicate that Atatürk was 
intensively affected by both the famous Western philosophers and the revolutionist 
Turkish intellectuals of his time. Some of the intellectuals who influenced Atatürk 
are Voltaire, Jan Jacques Rousseau, Descartes, Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, as 
well as Turkish nationalists such as Namik Kemal, Ziya Gokalp, and Tevfik Fikret.229 
The ideas of these intellectuals played a significant role when Atatürk was 
identifying his six principles (Republicanism, Secularism, Populism, Statism, 
Nationalism, and Revolutionism). Additionally, the ideals of French Revolution, such 
as equality, liberty, and fraternity, according to the historians, played a major role in 
shaping Atatürk’s ideas. Just as with revolutionary officers of his time, Atatürk saw 
sharia and monarchy as reasons for backwardness.230 
If one visits garrisons, barracks, and other military units in Turkey today, one easily 
observes the impact of Atatürk. Everywhere is decorated by Atatürk’s sentences, 
busts, and pictures. All the formal ceremonies start with commemorating Atatürk and 
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 On the main page of the Turkish Armed Forces’ website, there is a 
big picture of Atatürk in his military uniform. Even a special ceremony to remind 
students of Atatürk is carried out in the military academy on 13 March every year: 
after reading the names of all the officers, the commander from the platform reads 
the number “1283”, which was the number of Atatürk when he was in the military 
academy, and everybody loudly says “he is here”.232 Although Atatürk’s principles 
were embedded in the constitution as a kind of formal “state ideology” and were also 
referred to regularly by the civil politicians, no other institution within the state 
showed the same rhetorical commitment to Kemalism than the military, even 
including the Republican Party, which was founded by Atatürk himself. 
3.3.3.1 Atatürk and Military Culture 
Atatürk’s definition of military culture has many similarities with Huntington’s. 
Despite his acceptance of notions such as rationalism, technical capability, discipline, 
strict obedience, and collective mind, his strong emphasis on moral ethics makes him 
somewhat different to Huntington. In other words, Atatürk’s idea that an officer at 
the same time should have a “high level of morality and character” separates him 
from most of the war philosophers.
233
 Additionally, it is observable that, while 
Atatürk was describing Turkish soldiers, he often makes reference to the traditions, 
literature, and lifestyle of the pre-Islamic and Islamic Turkish societies. Arguably, 
Atatürk’s words indicate that he was deeply influenced by the German/Prussian 
military culture, as were all other Ottoman military officers of his time. The values of 
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strong discipline, rationalism, and being aware of the latest scientific and 
technological developments are the main aspects of German military culture 
according to Huntington, just as Atatürk mentioned.234 
Atatürk considered that a strong military is an obligation for the survival of a nation; 
but if one observes his statements, he severely restricts himself from glorifying war 
and militarism; his words that a soldier should have “strong moral values” during 
times of peace evidence that. He also implies that the behaviour of the officer toward 
the soldier should be kind, and he should avoid giving out humiliating treatments.235 
His ideas about war are crystallised in his well-known sentence: 
War is nothing but just a murder if there is no need to defend the 
nation.236 
Related to this, Atatürk’s ideas show a strong disagreement with the Ottoman 
Empire’s expansionist foreign policy, and he states that the armed forces should only 
be used for defensive concerns: 
From now on, our soldiery is only for defending our sacred lands, 
but not for some peoples’ arbitrary passion for personal power and 
fame as it used to be in the past.
237
 
Arguably, in that speech, Atatürk associates past Ottoman conquerors with a desire 
for glory, power, and hegemony. Therefore, his basic principle for Turkish Foreign 
Policy is categorised under his famous words: “Peace at home, Peace in the World”, 
which can clearly be seen on the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s official website’s 
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opening page under the picture of Atatürk.238 However, he assumes, if the conditions 
compel a nation to defend itself, that a soldier should be ready to sacrifice himself for 
the nation. He considers that strict obedience in the militaries can be regarded as 
despotic from outside; however, he continues by saying that there is no other way for 
success during wartime. Additionally, his idea that “Military action starts when 
political resolutions came into a deadlock [become hopeless]” might be considered as 
a view similar to Clausewitz’s idea that “war is nothing but continuation of 
politics”.239 
Atatürk argues that a military should be strong and its soldiers ready to die without 
hesitation, if necessary. In the Gallipoli battles in 1915 during the First World War, 
his career dramatically changed after his successful commandership, and he became 
a national hero. In that war, he ordered his soldiers: “I am not ordering you to attack, 
I am ordering you to die”.240 Also, the following speeches by him show that he saw 
militaries as obligatory institutions for security and surviving: “If a nation does not 
demand any military forces or does not give the necessary financial and emotional 
support to their military, they tie their neck with a chain of slavery”;241 and “Military 
is the natural result of the surviving instinct of a nation”.242 Atatürk defines the 
profession of soldiery in his work Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal: 
The basic thing is the holy sense of altruism and the aspiration for 
heroism. … Being an officer means to be ready to sacrifice oneself. 
… An officer will not give importance to his life for the art of the 
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military. … In the military, the right to refuse, object, giving 
opinions or adding ideas is not given to the subordinates.243 
What is more, Atatürk considers military forces as the tools that carry the nations to 
the “actual” goal. The main aim, according to Atatürk, was “catching the level of 
contemporary civilisations”, which only possible with a strong army. A strong army 
guarantees the independence and security of the state, and provides the necessary 
circumstances for the victory of an “education army”, which includes teachers, 
scientists, artisans, scholars, philosophers, poets, and the rest of the enlightened class. 
There are many sayings of Atatürk in that sense; for instance, these words of Atatürk 
offer proof that: 
A nation must be strong in spirit, knowledge, science and morals. 
Military strength comes last … Today it is not enough to have arms 
in hand in order to take one’s place in the world as a human 
being.244 
3.3.3.2 Atatürk and Civil-Military Relations 
According to Atatürk, military subordination to civilians is one of the main 
requirements of professionalism. In all of his statements, he clearly expresses his 
distinct commitment to the separation of the military from politics. Therefore, it is 
likely for one to think that Atatürk’s ideas about civil-military relations have 
remarkable similarities to Huntington’s. One may even claim that one of Atatürk’s 
main goals after founding the Republic was making the military completely 
professional (both technical and normative).245 In the earlier days of his carrier, in 
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1909, at an annual party (the Committee of Union and Progress - CUP) meeting in 
Salonika, Atatürk stated: 
As long as officers remain in the Party, we shall build neither a 
strong Party nor a strong Army. In the 3
rd
 Army, most of the 
officers are also members of the Party … Let us resolve here and 
now that all officers wishing to remain in the Party must resign 
from the Army. We must also adopt a law forbidding all future 
officers having political affiliations.
246
 
Again, in his speech which was published by the newspaper Minber on 17 November 
1918, Atatürk stated that a strong military should be “moral”, “scientific”, 
“civilised”, but also “subordinated” to the civilians who rule the state. Since his years 
in the military academy, his ideas had not changed on that issue:247 
From my standpoint, a strong army means: with its all members –
particularly with its officers and the commanders – a staff with a 
high level of morality which grasp the requirements of 
contemporary civilisation and science and arrange their 
behaviours according to these considerations. Naturally, the 
primary goal, duty and preparation of the (military) staff is to 
defend the nation … (By following) the orders of the authorities 
who rule the state…248 
                                                                                                                                     
military relations are available in: Sinan Meydan, Akli Kemal Book: 1, (the Mind of Kemal), Inkilap 
Press, 2015 p: 207-221. Also, for Atatürk’s strong opposition to the military’s politicisation in the 
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Similarly, for the establishment of Turkish Grand National Assembly on 23 April 
1920, Atatürk mentioned these words in a telegram: 
From this date (23 April 1923) on, the highest institution for both 
civilian and military authorities … to apply will be the Grand 
National Assembly…249 
Indeed, in a speech on 28 November 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
(later to be president) evaluated this telegram of Mustafa Kemal as evidence of 
Atatürk’s commitment to “public sovereignty” and his “anti-juntaist” opinions.250  
This is from another speech by Atatürk, made in Ankara in 1924, which clearly 
indicates what he thought about CIV-MIL relations: 
Keeping the military out of the political sphere in our country’s 
daily agenda (should be) an important principle of (our) republic, 
which has been (successfully) implemented until this day…251 
Accordingly, while the military officers were rapidly politicised during the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) era, he avoided involving himself in 
politics. While the military officers were increasing their influence in the party, 
Atatürk made a presentation at the annual congress of the CUP in Salonika in 1909; 
he stated that the military and the civilians must be separated for the good of both. 
He made a suggestion that the military officers must decide whether to stay in the 
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party as politicians, by resigning from the Army, or continue their military job by 
resigning from the party.252 Atatürk states that: 
The leaders of the CUP revolution, who … entered the government 
(after the revolution) … were our close friends. In the beginning 
(during the revolutions), we acted together (with the leaders of the 
movement). After the Revolution, we fall apart … (we warned them 
that) … we should not have been mixed in politics as army 
officers.253 
The same behaviour can be seen during the Liberation War. After moving to 
Anatolia to organise national resistance, he retired from the military and continued 
his obligation as “the chief of the Grand National Assembly”. Then, the Assembly 
assigned him to the position of “the commander in chief”. Once, in an interview, 
Murat Karayalcin implied that: “During the Liberation War, Atatürk took all the 
decisions under the inspection of the Public Assembly. Even his assignment to the 
position of commander in chief was implemented by the demand of the Assembly 
and by the majority of votes.”254 By the same token, on 21 January 1921, Atatürk had 
an interview with the secretary of the Soviet representation in Ankara, Upmal 
Angorsky. Angorsky criticised Atatürk for his determination of keeping the military 
out of politics, and Atatürk responded: 
I myself was interested in politics when I was in the military and I 
(saw) that this can be very risky ... Thus, I consider that the 
military completely should be separated from politics. If … the 
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military involves (itself) in politics, this may cause the emergence 
of (ideological) divisions (inside the military) … (Therefore) when 
a commander orders (a soldier) from the opposite (political 
ideology), that person can say that: ‘this order is conflicting with 
my (ideological thought), so I cannot obey this order’. (As a 
result), these (ideological conflicts) can slow the combative 
capacity of the military.255 
Atatürk’s certain determination in subordinating the military to civil rule continued 
after the foundation of the Republic. He stated that the military officers who served 
in the Assembly during the Liberation War had to choose between a military career 
and a political one. Thus, the officers who continued with their profession as soldiers 
resigned from their position in the Assembly. Additionally, Atatürk dressed only in 
civilian clothes during his presidency. He avoided dressing in military uniforms apart 
from some specific cases. Ismet Inonu also showed the same determination. Marshall 
Fevzi Cakmak retired from politics and continued his duty as the “Chief of the 
General Staff”. 
Consequently, there are clear evidences to demonstrate that Atatürk supported full 
separation of the military from politics.256 However, there is one recorded speech of 
Atatürk, in Konya (1931), which describes the military as the “true owner of the 
state” and “the guardian of the national ideals”. The original formation of that speech 
includes the following: 
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opinion of the political neutrality of the military see: Mango, Atatürk, 204.  
256 Momayezi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 3;60; Heper and Evin, State, Democracy, and the 
Military, 160. (The author argues that the Atatürkist tradition of separating the military from politics 
was broken with the 1960 coup, for the first time in the history of the Republic.)  
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The Turkish nation has … always looked to the military … as the 
leader of movements to achieve (its) lofty national ideals … When 
speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the 
Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country … (The) 
Turkish nation … considers its army the guardian of its ideals”.257 
How should one understand this speech when comparing it to the previous 
statements, which implied the separation of the military from politics? This speech 
has been discussed by some scholars who claim that Atatürk offered the duty of 
“guardianship of the revolutions” directly to the military. However, I consider that 
this speech does not evidence the suggestion that Atatürk demands an army that 
frequently interferes in civilian affairs. Indeed, in the speech, Atatürk does not 
mention “guardian of revolutions”, he only mentions “guardian of national ideals”, 
which debatably gives a softer meaning than guardianship, because the latter can also 
include defending national interests from external attacks. 
In this speech, Atatürk states that the Turkish nation looks to his army before starting 
a revolutionist attempt for achieving its “lofty ideals”. I consider that Atatürk does 
not want to say that the military should intervene in politics. Arguably, he refers to a 
well-known assumption that was embedded in national culture many centuries ago. 
This assumption is the belief in the military’s central role for nation building, and the 
role it had played in the foundation of the previous Turkish states. Perhaps, Atatürk 
wanted to preserve this unique national image of the military – at least symbolically 
– as a connective symbol. In this way, the strong links between the military and 
society would be protected, and the military would remain as the “symbolic” 
defender of republican ideals. Yet, Atatürk’s real ideas on this issue are observable in 
                                               




his sayings, writings, and practices. His actual purpose was to impose irrevocably a 
high democratic culture to the Turkish citizens, and make the Turkish regime 
completely civilian. In other words, after dominating society with a democratic 
conscience, the public could guard the Republic and secularism by using democratic 
mechanisms, and they would not need military support. But perhaps he thought that 
military power was still necessary, until the Turkish people adopted such a 
democratic conscience. Accordingly, if one looks at Atatürk’s ‘Speech to the Youth’ 
(Nutuk, 1927), Atatürk explicitly states that protecting the revolutions from the 
internal and external threats should be the civilians’ responsibility. The relevant 
passage in this speech states: “Even if all the national militaries were dispersed … 
the duty of protecting the revolutions and independence belongs to the Turkish 
Youth…”258 This shows that Atatürk considers that the duty of protecting the regime 
should belong to the civilians. I discuss that well-known speech of Atatürk’s broadly 
in the next part of this chapter, under the title “Concept of military-nation”. 
In summary, there are a considerable number of historical archives which support 
Atatürk’s commitment to civilian supremacy. He proved this both by his formal 
statements and by his practices. Hence, it may be historically doubtful to assert that 
Atatürk offered the “guardianship of the republic” to the military only by considering 
one piece of evidence, namely the Konya speech. Also, the Konya speech was 
directly made to officers; it is possible to take this speech as one of Atatürk’s 
“encouragement speeches” for a specific group of people, to grace them. As with all 
other founding politicians, Atatürk’s speeches and statements involve similar 
encouragements for different sections of society, including women, villagers, 
                                               
258 Atatürk, ‘Genclige Hitabe’ (the Speech to the Youth) in Nutuk, 1927 
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artisans, policemen, teachers, and musicians.
259
 Therefore, I will finish this section 
by giving the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Karayalcin’s view on the 
matter: 
We need to evaluate that speech under the conditions of those 
years. We know that he explicitly left the duty of protecting the 
Republic to the younger generations (in the ‘Speech to the Youth’). 
How many political leaders gave such an inheritance to his nation? 
He makes a legacy for the Turkish young. If he was thinking that 
the military has a guardianship mission as it was argued by some 
“anti-Atatürkist” academics, he could mention that for the 
military.260 
3.3.3.3 Analysis 
During his lifetime and after his death, the military ethoi (at least officially) were 
embedded in Atatürk’s ideas.261 Whenever the military intervened in politics the 
military authorities stated that the military’s duty is “protecting the principles of 
Atatürk which are regulated in the constitution”. Hence, it is possible to say that 
there are both written and unwritten rules upon which the military relies for 
legitimacy. Unwritten rules, principally, are based on people’s aforementioned 
assumptions about the military and the idea of army-nation .262 The written ones, on 
                                               
259 For instance: Atatürk made a similar encouragement speech to the students of Faculty of Law in 
Ankara University by stating that they are the guardians of the Republic. See: Sinan Meydan, Akli 
Kemal 5 (The Kemalist Mentality 5), Inkilap Press, 2015. 
260 Interview, Murat Karayalcin (June 2014). 
261 Atatürk’s principles have been independently analysed in a separate chapter. 
262The adjustment of Article 35, the National Security Council, OYAK, and other aspects which give 
the military political and economic autonomous will be discussed in the following chapters in detail. 
See: Frederic Misrahi, ‘The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces: An Analysis of 
Recent Developments in Turkey’, Perspectives: Review of International Affairs, No.22, 2004: 27. (In 
the article, it is argued that the military’s main power comes from public support, not from the legal 
procedures; therefore, he argues that the military will remain more powerful than the civilians as a 
result of this unconditioned public support.) For the privileges that benefit the military from the 
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the other hand, are to be found in Article 35, the National Security Council, OYAK, 
YAS (High Military Council), and financial privileges.263 In particular, the creation 
of OYAK (Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension Fund) is important for 
understanding military autonomy and the military’s assumed role as the “nation-
builder”. The foundation of OYAK as a military-industrial complex increased the 
military’s influence in politics by turning it into a major capital power.264  
By the 1960 intervention, the revolutionist tendency of the military gave way to a 
relatively more conservative attitude; but formally they continued to define their 
ideology as Kemalism.265 Normally, guardianship can be seen as the continuation of 
revolutionism. Having been the motor force of the Turkish revolutionism, the 
military officers have always been very sensitive for the continuity of the regime 
they have created (at least rhetorically).266 During the rules of Atatürk and Inonu the 
military had appeared apolitical, but the revolutionists had not yet faced a serious 
opposition. However, after witnessing several “counter-revolutionary” 
implementations during the rule of Democrat Party, the military authorities began to 
involve itself in politics. 
                                                                                                                                     
OYAK see: Gerassimos Karabelias, ‘Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil–Military Relations in the 
Post‐Özal Decade, 1993-2003’, Turkish Studies, 9, No.3, 2008: 466; Demirel, ‘Soldiers and 
Civilians’, 130; Gerassimos Karabelias, ‘The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War 
Turkey, 1980-95’, Middle Eastern Studies, 35, No.4, 1999: 140, 142; İlhan Uzgel, ‘Between 
Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Turkish Yearbook 
of International Relations, 34, 2003: 183-184.  
263 Principally, there are three articles which give the military privilege and political autonomy. These 
are: 
1) Article 35 of the military’s internal service act: ‘The military is responsible for defending both the 
Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution’. (That article has been 
changed under AKP rule, limiting the military’s role as ‘defending the nation from external threats’). 
2) Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces: ‘Turkish Armed Forces 
shall defend the country against the internal as well as the external threats, if necessary by force.’ 
 3) Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution: The MGK (National Security Council) ‘shall submit to the 
Council of Ministers its recommendations against the internal and external security of the country’ 
(and it became obligatory for the government to give priority to the military’s recommendations in the 
MGK; however, under AKP rule, the contexts of these articles changed in favour of the civilians). For 
the institutional privileges of the Turkish military see: Kuru (2012): 43-44. 
264 For a detailed analysis see: p, 243-44. 
265 For instance see: Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 129. 
266 Interview with Aydin Kalpakci, June 2014. 
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Political involvement from the military moderately continued until the second term 
of the AKP government, at which point they slowly began to become depoliticised. 
The beginning of depoliticisation can be shown in the military’s statement of 27 
April 2007. Following that declaration, the political influence of the military rapidly 
decreased.267 Since 2011, particularly during Necdet Ozel’s tenure as Chief of the 
General Staff, the military’s depoliticised status became more evident. They have not 
given any political statements or made comment, apart from in relation to minor 
events. They have usually worked in harmony with the government in domestic and 
foreign issues. The best indicator of that case was the military’s silence during the 
big Istanbul Gezi (Parki) protests against the government, and the corruption 
allegations toward Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in 2013. On the other hand, given 
the reasons that have been discussed in Chapter 1, associating this recent process 
with professionalism can be misleading. Hence, I defined the third and last stage of 
military culture as ‘depoliticisation’. 
In general, this section has discussed Atatürk’s basic ideas about the art of soldiery, 
military culture, and civil-military relations. Atatürk’s ideas about military culture 
show some similarities with Prussian military culture as regards discipline and 
professionalism. This is important in order to understand the parallelism between 
Atatürk’s and Huntington’s ideas, because in the The Soldier and the State 
Huntington gives the Prussian military ethic as a worthwhile example of 
professionalism. Accordingly, Atatürk was raised under the same discipline, because 
the Ottoman military academies had taken the Prussian model as an example. Atatürk 
argues that the officer should have a good level of education, and should be aware of 
                                               
267 There are several reasons for this political isolation; one of them is the alleged coup plots aimed to 
overthrow the government that led the arresting of top military commanders. That process is discussed 
in Chapter 7: The AKP Era. 
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the latest developments in science and technology. He should act rationally and 
positively without considering his emotional concerns, and should make the most 
logical decisions during warfare. 
Lastly, Atatürk’s ideas and practices show his commitment to civilian supremacy. 
Hence, Huntington’s and Atatürk’s ideas about that issue have many similarities. 
Atatürk explicitly mentioned in his famous ‘Speech to the Youth’ that guardianship 
of revolutions should be the civilians’ duty. Therefore, the military’s later 
politicisation cannot be based on Atatürk’s personality. 
3.4 MILITARY AND SOCIETY: THE CONCEPT OF 
MILITARY-NATION 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Military-nation is a term often used by the civil and military authorities to refer to the 
assumed cultural linkage between society and military.268 It can be seen as a formula 
that describes the unwritten roots of military legitimacy. The concept has often been 
applied by both civil and military authorities to motivate people to join the military 
during times of warfare. Hence, particularly anti-militarist and liberal intellectuals 
tend to use “military-nation” in a negative sense. For instance, Ayse Gul Altinay 
(1971) defines military-nation as a “myth” for giving society a militarist character. 
Additionally, that concept is used by the authorities to show an emotional contact 
between the Turkish society and military. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
term while analysing the acts of the Turkish military.269  
In any case, the military-nation idea puts the military in a separate place from the 
people. Hence, the military has always been “the most trusted organisation” in the 
                                               
268 Yusuf Oguzoglu, ‘The formation of modernism in the Turkish military culture by the cooperation 
of military and nation’ in: Turkish Army from the Foundation, Declarations from the 12th Military 
History Symposium-1, Ankara: The Presidency of General Staff, 2009: 56-57. 
269 Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 139. 
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eyes of the people. Arguably, one reason behind this love and trust is the importance 
that is given to militarist values by the nation. Additionally, the military’s role in 
history increases its importance for the people, because it played a key role in 
preserving the Turkish culture and language from outside threats, by using “original 
Turkish” as the only spoken language inside the military.270 Lastly, given the 
birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002), the military’s role in the 
Liberation War and Atatürk’s heritage further strengthened the ties between society 
and the military.
271
 Therefore, this thesis argues that the real political legitimacy of 
the Turkish military comes from the so-called roles and meanings that Turkish 
society has imposed on the military centuries ago. Due to the aforementioned 
historical reasons, the officers have, perhaps, had more confidence on state matters 
than the civilians. Indeed, perhaps this case has made the absorption of democratic 
culture harder for the people, due to their assumed dependency of military 
leadership. Relatedly, the military has continued to preserve its place as “the last and 
the ultimate resolution of the problems”. The former Chief of the General Staff Ilker 
Basbug mentions this case with these words: 
The Turkish military is not getting its power from its weapons but 
from the Turkish society’s love and trust in its armed forces.272 
This speech, and others by the generals, claims a strong cultural link between the 
military and the society. That is why the officers assert unwritten legitimacies behind 
the interventions. Accordingly, when one investigates the military interventions in 
Turkey, it can easily be observed that the military’s main concern was always the 
people’s reaction, because the military mostly restricted itself from political 
                                               
270 Ilber Ortayli, Europe and Us, Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Press, 2010: 165. 
271 For Atatürk’s connective symbolism between the military and society see: Finer (2002): 194. 
272 “Org. Ilker Basbug’un Genelkurmay Baskanligi Devir-Teslim Toreni Konusmasi” [“Gen Basbug’s 
Speech at the General Staff Handover Ceremony”], http://www.tsk.mil.tr (accessed: August 28, 2008). 
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involvements that did enjoy a remarkable public support. To maintain that public 
support, the military authorities make every effort to keep the military-nation idea 
alive.273 Yet, it may be beneficial to notice that, there is currently a serious decline in 
public support for junta rule. 
The examples of militarism can be observed in every section of the society. There are 
famous public sayings, such as “Every Turk born as soldier”, which can be heard in 
the military trainings.274 Another ancient idiom describes “horse, women (wife) and 
weapon” as the most important things for a Turkish man. Even when the Turkish 
military showed direct or indirect praetorian behaviours, Turkish society still 
continued to praise the military, and this was considered as a “public confirmation” 
by the military authorities.275 Hence, it is possible to notice that military culture and 
national culture have been in strong interaction since the time of the early Turks. 
Indeed, it may be hard to analyse them independently from each other. Some 
scholars go so far as to argue that military culture shaped Turkish culture and created 
its most important tenets.276 The ex-Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu 
notes: 
The Turks who are known as a “military-nation” won many 
victories through history and founded many states…277 
                                               
273 Demirel, ‘The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene’, 269-71. 
274 Ayse Gul Altinay, ‘‘Askerlik Yapmayana Adam Denmez”: Zorunlu Askerlik, Erkeklik ve 
Vatandaslik (“One cannot be a real man before completing military service”: Compulsory Military 
Service, Manhood and Citizenship)’, in: Men’s Nation, Soldier’s Nation, Istanbul: Iletisim Press, 
2013, p.205. Also for the importance of being an officer during the later years of the Ottoman Empire 
and the mass mobilisation for total war during the Liberation War, see: Nuran Yildiz, Tanks and 
Words, Alfa Press, 2nd ed., 2010, p.17-18; Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 140. 
275Ilhan Uzgel, Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign 
Policy, p: 183. 
276 Abidin Unal, Turkish Army from the Foundation, Declarations from the 12th Military History 
Symposium-1, Ankara: The Presidency of General Staff, 2009, pp.2-3. 
277 Quoted in: Ayse Gul Altinay, ibid.: 326. 
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In conclusion, there may be significant criteria which affect people’s general opinion 
toward militaries such as: “social characteristics, education, ideological beliefs, 
national and individual identities”.278 Although social and economic status is 
important to a certain extent, different factors can also be effective. In some cases, 
warrior traditions in societies and the meanings that they give to military objects may 
cause these societies to deeply associate themselves with their militaries, which can 
rarely be seen in the Western societies today. Conversely, in the anti-militarist 
societies, there are strong criticisms against warlike symbols, which create a distance 
between the militaries and the societies.279 Perhaps, the close ties between Turkish 
society and military culture can be explained with these sociological realities. 
3.4.2 Historical Background and Atatürk’s Contributions 
The first use of the term military-nation in history was in a book published in 
England in 1803, where it is used with a negative sense.280 The term was first used in 
the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s. A newspaper known as Tasvir-i Efkar described 
the Ottoman nation as a “combatant nation”. After a while, the term was used to 
show that the military was the nature of the Turkish nation, and, therefore, each Turk 
at the same time had to have the basic characteristics of the military.
281
 
After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the military-nation concept gained a 
new and stronger meaning, because the Turkish Liberation War was a public 
mobilisation.282 Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and with his 
                                               
278 Salih Akyurek at al. (2014): 210. 
279 Venesson Pascal, ‘Civil Military Relations in France: Is There a Gap?’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol.26, No.2, June 2003: 20-42. 
280 The book was titled The French Considered as a Military Nation Since the Commencement of 
Their Revolution. It discusses the formation of conscript army in France and its possible consequences 
on Britain (See: Altinay, 1971: 14). 
281 In Nutuk, Atatürk defines military as the ‘source’ national institution. 
282 See: Ahmet Emin Yaman, ‘Kuvayimilliyeden Duzenli Orduya Gecis ve Ordu-Millet Dayanismasi’ 
(Transition to Formal Army from Guerrilla and the Cooperation of Military and Nation) in: Turkish 
118 
 
imposition of Tekalifi Milliye (the national taxes), a great majority of both male and 
female citizens supported the military in the war, either by actively joining or by 
giving background support. The designers of the military-nation concept gave the 
military a special position, given its role as nation builder.283 Accordingly, retired 
general Omer Bayrakli noted: 
The close connections with the military and the citizens stem from 
the total warfare of the nation under Atatürk’s leadership. The 
Tekalifi Milliye orders enabled the people to join the war. By this 
way, the civilians were partnered to the Republic, war and security. 
Almost all of the logistical supports behind the front-lines during 
the war were made by the civilians. Turks are the nation that best 
makes these kinds of battles and that is the thing that created the 
military culture.284 
After the foundation of the Republic, Atatürk made several references to the military-
nation idea, in both Nutuk and Vatandas icin Medeni Bilgiler (Civilised Knowledge 
for Citizens) as well as in the Turkish History Thesis. For instance, the extracts from 
speeches below clearly show Atatürk’s depictions of Turkey as a military-nation: 
We are a military-nation. From ages seven to seventy, women and 
men alike, we have been created soldiers …285 
                                                                                                                                     
Army from the Foundation, Declarations from the 12th Military History Symposium-1, Ankara: The 
Presidency of General Staff, 2009. 
283Ahmet T. Kuru, ‘The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, 
and Communism’, Insight Turkey, Vol.14, No.2, 2012: 37-57, p.41. 
284 Interview, Omer Bayrakli, 09. 07. 2014. 
285 Altinay (1971): 14. 
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Our nation is a country of two things: soldiers and farmers. We are 
a nation which is capable of raising excellent soldiers and 
farmers…286 
Hence, Atatürk argued that military culture and national culture should go hand in 
hand and should not be separated from each other.287 Furthermore, Atatürk 
generalises that argument by considering that the military cultures and civil cultures 
of nations are strictly tied with each other: 
 War is not just a battle between two militaries but a battle between 
their nations. War is an exam for the societies with their all 
members and their practices in the field of science and 
technology.288 
To that extent, several scholars – including Altinay, Ozkan, Morin, and Lee – 
consider that Atatürk constructed the necessary “myths” for creating a nation state 
during the 1930s. The most important of these myths was, they argue, the concept of 
“military-nation”. The concept was created to demonstrate a close connection 
between the military, national feelings, and revolutions. Articles and history books 
were reshaped for the education programme with the motifs of the concept of 
military-nation, the heroism of Turks, and their warrior characteristics. These motifs 
were designed with religious attributions and the importance of being martyrs.289 The 
history books described the Turks brought up as “soldiers” and “heroes” by giving 
                                               
286 Atatürk, The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk: Vol.2, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre, 1997, 
p.135. 
287 Nurseli Yesim Sunbuloglu, ‘Giris: Turkiye’de Militarizm, Milliyetcilik ve Erkek(lik)lere Dair Bir 
Cerceve’ (Introduction: A Frame of Militarism, Nationalism and Manhood in Turkey) in: Men’s 
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the prophet Muhammed’. For being a martyr, see: A. Kadir Varoglu and Adnan Bicaksiz, 
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references to the ancient Turks in Central Asia. Warrior culture was defined as a 
characteristic that can only be seen in the Turkish societies, not in the other nomadic 
ones.290 Faik Turkmen, a lecturer in the military schools during those years, defines 
this case with these words: 
We are a nationalist and soldier state before everything else. 
Nationalism and soldiery are the real basics of the Turkish soul. 
Turks admire … war scenes, heroic music, horses and the sounds 
of swords.291 
Some authors argue that Atatürk applied the military-nation concept in Nutuk (1927) 
during his “construction of Turkish nationality” with arguments such as: “Turks have 
always been free and independent and they prefer death to subjugation”.292 
Accordingly, Morin and Lee (2013) argue that Nutuk is a typical example of the 
nation state construction, because it creates all the required narratives for that kind of 
construction, such as the “myth” of a military-nation: “Your first duty is to forever 
protect and defend Turkish independence”. Atatürk defines Turks as “historically 
military people” who are “born soldiers” and “ready to make ultimate sacrifice”. 
Atatürk mentions that the Turkish people should live in “honour and dignity”, and 
that this can be achieved only by “complete independence”. “A nation deprived of its 
independence cannot go further than being a slave in the eyes of the civilised world, 
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Turks have never been in such a humiliating state in history and it is better for such a 
nation to be perished than to be a slave, if so Independence or Death!”293 
3.4.2.1 Atatürk’s ‘Speech to the Youth’ 
As has been mentioned in the previous section, the ‘Speech to the Youth’ included 
clear evidence that, according to Atatürk, the “protection of the Republic” should 
belong to civilians. The ‘Speech to the Youth’ is a quite well-known speech in 
Turkey. It is normally the final part of Nutuk. Most citizens learn and memorise the 
speech during the earlier years of school life. Indeed, it is possible to encounter that 
speech in every corner of Turkey including schools, colleges, universities, state 
institutions, private properties, and businesses, as well as the military establishments, 
barracks, and ordinary citizens’ homes. 
In the last pages of Nutuk, after explaining the reasons for and the story of the 
Turkish Liberation War, Atatürk draws a conclusion that the new Turkish Republic 
cannot be left to the hands of “the Sheikhs, dervishes, murids (different ranks within 
religious brotherhoods), fortune-tellers, wizards, tomb guardians”. He maintains that 
“a nation which leaves its destiny to the hands of superstitions” cannot reach to “the 
level of contemporary civilisations”, and remains as “primitive”. Nutuk continues 
with the words “I present this Republic as a ‘gift’ to the younger generations”. Then 
he finishes Nutuk with the ‘Speech to the Youth’.294 In that final part, he suggests that 
the same conditions during the Independence War can emerge again in the future. If 
that happens, he warns the new generations to defend the Republic by implying that 
the Turkish young have a “noble blood”. Usage of unifying and motivating rhetorics, 
or applying to mythical expressions such as “noble blood”, is a common case during 
                                               
293 Atatürk, Nutuk, p.9-10; quoted in: Morin and Lee, ibid.: 493. 
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the construction of nationalism within modern terms. Hence, I specifically discussed 
the scholarly debate related to the usage of myths and symbols to construct the 
perception of “self” and “others” in Chapter 4. On the other hand, for the purpose of 
this chapter, this speech shows us Atatürk’s personal desire for making civilians the 
primary and ultimate protectors of the regime. Also, the speech explicitly suggests 
that the “true owners of the Republic” should be “civilians”, not the “military”. His 
words “(Even when) all of the (nation’s) armies were dispersed … O! (Turkish 
Youth) … your duty is saving the Turkish Republic and independence” are 
especially remarkable for the purpose of this thesis: 
If some day again you are compelled to defend the Republic and 
independence, you shall not waste time assessing the possibilities 
and circumstances of the situation … (Because) the enemies … may 
have an unprecedented victory… All the castles of the holy nation 
may be captured, all the shipyards occupied, all its armies 
dispersed and every part of the country invaded … O, Turkish 
youth! Even under these circumstances your duty is saving the 
Turkish independence and Republic. The strength you need is 
already embedded in your noble blood.295 
3.4.3 The Impacts of Compulsory Military Service 
Throughout the foundation of the Republic, the concept of military-nation has been 
dominated by several assumptions, such as “prioritising the nation over everything; 
even than parents and family” and “sacrifice oneself if necessary for the benefits of 
the country”.296 To indicate how military service is important for the people, it can be 
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worthwhile to mention the citizens’ perspective on military service. Predominantly, a 
number of citizens who come from rural areas consider military service as the most 
important aspect of their lives.297 They believe that a man must complete his duty of 
military service to become “a real man”. It is very common to observe people who 
send their son, friend, or relative to the military with traditional celebrations. The 
people cover their vehicles with the Turkish flags and chant “Our soldier is the 
greatest soldier”.298 Some of them may even fire guns into the air. Compulsory 
military service enables the military to bring together all types of citizens, of 
different status, ideologies, and regions, equally, under one flag. Accordingly, the 
removal of class differences, ideological conflicts, and status within military barracks 
builds the core of the military-nation idea.299  
It is a fact that military service can be a school for the people who live in rural areas: 
they socialise, learn how to read and write, how to eat in public, and how to live 
under discipline.300 Therefore, when they come back to their family, they are 
regarded as “a real man” who is ready to marry and to be “the leader of the 
family”.301 There is a famous idiom that goes “nobody gives his daughter to a man 
who has not completed the military service for marrying”.302 In addition to this, it is 
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quite usual that a mother and a father say “Long live the homeland” after they have 
lost their son in a war when he was in the military service.303 
As a summary, some states tend to implement civilian control over their militaries 
without much effort. Nevertheless, some nations, like Turkey, can inject special roles 
to their military beyond security, such as “modernism” and “development”, as a 
result of their inherited characteristics. In these types of states, military culture 
becomes more autonomous and interventionist in political affairs. In Turkey, most 
cases such as secularism, foreign policy, education, and social problems are 
considered within the circle of security; therefore, drawing the roles of civilians and 
the military can cause confusion.304 As has been mentioned, the traditions and 
cultural values of Turkey have enabled the military to have a big influence on 
political matters. Thus, the military became the primary actor of modernisation, from 
the middle of the nineteenth century, during the Ottoman Empire, and this role 
strengthened during the Republic. Due to this basic role, society has always had a 
deep respect toward the military, regarding it as the most trustable institution within 
the state.305 
3.4.4 Public Support 
According to the public surveys, people’s trust in the military has always remained 
higher in Turkey than it has for all other institutions. After the latest events, such as 
the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, there has been remarkable decline in the level of 
trust, but still the military retains its position as the most trustable organisation within 
Turkey. Eurobarometer surveys demonstrate that the public trust for the military was 
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89 per cent in 2004, although it declined to 70 per cent in 2010.306 Additionally, 
Bilgesam’s survey in 2013 suggests that the public trust for the military was 
approximately 64 per cent. That shows that, despite a considerable decrease in the 
findings compared to previous years, the military is still the most trusted organisation 
in Turkey, by a large margin. Yet, Ahmet T. Kutu (2012) claims that one reason for 
the high level of trust can be the military’s lack of accountability, which made the 
generals more trustable compared to the politicians. He argues that the decline in the 
level of trust after the Ergenekon and Balyoz prosecutions proves that idea.307 
However, even if one believes that Kuru is right, one should recognise that public 
support is still strong for the military, despite all the coup prosecutions, detentions, 
and arrests.308 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
As was briefly referenced in the introductory section, this chapter has made three 
main contributions to the thesis. Firstly, it has outlined the main ethoi of Turkish 
military culture. Turkish military culture can be summarised as the combination of 
several factors, including: the idea of military-nation; the revolutionist legacy of the 
Young Turks; Atatürk’s legacy; the Islamic legacy; and other collective military 
ethoi, namely ideas, rituals, symbols, and beliefs, which are common across all 
militaries, such as self-sacrificing, altruism, being sceptical to politicians, and routine 
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practices. Especially, the Turkish military’s sceptical legacy toward politicians has 
made it politically keen and active until recent years, in that the officers still were not 
inclined to trust the politicians’ sincerity in commitment to national interests and 
Atatürkist ideals. Additionally, members of the military have tended to be suspicious 
about civilians’ capability to rule, due to the lack of discipline in civil life. That line 
of consideration became an important point that prevented the military from stepping 
back from politics. 
The second contribution of the chapter is related to Atatürk’s ideas about the relevant 
issues. Atatürk’s ideas about officership and military culture have many similarities 
with Huntington’s pragmatic views, in that Atatürk sees officership as a combination 
of passion for heroism, altruism, rationality, and scientific and technological 
superiority, as well as strong obedience. Yet, one interesting point that separates 
Atatürk from Huntington’s pragmatism is Atatürk’s strong emphasis on ethical and 
moral considerations. That is to say, Atatürk argues that, apart from being a man of 
reason and mind, the officer should have a strong level of moral and ethical values in 
peacetime, and he should consider himself as the defender of national peace and 
order. Atatürk’s ideas about war evidence this fact, in that he ponders that war can 
only be legitimate if there is a need to defend the nation; otherwise, it becomes 
murder and slaughter. Lastly, Atatürk’s relevant ideas, statements, and practices 
about civil-military relations indicate that he believed in the necessity of military 
depoliticisation, and its subordination to civilians for a sustainable parliamentary 
regime. Indeed, it is possible to find a similarity between Huntington’s professional 
military mind and Atatürk’s ideas. 
The last contribution of the chapter is related to the military-nation idea – the 
assumed linkage between the military and society. The dominancy of militarist 
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values in society, due to the reasons that have been mentioned above, gave the 
military a core position in Turkey’s national politics. The roles and meanings that 
have been imposed on the military centuries ago caused them to remain in a 
politically active position. Indeed, in most of the previous Turkish states, we may see 
that the military has been in the founder and the ruler positions. This reality was also 
mentioned by Atatürk, in that he defined the military as the core and basis of the 
national institution and the guider of national ideals. Additionally, given the 
birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002), the military’s role as the nation 
builder during the Liberation War gave it an unwritten legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people. 
In summary, this chapter has been a foundation for the empirical chapters by 
exploring the main ethoi that create military culture. In the next chapter, Atatürk’s 
principles will be discussed by taking into account their academic foundations and 
their relationships with the military discourse. By doing this, the aim is to illustrate 
the ties between the martial ethoi and Kemalist principles, insofar as they have been 
used as the main reasons behind military interventions. So, by analysing the 
Atatürkist principles, we have two goals: firstly, to understand whether or not the 
military discourse was consistent, while showing Atatürk’s principles as a 
justification for their interventions; secondly, to identify the main theoretical terms 




CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF 
ATATÜRK’S PRINCIPLES AND MILITARY’S 
RHETORIC 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter looked at the dynamics of Turkish military culture as well as 
the reasons behind the Turkish military’s political character. It also argued the 
importance of Atatürk and Atatürkist ideals, as the symbolic and ideological ethos of 
military culture. This chapter will continue to define Turkish military culture by 
offering a conceptual analysis of Atatürk’s principles. Indeed, Kemalist principles 
have not only been a type of “military ideology” in their discourse, but they have 
also represented the founding philosophy of the Turkish state. It is even possible to 
consider Atatürk’s principles as the formal state ideology. Principally, the formal 
character of the regime in Turkey has been based on these principles, namely 
Republicanism, Secularism (Laicism), Nationalism, Populism, Statism, and 
Revolutionism.
309
 Especially, secularism, nationalism, and republicanism are referred 
to as the “unchangeable principles” of the regime. Indeed, any suggestion to change 
these principles is defined as a “crime”, according to the Turkish constitution.310 
By referring to Article 35 of their Internal Service Act, the army authorities have 
often interfered in state affairs, either directly or indirectly.
311
 The article gives the 
military the responsibility of protecting the Turkish constitution (especially the 
aforementioned principles) from internal and external enemies. Article 35 was 
prepared by the ruling junta following the 1960 coup d’état. Additionally, by creating 
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the National Security Council (NSC), the military authorities had a legal tool for 
involvement in the execution process. The NSC is a combination of civilian and 
military authorities to discuss and decide the fundamental domestic and foreign 
security issues. After each military intervention, the military’s powers were increased 
in the Council. The main domestic security problem has been indicated as the 
“threats against Atatürk’s principles”, namely excessive ideologies such as political 
Islam and the Kurdish separation movement. Yet, the legal powers of the military 
have been restricted by the AKP government, under the guidance of European Union 
Progress Reports. Accordingly, the military has lost most of its legal foundations to 
claim protection of Atatürk’s principles.312 
After Atatürk’s death, the military protected its subordinated position until the 1950s. 
Although there had been several juntaist attempts up to that point, the civilian regime 
continued without a break until the 1960 coup d’état. Following the coup, the 
military intervened in democracy on four occasions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997). 
During these interventions, the military prepared radical regulations to establish 
supervision over the civilians. The major motivation behind the interventions was 
described as protecting Kemalist principles.
313
 Relatedly, the military authorities 
have rebuffed all charges of breaching democracy by referring to their “constitutional 
responsibility”. 
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This chapter has four targeted contributions. Firstly, it will discuss Atatürk’s 
principles by investigating their conceptual backgrounds. That is to say, the chapter 
will define relevant principles by taking into account Atatürk’s writings, speeches, 
and practices. The second contribution of the chapter is to explore the similarities 
and differences between the Atatürkist and foreign interpretations of the relevant 
terms. The third contribution is to argue whether or not the military was consistent 
while embedding their interventions into a Kemalist legacy. The final contribution is 
to make a brief introduction to the empirical process, because starting from the next 
chapter these terms will occasionally be used while analysing civil-military relations. 
Additionally, these terms will be the main framework of the analytical tables in 
empirical chapters. 
4.2 FIRST PRINCIPLE: SECULARISM 
4.2.1 Conceptual Clarification: 
Before analysing the secularism in Turkey and its relationship with democratisation 
and modernisation, it may be beneficial to observe two different views in the 
literature, one of which considers a direct relationship between secularism and 
modernism and the other that objects to this. Actually, as a dictionary term, 
secularism comes from the Latin word saeculum, which means “of the world”, 
developed as a reaction to “of the church”; in other words, being secular can be 
defined as “creating distance between the matters of religion and the matters of the 
world”.314 The leading scholar in this field Peter Berger (1967) explained 
secularisation as “a process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from 
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the domination of religious institutions and symbols”.315 In this regard, Berger 
defined this process as a gradual penetration to the society and institutions in which 
people become more aware of the world and organise their life without expecting any 
benefit from the promises of religion.
316
 In other words, secularism might be defined 
as an instrument that puts forward the idea that moral rules can be shaped logically, 
without regard to religious doctrines.
317
  
Related to this, Andrew Davison (2003) argues that secularism is applied by 
materialists, humanists, atheists, and antitheists to outline a very different worldview, 
which is sharply different to religious explanations. He argues that the term secular 
may have a negative relationship with religion and religiosity because it divorces the 
religious doctrines and the idea of god from human conscience and behaviour, for a 
realistic outlook on items such as social norms, customs, art, education, ideology, 
law, and politics.
318
 In accordance with this, there are various definitions of 
secularism drawing sharp lines between state and religion. For instance: a 
contemporary scholar Azzam Tamimi (2000) defines secularism as “a certain theory 
of life and conduct without reference to a deity or a future life”.319 John Keane also 
argues that secularists are the people who believe that “Church and the world are 
caught up in an historical struggle in which slowly, irreversibly worldliness is getting 
the upper hand”.320 By looking at these definitions, it is fair to summarise that 
secularism aims to liberate worldly matters such as art, science, education, politics, 
law, and social life from the impact of religion, for the good of both. But, given the 
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existence of more than one religion, there are questions of defining what “religious” 
means and how far the religion can penetrate into the worldly area. Because of this, 
as will be discussed presently, the questions of what “secular” means and how far it 
can limit religion also remain unanswered.  
In this regard, Berger offers two models of secularism, one of them more democratic 
and the other one stricter: objective and subjective. Berger defines objective 
secularism as an institutional separation in which religion is entirely isolated from 
state departments. In this model, the state controls the society by employing positive 
and secular regulations. Therefore, the concept of nation state develops as the main 
institutional instrument of the state, instead of the supranational religious unity 
(known as “ummet” in Islam) to keep citizens together.321 On the other hand, 
subjective secularism analyses the case on a more individualistic basis. In this model, 
the individual understands the world and tries to find solutions to problems in a 
pragmatic way. Also, in his/her social relations with others, he/she chooses a 
positivist/scientific approach.  
At this point, Berger suggested a secularisation theory by considering a positive 
relationship between secularisation and modernisation. According to this suggestion, 
while the people’s interest in worldly matters including science, art, and philosophy 
was being increased, religion would slowly be disappeared from social and 
individual spheres. Berger explained this case as “secularisation of consciousness” 
by which he argues “secularism may be observed in the decline of religious contents 
in the arts, in philosophy, in literature … in the rise of science as an autonomous, 
thoroughly secular perspective on the world … Moreover, the process of 
secularisation has a subjective side as well. As there is a secularisation of society and 
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culture, so is there a secularisation of consciousness”.322 In a similar way, another 
scholar Jose Casanova (1994), suggested that the decline of religion would occur in 
three steps: (1) “the increasing structural differentiation of social spaces resulting in 
the separation of religion from politics, economy, science, and so on”; (2) “the 
privatisation of religion within its own space”; and (3) “the declining social 
significance of religious belief, commitment, and institutions”.323 This approach 
contends that if societies become more modern, simultaneously the level of religious 
beliefs and practices declines, and the impact of religion on social and political life 
disappears. 
On the other hand, there are scholars who have challenged the modernisation theory 
by arguing that it is not always possible to find a direct relationship between 
secularism and modernisation. Interestingly, one of these scholars is the principal 
builder of the secularisation theory, Peter Berger. Berger later changed his idea by 
declaring that he was wrong, because, although there is improvement in science, 
philosophy, and the arts, religion still preserves its influence.
324
 Actually, there are 
two criticisms against the secularisation theory that need to be clarified. The first 
issue is the uncertainty of the concept. In the academic literature, there is not a 
universally accepted definition of ‘secularism’. Instead, one is quite likely to 
encounter different definitions. As was argued by Thomas Mitchell (2000), “the 
meaning of the term secular” is not something self-evident or universal.325 Hence, 
Rajeev Bhargava (1998) argues that secularism can be “interpreted differently at 
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different times”.326 Indeed, due to the existence of many different religions and due 
to the absence of a universal definition of what religion and religious mean, it is 
perfectly normal that there can be many different definitions of secularism that are 
not universally accepted. Secondly, due to the non-existence of a universal 
definition, the term can easily be constructed and interpreted according to the 
political benefits. Indeed, there is a view that considers secularism as a Western myth 
for othering the developing states and for indicating the West as a modernised and 
civilised role model to imitate.
327
 According to the critical scholar Scott Thomas 
(2005), religion and secularism are indeed invented myths of liberalism, which claim 
a universal validity to guide non-Western developing states for progress, 
modernisation, and developing.  
Indeed, there are strong evidences that oblige us to consider that Thomas is right. In 
other words, the United States and other Western states claim to be secular but still 
they apply to religious references when needed for their political interests. The 
existence of the Christian Democrats can be supportive evidence to this. In addition 
to this, there are religious references in the legal American regulations that, in fact, 
should be secular, such as the court cases, state departments, wedding ceremonies, 
and even the statement ‘in God we trust’ on the dollar. Most importantly, the 
President of the “secular” United States George W. Bush applied religious terms 
after the 11 September attacks to legitimise his operation to Iraq as a war against 
“evil”.328  
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To sum up, the definition of secularism is contested and changes from one case to 
another. The main purpose of secularism is to separate worldly matters such as 
education, law, science, social life, and the arts from the impact of religion. 
However, the boundaries of this limitation are highly blurry and contested. As long 
as there is not a universal answer of what is religious and what is not, the definition 
of secularism will continue to experience a similar paradox. Yet, basically, there is a 
view offering a positive relationship between secularism and modernism and there is 
another view that opposes this. In the next part, we will discuss which one of these 
two views better explains the Turkish case by taking into account the importance of 
secularism for Turkish modernisation and military culture.  
4.2.2 Secularism in Turkey 
The principle of secularism has always been considered the most vital element of 
Turkish modernism. Especially, the founding father Atatürk prepared all the 
revolutions according to this principle. Indeed, the nationalism principle, at one 
point, served as a tool for achieving secularism by breaking ties with the Islamic 
world and the concept of ummet.
329
 Furthermore, Atatürk and the later junta leaders 
saw the secularism principle as being part and parcel of a democratic regime. At this 
point, we have already seen that there are two different views, one of which suggests 
a positive relationship with secularism and modernism and the other that opposes 
this. To see the role and importance that was given to secularism during the 
foundation of modern Turkey, it is necessary to observe history.  
The first secularisation movements in Turkey date back to the last centuries of the 
Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was officially considered an Islamic state. Sharia 
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law was dominant in political, social, civil, and cultural spheres.
 330
 Sharia was based 
on three main resources, namely the Koran, Hadith (The Prophet’s sayings) and icma 
(the interpretations of the religious authorities). Particularly after the seventeenth 
century, a series of defeats against the Western military powers, territory losses, and 
economic deadlocks led the Ottoman elites to produce reform plans. In the following 
process, the impact of religion on state matters began to be lessened; however, that 
change was not revealed to the people in the very beginning. The first official and 
strong reaction against the belief that “religion could administer all of the worldly 
matters” came with the Tanzimat. Tanzimat was a decree by the Sultan in 1839 that 
was influenced by the Western system, considering that the rapidly changing world 
conditions could not be handled by the old religious principles. Tanzimat included 
several reforms that were carried out by following Western laws and institutions.
331
 
Moreover, the first secular public schools and courts began to be established. The 
judges in these courts were trained in a more secular environment than the previous 
ones. Especially, in the following decades, the new graduates of the reformed 
military academies would undertake a major role in the Turkish revolution.
332
 
Eventually, the new secular Turkish Republic was founded by these officers.
333
 
After the foundation of the Republic, a number of secular reforms were implemented 
by the founding father, Atatürk. The most important of these reforms are: ‘the 
abolition of the Sultanate’ (1922); ‘the declaration of the Republic as the new 
regime’ (1923); ‘the removal of the Caliphate’ (1924); ‘the adoption of modern 
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clothes’ (1926); ‘the adoption of the Swiss civil code’ (1926); ‘the removal of 
religious brotherhoods (tarikats)’ (1926);334 ‘the adoption of the Italian penal code’ 
(1928); ‘the adoption of the Latin alphabet’ (1928); ‘the enfranchisement of women 
and their right to stand for election’, (1934); and ‘the replacement of the article 
emphasising that “the state’s religion is Islam” by the principle of secularism’ 
(1937). Religious teaching in public schools was also abolished. The ‘Call to Prayer’ 
and the prayer speeches were officially translated into Turkish from the Arabic.
335
 
The founding fathers of the Republic generally preferred to use the term laicism 
(laiklik) to describe the separation of the state and religion, rather than 
“secularism”.336 Laicism is a French word that means “of the people” instead of “of 
the clergy”. Some scholars consider that laicism and secularism denote the same 
situation. However, there are several scholars who argue that they are somewhat 
different concepts in reality. Talal Asad (2003) defines laicism as the situation in 
which religious beliefs and practices are “confined to a space where they cannot 
threaten political stability or the liberties of free-thinking citizens.
337
  
One claim of laicism, at the same time, is to guarantee an individual’s religious 
freedom in their own private life while excluding religion from public life.
338
 Yet, in 
some cases, the state can cross the objective borders of secularism and penetrate into 
the subjective line through Laicist practices. For instance, in France, the state has 
banned the wearing of religious symbols such as headscarves, skull caps, veils, and 
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 This example shows us that Laicist implementations sometimes do not 
only regulate social life according to a secular philosophy but they apply coercive 
methods with the purpose of breaking an individual’s moral and intellectual ties with 
religion through penetrating into the individual’s private area.340 It is fair to say that 
the Turkish state applied strict methods to stabilise secularism in every aspect of life. 
At the same time, some right-wing parties followed a completely opposite way by 
undermining secularism to get votes from pious electors. Therefore, I applied the 
separation of strict, moderate, and democratic secularism to indicate different 
implementations of laicism in Turkey that are applicable in the analytical tables at 
the end of each empirical chapter. 
In this context, the aforementioned reforms of Atatürk have received different 
criticisms with regard to the practising of secularism in Turkey. Some scholars find it 
strict, some find it moderate, and some perceive it as softer than the other secularist 
regimes. Although most scholars agree that anti-religious and positivist ideas 
influenced some of the Kemalist reforms, most of them also argue that Atatürk’s 
reforms did not oppose religion as a concept.
341
 Indeed, some argue that they did not 
offer an absolute separation of religion and the state. They suggest that the laws and 
political regulations were built on secular principles, but the state also applied Islam 
as an instrument for promoting national unity. However, they also maintain that the 
real aim of the state, while doing this, was keeping the religion under state 
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One contested issue in the practice of Turkish laicism is the creation of the 
Directorate of the Religious Affairs (DIR). The DIR was established after the 
abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 by the Turkish Assembly. The aim in creating that 
organisation was to put all the religious activities and services under the official 
supervision of a formal state institution. In this way, the state had an official 
mechanism to supervise possible anti-secular propaganda. According to the current 
regulation of the DRA, their main duty is: “By committing to the principle of 
secularism … to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of 
Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshiping 
places.”343 This institution has been one of those within the state to have had the 
largest allocation from the state budget. In addition to this, the Ministry of Education 
was authorised by the state to found a Faculty of Divinity, which would be 
responsible for training religious officials. The Faculty of Divinity was transformed 
into the “Institute of Islamic Research”. Moreover, the DIR opened Quran courses in 
1934. 
As a result, it is possible to separate the views related to Turkish secularism and 
Islam into two categories. The first view does not consider Islam as a serious 
obstacle against modernisation and they tend to refuse the subjective side of 
Atatürk’s secularism. This group, particularly, puts forward the aforementioned 
creation of DIR and Islamic institutions. Through the DIR and other Islamic 
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institutions, the founding fathers would aim for two purposes: firstly, they aimed to 
employ Islam as a tool of revolution to prevent religious resistance and to impose the 
revolutionist principles by reinterpreting Islam according to these principles.
344
 
Secondly, they aimed to nationalise Islam by making it part of the new Turkish 
secular identity.
345
 This is because absorbing Islam as part of Turkish culture within 
a modern format was seen as a more pragmatic way, given the deep influence of 
Islam in Turkish society. Moreover, during those days, a direct opposition to religion 
would create a very strong counter-revolutionary resistance. Hence, instead of 
completely removing their ties with Islam, the founding fathers aimed to suppress 
traditionalism with its own tool by closing unofficial Islamic establishments 
(religious brotherhoods) and by controlling all the Islamic activities through the DIR. 
As was suggested by Toprak Binnaz (1995), by this institution, the religious leaders 
such as the Imams and Muezzins became paid “employees of the state”.346  
On the other hand, the second group tends to see Kemalist secularism as a conflict 
between Islam and modernisation.
347
 Thus, secularism became a key for Kemalists to 
solve this problem in favour of modernisation. This group emphasised two things: 
the subjectivity of Kemalist secularism and the intention of removing Islam from the 
new Turkish identity. Firstly, they found Kemalist secularism subjective because, as 
suggested by Berger, it was also intended to control the private life of individuals, 
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and moved beyond its normal aim.
348
 They argue that these reforms were imposed 
with force, without giving the citizens enough time to absorb them. The reforms 
intended to outlaw the existence of religious rules in the public sphere and aimed to 
eradicate those rules from both the private and cultural life preferences of citizens, 
and also to remove its role in Turkish identity construction. To achieve this, the 
critics maintain, a set of regulations had been created, from education to dress, as 
mentioned above.
349
 Thus, secularism took a subjective form, which does not only 
indicate “the official disestablishment of religion” but also enables “the 
constitutional control of religious affairs”.350 Due to these reasons, the critics argue 
that Kemalist secularism has a different and broader meaning than secularism in 
most of the Western states. It did not only intend to separate religion and politics, but 
also aimed to liberate society from the hold of religion by creating free individuals 
who are “nationalist, positivist, scientific-minded, anti-traditionalist and anti-
clerical”.351 
In addition to this, the scholars who see an opposite relationship between Kemalism 
and Islam also object that Atatürk saw Islam as part of the Turkish identity. 
According to Bernard Lewis (2001), although the Republican elite has never resorted 
to an anti-Islamic rhetoric, the real aim of the Atatürk reforms – to break the power 
of organised Islam and its influence on the minds and hearts of the Turkish people – 
was clear.
352
 Kemal H. Karpat (2001) suggests that Atatürk aimed to create a new 
type of nationalism, which rejected the Ottoman and Islamic heritages, by giving 
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reference to the pre-Islamic past of the Turks. He argues that the Republican history 
books were reshaped to indicate that the pre-Islamic Turks had democratic and 
modernist tendencies, but that their connection with the Western civilisations was 
prevented by force after they converted to Islam, and they lost touch with the 
West.
353
 Some Kemalists considered the traditional clothes, such as hijab, veil, and 
fez, as backward dress, adopted from the Persian, Arabic and Byzantine cultures, and 
violating the “true” pre-Islamic Turkish culture. They argued that the early Turks in 
Central Asia had never covered their women’s heads.354 Justin McCarty (2001) also 
notices that Turkey rejected the Ottoman past to become a part of the West.
355
 
According to Bernard Lewis (2001): 
[T]he political and intellectual leadership of Turkey made a 
conscious choice for the West and for a Western identity … the 
Middle East had become associated in their minds with decline, 
defeat and betrayal. The West … seemed to offer the means of 
economic development and of social and political liberation.
356
 
Similarly, William Hale (2000) notes: 
With the establishment of an officially secular republic, any idea 
that Turkey should act … as a Muslim state was definitively 
abandoned … Atatürk’s clear aim was to establish Turkey as a 
                                               
353 Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and 
Community in the Late Ottoman State, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.353. 
354 Emilie A. Olson, ‘Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: The Headscarf 
Dispute’, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 58. No. 4, Self & Society in the Middle-East, 1985, 164. 
355 Justin McCarty, The Ottoman Peoples and the End of the Empire, London: Arnold, 2001, p.216.  
356 Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, 136. 
143 
 
respected nation state, on the Western model, with sufficient 
economic and military strength to sustain that role.
357
 
As a result, as was argued in the previous section, there is a view considering that 
secularism is an invented modernisation myth to establish and maintain hegemony 
over the developing states. The concept of secularism goes hand-in-hand with the 
modernisation theory and shows the modern Western world as a role model to 
imitate. Through that, secularism becomes a tool for big powers to lead the 
developing states according to their own interests. In this way, Western hegemony 
and its neoliberal ideals are maintained. The supporters of this view consider that 
there is not a certain academic definition of secularism and it is open to different 
interpretations. Especially, the religious motifs that are used by the allegedly secular 
states to legitimise their domestic and foreign policies evidence this fact. By 
considering this argument, we may argue that it is academically contested whether 
there is a relationship between secularism, democratisation, and modernisation. At 
this point, for the Turkish case, there are two views, one of which explains Turkish 
secularism as a battle against Islam for achieving modernisation and democracy. The 
second view opposes this by arguing that a modernised interpretation of Islam was 
institutionalised by the state through the DIR and was used for injecting revolutions 
to the society and for preventing Islamic-based criticisms.  
Indeed, none of these views are either completely true or wrong. Perhaps, not Islam 
by itself, but its anti-modernist interpretations and its institutional-legal rules (sharia) 
by the religious Ulama class were frequently used to supress modernist acts in the 
Ottoman Empire. Mostly, this religious propaganda against modernism was made to 
maintain the privileged position of the religious class and the Janissaries. 
                                               




Furthermore, the Young Turks Revolution faced a serious resistance from the 
religious groups and monarchist officers who were organised under the Freedom and 
Accord Party. As a result, a negative relationship occurred between modernisation 
and Islam, both in Turkish society and military culture. Again, the reason for that 
perhaps was not Islam as a belief but its interpretations by the Ulama. Additionally, 
as can easily be seen in the Quran and Islamic texts, Islam is a religion that includes 
regulations for social life, administration, and law. Given that these rules were based 
on the social life in the Arabian Peninsula 1,400 years ago (during the sixth century 
AC), they were far from meeting the demands of modern life. Hence, starting from 
the Young Turks era, the revolutionist officers began to see the worldly rules of 
Islam (sharia) as an obstacle against reforming the society regarding education, law, 
and social life. 
Nevertheless, none of these previous reform attempts became successful to secularise 
society and liberate it from the attachment of Islamic law. Only the victory in the 
Independence War and the dissolving of the positions of Caliphate and monarch 
opened the path for doing this. As the saviour of state and religion with a religious 
Ghazi title, Atatürk’s credit became limitless in the eyes of people, even to the 
degree of overthrowing the monarch and establishing a republic. Following the 
foundation of the Republic, most of Atatürk’s revolutions were directly related to the 
purpose of secularising the nation. The secular reforms were implemented in a 
radical manner by intervening in the private area. Hence, the Turkish version of 
secularism is closer to the subjective model. Nevertheless, Atatürk’s secularism, 
which was dictated by force, has some differences with Berger’s suggestion because 
Berger suggested that secularism will occur automatically during the modernisation 
process without needing to use force.  
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On the other hand, due to the strong influence of Islam in the society, Atatürk aimed 
to institutionalise Islam by putting it into state control. By creating the DIR, Faculty 
of Divinity, and translating the Quran into modern Turkish, the founding fathers 
intended to meet Kemalist revolutions with a modern interpretation of Islam. By this 
way, Atatürk also aimed to break the conflict between Islam and modernism without 
removing it from Turkish cultural identity.  
I argue that, given the deep influence of Islam in the society, a true democracy is 
only possible with the absorbance of the secularism principle. For instance, giving 
equal rights to women, such as giving the same share from inheritance, preventing 
the assassination of women for adultery, increasing people’s education level in the 
urban regions, liberating villagers from the hegemony of landlords, even protecting 
the non-Muslim citizens’ rights are only possible with the true intertwining of 
secularism with democratisation. As we will see in the Democrat Party and AKP eras 
(Chapters 6 and 7), when secularism was weakened, religion could easily become a 
manipulative force in the hands of politicians to increase and maintain their political 
power. 
Related to this fact, starting from the Young Turks era, the revolutionist ideals of 
military culture were shaped according to the secular worldviews. After Atatürk, the 
military continued to see secularism as part and parcel of democracy. Yet, following 
NATO membership and the change in military culture from revolutionism to 
guardianship, the military’s sensitivity in terms of secularism softened. Especially, 
after capitalism and anti-Communism became embedded in military culture instead 
of Kemalist statism and populism, the military began to use secularism as an excuse 
to legitimise its interventions and to protect its privileged economic position. 
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Overall, it is fair to consider the revolutionary stage of military culture (1908-1945) 
as a sincere but impatient effort to create a stable democratic regime. Secularism 
became the main tool of this effort. However, starting from the guardianship era 
(1945-1999), the military’s approach to secularism changed, and this time it became 
a tool for legitimising its interventions and for preserving Turkey’s good relations 
with the Western bloc. Eventually, the military’s alleged efforts to intertwine 
democracy with secularism would not prove successful. Following the military’s 
recent depoliticisation, the AKP government began to increase the Islamic tone in its 
politics and, perhaps for the first time since the 1908 Revolution, Islam became too 
influential in Turkish politics. The historical details of these developments will be 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. In the next section, finally, as has been mentioned at 
the beginning of this section, considering the Turkish case and the results that have 
emerged this section, the analytical tables in the empirical chapters will analyse 
secularism under three different titles: moderate secularism, strict secularism, and 
democratic secularism. 
4.3 PRINCIPLE: NATIONALISM 
4.3.1 Conceptual Clarification 
Around the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and particularly after the French 
Revolution, nation states began to replace the multinational empires. In these 
processes, the concept of nationalism undertook a constructivist duty and grew up as 
a new kind of “passionate” thought.358 Especially, in the Ottoman Empire, the 
growing nationalist trend led various ethnic groups to demand their independence 
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 Eventually, most of these groups regained their independence during the 
process of dissolution. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire also led to “redrawing 
the map of the Middle East”.360 Firstly, most of these regions were controlled by the 
Great Powers and later, when they retreated, the territory was consumed by power 
strife and regional conflicts among the new nation states. Nasser’s attempts to create 
an Arab Nation, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait are 
some remarkable examples of these strifes during the twentieth century.
361
 
Unlike the nationalist attempts in the Middle East and the Muslim world, Atatürk 
avoided the new Turkish state searching for a religious unity or a leadership of the 
Muslim world.
362
 Rather, his efforts were to create a nation state under the Turkish 
identity. In this way, the impact of religion in society and politics would also be 
broken, because the identity of Turk had been supressed under the Muslim identity 
(Ummetcilik-Umma) during the Ottoman era. Due to the religious character of the 
Empire, its people tended to be classified as “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”. 
Atatürk’s definition of nationalism aimed to unite all the ethnic groups in Turkey 
under the Turkish identity.
363
 
Aysel Morin and Ronald Lee (2010) argue that Atatürk’s so-called “anti-religious” 
reforms deeply influenced the perception of Turkish nationalism. They maintain that 
Atatürk’s nationalism had ethnicity statements, which is similar to romantic 
nationalism such as the German and Italian versions. However, unlike them, his ideas 
were not transformed into “extremist ideologies”. Atatürk adopted ideas from the 
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French Revolution such as “sovereignty”, “secularism”, and “equality”. But, unlike 
in France, the authors assume, the principle of nationalism emerged as a “top-down 
military movement”. Additionally, Atatürk’s formulation was different to the Third 
World nationalisms, which developed against European colonisation without any 
pushing factor from above.
364
 
In the literature, there are two dominant definitions of nationalism, namely the 
primordialist and modernist approaches. Scholars in the primordialist group contend 
that nationalism is embedded in ethnicity, and takes the roots of nations from the 
very beginnings of history. Therefore, this approach considers that ethnic ties are 
natural, fixed, and given. E. Shills (1957) defines ethnicity as a “blood tie” and 
considers it “primordial”.365 Clifford Geertz (1973) offers the “given-ness” of 
ethnicity and claims that ethnic ties cannot be completely understood by referring 
only to social relations.
366
 Van Den Berghe (1981) asserts that sociological 
formations among humans are, in fact, based on biological ties.
367
 Finally, Reynolds 
V. (1983) argues the impact of ethnicity in shaping in-social groups, such as “in” and 
“out”.368 
On the other hand, modernisation theorists define “nation” as a modern formation. 
They consider the emergence of nationalism as the natural result of transition from 
“agrarian to industrial society”.369 Ernest Gellner contends that the increase in 
industrialisation triggered the need for centralised education. Centralised education 
increased the level of education and led to the homogenisation of cultures.
370
 Gellner 
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(1964) argues that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-
consciousness” but is nevertheless “the invention of nationalist discourse”.371 He 
claims that the nationalist discourses created nations that had not previously 
existed.
372
 Benedict Anderson uses the description “imagined communities” for 
explaining these nations.
373
 Eric Hobsbawm considers nations as the creation of 
“social engineering”. He argues that collective identities are constructed through 
“invented traditions”, which aim to create a link between the past and present for 
their societies.
374
 Modernists assert that ethnicity is a concept that is used by the 
elites to gain popular support in their struggle for power.
375
 
Maurica Charland (1987) contends that social engineers choose specific narratives 
and interpret them in a text to categorise “people” as subjects, in order to create a 
collective identity.
376
 M.C. Mcgee (1975) puts forward that “the people” emerge only 
as rhetorical objects in that type of texts. Accordingly, he argues that “the people” in 
those texts are, in fact, the socio-political myths that they depict.
377
 Kenneth Burke 
(1989) states that myths as the stories which produce the “essence” of the cultures in 
narrative ways.
378
 He notes that: “To derive a culture from certain mythic ancestry, 
or ideal mythic type, is a way of stating that culture’s essence in narrative terms”.379 
Therefore, the political rhetoric often applies to this “essence” to construct “the 
people”. Also, he defines ideologies and myths as two related concepts: “ideology is 
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to myth as rhetoric is to poetry”.380 H. Tudor (1972) considers myths are used to 
demand concepts such as hegemony, authority, territory, independence, and social 
solidarity.
381
 B.S. Osborne (2001) notes that the myths organise “the past in patterns 
that resonate with a culture’s deepest values and aspirations”.382 C.G. Flood (1996) 
argues that the myths poke “the feelings of solidarity and alienation which underpin 
and undermine communities and their boundaries”.383 
M.P. Moore (1991) contends that political myths are the growing results of 
fragmented narratives.
384
 According to Charland (1987), the “constitutive rhetorics” 
combine together and reshape these narratives and use them for creating new 
political coalitions and identities.
385
 Morin and Lee (2010) argue that these narratives 
define various past events as the causes that led to the current circumstances, and 
they promise a future that will be real when “the constituted subjects begin inhabiting 
and performing their identities”.386 Burke (1973) contends that Hitler’s Mein Kampf 
is an example of creating an “enemy”.387 He (Hitler) accuses the Jewish people of the 
economic crisis in Germany and blurring the Aryan blood.
388
 He uses myths such as 
claiming the “inferiority” of the Jews and “superiority” of the Aryans.389 He also 
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applies to the religious terms to show his war as a struggle between the “good” and 
the “evil”, and his task as removing “the evil” from the surface of the earth.390 
4.3.2 Nationalism in Turkey 
Atatürk’s definition is a mixture of primordial and modernist interpretations of 
nationalism (milliyetcilik in Turkish). Article 88 of the 1924 constitution defined 
“Turk” as: “Among the people of Turkey, without the distinction of race or religion, 
Turk shall be the term of citizenship”.391 Atatürk answers the question of “who is 
Turk?” with these words: “Turks are the people of Turkey who founded the Turkish 
Republic”.392 Considering these definitions, one may argue that “Turkish identity” in 
its current form was designed by Atatürk. This new perception of Turkish identity 
did not only create a nation state but also created essential circumstances for secular 
revolutions. As was argued by Malcolm Cooper (2002), the abolition of sharia and 
the alphabet revolution prepared the suitable conditions for constructing the new 
“Turkishness”.393 
Atatürk’s nationalism is theoretically formulated with his famous words: Ne Mutlu 
Turkum Diyene! (How fortunate he who calls himself a Turk!). That is to say, an 
individual’s “Turkishness” is not based on his race but on his accepting himself as 
Turkish. Therefore, everybody who was involved in the Liberation War was taken as 
a “Turkish citizen” without looking at their ethnicity. The accepting of oneself as 
“Turk” includes the adoption of Turkish culture, including language, traditions, and 
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 The Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren, during the 1980-83 junta, 
explains Atatürk’s nationalism with these words: 
What lies at the basis of the Turkish Republic … is the sublime 
Atatürk’s philosophy that says: “How fortunate he who calls 
himself a Turk!” This philosophy includes every citizen who 
considers himself a Turk, regardless of creed, race, religion … 
Atatürk’s concept of nationalism is basically this … this philosophy 
establishes a perfect harmony with the democratic regime, and 
contributes to the formation of a healthy national body. For there 
exists no discrimination among the individual citizens. All the 
citizens are equal. Those who govern the country in the name of the 
people are allowed no discrimination, have no right to divide the 
nation and enmity among the citizens. In this context the 
democratic regime … is not a separatist, but a unifying factor … 
Turkish nation based upon the principles of Atatürk, will survive by 
… the motto “a single state, a single nation” … No power will be 
able to divide it.
395
 
In this long speech by Kenan Evren, there are several references to Atatürk’s 
principles, to state unity, and nationalism. Atatürk’s nationalism is defined as a 
combining element among different ethnic communities in the state by the condition 
of regarding themselves as “Turk”. This speech was made during the 1980 coup, just 
after the rise of the Kurdish separation movement. Therefore, one purpose of Evren’s 
while making this statement can be seen as preventing separation attempts. 
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Although there is one formal definition in the constitution, Atatürk’s nationalism has 
been understood differently by different ideologies. At this point, Tanil Bora’s 
(2003) categorisation can be helpful in order to see different interpretations of 
nationalism in Turkey. He separates nationalism into four groups: Official, Kemalist, 
Liberal, and Radical nationalism. The first is the “Official Nationalism: Atatürk’s 
Nationalism”, which is a combination of modernist and primordialist nationalism, 
based on the idea of nation-state, and renders the military as “the founder and 
guardian of the nation state”.396 This formula does not take into account any other 
Turkish communities that live outside of the mainland, “Anatolia”, in nationalist 
terms, and it does not include the previous Ottoman territories such as the Balkans, 
Arabia, and North Africa. Therefore, it can also be regarded as the “Anatolian 
Turkism”, which took its origins from the “Misak-i Milli” (the National Pact) during 
the Turkish Liberation War, which included Anatolia and western Thrace. After the 
Liberation War, these territories were mostly gained back, except for Mosul, Hatay, 




On the other hand, the status and identity of the non-Muslims (Armenians, Rums, 
Jews, and so on) and the Kurdish people have always been an argumentative issue 
while defining Anatolian nationalism. Principally, the south-eastern parts of the 
National Pact borders had mostly been held by the Kurdish people. After gaining 
independence in 1923, the Lausanne treaty did not specifically refer to the Kurds as a 
minority group.
398
 Although the founding fathers avoided defining Turkish 
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397 Nicholas Danforth, ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the 
AKP’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 7, No.3, 2008: 86-87. 
398 See: Sandal, ‘Public Theologies of Human Rights and Citizenship: The Case of Turkey’s 
Christians’. Also see: Baskin Oran, Kurtler ve Aleviler Azinlik midir? (Are the Alevis and the Kurds 
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citizenship with ethnical elements, in the following decades, the Kurds have 
occasionally stated their discontent with state politics because of the restrictions over 
the Kurdish identity. The earliest Kurdish rebels started in the earlier years of the 
Republic. In the event known as the Dersim Rebellions (1937-38), thousands of 
Kurdish citizens died. After that, Kurdish separatism weakened.
399
 Yet, during the 
1970s, especially after the foundation of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), 
Kurdish separatism became one of the most challenging problems of Turkish 
politics.
400
 The PKK was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan as a socialist and 
nationalist Kurdish resistance organisation. The PKK has become a serious threat to 
state security given its periodic attacks on the south-eastern borders. The conflict 
between the PKK and Turkish military has continued up to the present by causing 
thousands of deaths. The major issues that cause dissatisfaction among the Kurdish 
citizens can be summarised as restrictions over the Kurdish language in education 
and the media, denial of the Kurdish identity, poor economic conditions, as well as 
discriminations and oppression over the Kurds.
401
 Most of these complaints by the 
Kurdish citizens particularly strengthened after the junta rule spanning 1980-83. 
Indeed, the restrictions on the Kurds and denial of the Kurdish identity went so far as 
considering the Kurdish people as one ‘Turkish tribe’. Additionally, the junta rule 
promoted Islam as an antidote against Kurdish nationalism.
402
  
The second one is “Kemalist Nationalism: Ulusculuk”, which is a left-wing 
interpretation that appeared during the 1990s, particularly as a reaction to the anti-
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secularist movements. That movement promotes secularism against the danger of 
“sharia” and is more likely to see the military as “the guardian of secularism and the 
national unity”.403 In this model, the “humanistic” and the “universalistic” façade of 
Kemalist nationalism is stressed. During the 1960s and 1970s, this movement 
associated Kemalism with “anti-imperialism” and “full sovereignty”. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, new rhetoric was added to this movement, such as “anti-Islamism” and 
“anti-sharia”, which are decorated by “anti-Westernist motifs”, and discourses about 
“national pride”.404 
The third one is “Liberal Neo-Nationalism”, which emphasises the importance of 
modernisation by using economic terms. Bora explains that the emergence of this 
model dates back to the last years of the 1980s, as a result of capitalisation in Turkey. 
The Liberal approach associates nationalism with the passion of attaining the level of 
the wealthy/developed states. In other words, “national pride” should have been 
promoted by competing against the big economies. They predominantly put forward 
Atatürk’s goal of reaching the level of contemporary civilisations by associating 
Turkey with having a strong economy, market, and the power of export. That 
movement, which stresses the importance of economics and creating a national 
market, is highly supported by particular media figures and big businessmen. Thus, 
the AKP’s discourse, which had supported the EU membership, in particular in the 




                                               
403 Again, this argument is open to criticism, because there is not any clear academic evidence to show 
that most Kemalist Nationalists support military interventions against political Islam. 
404 Tanil Bora, ‘Nationalist Discourses in Turkey’, The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, No.2/3, 
Spring/Summer 2003: 433-451, pp.438-440. 
405 Ibid., 440-442. 
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The fourth one is “Turkist Radical Nationalism”. Tanil Bora describes this type of 
nationalism as a “fascist” ideology which understands Atatürk’s nationalism with 
extreme terms. That movement takes its origins from the pan-Turanist movements in 
the last years of the Ottoman Empire, which aimed to combine all the Turkish 
inhabited territories around the world – particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
– under one Turkish state. The early representative of this ideology was Nihal Atsiz. 
Then, in the 1960s, that ideology found a place of expression in the Assembly 
through the establishment of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Alparslan Turkes, 
as a nationalist, conservative, and anti-Communist figure, became the leader of this 
movement. However, the racist emphasis lost momentum after the 1970s and was 
replaced by a new discourse based on a “cultural-historical essentialism”. The new 
understanding of radical nationalism also put forward Islam as the main element of 
Turkish nationalism. After the 1980 coup, the Islamic elements gained a significant 
importance and the pan-Turkist elements weakened. The movement showed strict 
opposition to Kurdish nationalism, defining it as “secessionism” during the 1980s 
and 1990s. The PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) attacks during these years had 
strengthened public support for the MHP. The young idealist supporters of MHP 
(Ulkuculer, or the Grey Wolfs) created new myths, which made reference to Turkish 
mythology, and pre-Islamic and Islamic Turks. After the rise of the Islamic 
movement, as a response, the MHP left the Islamic elements to a secondary position 
and put forward Turkish nationalism again, and remained in a more secular position. 
The Radical Nationalists depict an Atatürk figure who is “a passionate Turkish 
nationalist”, and who does not make any “concession” from the “nationalistic” 
ideals.
406 
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Indeed, Bora’s categorisation is also remarkable for its indication of Turkey’s 
ideological map. The four different interpretations of nationalism – Official, 
Nationalist, Liberal, and Radical – also represent the general rhetoric of four major 
political movements in Turkey: Moderate Kemalism, Radical (Nationalist) 
Kemalism, Ultra-Nationalism, and Liberalism. These four movements have been 
represented by different parties within different periods. One could add a fifth model 
of nationalism to Bora’s categorisation, namely National Outlook (Milli Gorus), 
which refers to the nationalist discourse of political Islam. National Outlook tends to 
glorify the Ottoman Empire’s successful centuries. Yet, it is slightly different to the 
MHP’s radical nationalism, in that National Outlook has strong references to the 
Muslim identity of Turks. Hence, they argue that Turkey should break its 
connections with the West and be the leader of the Islamic World, as it had been 
during the Ottoman era. The National Outlook can also be beneficial to understand 
the AKP’s increasing success. Unlike the previous Islamic parties, the AKP softened 
the Islamic emphasis of National Outlook and gained support from more secular 
voters, including businessmen and intellectuals, and from the media. That is to say, 
the AKP’s position can be defined as a combination of liberal and Islamist versions 
of the nationalist discourses, because, unlike its predecessors, the AKP adopted a 
strong liberal discourse apart from its Islamic background. Indeed, the AKP have an 
image that is closer to secular right-wing parties, such as the Motherland (ANAP) 
and True Path (Dogru Yol) parties.
407
 The National Outlook version of nationalism, 
indeed, is important in order to understand the rhetoric during the military 
interventions. The anti-secular references in that version of nationalism and its stress 
on Islam as one vital part of Turkish identity were explicitly against Atatürk’s 
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definition of nationalism and secularism. Hence, one may see a negative relationship 
with the National Outlook and military rhetoric. Especially, the models that we have 
defined as positive-undemocratic and its opposite negative-democratic in Turkey 
have a direct relationship with the rhetoric of Islamic parties and the military’s 
sensitivity in terms of secularism. In other words, whenever the military increased its 
voice in politics, the Islamist emphasis by political parties softened; and whenever 
the military stepped back, the Islamic discourse began to increase. 
Morin and Lee (2010) argue that Turkish nationalism has characteristics of both 
modernist and primordialist nationalism, but neither enables a full description. As 
modernists argued, Turkish nationalism emerged in the modern era but it did not 
experience any industrial development until the opening of a sugar factory in 
1933.
408
 The primordialist explanation also cannot explain the case, because, they 
argue, Turkish nationalism was “discursively constructed” by the constitution, and 
with Atatürk’s own words. Altınay notices that the Turkish History Association 
(1931) and the Turkish Language Association (1932) – under the supervision of 
Atatürk – played the central role in constructing the tenets of the modern Turkish 
nationalism.
409
 That association tried to research the ethnic roots of the Ancient 
Turks by making several observations and creating historical theses. The most 
famous of them was “the Sun Language Theory”, which argued that there were links 
between the Ancient Turks and the Sumerians and the Mayans. The theory also 
suggested that Turkish was one of the oldest languages, and the ancestor of many 
modern ones.
410
 One main purpose of these works was to remove “ummetcilik” and 
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inject “nationalism” into people’s minds by giving priority to pre-Islamic Turkish 
researches, instead of Islamic ones.
411
 
Indeed, Turkish nationalism can be seen as the result of an “identity search” that 
started during the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire applied the “millet” 
(nation) system to identify its people. The millet system was created by considering 
religious identities, in which the people were categorised as the Muslim, Jewish, and 
Christian Ottoman millets. The millet system lost its effect after the rise of 
nationalism among different communities. With the impact of the French Revolution, 
the multi-cultural structure of the state caused divisions among the different 
nationalities. The ideas of “Pan-Turkism”, “Turkism”, “Ottomanism”, and “Pan-
Islamism” aimed to produce alternative solutions to keep specific ethnic 
communities together. Pan-Islamism promoted the “ummetcılık”, which aimed to 
combine all the Muslim communities under the “Muslim” identity, and Pan-Turkism 
promoted the Turkish identity as Turks together under one single state. Ottomanism 
aimed to connect all the millets under the identity of “Ottoman”. All these ideals 
failed except Turkism. Turkism was similar to Atatürk’s “Anatolian Turkism”, which 
sought to create a nation state within the borders of modern Turkey. Eventually, the 




As has also been argued in the previous chapter, Morin and Lee suggest that 
Atatürk’s famous Nutuk (The Speech) is a typical example of using myths for 
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shaping collective national identities.
413
 Nutuk, at the same time, became a response 
to the criticisms of the opposition, who began to title him a “dictator”. Atatürk’s 
Nutuk was described as a “self-narrative” by Hulya Adak (2003), in which Atatürk 
wrote history by “his own hands” and “his own personal memories of the Liberation 
War”. Nutuk constructed the necessary myths to create the nation state, such as “the 
First Duty”, “the Encirclement”, “the Internal Enemy”, “the Ancestor”, and “the 
Modernity”, and became the benchmark of republican Turkish nationalism.414 Nutuk 
became the most influential discourse in shaping “Turkish politics, culture and 
education”.415 
As a result, Atatürk’s nationalism is a mixed model – a combination of primordial 
and modernist models. Indeed, Atatürk’s approach is scientifically reasonable 
because the Ottoman Empire’s domination over three different continents caused its 
citizens to mix with each other. Therefore, it is highly contested whether the people 
who live in modern Turkey are originally as Turkish as their ancestors in Central 
Asia, or whether they mixed with other nationalities under the long-term Ottoman 
rule. As a result, modern Turkish nationalism can be seen as a concept that has 
predominantly been constructed and defined by Atatürk. According to his definition, 
the Turkish people are the citizens who live within the borders of the current Turkey, 
who fought together in the Liberation War and founded the state. Even by his words, 
Atatürk defines Turkish citizenship as accepting oneself as a Turk.416 The military 
has also tended to follow the same path as Atatürk. Rhetorically, the military 
authorities defined the Turkish nationalism without ethnical terms – merely 
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accepting oneself as Turk. Yet still, particularly during the periods of junta rule, the 
military faced serious criticisms with its alleged discriminative behaviour toward 
minorities. These criticisms came from both domestic and foreign authorities. 
However, there is not any explicit evidence to argue that the military has ever acted 
contrary to Atatürk’s definition of nationalism. Therefore, in line with the results that 
have emerged from this section, the analytical tables in the empirical chapters will 
identify the Turkish model of nationalism as a mixed model, in parallel with 
Atatürk’s ideas.417 
4.4 OTHER PRINCIPLES: (-Republicanism, Statism, 
Populism, Reformism-) 
4.4.1 Republicanism 
As a political terminology, republicanism (cumhuriyetcilik in Turkish) refers to the 
governance type that takes its legitimacy directly from the people. Therefore, the 
governance does not belong to a particular person, class, or group but directly to the 
all parts of the citizenship. As defined in The Social Contract by Jan Jacques 
Rousseau, the citizens use (or give) their right to govern through the elected people 
(governments) by the elections.
418
 Article 1 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates: 
“The State of Turkey is a Republic”; Article 2 states: “The Republic of Turkey is a 
democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law, within the notions of 
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public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the 
nationalism of Atatürk…”419 
Atatürk considered that the best way of governance is the republic. He explained this 
situation with his famous words: “Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the 
nation”.420 In Nutuk, Atatürk stresses that “the Ottomans (the sons of the Ottoman 
Sultans) acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and maintained it by 
violence and repression for more than six centuries and now the Turkish people took 
the sovereignty by rebelling against these usurpers”.421 During the Ottoman Empire, 
the Sultan was, at the same time, the Caliph. Traditionally, people tended to believe 
that the monarch had a divine right given by God, and anybody who refused to obey 
him was indeed revolting against God himself. This gave the Sultans an absolute 
sovereignty, which could not be challenged by anybody. 
Atatürk defines this case in Nutuk:  
The Nation and the Army had no suspicion at all of the Padisah-
Caliph’s treachery. On the contrary, on account of religious and 
traditional ties handed down for centuries, they remained loyal to 
the throne and its occupant. Seeking for means of salvation under 
the influence of this tradition, the security of the Caliphate and the 
Sultanate concerned them far more than their own safety. That the 
country could possibly be saved without a Caliph and without a 
Padisah (Sultan) was an idea too impossible for them to 
comprehend. And woe to those who ventured to think otherwise! 
                                               
419 For the translation of the 1982 Turkish constitution see: TBMM, Constitution of the Republic of 
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They would immediately have been looked down upon as men 




As a result, the principle of republicanism aimed to break the perception that 
“citizens” (known as the “tebaa” in the Ottoman Empire) had to be ruled by “a sacred 
person”, and to give the confidence that each individual is equal with another and has 
an equal right to have a say in social matters. The military’s close relationship with 
the republicanism principle is explicit enough. Most of the direct military 
interventions have been made by the statement of being carried out through the “duty 
of protecting the Republic and republican principles”. Yet, one may argue that the 
military occasionally breached the republican principles during its political 
involvements, either willingly or reluctantly. Given the evolution of the Turkish 
regime from one party to a multi-party system, and given the periodic military 
interventions, the analytical tables in the empirical chapters will classify the versions 
of republican regime in Turkey into two groups, namely authoritarian and 
democratic republics. 
4.4.2 Statism 
Atatürk states that real and absolute independence is only possible with economic 
independence, and that is the true way of modernisation. The principle of statism 
(devletcilik in Turkish) declares that the state should supervise all the economic 
activities within the state, and should involve itself in the areas where private 
enterprise is not willing to go, or where private enterprise is incapable. According to 
the principle of statism, the state is not just the main source of economic activities, 




but it is also the owner of the major industries within the state.
423
 Artun Unsal argues 
that, in the first years of the Republic, the country was extremely undeveloped and 
had a poor capital. About 80 per cent of the capital belonged to foreigners and ethnic 
minorities, such as the Armenians, Jews, and Greeks. He refers to Taner Timur’s 
words in his work: “In the country, an industrial bourgeoisie was almost non-
existent, and was also not national”.424 Ayfer Dagdelen notes that the principle of 
statism aimed to create a national economy, independent from foreign 
interventions.
425
 Unsal argues that a new law was enacted in 1927 to promote 
industrialisation, while also giving incentives to the private sector. Atatürk 
considered that a bourgeoisie would emerge in the long run, but the global economic 
crisis made it necessary for state-owned enterprises to control the key sectors. 
Meanwhile, the mixed economy was a reasonable solution, where the private sector 
had not enough capital.
426
 
Malcolm Cooper explains Atatürk’s economic policy as a state-sponsored experience 
rather than a private one. He maintains that the Ottoman economy was feudal and 
based on agriculture. The new Republic aimed to create industrial bases under state 
sponsorship during the 1920s. The founding fathers of Turkey were under the 
influence of harsh economic conditions during the war years, which made it hard for 
private entrepreneurs to have enough capital for establishing businesses. The 
economic policy in the Atatürk era was highly influenced by the Soviet system, even 
to the extent of using their five-year term template for industrial development in 
1933. Thus, Turkish enterprise became a combination of tariff protections and a 
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weak domestic competition policy. At the practical level, many elements of state 
ownership were put under the protection of the law. Cooper argues that some parts of 
the judiciary became more passionate even than the military, in terms of protecting 
the Atatürk model of statism.427 Ayfer Dagdelen contends that Atatürk saw the 
principle of Statism as a socio-economic requirement for catching up with the 
Western civilisations, due to the poor economic conditions of the state and lack of 
capital. She notes that a strong economy is the first condition for creating an 
independent nation state. Thus, Atatürk’s nationalism considered statism as the true 
way of providing this goal.
428
 
In conclusion, the military rhetoric tends to promote Atatürk’s statism against a 
liberal economy, in general. Yet, especially after the NATO membership, one can 
observe a growing interest in a liberal economy by the military authorities, arguably 
due to preserving close relations with the Western bloc. The changing characteristic 
of military culture from revolutionism to guardianship enabled capitalism and anti-
Communism to embed in military culture and turned the military into a military-
industrial complex. Following the 1960 coup d’état, the military changed its 
members’ social status by creating economic privileges such as the foundation of 
OYAK. In addition to this, the 1980-83 period of junta rule played an important role 
in embedding liberal policies in the national economy. By assigning liberal 
economist Turgut Ozal to the highest position in economic matters, the military 
opened the paths toward liberalisation. Following the junta rule, Turgut Ozal became 
the first civil prime minister and replaced most of the statist policies with liberal 
practices. Hence, one cannot argue that the military has remained loyal to Statism in 
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every period of history. In the analytical tables, the statism principle will be analysed 
under the “economic policies” headline, which separates economic policies into two 
groups, namely statism and liberal economy. 
4.4.3 Populism 
The principle of populism basically states that there are no class privileges and 
distinctions in the Turkish Republic, and no individual, family, class, or organisation 
can be superior to the others.
429
 According to the principle of populism (halkcilik in 
Turkish), each citizen should be equal in the eyes of the law without considering any 
ethnic, religious, language, or sect differences. As has also been argued in the 
previous chapter, Artun Unsal notes that, when he was in the military academy, 
Atatürk read a lot of books about the French Revolution and had ideas about the 
concepts of “freedom, equality, and brotherhood”.430 He accepts the existence of 
classes, but there cannot be any discrimination. They can only survive with 
cooperation, without considering any difference: 
Our people are not constituted of classes with diverging interests 
but classes whose existence and work require each other. Who can 
deny the fact that the farmer needs the craftsman, the craftsman the 
farmer, and the farmer the merchant, and that each of them needs 
all others and the worker.
431
 
The principle of populism offers that the politicians elected by the citizens should 
follow policies which favour the interests of different groups within the nation, 
without considering any differences. The aim of populism is to educate people to 
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govern themselves; therefore, the principle of populism is the natural result of the 
principle of republicanism. Because republicanism means people elect the rulers 
from inside, and thus the republican regime becomes a public regime Therefore, 
since the opening of the Turkish National Assembly, Atatürk often stressed that the 
new republican regime would be a public regime.
432
 
Indeed, the populism principle, and Atatürk’s emphasis on public education by 
associating it with this principle, is an important point regarding democratisation, 
political culture, and their relations with military interventions. As was argued by 
Samuel Finer in his classic Man on Horseback (1962), the countries with minimal 
and low political cultures are more vulnerable to military interference than the 
countries with developed and mature political cultures.
433
 Atatürk’s efforts for 
increasing people’s level of education with reforms, such as adopting the Latin 
alphabet, opening public schools, public houses, village institutes, schools for 
women in villages, and land reform, can also be seen as attempts at increasing 
political and democratic culture. Again, considering Finer’s argument, Atatürk’s 
education reforms can also be seen as the most stable solution to future military 
interventions. Lastly, the military has ostensibly remained loyal to the populism 
principle. Yet, the military’s alleged discriminative, oppressive, and authoritarian 
behaviours during the periods of junta rule in the guardianship era do not meet with 
Atatürk’s populism principle in reality.434 
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The principle of revolutionism (reformism) suggests that Turkey should make 
reforms and should replace traditional institutions with modern ones.
435
 
Revolutionism (inkilapcilik in Turkish) is a meticulous policy of transformation that 
assumes that the policy makers within a state should always be the leaders of 
reformism and progressive movements to struggle against the newly arising 
problems of the age in the society. Atatürk considers science as the “true and only 
guide” for reformism. He expresses the main aim of reformism with his famous 
words: “We will attain the level of contemporary civilisations”.436 Stephen Kinzer 
argues that in a rapidly changing world, Atatürk’s belief was that Turkey could be 
modern only by adopting modern values.
437
 Atatürk stated that his ideas should be 
open to interrogation and change, if necessary. They should not be taken as 
unchanging dogmas. Once he said: “In a rapidly changing world, introducing 
unchanging ideas becomes illogical. I do not leave you any verses, dogmas or 
unchanging-fixed rules as a spiritual legacy. My spiritual legacy is science and 
reason.”438 The military’s relationship with the revolutionism principle has indeed 
coming from the Young Turks era. Even, Atatürk himself was raised during this era 
as being one of the revolutionist officers of the age. More or less, the military’s 
revolutionist character has continued to exist up to the present day, since the military 
modernisation in the Ottoman Era. 
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The theoretical part of this thesis has been completed with this chapter. In the first 
four chapters, military culture, the martial ethos, elements of Turkish military 
culture, and finally Atatürk’s principles have been defined. That is to say, the thesis 
has presented the essential conceptual clarifications for starting the empirical 
process. Following this, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will analyse the character of the 
relationship between military culture and politics regarding the five analytical 
models that have been mentioned above. 
Additionally, this chapter has made four specific contributions. Firstly, it has 
discussed the theoretical definitions of Atatürk’s principles by considering the 
relevant literature. The second contribution of the chapter has been to discuss 
differences and similarities between Atatürkist and alternative interpretations and 
practices of these principles. Especially, the secularism principle has some relative 
differences to other versions, in that the Atatürkist version, which is known as 
laicism, has not only aimed at liberating social life from the impact of religion, but 
has also aimed at liberating minds and souls from the impact of religion in private 
life. Hence, Atatürk’s version is closer to the subjective secularism definition of 
Berger. Yet, Atatürk’s laicism is still different to Berger’s, because it aimed to 
dictate this separation by laws and regulations. On the other hand, Berger said that 
this liberation would be coming naturally while people are modernising, not by force. 
Therefore, the analytical chart in the empirical chapters will separate secularism into 
three different titles regarding their practice in Turkey: strict, moderate, and 
democratic secularism. Also, Atatürk’s nationalism definition is a mixture of 
primordial and modern models, because Turkish citizenship, legally, has not been 
based on ethnicity but on accepting Turkish nationality. On the other hand, there 
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were still strong primordial references to the origins of the Turks in Atatürk’s time, 
which were embedded in the national education system. Yet, the analytical chart will 
indicate the Turkish nationalism as a mixed model in the empirical chapters. 
The third contribution of the chapter was to evaluate military interventions under the 
guidance of Atatürkist principles. Normally, the military has stated that it was a 
constitutional duty for the military to protect Atatürk’s principles from external and 
internal threats, by referring to the relevant regulations. On the other hand, it is not 
easy to maintain that the military has always remained loyal to Atatürkist ideals. 
Especially, the Turkish-Islam synthesis, which was promoted by the military, was 
explicitly against the major purpose of the secularism principle. The main reason for 
this shift from the Atatürkist line was indeed change from revolutionism to 
guardianship, which put military culture into a capitalist and anti-Communist route 
after the NATO membership. Eventually, after being a military-industrial complex, 
secularism became an excuse for the military to maintain its new social status and 
economic privilege as well as enabling the military to preserve Turkey’s alliance 
with the Western bloc against the Soviet Union. Additionally, the liberal 
transformation of the national economy during the 1980s was indeed started by the 
military’s promotion, in that the military assigned liberal-orientated Turgut Ozal to 
the position responsible for economic policies. Ozal became the first prime minister 
after the junta rule, and comprehensively replaced Atatürk’s Statism with a 
completely liberal economic policy. As a result, one can come to the conclusion that 
the military’s staunchly Kemalist discourse has sometimes not gone further than 
being an excuse to legitimise military interventions. 
The last contribution of the chapter was to make a brief introduction to the analytical 
process. Most of the terms that have been discussed in this chapter will also be 
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applied in the empirical chapters. The terms will also be shown in several analytical 
tables in the final parts of each case study, which will be coded by taking into 
account relevant scholarly debate and Turkish experiences. In other words, 
secularism will be identified from moderate to strict, namely: moderate, democratic, 
and strict secularism. Nationalism will be shown as mixed nationalism; regime type 
will be identified as strict or democratic republic. Finally, the economic policy will 




CHAPTER 5: Case Study I: Major Cultural 
Transformation in the Turkish Military “From 
Traditionalism to Revolutionism” (1908-1945) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first four chapters have prepared the necessary background to answer the main 
research questions. The important points that have been derived from the previous 
chapters can be summarised thus: The main purpose of civil-military literature is to 
prevent militaries from breaking democracy. At that point, the suggestion of this 
thesis is looking at the main ethoi that create military cultures. As has been 
elaborated in the second chapter, military ethoi have crucial impacts in shaping 
militaries’ political positions. Hence, if these sets of ethoi are shaped according to 
democratic and liberal principles, namely political neutrality and civilian supremacy 
(the professional ethos), with a proper education programme, the militaries may stay 
in their own autonomous area by professionalising, and may accept subordination to 
civilians. Indeed, that is the case that was referred to as objective control by Samuel 
Huntington. At that point, the Turkish military’s evolution from a highly political 
culture to current depolitical status becomes a rich case for analysing the relationship 
between military ethos and politics. Given the nation-builder status of the Turkish 
military (the birthright principle), the changes in military culture have tended to bring 
fundamental changes in Turkish politics. Hence, starting from this chapter, the thesis 
will focus on the answer to the key research question, namely the type of relationship 
between the Turkish military and politics as regards the five analytical models: 
positive-democratic, negative-democratic, positive-undemocratic, negative-
undemocratic and variable. 
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The analysis will be done within three steps. Firstly, in each empirical chapter, the 
historical narrative will be explained by taking into account the changes in military 
culture and national politics. Each change will also be analysed with regard to the 
relevant analytical model. Secondly, in the summary part of each chapter, a final 
evaluation will be made. Lastly, an analytical table will be included in final part to 
give the reader a schematic summary of the process. The analytical tables will be 
prepared according to the results that emerge from the empirical chapters. 
Additionally, a final and comprehensive evaluation of the three case studies will be 
made in Chapter 7 and in the Conclusion. To implement this purpose, the empirical 
part of the thesis will be divided into three chapters. Chapter 5 analyses the 
revolutionist transformation between 1908 and 1945; Chapter 6 analyses the 
guardianship process between 1945 and 1999; Chapter 7 analyses depoliticisation 
between 1999 and 2013. 
At this point, this chapter has four targeted contributions. The first contribution is to 
explore the dynamics that have created a close linkage between the military and 
society. Hence, the chapter will analyse the military institution from the earliest 
Turkish states in Central Asia. In this way, the chapter will not only show the 
foundations of the military-nation assumption, but will also indicate why the military 
has always had a central position as being the founder and ruler in the Turkish states. 
The second contribution is to show how praetorian tradition was embedded in the 
Ottoman army during the declining period. To achieve this goal, the chapter will 
begin its analysis from the foundation years of the Ottoman Empire by indicating the 
status of the military within the state. Then, the chapter will analyse the declining 
years of the Empire, wherein the state authority was weakened and the military often 
intervened in state affairs. The Janissaries interventions have also marked the 
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beginning of a long-term praetorian tradition in the Turkish military, which has 
continued after the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. Given the main 
purpose of the thesis, the main focus will be given to the history of modern Turkey. 
Therefore, the pre-Islamic Turkic history and the classical Ottoman era will be 
summarised briefly, and then the main focus will be given to the revolutionary era of 
military culture, which starts with the Young Turks Revolution in 1908 and 
continues until the end of the early republican era in 1945. The third contribution of 
the chapter is to explore how revolutionism became embedded in military culture, 
and how it led to the foundation of the secular Turkish Republic. The last 
contribution is to indicate the ideological divisions within the military, and the 
variable nature of military culture. For the third and fourth contributions, the chapter 
will analyse a number of important incidents, namely: the earliest military reforms in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the Tanzimat reforms; the First and Second 
Constitutional eras; the Young Turk revolution; the Union and Progress Era; and, 
finally, the Liberation War and Atatürk’s reforms. 
5.2 THE FOUNDATION AND RISING YEARS OF 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1299-1699) 
5.2.1 Early Turkish States and the Origins of Military Nation Idea  
The latest scientific findings demonstrate that the history of the Turks began around 
BC 5000; however, the written history starts approximately 3000 years ago. 
According to the Orkhon Inscriptions, one of the first basic characteristics of the 
Turkish societies was soldiery.439 The Great Hun Empire (BC 220-BC 46) is mostly 
accepted as the first Turkic state. The Turkish military takes its formal date of 
foundation as BC 209, which is the date that Mete Khan had created the first 
                                               
439 Pekin and Yavuz, (2014): 37. (The Orkhon Inscriptions are one of the oldest written resources 
about the early Turkish societies.) 
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organised land forces.440 Historians note three features which separated the ancient 
Turkish military from the others: it was non-paid, it was permanent, and it was 
composed of horsemen.441 Because of the nomadic life and hard living conditions of 
the weather, everybody within the state was a soldier and was ready to fight. Military 
discipline penetrated into every part of social life and fixed militarist values as a 
lifestyle into the Turkish societies.442 Children were brought up as warriors; the 
women rode horses and used weapons. There were traditional sports such as cevgen, 
cirit, archery, and wrestling, which involved riding horses, using weapons, and 
struggling. The hunting sessions were like military exercises.443 Therefore, military 
was not a profession but an obligation, which collects all the settlers together during 
wartime. The collective mobilisation or “total war” during the Turkish Liberation 
War can be considered as a reflection of this structure, inherited from the previous 
Turkish states.
444
 Historians argue that there are two characteristics that have been 
inherited from the Central Asian Turkish states and transferred to the later ones: 
these are military culture, which has been deeply associated with the Turkish 
societies, and the tradition of strong central state authority.445 In the language used by 
the early Turks, the dominance of militarist expressions indicates the position of 
soldiery in the Turkish national culture.446 Additionally, even in the first Turkish 
states, the military was effective in politics. The warriors and veterans had some 
                                               
440 Unal, ibid.: 7. (Mete Khan, also known as Modu Chanyu, was the first Emperor of the Huns.) 
441 Ibrahim Kafesoglu, Turk Milli Kulturu (Turkish National Culture), Istanbul: Bogazici Press, 1991, 
p.269. 
442 The Presidency of the General Staff, Atatürk and the Republic in Turkish History, Ankara: General 
Staff’s Press of Military History and the Presidency of Strategic Research, 2nd ed., 2009, p.11. 
443 Ibid. 
444 Unal, ibid.: 8. 
445 Mevlut Ozdemir Turk Ordusunun Tarihsel Dayanaklari (The Historical Origins of the Turkish 
Army), Ankara: University of Ankara Political Science Press, 1972, p.10. (The central state means 
establishing states with strong central authority, which is a tradition that transferred to the later 
Turkish states from the ancient ones.); A. Kadir Varoglu and Adnan Bicaksiz, ‘Volunteering for Risk: 
The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces’, Armed Forces & Society, 31, No.4, July 2005: 583. 
446 Mevlut Ozdemir, ibid.: 16. 
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influence over the Khakan (Empire) through the decision-making body (Kurultay). 




5.2.2 The Ottoman Empire: Early Years (1299-1699) 
The Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) was founded in 1299 by a group of warriors under 
the leadership of Osman Ghazi (1299-1326). Osman Ghazi became the first Sultan of 
the new state. The years between 1299 (the foundation of the state) and 1699 (the 
Karlowitz treaty) have generally been referred to as “the rising years” of the Empire, 
in that the state controlled the Balkans, Ukraine, Caucasia, Western Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
the Arabian peninsula, North Africa, and most of the islands in the middle and 
eastern Mediterranean Sea. Among the reasons behind this early success, one may 
mention effective usage of physical force, applying religion as a connective tool for 
keeping the people together, and legitimising conquests by using the jihad card.448 
The Ottomans were founded nearby the border of the Byzantine Empire as a small 
emirate.449 The Ottoman Emirate expanded its borders by the Gaza doctrine and 
rapidly turned into an Empire. The gaza policy, as a “Sunni Muslim doctrine”, 
generated the main pushing force of the Ottoman expansion.450 
                                               
447 Varoglu and Bicaksiz, ‘Volunteering for Risk’, 583. 
448 Halil Inalcik, ‘The question the emergence of the Ottoman State’, International Journal of the 
Turkish Studies, 2:2 1981-1982, p.71-79. (The concept of jihad (or gaza) is an argumentative issue in 
Islamic literature. Modern Islamic philosophers contend that the jihad means defending yourself from 
foreign attacks, but does not mean attacking somebody’s country just for invasion or economic 
benefits. However, when one observes the history, most of the Muslim states tended to use the term to 
legitimise their attacks and invasions under the excuse of ‘religious war’. Therefore, I have also 
applied the term while explaining the Ottoman campaigns.) 
449 Yusuf Halacoglu, ‘The Ottoman State Organization in the Classical Age’, Turks: Book 9, pp.795-
838. 
450 M. Naim Turfan, The Rise of the Young Turk: Politics the Military and Ottoman Collapse, Alfa 
Press, 2000, p.37. 
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The Ottoman Emirate’s gaza policy focused on conquering and settling as well as 
expanding the borders.451 The conquering policy required a strong army, which is 
stable and powerful.452 The strong army would invade the new lands and would find 
new income sources.453 The Sultan was accepted as “zillullah”, which means “the 
shadow of Allah”, and his decisions were considered as the God’s decisions. 
Obedience was inevitable.454 The military campaigns and invasions formed the main 
financial income of the soldiers; consequently, the Empire needed more lands to 
meet its increasing soldier requirement. For instance, the state was giving a piece of 
land to the Sipahis, as had the Seljuks. Therefore, the Empire needed more lands as 
the number of Sipahis had increased.455 
The major impact of the military over the state has continued through the entire 
history of the Ottoman Empire, and that tradition also remained during the 
Republic.456 As Albert Howe Lybyer stated, the Ottomans were an army before it 
was anything else.457 The Sultan was the Commander in Chief, and the Vezirs were 
the generals. The Sultans were being trained according to military discipline from 
their childhood, and learned the combat techniques. In the classical period, the core 
of the Ottoman military power were the Janissaries army which were directly 
                                               
451 Ibid.: 40; Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, 1977: 
152; Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, 1999, p.18. (Kinross’s true name is indeed 
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‘Patrick Kinross’. 
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453 Ibid.: 70. 
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Political Science Department Magazine, xv: 3, 1961, p.39-45. 
457 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the 
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dependent to the Sultan. The Janissaries were one of the most disciplined and the 
stable militaries of Europe (perhaps the best).458 These Janissaries were taking the 
orders from Istanbul, not from the local governors. In this way, the central authority 
was preserved.459 The absolute obedience of the Janissaries is defined as machine-
like fidelity by Serif Mardin.
460
 In the time of Suleiman and afterwards, the Empire 
had the strongest and most disciplined army of its time.461 
5.3 THE DECLINE OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1699-1908) 
Although the main problem behind the Empire’s decline has been defined as the 
military’s deformation by Ottoman ruler elites, the major reason was modernisation 
in Europe after the Renaissance Era. During the time of Suleiman I, the Ottomans 
reached their maximum success, which made the Empire “self-satisfied and inward 
looking”, closing its doors to outside developments.462 The Ottomans had achieved 
some progress in technology but they applied to these innovations just for the 
military institution. They could not “break their ties with the Near Eastern culture” 
and remained under “the impact of traditionalism”. They could not manage to 
observe the “changing mentality” in Europe, and this caused the Empire to overlook 
military developments in the Western world.
463
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Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the military entered into “a 
process of instability, lack of function and technological backwardness”.464 The 
breaking point that stopped the Empire’s growth was the Second Siege of Vienna in 
1683. The defeat in the siege indicated that the European militaries were 
technologically improved, and the Ottomans were weakened. By the treaty of 
Karlowitz in 1699, the expansion process of the Empire ended and the state began to 
decline.465 The Empire began to lose lands and weaken gradually. The state 
authorities became convinced that unless the military was reformed, the collapse of 
the state was inevitable.466 During the declining era, the military rebellions created 
serious threats against weak state authority. Nevertheless, the Janissaries’ riots were 
generally implemented with a goal of maintaining the existing power of the 
Janissaries within the state, and therefore they should be analysed as distinct from the 
later revolutionary attempts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.467 Indeed, the 
Janissary riots were conveying strong anti-Western motifs. Accordingly, the religious 
feelings of the people were severely manipulated to legitimise these rebellions.468 
In the declining era, the Janissaries gradually increased their political power as an 
interest group, to the degree that it challenged the Sultan’s authority. It may even be 
correct to define the Janissaries army as a “state within the state” within those years. 
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Many times, the Sheikh ul-Islam and the Ulama made compromises with the 
Janissaries to overthrow the Viziers and the Sultans.469 
Additionally, with the new regulations, the Janissaries were allowed to marry and 
sell merchandise. The freedom of merchandising pushed the Janissaries toward 
financial interests. After each new rebellion, they began to demand land and 
privileges from the Sultan. Indeed, they became an important ally of the civilian 
groups who were demanding higher positions within the state. The central authority 
continued to decline and the military’s political influence continued to grow.470 
Accordingly, in the following centuries, the defeats against the European powers 
continued to grow. Now the state rulers realised that the expected reforms should 
cover a large area, namely discipline, weapons, technical effectiveness, education, 
and even military uniforms.
471
 As one can predict from this example, the Ottoman 
army should have been professionalised with technical terms. The first serious 
modernisation attempts started with the naval forces. The Muhendishaneyi Bahri 
Humayun (the Empire Naval Engineership) was opened in 1773 to raise new naval 
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engineers with the new techniques of “geometry and geography”.472 In the meantime, 
a French specialist, Baron de Tott, was assigned by the Ottomans as an advisor. 
Tott’s suggestions led to the foundation of a new howitzer school.473 Additionally, 
again through his suggestions, the School of Riyaziye was opened to give 
mathematics lessons to the officers.474 As a result, the following centuries would 
witness a sudden mental change within the Turkish military, from a traditionalist and 
conservative worldview to a revolutionary and progressive tendency.
475
 
5.3.1 The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century Reform Attempts (1789-
1876) 
5.3.1.1 The Era of Selim III (1789-1807) 
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed important reform 
attempts by the Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). Indeed, there are some authors who 
suggest that he was the first Ottoman Sultan who seriously realised that the Ottomans 
needed to adopt Western technology and science to recover the state.
476
 He decided 
to remove the Janissaries institution, because that organisation was the greatest block 
to reform efforts. But the Janissaries and the Ulama were resisting any attempts at 
change, while labelling them as “the infidel inventions (Gavur Icadi)”.477 
Nonetheless, Selim III bravely established a new military organisation, named as 
“Nizami Cedit” (the New Order) in 1793.478 The Nizami Cedit was trained by the 
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European officers and experts; their training system was designed according to the 
European militaries. Eventually, the anti-reformist units of the state organised a big 
resistance against the Nizami Cedit.479 In the mosques, the preachers criticised the 
new military institution by stating that “the infidel Nizami Cedit were dressed alike 
the French militaries and the Sultan would be punished by Allah because of allowing 
that”.480 Eventually, they organised a rebellion to remove the Nizami Cedit in 1807 
with the Janissaries (the Kabakci Mustafa event). The leader of the rebellion, 
Kabakci Mustafa, demanded a religious fatwa from the Sheikh ul-Islam, and 
obtained it. In summary, the fatwa declared: 
The poor Sultan increased his blindness … and forgot that he was 
the head of Muslims, he did not trust Allah but copied the infidels 
… now I only care about the religious interests and the future of 
the Ottoman state.481 
Selim III was obliged to issue a law to remove the Nizami Cedit. However, the 
rebellions did not satisfy the Janissaries: they massacred many members of the 
Nizami Cedit, dethroned the Sultan and then executed him as well.482 Eventually, 
they removed all the remaining Nizami Cedit.483 Overall, the reign of Selim III is 
particularly important in showing the increasing power strife within the military. 
Additionally, the event marked the beginning of a secularisation process by 
modernising military units. The foundation of Nizami Cedit, as a Western-orientated 
modern army, received strong reactions from the traditionalist wing of the military. 
                                                                                                                                     
army was indeed the beginning of a modernisation process within military culture, and was also the 
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Despite the Nizami Cedit being closed down, this division within military units 
would continue under different names. The later conflicts within the military, such as 
Mekteplis versus Alaylis, Unionists versus Saviours would occur because of the 
different worldviews of the officers. 
5.3.1.2 The Era of Mahmud II (1808-1839) 
During the reign of Mahmud the II (1808-1839) the reformist Grand Vizier Alemdar 
Mustafa Pasha attempted to reinstitute the Nizami Cedit under a different name 
“Sekbani Cedit” (the New Army) in 1808. The Janissaries revolted again and the 
Sekbani Cedit was abolished in 1808.484 But Mahmud II was very determined to 
remove the Janissaries to strengthen the central authority.485 Therefore, unlike his 
predecessors, Mahmud II followed a more cautious strategy by convincing the 
Ulama of the necessity of a new military organisation. He had a fatwa from the 
Sheikh ul-Islam and declared that “there was no religious obstacle against forming a 
new educated military organisation”. Eventually, a mutiny made by the Janissaries 
against modern military training methods gave Mahmud II the suitable conditions for 
disbanding the Janissaries. The forces of Sultan surrounded the Janissaries’ barracks 
and opened fire. Eventually, the Sultan managed to break the rebellion. The 
Janissaries were abolished in 1826 and that event is recorded in history as the Vakayi 
Hayriye (the Auspicious Incident).486 That event broke the main obstacle against 
military modernisation.487 Additionally, the abolition of the Janissaries became an 
important turning point for the Ottoman economic policies. Not only did this event 
re-strengthen the central authority but it also opened the path for transiting from an 
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urban to a liberal economy.
488
 Following this event, the first commercial bourgeoisie 
class began to emerge among the non-Muslim minorities. For the first time in 
Ottoman history, a privileged class appeared who made independent commercial 
activities. These important changes affected the military, the Ottoman intellectuals, 
and the non-Muslim minorities. Given the emergence of the printing press (print 
capitalism), non-Muslim Ottoman minorities began to construct their own national 
identity by using a common discourse and language through the newspapers, books, 
reading clubs, conferences, meetings, and commerce.
489
  
More specifically, an Ottoman bureaucratic elite would emerge in the following 
decades apart from the commercial bourgeoisie. The emergence of a Westernist 
education system in the new military schools created a kind of “cultural capital”, 
which collected the positivist, secular and liberal worldviews of its time. This new 
trend would prevail to the civilian intellectuals from the military elite and would 
create a feeling of unity and a common ideal among the new Ottoman bureaucratic 
elite to liberate the state from ignorance and would simultaneously create the 
foundations of revolutionism within military culture.
490
  
In this regard, the following process would trigger the notion of nationalism by 
encouraging minorities for independence and would push the Ottoman intellectuals 
and military elite to seek solutions for preventing the Empire from dissolving. The 
events in the following process, such as the enlightenment and politicisation of the 
                                               
488 For re-establishment of central authority and transition to liberal economy, see: Inalcik and 
Quataert, an Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, pp.6-7, 764-768, 825 and 854-858. 
489 For a detailed analysis relevant to the emergence of print capitalism and first commercial 
bourgeoisie class among the non-Muslim minorities, see: Fatma Muge Gocek, Rise of the 
Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernisation and Social Change, Oxford University 
Press, 1996, pp.117-118. For related arguments, also see: Ayla Gol, Imagining the Turkish Nation 
through ‘othering’ Armenians, p.128.  
490 For the emergence of a bureaucratic elite, see: Gocek, ibid.: 80-81 (the author describes it as a 
“bureaucratic bourgeoisie”, which is distinct from the commercial bourgeoisie. The author argues that, 
while the commercial bourgeoisie collected material resources, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie collected 
knowledge and culture.) 
185 
 
military elite, the Tanzimat Era, the emergence of the Young Ottomanist movement, 
and the declaration of First Constitutional Monarchy are related to this solution 
search.  
Immediately after the abolition of the Janissaries, a new military institution, “Asakiri 
Mansureyi Muhammediye” (the Victorious Soldiers of Mohammad), was founded.491 
Mahmud II intentionally chose the “name of Prophet Mohammad” for the new 
military institution, to give an Islamic impression. All of the Janissaries’ barracks 
were destroyed, and roughly 6,000 Janissaries were massacred (according to many 
historians). Twenty thousand of them were sent to prison.492 In the following process, 
important developments were seen. The first medical schools, “Tiphaneyi Amire” 
(1827) and “Cerrahhane” (1832), were opened. In 1834, the Military School 
“Mektebi Umumi Harbiye” and “Mizikayi Humayun” (the Harmonica School) were 
opened. These establishments sent several students to Europe for education. 
Additionally, a number of teachers were demanded from Europe to teach in these 
schools.493 
At this point the aforementioned reforms came, namely the establishment of modern 
military schools, sending officers to Europe, and bringing European teachers. It 
started a new cultural trend within the military, which prepared the essential 
conditions for the future transformation that has been titled revolutionism in this 
thesis. The progressive ideas began to occur among the officers while they were 
learning the positive sciences in the modern schools: philosophy, mathematics, 
astronomy, and contemporary political thoughts, as well as the latest scientific and 
technological innovations. Accordingly, most Turkish officers learned French to 
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learn the ideals of the French Revolution.494 The first remarkable coup attempt 
became the Kuleli Incident (Kuleli Vakasi) in 1859, an unsuccessful attempt to 
overthrow the Sultan.
495
 Yet, that praetorian trend would continue to develop in the 
following process and would reach its climax during the 1908 Young Turk 
Revolution. The words of historian Naim Turfan (2000) summarises that transition: 
The officers in the modern military were trained with the 
contemporary political ideas of that era in the military schools. 
That caused a feeling of self-awareness among the officers in 
which they believed that they can be a pushing force from the top. 
Therefore, that process – unlike the intentions of Mahmud II – 
increased the military’s impact on the state and made it the most 
effective institution … Soldiers began to consider themselves as the 
most capable group to solve the state’s problems.496 
Most of the aforementioned ideas derived from the French Revolution, such as 
nationalism, republicanism, liberalism, equality…497 Hereafter, the whole military 
education and equipment were brought completely in line with the Prussian and 
French models.498 Niyazi Berkes explains these renewals toward the European 
military system with these words: 
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The most important but less known educational reform within the 
19
th
 century Ottoman state was the creation of the modern 
military.499 
Lastly, another important change within this era was the beginning of compulsory 
military service, following a regulation of 1843. Soldiers were chosen by lottery, the 
service was five years and limited to the Muslim citizens.500 
5.3.1.3 The Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) 
Tanzimat is the reform process that starts with the declaration of the Imperial Act of 
Gulhane (Gulhane Hatti Humayunu) in 1839 and ends with the declaration of the 
First Constitutional Monarchy (Birinci Mesrutiyet) in 1876. The primary purpose 
was giving non-Muslims rights equal to those of the Muslim citizens. Since the 
French Revolution had spread nationalist ideals to every part of Europe, some ethnic 
groups within the Ottoman Empire began to demand autonomy. As a reaction, the 
Sultan and his advisors considered that if they give equality to non-Muslims, they 
could create a new Ottoman identity (Ottomanism) without regard to any religious or 
ethnic difference, and in this way they prevent the Empire dissolving. The Tanzimat 
Reforms were proclaimed legal with the declaration of “Gulhane Hatti Humayunu” 
(the Imperial Act of Gulhane) in 1839.
501
 Although the movement could not find 
enough support from both the Muslims and Christians, it led to some important 
reforms, such as starting the secular changes in the education system and the law.502  
                                               
499 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Routledge, 2013: 101-102. For a 
detailed analysis of reform movements during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries in the Ottoman 
Empire see: Aziz Rifki Ateser, ibid.: 351-370. For the importance of new military schools on military 
modernisation also see: Gocek (1996): 45, 74-75. 
500 Taner, Tanzimat’tan Kurtuluş’a Osmanlı Ordusu, 18-19. 
501 Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, 66; Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans: Dissolving 
Images, 1993: 167; 183; Heper and Evin, State, Democracy, and the Military, 28; Bulent Daver, 
‘Secularism in Turkey’, Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi, 1969, 30-32.  
502 Joan Haslip, The Sultan, Cassell & Company, 1958: 12; Cevizoglu, ibid.: 100. 
188 
 
5.3.1.4 The First Constitutional Monarchy (1. Mesrutiyet) Era (1876-1878) 
In 1856, another reform package, the Decree of Reform (Islahat Fermani), was issued 
to continue the Tanzimat reforms. The decree offered more rights to non-Muslims. 
Firstly, military service became obligatory for non-Muslims. Secondly, non-Muslims 
had the right of promotion to “colonel” rank within the Ottoman army.503 Apart from 
the military reforms, some renewals were made in the civil education system. 
Following this process, a new movement, the Young Ottomans (Genc Osmanlilar), 
began to grow up among the educated class. The Young Ottomans comprised a 
group of civilian intellectuals who aimed to combine all the different ethnic groups 
under the Ottoman identity.504 This new movement was promoted to the public 
through newspapers, theatre, games, poets, and books. The most influential member 
of the Young Ottomans was Namik Kemal (1840-1888).
505
 The Young Ottomans 
played leading role in the declaration of the First Constitutional Monarchy.506 During 
the declaration of the constitutional monarchy, the progressive wing of military 
played an important role by giving their support to the Young Ottomans. In 1876, the 
first Ottoman constitution (Kanuni Esasi) and the first parliament (Meclisi Mebusan) 
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were officially approved by the Sultan. The First Constitutional Monarchy lasted for 
two years. The authoritarian Sultan Abdulhamit II decided to dissolve parliament in 
1878, and the Empire returned to being an absolute monarchy.507 
In the final analysis, the process from the first military reform attempts to the end of 
First Constitutional Monarchy can be considered as a transition period for military 
culture from traditionalism to revolutionism. However, despite there having been a 
remarkable modernist trend within the military regarding the absorbance of the ideals 
of the French Revolution, namely liberty, equality and fraternity, it can be too early 
to consider military culture as revolutionist at this level. Furthermore, the First 
Constitutional Monarchy was not a strong liberal regime because the Sultan was still 
in a supervisor position and had the right to dissolve parliament. Related to this, it is 
not possible to associate the military with a Huntington type of professional military 
ethic, given its increasing relationship with politics.  
5.4 FROM TRADITIONALISM TO REVOLUTIONISM: 
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION AND THE MILITARY 
CULTURE (1908 – 1945)  
5.4.1. The Young Turks Revolution and the Second Constitutional 
Monarchy (1908) 
After restarting absolute monarchy, Abdulhamid II increased his authoritarian 
behaviour. Additionally, he became one of the early representatives of Islamist 
ideology. Islamism was one of the main ideologies during that era, aiming to 
combine all Muslims under the identity of “Islam”.508 To achieve that, Abdulhamid 
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was considering strengthening the position of the Caliphate.509 Historians note that 
the first known praetorian revolutionary organisation appeared during Abdulhamid’s 
reign. The officers organised a coup d’état in the Imperial Military Medical School 
(1896). However, this attempt became unsuccessful, and its members were tried and 
exiled.
510
 Despite the failure of this earliest coup attempt, the revolutionist officers 
began to increase their impact in politics by organising the Young Turks (Jon Turks) 
movement.
511
 The Young Turks movement combined the revolutionist officers and 
civil Ottoman intellectuals against the authoritarian rule of Abdulhamid II.
512
 
Eventually, the Young Turks movement would lead to the establishment of modern 




Indeed, the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki – 
CUP) is the most important development that made the Young Turks Revolution 
successful by enabling them to be organised effectively. The Committee was 
founded by the medical military students in 1889 as a secret organisation (the earliest 
name was the Ottoman Union), which penetrated into the Military (Harbiye) and 
Medical (Tibbiye) academies as well as the School for Civil Servants (Mulkiye).
514
 
Thus, the composition of the organisation became a mixture of revolutionist officers 
and civil intellectuals. The Committee’s discourse tended to be secular and liberal.515 
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In following years, the organisation rapidly increased its impact in Turkish politics 
by acting together with the Young Turks.
516
 Together with the CUP, the Young 
Turks increased their protests against the oppressive rule of Abdulhamit through the 
circulation of bulletins and issuing of secret newspapers.
517
 Indeed, the CUP party 
became a tool for the Young Turks to increase their effect in politics.518 
Related to this, a number of events in the meantime triggered nationalist feelings and 
accelerated military politicisation. These events were important land losses, such as 
Tunisia to France (1881), Egypt to Britain (1882), and the turmoil in Greece (1896-
1897).519 The German Field Marshall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, within this 
period, was a general inspector in the Ottoman military school. After his 
observations, he prepared a report and submitted it to Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-
1918). The report mentioned the growing politicisation among the Turkish officers 
due to strong nationalist feelings. He implied that, accordingly, the Turkish officers 
could be demanding radical political changes in the near future.520 The following 
decade evidenced that Goltz was right. The strong opposition from the Young Turks 
obliged Sultan Abdulhamit II to declare the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908 
(the Young Turk Revolution).521  
On the other hand, one important event during the revolutionary era, “the 
Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy”, is particularly important to understand why I chose the 
title ‘Crossing Identities’ to describe Turkish military culture. The early days of the 
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Second Constitutional Monarchy saw a rivalry and division among the officers, 
between the higher educated and lower educated ones. Basically, two rival groups 
appeared within the military: the first group was “Mekteplis”, graduates from the 
military academy; the second group was “Alaylis”, those from the ordinary schools. 
Accordingly, the first group regularly displayed contempt for the latter, because of 
their ignorance, and the second group did likewise, because of the Mekteplis’ 
inexperience. While the Mekteplis were Western-orientated, modernist, and 
nationalist, the Alaylis were mostly conservative, traditionalist, and coming from 
pious families.522 The Alaylis were loyal to the Sultan and supported the absolute 
monarchy. They were anxious that the growing power of the Mekteplis would push 
them to the subordinated position.523 Indeed, the Alaylis lost their power after the 
1908 Revolution, but they continued to organise counter revolutions such as the 
unsuccessful 1909 coup attempt (the 31 March Incident) and the successful 1912 
coup d’état (under the name of “Saviour officers”). Yet, the 1913 coup d’état by the 
Mekteplis (under the name of “Unionist officers”) led the revolutionist officers to 
hold full control over the state and the army. The domination of Mekteplis in the 
military continued to remain throughout the Kemalist revolution. After Atatürk, 
similar divisions to the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy continued to occur under different 
names and ideologies. In addition to this, the stronger side would use every 
opportunity to eliminate the weaker side from the military.
524
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As aforementioned, the 1908 Revolution and the declaration of the Second 
Constitutional Monarchy marked the beginning of revolutionism within the military 
culture. The modernisation attempts started in the previous century not only created a 
secular and revolutionist military elite but, at the same time, led to the secularisation 
and liberalisation of the political system. Indeed, the events before the 1908 
revolution and the impact that the revolution made on the Turkish political system 
have not been sufficiently analysed yet by Turkish scholars. One comprehensive 
study, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, by the Turkish historian Aykut Kansu 
brings forward radical arguments for the process. In contrast to the traditional 
argument, Kansu imposes a civilian character to the Union and Progress party and he 
defines the 1908 Revolution as “a civilian-led move”. Furthermore, Kansu argues 
that the 1908 Revolution is the main breaking point in Turkish politics, which 
embedded a strong parliamentary tradition to the Turkish political culture and in this 
way opened the path to the Republican regime.
525
  
Indeed, as was argued by Kansu, the events before the revolution – such as the public 
protests against Sultan Abdulhamit II’s oppressive regime and his policy of high 
taxes, which started in Erzurum and prevailed to other cities in 1906 – indicate that 
the revolution obtained a considerable level of public support, which is mostly 
overlooked by the Turkish historians.
526
 Nevertheless, Kansu’s work severely 
overlooks the military’s role during the revolution and aims to give the revolution an 
almost completely civilian character. Although the movement has benefitted from a 
significant civilian power, the coercive image of the revolutionist officers was 
obligatory to deter the Sultan and his followers. In addition to this, after the 31 
March 1909 mutiny, the parliamentary regime had frequently been interrupted by the 
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military coups and was eventually replaced by a military dictatorship. Especially 
after the 1913 coup d’état, the Union and Progress party became a tool for the 
revolutionist officers to maintain their dictatorship. 
One crucial fact increases the importance of 1908: the Second Constitutional 
Monarchy regime was much more liberal than the previous one in 1876, because 
now the Sultan was almost a symbolic figure and had neither the right to interfere in 
parliament nor to dissolve it arbitrarily.
527
 As mentioned above, the Union and 
Progress Party – as the motor force of revolution – gained remarkable public support 
from the Turks, Armenians, and Jews. Although the regime did not receive effective 
support from some ethnic groups especially the Arabs and Rums, and although there 
was not true equality, given the absence of women voters, for the first time in history 
the Ottoman state benefited from a strengthened liberal political atmosphere with the 
representation of different parties and ethnic groups.
528
  
5.4.2 The 31 March 1909 Event 
The first serious challenge to the recently created parliamentary regime came on 31 
March 1909. The supporters of monarch and the radical religious groups launched a 
rebellion in Istanbul. The mutiny generated a risky situation shortly afterwards, 
prevailing around the streets of Istanbul. The rioters were chanting slogans such as 
“we want sharia back”. Combining their powers with the monarchist officers (mostly 
Alaylis), they began to attack the sympathisers of the Unionists and the 1908 
Revolution. The revolutionist wing of the military were alarmed and they began to 
prepare units to stop the revolt. The forces that are known as the “Movement Army – 
Hareket Ordusu” came to Istanbul from Salonika and quelled the uprising. Martial 
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 The Movement Army dethroned Sultan Abdulhamit II and 
replaced him with the Sultan Mehmed V Resad (1909-1918).530 This coup d’état –
known as the 31 March Event – was especially important for the military’s future 
political role. Now, the military had become completely entrenched in politics. 
Afterwards, the revolutionist officers would be the “guardians” of the new 
parliamentary regime that had been created in 1908. 
After the dethronement of the Sultan, the military backed the Committee of Union 
and Progress, which increased its dominance in the Assembly (Meclisi Mebusan – 
The Assembly of Representatives).531 Particularly, Mahmud Sevket Pasha, who 
during the 31 March Events was the commander of the Movement Army, obtained a 
respected and influential position within the state, as the new head of government. 
Accordingly, the new Sultan V Resad’s authority was symbolic and weak.532 
Concurrently, the strongly nationalist Turanism ideology (combining all the Turks 
under one single state) began to increase its popularity among the officers and 
Unionists.533 The announcement of martial law after the 31 March Incident gave the 
military extraordinary powers, and turned Mahmud Sevket Pasha’s government into 
a “dictatorship”.534 
The general policy of the military during the period of martial law was protecting the 
Constitutional Monarchy and sustaining the status quo in the conservative cities. 
Therefore, they cracked down on all those who tried to challenge the power of the 
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military.535 In 1911, an opponent party, the Hurriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi (the Freedom 
and Accord Party), was established. Immediately, the party received increasing 
support from the public. As a reaction, the Union and Progress party approached the 
military for help to stop the rise of the Freedom and Accord Party. Together with the 
revolutionist officers, the CUP applied brutal methods to suppress the opposition.
536
 
Eventually, they (CUP) became successful in the 1912 elections by applying “fraud 
and violence”.537 Now, the cooperation between the military and the Unionists were 
clearly observed by everyone. The officers considered that they were the most 
legitimate institution within the state who could decide the destiny of the nation.538 
Thus, now, they were expecting legitimacy as being the “guardians of the regime”. 
Mahmud Sevket Pasha explained this situation with these words: 
The military had a major role during the declaration of the 
constitutional regime … because the Union and Progress could not 
achieve that task alone … that was obligatory that they needed a 
great support … Normally, that is not a right thing for a military to 
leave its main task and to involve in politics. An army should not 
do this malignity … however if the case was to save a nation which 
is declining, it is not a malignity but it is an honourable thing.539 
During these years, a new opponent movement inside the military was organised as a 
reaction to the fraudulent 1912 elections. The defeat in the Trablusgarp (Libya War) 
against Italy (1911) and the Albanian Revolt (1912) weakened the authority of the 
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Union and Progress party. The name of the new opponent movement begun by 
counter-revolutionary officers was the Saviour Officers (the Halaskar Zabitan), and it 
forced Mahmut Sevket Pasha to resign. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha formed a new 
government by mixing the anti-Unionists and opponent military officers.
540
 As a 
result, the opponent officers became successful and pushed the Union and Progress 
party out of government.  
5.4.3 The 1913 Ottoman Coup d’État (Raid on the Sublime Porte – 
Babiali Baskini)  
Almost immediately after the Gazi Ahmed Pasha government came to power in July 
1912, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) began, in October 1912, turning into a major 
defeat for the Ottoman state. The government of Ahmed Pasha retired. The Bulgarian 
forces besieged Edirne and came very close to Istanbul. The state was under a major 
threat. The anger against the government was strengthened among the nationalists.
541
 
The 1913 coup was implemented within this tough atmosphere by the unionist 
officers. Lieutenant Colonel Enver Pasha was the leader of the movement. The 
organisers initiated propaganda by stating that the government would be leaving 
Edirne to the enemy very soon.542 On 23 January 1913, everything was ready for the 
coup; the propaganda urged the public against the government. They encircled the 
Sublime Porte (the government building) and shouted slogans. The raiders killed the 
Minister of War, Nazim Pasha, and his assistant Nafiz Bey.543 Enver Pasha declared: 
“We will establish a government which has the ability to defend the nation’s 
                                               
540 Ibid.: 300-306. 
541 For the Balkan Wars see: Andrew Mango, Atatürk, Hachette UK, 2011: 112-116, 121-123. 
542 Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, ibid. and Enver Pasa, Makedonyaʾdan Orta Asyaʾya Enver Pasa: 1908-
1914 - Book 2 (Enver Pasha, From Macedonia to Central Asia), Remzi Kitabevi, 1976: 383. 
543 Turfan, ibid.: 360. 
198 
 
rights”.544 Enver Pasha forced the Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha to retire by the threat of 
a gun.545 
The Sultan did not show any resistance and signed the government’s resignation. The 
Sultan’s sanctity legitimised the coup. The government was replaced under the 
leadership of Mahmut Sevket Pasha. Talat Pasha was chosen as the Minister of 
Domestic Affairs and Ahmed Izzet Pasha as the representative of the Commander in 
Chief.
546
 The new cabinet started a “new era for the Young Turk movement”.547 The 
1913 coup also redefined the status of the military from “praetorian” to a “ruler” 
army. Following the intervention, the military officers became “active rulers” within 
the government and cooperated with the civilian politicians (Unionists) to rule the 
state together.
548
 Therefore, the following process, starting from the Sublime Court 
until the end of the First World War, can be defined as a half-junta regime.
549
 
The Union and Progress Committee decided to continue to the war against the 
Balkan forces. However, they could not manage to defend Edirne, and the Bulgarians 
entered the city on 30
 
May 1913. The loss of Edirne caused a deep sadness among 
the citizens, because it was the previous capital of the Ottoman Empire and, thus, had 
a symbolic importance for the nation.
550
 The defeat in the Balkan wars and the loss 
of territories – particularly Edirne – strengthened militarism within the society, 
which assumed that the Empire was dissolving.
551
 In the literature and political 
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discourse, the militarist rhetoric began to be applied more frequently, to stimulate 
nationalist feelings in the citizens.
552
 
Another important development in those years was the strengthening of relations 
between the Ottoman and the German militaries. Ilber Ortayli explains the situation: 
One of the important results of the 1912 Balkan defeat was the 
Ottomans’ demand for a new reformist committee from the German 
military…553 
Indeed, Mahmud Sevket Pasha was not happy with the growing political interests 
among the officers. The ideological conflicts inside the military were reducing its 
effectiveness. He was thinking about prohibiting military members from 
participation in political parties and voting. As a result, he intended to invite a 
German military expert for reconstructing the military. In this way, he thought, the 
military could adopt the professional mentality of the Prussian military.554 Mahmut 
Sevket Pasha avoided revealing his reformist ideas and his intention of depoliticising 
the military.555 Yet, on June 1913, Mahmut Sevket Pasha was assassinated in his 
                                               
552 Turfan, ibid.: 425-431. 
553
 Quoted in Pekin and Yavuz, ibid.: 43. 
554 Hayati Aktas, ‘Birinci Dunya Savasi’nda Turkiye’de Gorev Yapan Alman Subaylarinin 
Faaliyetlerinin Bir Degerlendirmesi ve Turk Askerinin Konumu’ (An Assessment about the German 
officers’ practices who were in duty during the First World War in Turkey and the Position of the 
Turkish Soldier), in: The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II The Ottoman Empire 
between the years of 1763-1938 and the society and the army in the Turkish Republic, Ankara: The 
Turkish Chief of the General Staff, 2001: 413. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
Prussian army became an example for the revolutionist nations who aimed to professionalise their 
armies. A similar case to the Ottoman reformation is also seen in the Chilean army: in 1885, the 
government invited the Prussian Colonel Emil Korner along with the 20 Prussian officers to train the 
Chilean army in a professional way. As in the Ottoman case, the Chilean officers travelled to 
Germany for training. (See: Koonings and Kruijt, (2002): 112-113). Additionally, during the 
American Revolutionary War, the Prussian general Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben played a 
fundamental role by teaching the units of the continental army the essentials of professional military 
discipline, war strategy, and training. See: Michael Lee Lanning, The American Revolution 100: The 
Battles, People, and Events of the American War for Independence, Ranked by Their Significance, 
Sourcebooks, 2008: 223. 
555 Turfan ibid.: 479. 
200 
 
car.556 His death concurrently removed the only obstacle against the Union and 
Progress hegemony.557 Because of these reasons, it is possible to consider that 
Mahmut Sevket Pasha was the first key historical figure in the Turkish military to 




According to Naim Turfan, the Union and Progress party was not very strong when it 
was alone. But their power was sharply increasing through the military support, 
because the real dominant power within the state was the young officers. Indeed, 
Turfan argues that the civil political parties in the state could not go further than 
being the “puppets” of the military. Therefore, the Unionists had always been in 
close relations with the officers, to preserve their good positions. The young officers 
were a “rising class” and they were not affected by the political changes.559 
Furthermore, the death of Mahmud Sevket Pasha, ironically, cleansed the way for the 
revolutionary officers. Afterwards, Evren Pasha emerged as the most influential 
figure among the young officers.
560
 
In June 1913, the Second Balkan Wars started. This time, the Ottoman forces gained 
back some of the lands that they had lost in the First Balkan War, including Edirne. 
The success was met with a great joy among the citizens and increased trust toward 
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 The public support for the military after the Edirne success is 
also important in yet again exemplifying a tradition: whenever there was a failure, 
the public blamed the politicians, not the military; but when there was a success, the 
people thought of it as the military’s achievement.562 That situation can be seen as 
the reflection of the militarist elements within Turkish society and the assumed 
military-nation idea. The Turkish people have always wanted to see the military as a 
trustworthy organisation, and they always tended to remain suspicious against the 
civil politicians. This perception has not changed much during the Republic. Public 
support, the people’s trust for the military and their suspicion of politicians, has 
always made it easier for military officials to interfere in politics. Actually, the high 
level of public trust in the military is an aspect that is common to all militarist 
nations. Conversely, in the liberal and anti-militarist states, the trust level for the 
military can be much lower. Therefore, insofar as strong militarist values continue to 
protect their dominance within the society, it is presumable that the high public trust 
and sympathy for the military will remain in higher proportions in Turkey.  
After regaining Edirne, Enver Pasha became a national “hero” and was assigned the 
position of Minister of Defence.
563
 Enver Pasha’s main goals were to complete the 
Westernist reforms and to insert the “Unionist ideology” into all sections of the state 
and military.
564
 The pan-Turkist ideology was promoted and a more nationalist 
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economic policy was adopted.
565
 Yet, commerce continued to remain under the 
control of non-Muslim minorities.
566
 On the other hand, the liberal views of the CUP 
and its tolerance for minorities were notably weakened by the impact of the military 
and the absorbance of pan-Turkism. In addition to these developments, Evren Pasha 
forced some officers to resign and replaced them with the younger and “modernist” 
ones, and in doing so obtained an absolute control over the military.567 Turfan 
describes this scheme as “the civilians were under the control of the military and the 
military was under the control of Enver Pasha”.568 
On 14 December 1913, a committee of German officers under the leadership of 
Liman Von Sanders came to the Ottoman state.569 Enver Pasha arranged the reforms 
by considering the advices of Liman Von Sanders and his committee.570 In these 
years, Enver Pasha’s great influence over the state caused the Germans to define 
Turkey as “Enverland”.571 In a short period of time, sizeable progress was achieved 
in the education of the land forces. The German officers were assigned to important 
positions inside the Ministry of War and under the Chief of the General Staff. 
Furthermore, the Minister of Navy, Cemal Pasha, started a reformation programme 
for the Navy by taking the advice of English advisors Admiral Arthur Limpus, 
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Admiral Douglas Gamble, and Admiral Hugh Pigot Williams.572 He forced the older 
and more conservative generals to retire.573 A number of warships were ordered from 
the United Kingdom and France, including submarines and explorers.574 
5.3.4 The First World War and the War of Liberation 
The close links between the Turkish people and military date back to the beginnings 
of written Turkish history. Undeniably, the close links, as well as the roles and 
meanings that Turkish society imposed on the military, have played a crucial role in 
the military’s politically keen and active nature. Yet, as has been defined in the 
birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002), and through the events in the 
Liberation War, the military’s role in organising the national resistance and founding 
the Republic has increased its political legitimacy in national politics and in the eyes 
of people. In the following process, the events which led to the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic will be elaborated. In other words, the following process is 
particularly important for observing the future political legitimacy of military, the 
main ethoi that created the foundations of military culture as well as the close linkage 
between the military, society, and politics. 
When the First World War (1914-1918) began, the situation of the Ottoman military 
was relatively better than it had been in the previous years. The reforms made by 
Evren Pasha, by following the German system, showed their results. According to 
Liman Von Sanders, the Turkish military was now in better conditions, and it was 
even ready to challenge Russia’s military power.575 Related to this, in August 1914, 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire signed a secret alliance to induct the Ottoman 
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Empire into the war.
576
 As a result, the Ottoman Empire entered the war by opening 
several fronts, including Gallipoli, the Eastern Front, and the Suez Canal. In some of 
its fronts, the military showed successful defensive manoeuvrings. In the Battle of 
Gallipoli (1915), the Ottoman military purged back the Allies’ campaign of 
conquering Istanbul after a series of battles.
577
 Mustafa Kemal’s reputation suddenly 
increased after his successful commandership and key role in the victory at 
Gallipoli.
578
 However, in most of the fronts, the Empire suffered severe defeats. 
Among the military failures, the most famous was the Battle of Sarikamis (1914-
1915). Enver Pasha launched a campaign against Russia in Eastern Turkey. The 
campaign turned into a severe defeat, with thousands of deaths.
579
 
A number of losses were taken on other fronts as well. Finally, in 1918, the Empire 
took its place among the losers. The Armistice of Mudros was signed between the 
Ottomans and the Allies.580 Among the most important points of the agreement, the 
control of Istanbul and the Dardanelles were given to the control of the Allies. Most 
parts of the Ottoman military were dissolved. According to one regulation, the Allies 
had the right to invade any place in the Ottoman lands if they observed a security 
threat. Additionally, the supervision of communication tools, including the telegraph 
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and radio, and all the ports and shipyards were taken by the Allies. The Armistice of 
Mudros marked the “unofficial” end of the Empire,581 because the Sultan and his 
government had already accepted the rule of the Allies and had begun propaganda 
against any possible nationalist resistance.
582
 Three days after the agreement, Enver 
Pasha and the leaders of the Union and Progress party, as the major figures 
responsible for the defeat, left the country.583 The Union and Progress party dissolved 





May 1919, Greek forces invaded Izmir (Smyrna), located in a very strategic 
position for potential military campaigns.585 Italian units invaded Antalya (a strategic 
port city in southern Turkey) and French troops advanced to southern Turkey from 
Syria.586 The Turkish people were worried but could not manage to organise any 
serious resistance at this level. As a result of the Armistice, most of the military were 
dissolved except for some minor forces in Ankara and Erzurum.587 There were still 
national guerrillas throughout the state, but they were local and were not be able to 
act effectively. Concurrently, Mustafa Kemal pasha (Atatürk) was sent to Samsun 
(north-east Turkey) on 19 May 1919 as the inspector of the 9
th
 Army by the Ottoman 
government.588 At that point, his intentions of organising a resistance movement in 
Anatolia were not known by the Sultan and his government.
589
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Mustafa Kemal’s attempts for organising national resistance started with a number of 
meetings in Amasya, Erzurum, and Sivas (June-September 1919). In these meetings, 
the level of threat and possible salvation scenarios were discussed. The meetings 
caused Istanbul’s government to suspect possible resistance in Anatolia under 
Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, without having the Sultan’s confirmation. The Sultan 
summoned Mustafa Kemal back to Istanbul by taking his duty of inspecting away. 
Mustafa Kemal immediately responded to Istanbul that he had retired from his 
military position. (In the Appendices C, there are some documents that clearly show 
that the Istanbul government gave orders to the local administrators in Anatolia to 
arrest military officers who showed an interest in politics. However, explicitly, the 
main purpose of the Istanbul government was to deter Mustafa Kemal and his friends 
from starting a national liberation without the permission of the Sultan).
 590
  
Despite these developments, the meetings of nationalists had already created suitable 
conditions for establishing a democratic assembly that would combine 
representatives from the different cities of Turkey. These representatives were named 
as “Heyeti Temsiliye” (Committee of Representatives).591 The Committee chose 
Mustafa Kemal as the president of the establishment. The decisions that were taken 
during the national congresses are important in understanding the purpose and 
strategy of the Liberation War. Briefly, these decisions can be summarised as 
follows: 
 The unity and independence of the nation are under risk. 
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 The Istanbul government cannot implement the responsibility that it 
undertaken. 
 The passion and determinacy of the people alone can save the state.  
 The lands of the nation within the national borders are whole and 
cannot be divided. 
 (If it was necessary), the whole nation together will resist and defend 
itself (against all types of invasions). 
 If the Istanbul government cannot protect the independence and 
security of the state, a temporary government shall be founded for 
this purpose. Its members will be chosen by the national congress (or 
otherwise by the Committee of Representatives). 
 Any kind of political supremacy and privilege cannot be given to the 
non-Muslim minorities. 




During the national congresses, Atatürk behaved cautiously to avoid directly 
attacking the Sultan and the Caliphate. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, he mostly 
directed his criticisms at the government, not at the Sultan. Moreover, he 
successfully managed to convince the people that the national assembly would be 
created temporarily, until releasing the Sultan from the “enemy invasion”. 
Following the meetings, the last Ottoman Assembly (Meclisi Mebusan) was opened 
in Istanbul. Atatürk was indeed against the establishment of an assembly in Istanbul 
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because of the existing British supervision.
593
 The most important development after 
the creation of the Assembly became the declaration of the “National Pact” (Misak-i 
Milli). The National Pact was a declaration by the Kemalist nationalists that 
promised to continue to fight until saving the current Turkish lands.
594
 The first draft 
of the National Pact, indeed, was prepared during the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, 
but was formally revealed on 12 February 1920 in the Ottoman Assembly.
595
 The 
Assembly in Istanbul was closed down by the Allies on April 1920.
596
 Immediately 
after this, the nationalists gathered in Ankara and opened the current Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (23 April 1920).597 The Assembly intentionally started work after 
the Friday Prayer. During the inaugural ceremony, an impressive religious ritual was 
implemented to convince the people that the nationalist resistance was not a rebellion 
against religion and the Caliphate.
598
 Nevertheless, these developments in the 
meantime had seriously worried the Sultan. The following days saw “a war of 
fatwas” between the Monarchist and Kemalist religious authorities. Firstly, the 
Sheikh ul-Islam issued a fatwa by declaring that the Kemalists were directly resisting 
against the Sultan. They had to be executed if they were captured, for the good of 
religion. As a response, Mufti Rifat Borekci, who was the major religious authority 
in Ankara, issued a counter-fatwa by declaring that, given the conditions of those 
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days, national resistance was not a mutiny but was a religious obligation in which 
each Muslim should participate.
599
 
In August 1920, the Ottoman government made an agreement with the Allies; the 
“Sevres Agreement” divided the remaining Ottoman lands to be shared between the 
Allies. The Sevres Agreement was refused by the Kemalists immediately.
600
 
However, the impact of this treaty has continued until today. The case was later 
recalled as the “Sevres Syndrome”. The Sevres Syndrome is based on the idea that 
the Western states still preserve their plans for dividing Turkey today, and arrange 
their foreign policy to achieve this goal.
601
 
In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal managed to unify most of the active and retired 
professional soldiers as well as local guerrilla forces (Efeler) under a stable, 
disciplined army. In reaction, Sultan Vahideddin organised his own army by taking 
the support of the Allies, creating what is known as the “Caliphate’s Army” (Kuvayi 
Inzibatiyye). The Caliphate’s Army organised systematic riots against Mustafa 
Kemal and the nationalists by dispersing religious propaganda. Yet, the Kemalist 
forces quelled all the riots and established a certain authority in central and eastern 
Anatolia.602 Additionally, the Ankara government built close relations with the 
Soviets. This friendship generated an important international support for the 
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Kemalists. Turkey and the Soviets signed a friendship agreement in Moscow on 16 
March 1921.603 
On the Eastern front, a serious battle took place between the Turkish and Armenian 
forces. The Turkish units managed to defeat the Armenian forces. The Treaty of 
Alexandropol (Gumru) was signed. Armenia became the first country to formally 
recognise the Ankara government (on 22 October 1920).
604
 After series of local 
conflicts in some cities between the French and the Turkish units, France signed a 
peace agreement (the Ankara Agreement) with the Ankara Assembly on 9
 
June 
1921.605 The French forces left the current south-eastern Turkey except Hatay.
606
 
Italy also left south-western Turkey without doing battle.
607
 
The longest and the strictest battles happened in the Western Front against the Greek 
Forces. During the Sakarya and Dumlupinar battles, Mustafa Kemal’s simultaneous 
implementing of two different roles, as the “Chief of the Assembly” and the 
“Commander in Chief”, was a remarkable event for civil-military relations. When the 
Grand Assembly was founded, Mustafa Kemal was chosen as the Chief of the 
Assembly. His military duty had formally ended. He was being placed in a civilian 
position in the Assembly. Yet, the military influence on the Assembly was 
significantly visible. For example, the two major commanders of the Liberation War, 
Ismet Pasha (Inonu) and the Fevzi Pasha (Cakmak), were also implementing civilian 
duties in the Assembly.608 
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The Turkish troops stopped Greek progress twice, in the first and second battles of 
Inonu (January 1921 and 31 March 1921, respectively), under Ismet Pasha’s (Inonu) 
commandership.
609
 But, in the following months, the Greek forces advanced with a 
more successful campaign. After defeating the Turkish forces in the Eskisehir and 
Kutahya battles (10-14 July 1921) the Greek army approached Ankara. The 
Assembly offered Mustafa Kemal the position of “Commander in Chief”, due to the 
“extraordinary reasons”. The position of Commander in Chief normally belonged to 
the Sultan. Holding this position would be an open challenge to the Sultan’s 
authority. However, Mustafa Kemal realised the opposition’s intention. The 
opponents were thinking to send Mustafa Kemal away from Ankara, because the 
military had already been in very risky situation. If the military lost under the 
command of Mustafa Kemal, his reputation would fade away. After evaluating this 
possibility, Mustafa Kemal offered a counterproposal, “using the Assembly’s 
relevant powers about the military issues”. He limited his proposal to three months. 
Some deputies found that offer too much, as they were frightened to lose their 
influence to a large extent. Also, the aforementioned deputies blamed Mustafa Kemal 
of demanding a “dictatorship”.610 On 5 August, the proposal was accepted by a great 
majority of votes. (In the Appendices B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4, there are some formal 
documents related to this event. In the documents it is clearly observed that Atatürk’s 
double duties as the Commander in Chief and the head of parliament were given to 
him by the Grand National Assembly and were accepted by the majority of votes due 
                                               
609 Mango, Atatürk, 2011: 307-311. 
610 Mango, ibid.: 317. 
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to the “extraordinary circumstances”. The regulation of Commander in Chief was 
limited to three months, given Atatürk’s wishes.) 611 
After being assigned Commander in Chief, Mustafa Kemal prepared a proclamation, 
known as the “Tekalifi Milliye” (National Obligations). The national obligations 
played an important role in changing the war’s destiny. This event was later referred 
to as a typical example of the “military-nation assumption”, in that the whole nation 
participated in the war, directly or indirectly. This proclamation gave ten orders 
including: every household shall provide one set of underclothes and boots for the 
military; 40 per cent of all stocks of cloth, leather, flour, soap, and candles shall be 
delivered; all civilian transport vehicles shall serve for the military free of charge; all 
weapons shall be surrendered to the military; one fifth of all horses, carts, and 
carriages shall be given to the military for use of the military…612 (There are formal 
documents related to the collection process of National Taxes available in 
Appendices D.1 and D.2).  
Eventually, the Turkish military, under Mustafa Kemal’s commandership, defeated 
the Greek forces and pushed them back to the western side of the Sakarya River in 
the Battle of Sakarya (21 September 1921). With the victory of Sakarya, the Turkish 
military gained an advantage over the Greek forces. The national trust and support 
for Mustafa Kemal irreversibly increased. After the battle, the legislation for the 
Commander in Chief was extended three times in a row.613 Mustafa Kemal gained 
the “Marshall” rank and religiously sacred Ghazi title, which is given to those who 
                                               
611 Pekin and Yavuz, ibid.: 185-86; Mango, ibid.: 317. Kinross, Atatürk, 271-272. Also for detailed 
information see: Atatürk, Nutuk: ‘Sakarya Zaferi’ (The Victory of Sakarya); George S. Harris, ‘The 
Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, Middle East Journal, 19, No.1, January 1965: 177 (see the 
second deep note on the page); Hanioglu, Atatürk, 126-127. As aforementioned, the copies of formal 
writings that were written during the negotiations about the legislation for the Commander in Chief 
are available in: Appendices B.1, B.2, B3, and B4. 
612 Mango, ibid.: 318.  
613 For detailed information about the Battle of Sakarya see: Atatürk, Nutuk. 
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were wounded during the Jihad (19 September 1921).
614
 Most likely, these two titles 
further increased Atatürk’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military and the people as 
the defender of the nation and Islam. Between 26 and 30 August 1922, the Turkish 
forces defeated the Greek units completely in the “Turkish Grand Attack” under 
Mustafa Kemal’s commandership. On 9 September 1922, the Turkish forces 
regained Izmir.615 The Greek forces left Turkey. On 11 September 1922, the 
Armistice of Mudanya was signed between the Allies and Turkey. The Allies agreed 
to leave Istanbul and the Dardanelles.616 The borders of current Turkey were finally 
controlled by the Turkish army (the only exception was Hatay). On 23 July 1923, the 
Lausanne Treaty was signed between the Ankara government and the Allies. The 
new Turkish state and the Grand National Assembly in Ankara were formally 
recognised by the other states.617 The lands that had been decided in the “National 
Pact” were mostly regained, apart from some regions including Kirkuk, Hatay, 
Mosul, eastern Greece and the Twelve Islands.618  
Overall, the process from the 1908 Revolution to the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923 can be seen as a feasible example of the model that has been titled 
the positive-undemocratic relationship, in that the theocratic Ottoman monarchy was 
replaced initially by a constitutional-parliamentary regime and latterly by a secular 
                                               
614 Kinross, ibid.: 335. 
615 For details of the Grand Attack and the Battle of Dumlupinar see: Atatürk, Nutuk: ‘Buyuk Taaruza 
Hazirlik, Baskumandan Meydan Muharebesi, Saltanatin Kaldirilmasi ve Gelisen Olaylar’ (The 
Preparation for the Grand Attack, the Abolishment of the Dynasty and the following events). 
616 Pekin and Yavuz, ibid.: 186. 
617 Ibid. 
618 For detailed analysis of the Lausanne Treaty see: Oran, Turkish Foreign Policy 1, 222-228; Mango, 
Atatürk, 2011: 356, 366-67, 373, 375, 380, 386-87; Kinross, Atatürk, 354-374; Andrew Mango, From 
the Sultan to Atatürk: Turkey, Haus Publishing, 2009: 172-182; Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey 
Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey, Overlook Press, 2011, 58; William M. Hale, Aspects of 
Modern Turkey, Bowker [for] the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies of the University of 
Durham, 1976, 2; For an analysis of the exceptions from the National Pact including Hatay 
(Alexandretta) see: Pelt, Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey, 35-40.  
214 
 
republic with the support of a military elite.
619
 In conjunction with this, the next 
process will explain how Turkey became a modern secular state through the reforms 
of Atatürk.620 On the other hand, as one may consider from the examples hitherto, it 
is hardly possible to talk about a Huntington type of normative professionalism at 
this level. Perhaps, the close relations with the Prussian army could make some 
contribution to professionalism regarding technical terms, but arguably not to a 
sufficient level. 
5.3.5 Early Republican Era (1922-1945) 
During the War of Independence, the lines between the civilians and the military 
were not sharply drawn. Although Atatürk was supporting a total separation of the 
military from politics, he did not put forward that idea explicitly during the war. In 
parliament, there were approximately 14 military commanders.621 Furthermore, the 
ideological differences among the deputies and the officers did not create big 
problems, because everybody was focused on winning the war.
622
 However, just after 
the victory, the differences of thought among the commanders became apparent. 
Some authors consider the strife as “a conflict for power” between Atatürk and the 
several military commanders (Kazim Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, and Ali 
Fuat Cebesoy).623 It is largely assumed that most of the commanders were still 
committed to the Sultan and the Caliphate, and could not imagine a regime without 
them. Nevertheless, Atatürk’s strategic political manoeuvrings enabled the abolition 
of both positions. On 1 September 1922, the monarchy was abolished. Then, on 29 
                                               
619 For a schematic analysis of the process see: Analytical Table 2 (p.196). 
620 See: Analytical Table 1, (p.223-225). 
621 Pekin and Yavuz ibid., 186; William Hale, Turkiye’de Ordu ve Siyaset, 1789’dan Gunumuze (the 
Politics and Military in Turkey, from 1789 to Today), Istanbul: Hil Press, 1996: 70-72.  
622 Heper and Evin, State, Democracy, and the Military, 140. 
623 See: Umit Ozdag, Atatürk ve Inonu Donemlerinde Ordu-Siyaset Iliskisi (Civil-Military Relations 
during Atatürk and Inonu Eras) (PHD Thesis), Ankara: The Gazi University Institute of Social 
Sciences, September 2006, p.39; Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 56-59. 
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October 1923, the status of the regime was stated as “republic”. That was followed 
by the abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924.624 
Following the abolishment of the Caliphate, Atatürk continued to implement the 
reforms that changed Turkey’s image from a theocratic ummet (umma) state to a 
secular national Republic.625 At this point, it is likely to state that some of Atatürk’s 
reforms had already been started after the 1908 Revolution but could not have been 
completed because of the strong religious opposition and involvement in the First 
World War. Atatürk’s reforms aimed to create a distance being created between 
Turkey and Ottoman past. Turkey approached Western culture by refusing its 
connection with the traditional Islamic legacy. The most notable of these reforms can 
be said to be the secularisation and nationalisation of education system, the 
replacement of sharia law with the Italian penal code and the Swiss civil law 
(equality of men and women before the law, prohibition of marrying more than one 
spouse, equality in shares of heritage), the adoption of modern clothes (jacket, hat, 
trousers, tie or bow tie for men instead of fez and turban; hat, jacket, and skirt for 
women instead of hijab and headscarf), voting and elective rights for women, the 
closing of the tarikats and tekkes (houses of Islamic brotherhoods),
626
 declaring 
Saturdays and Sundays as formal holidays, adopting Western weights and measures, 
                                               
624 Ozbudun and Kazancigil, ibid.: 68. For a detailed analysis of Atatürk’s strategic moves for 
implementing these revolutions, see: Atatürk, Nutuk: ‘Ankara’nin Baskent Olmasi, Baris Donemi 
Meclisi, Cumhuriyetin Ilani ve Gelisen Olaylar’ (The proclamation of Ankara as the capital city, the 
Assembly of the peace-term and the following events) and ‘Hilafetin Kaldirilmasi, Turkiye Buyuk 
Millet Meclisi’nde Meydana Gelen Gelismeler, Memlekette Huzur ve Guveni Saglamak icin Alinan 
Tedbirler, Genclige Hitabe’ (The Abolition of the Caliphate, the Developments which emerged in the 
Grand Assembly, the Measures for Sustaining Peace and Safety, the Speech to Youth). 
625 Ozbudun and Kazancigil, ibid.: 71. 
626 Tarikats and Tekkes are the meeting places of the people who have committed themselves to a 
specific religious community which is known as Sufi brotherhood; See: Heper and Evin, State, 
Democracy, and the Military, 120. 
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adopting the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic… Moreover, the statement that “the 
state religion is Islam” was replaced by the principle of secularism in 1928.627 
In the early years of the Republic, the military remained obedient to civilian rule.
628
 
However, it is not possible to associate these years with normative professionalism. 
The military’s commitment to the three main commanders of liberation war, namely 
Atatürk, Inonu, and Fevzi Cakmak was the main reason behind military 
subordination.629 Accordingly, Umit Ozdag describes this model as “militarism 
without the military”. Normally, the military was appearing to be out of politics, but, 
in reality, it was entirely political: it was representing Atatürk’s main power. The 
military was ready to suppress any possible opposition of Atatürk orders.630 Actually, 
Ozdag argues that both the Kemalists and conservatives had struggled to pull the 
military onto their own side. In the end, Atatürk, with his logical tactical 
manoeuvres, managed to gain full control over the military in 1927.631 Between the 
years 1927-1928, the military became the active protector of the regime.632 
Additionally, it is predictable that Atatürkist principles became deeply embedded in 
                                               
627 Lewis, ibid.: 404; Dietrich Orlow, ‘Political Violence in Pre‐coup Turkey’, Terrorism, 6, No.1-2, 
1982: 55-56; Ben Lombardi, ‘The Return of the Reluctant Generals’, Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol.112, No.2, Summer 1997: 191-215. (In these works, the author argues that Atatürk’s revolutions 
could not become very successful in penetrating into the lower social classes, rural places, and 
villages. Therefore, when Atatürk died, there was still a great level of commitment to the old 
traditions within the state. Even in many villages, teachers and Westernisation are perceived as 
symbols of ‘infidelity’.); Howard A. Reed, ‘Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey’, Middle East Journal, 
8, No.3, July 1954: 269; For a detailed analysis of Atatürk’s reforms also see: Birol Baskan, ‘What 
Made Atatürk’s Reforms Possible?’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 21, No.2, April 2010: 
143-56; For an argument over the revolution of dress and the headscarf issue, see: Emelie A. Olson, 
‘Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: ‘The Headscarf Dispute’’, 
Anthropological Quarterly, 58, No.4, October 1985: 161-71; Daver, ‘Secularism in Turkey’, 32; Pelt, 
Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey, 19-20. 
628 Nil S. Satana, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Europe, the Middle East and Turkey’, Turkish Studies, 
12, No.2, 2011: 286. 
629 Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 58; Giray Sadik, ‘Comparative Analysis of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and South Korea till the Early 2000s’, Gazi 
Akademik Bakı\cs, No.12, 2013: 211. 
630 Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 129; Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 56. 
631 Karabelias, ‘Military Class and Perpetual State Control in Turkey’, 6. 
632 Ozdag, ibid.: p.43 
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military culture within these years, arguably due to the education that was given in 
the military academies, colleges, and barracks.  
To understand better how Atatürk used the military’s power and how the military 
was naturally at the centre of politics, his speech in 1922 to some of the deputies can 
be used as strong evidence. This famous event was mentioned in detail in Nutuk by 
Atatürk. Shortly before the abolishment of the Sultanate, the supporters of the 
monarchy were arguing in favour of the Sultan. Atatürk argues that the deputies who 
committed to the Sultan were arguing that “no … the Sultanate cannot be abolished 
… it is not possible both religiously and scientifically”. Atatürk explains the rest of 
the process with these words: 
Gentlemen, I said sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, 
by power and by force. It was by force … (the Ottoman Sultans) 
seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation … Now 
the Turkish nation has rebelled and has effectively taken 
sovereignty … into its own hands … (Therefore), the question 
under discussion is not whether or not we should leave the 
Sultanate and sovereignty to the nation. That is already an 
accomplished fact – the question is merely how to give expression 
to it. This will happen in any case. If … the Assembly … could look 
at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if 
they do not, the truth will still find expression, but some heads may 
roll in the process.633 
In this speech, Atatürk states that the abolition of the Sultanate will be carried out, if 
necessary, by force. The deputies who would object to its abolition are threatened 
                                               
633 Lewis, ibid.: 258.; Interview, General Aydin Kalpakli, June 2014; Atatürk, Nutuk. 
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with execution. Doubtless, this threat of Atatürk could not be achieved without the 
existence of military support. During the speech, Atatürk had the full authority over 
the military as the Commander in Chief. As a result, the example supports the view 
that the military was political, as the guardian of revolutions.
634
 
There are several developments that enabled Atatürk to gain full control over the 
military. Firstly, he asked the commanders to choose between military and civilian 
careers. Then, he worked for eliminating the opponent commanders from effective 
positions within the military and replaced them with commanders who were loyal to 
him. Marshall Fevzi Cakmak, known for his loyalty to Atatürk, became the Chief of 
the General Staff.
635
 Additionally, the public support for him as the “saviour of the 
nation” significantly strengthened Atatürk’s position against the opponents. Indeed, 
the public support for Atatürk remained at very high levels until his death. The 
paradox between the people’s religious concerns and Atatürk’s secular reforms, 
interestingly, could not undermine the public’s love for Atatürk. To see the positive 
impact that Atatürk has had on the people, it is enough to observe current Turkey, 
because, in every place, even in the most conservative parts of the state, one can 
easily encounter his busts, posters, sayings, and commemorations. Such a level of 
                                               
634
 For a detailed analysis of how the military played the major role in suppressing the anti-
revolutionary moves see: Gavin D. Brockett, ‘Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Toward 
a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38’, Middle Eastern Studies, 34, No.4 
(1998): 44-66. Two of the most important of these counter-revolutionist riots are known as the 
Menemen and Sheikh Sait riots. Especially, the Menemen event, which happened in 1930, has left 
deep impacts as the symbol of religious fanaticism against Atatürk’s revolutions. The rebellions 
started with demonstrations declaring a demand for sharia law; eventually they beheaded Lieutenant 
Kubilay, who was unarmed. Immediately, martial law was declared in the city and the rioters were 
caught. Some of them were sentenced to death (L.C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf, London, 1932: 324, 327). 
In addition to these two events, some counter-revolutionist events happened in Kayseri, Erzurum, and 
Maras (22-26 November 1925). In Maras, some pious people protested the ‘revolution of dress’ by 
shouting ‘we don’t want hats’. As a response, the local soldiers intervened and arrested 39 protestors. 
In Erzurum, a group of 3,000 people – men and women – protested the introduction of Western dress 
by wearing fezes and turbans. The gendarmerie forces opened fire upon the crowd and killed some of 
the demonstrators (Brockett, 1998: 49-50). Thus, the military’s ‘indirect’ political support of Atatürk 
and his revolutions were an undeniable fact during the early Republican Era. 
635 For the power struggles between Atatürk and his opponents to take the full control of the military 
see: Ozdag, ibid. 
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trust and commitment enabled Atatürk to attempt even the most radical reformations 
during his lifetime. 
Thirdly, Atatürk used several opportunities to eliminate conservatives from the 
Assembly. The first one was the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party 
(Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi) in 1924. The opponents, Kazim Karabekir, 
Adnan Adivar, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Rauf Orbay, established an 
opposition party. Their party stated that they were committed to the Republic and to 
liberal values, but also that they were respectable to the “religious values”.636 
Following the establishment of the party, two incidents that were allegedly related to 
the party members and policies happened: the rebellion of Sheikh Sait; and the 
attempted assassination of Atatürk. After these events, the Kemalists accused the 
Progressive Republican Party of manipulating the people’s “innocent” religious 
feelings. Some members of the party were also accused of involvement in the 
attempted assassination of Atatürk; one of these members was Kazim Karabekir, the 
“heroic” figure of the Liberation War, who was the General Commander of the 
Eastern Front. After these events, some people were sentenced to death and the 
Progressive Republican Party was disbanded.
637
As a result, after these successful 
political manoeuvrings, Atatürk managed to hold full authority over the military. 
                                               
636 This party can be seen as the ancestor of the right-wing conservative parties in Turkey. It was 
followed by the Free Republican Party, Democrat Party, Justice Party, the Motherland Party, the 
National Action Party, the National Order Party, the Welfare Party, the True Path Party, the AKP and 
others; For the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party, the following process, and its 
closure see: Kinross, Atatürk, 394-403; Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Taylor & 
Francis, 2002: 57-58; Mango, Atatürk, 2011: 418-19, 425-426, 429, 446, 450; Ersin Kalaycioglu, 
Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 59. For the Sheikh Sait 
Rebellion see: Oran, Turkish Foreign Policy 1, 248; Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish 
Politics’, 56; Baskan, ‘What Made Atatürk’s Reforms Possible? ’, 148.  
637 Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics,’ 59; William Hale, ‘The Turkish Republic and 
its Army, 1923-1960’, Turkish Studies, 12, No.2, 2011: 194. 
220 
 
Under the military’s “deterrent” image, Atatürk implemented his ideals by creating a 
secular-modern Turkey, until his death in 1938.
638
 
After Atatürk’s death, his “companion in arms” Ismet Inonu was chosen as the 
second president of Turkey. Ismet Inonu had a good reputation through his 
successful commandership during the Liberation War. Additionally, he also had a 
good political career, having been the chief representative of Turkey in the Armistice 
of Mudanya (1922) and at the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Both in the Liberation War 
and the Republican era, he undertook several political roles in the Assembly, 
including the prime ministry. Inonu was chosen as the new president after Atatürk’s 
death. His presidency came in the eve of the Second World War. Therefore, he spent 
most of his time preparing Turkey for a possible war. It is often mentioned that the 
military during WWII was technologically outdated, and the officers lacked 
knowledge of new weapons, military vehicles, and other devices. Hence, 
technological backwardness of the military can be accepted as a motivating factor for 
entering NATO in the 1950s. Other than this development, the military’s 
subordination to civilians continued until the end of Inonu’s presidency. Undeniably, 
his military background and his role in the Liberation War had a big role in keeping 
the military in its barracks, just as happened during Atatürk’s term. Although there 
were some claims that the military began to be politicised during his presidency, 
there was not any noticeable movement against civilian authority. Indeed, the 
                                               
638 For detailed analysis of the assassination attempt to Atatürk see: Ugur Mumcu, Gazi Pasaya 
Suikast (Assassination Attempt to Gazi Pasha), Ankara: Ugur Mumcu Research Press, 1998; For the 
opponents’ criticisms and Atatürk’s answers to them during this era see: Atatürk, Nutuk: ‘Ankara’nin 
Baskent Olmasi, Baris Donemi Meclisi, Cumhuriyetin Ilani ve Gelisen Olaylar’ (The proclamation of 
Ankara as the capital city, the assembly of the peace-term and the following events) and ‘Hilafetin 
Kaldirilmasi, Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi’nde Meydana Gelen Gelismeler, Memlekette Huzur ve 
Guveni Saglamak icin Alinan Tedbirler, Genclige Hitabe’ (The Abolishment of the Caliphate, the 
Developments which emerged in the Grand Assembly, the Measures for Sustaining Peace and Safety, 
the Speech to the Youth); For the removal of the Progressive Republican Party see: Serif Mardin, 
‘Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?’, Daedalus, 102, No.1, January 1973: 182. 
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connection of the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence in 1949 had 
been a giant step toward achieving professional CIV-MIL relations. However, that 
regulation was abolished after the 1960 coup d’état. The military was directly 




By and large, The liberal atmosphere of the 1908 Revolution (the declaration of the 
Second Constitutional Monarchy) gradually turned into a dictatorship after the 31 
March 1909 event. The revolutionist officers quelled the mutiny and declared martial 
law. They replaced Sultan Abdulhamid II with Sultan V. Resad. Following this 
event, the military became the guardian of the constitutional regime. Accordingly, 
the parliamentary regime was occasionally breached by coups d’état and military 
involvements. Indeed, the process saw an ideological strife within the military. As a 
continuation of the Mekteplis/Alaylis tradition, this time the strife existed between 
the Unionist and Saviour officers. After the 1913 coup d’état, the revolutionist 
officers (Unionists) gained full control over the military and ruled the state as a 
military dictatorship. The hegemony of revolutionist officers lasted until the end of 
WWI (1918). The remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire including the current 
Turkish soils were conquered by the victory states. Yet, through the Turkish 
Liberation War (1919-1923), under the leadership of a revolutionist military elite 
commanded by Kemal Atatürk, the Turks regained their independence. After the 
victory in the Liberation War, a new Turkish state – the Republic of Turkey – was 
founded over the remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire and its regime was 
announced as a republic (1923). The monarchy and Caliphate were abolished. After a 
series of Western-orientated secular reforms, the Turkish revolution was completed.  
                                               
639 See: Analytical Table 1, (p. 223-225) . 
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To sum up, I view the beginning of the revolutionist period within the military 
culture as the 1908 Revolution and extend it until 1945. In general, the years between 
1908 and 1945 can be associated with the positive-undemocratic relationship, in 
which a revolutionist military elite became the founders, rulers, and guardians of a 
parliamentary regime. During the process, the revolutionary ideals of the Young 
Turks, including secularism, liberalism, nationalism, and democratisation, dominated 
military culture and were finally formalised as Kemalism after the foundation of 
Turkey. On the other hand, Atatürk’s and Inonu’s presidencies perhaps became the 
only period within which the military presented a completely depolitical image. 
Additionally, the years between 1923 and 1945 became the only stable and problem-
free periods of Turkish civil-military relations. Yet, it is not possible to associate this 
process with a Huntington type of normative professionalism. Rather, the terms of 
Atatürk and Inonu should be explained with the subjective control model of 
Huntington, wherein Atatürk’s revolutions and the Republican Party’s basic 
principles were indoctrinated to the military and, in this way, the military became the 
“mirror” of the state. In addition to this, the officers who were against Atatürk’s 
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This chapter has been the first step of the empirical process. After making a brief 
introduction to pre-Islamic Turkish history and the early Ottoman period, the chapter 
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explained the main reasons behind praetorianist evolution and the foundations of 
revolutionary transformation within military culture. Lastly, the chapter explained 
the foundation of Turkey as a secular republic. In other words, the first case study 
has seen a regime change from a monarchy to a republic, under the leadership of a 
revolutionist military elite. Indeed, this is a clear example of the model that has been 
defined as positive-undemocratic from the beginning of this thesis. 
Ultimately, this chapter has brought four main contributions for the purpose of thesis. 
The first contribution has been indicating the dynamics that created the military-
nation perception. The strong warrior tradition in the early Turkish states has 
generated a close linkage between the military and society, which has continued up 
to the present day. The main implication of this fact, for the purpose of the thesis, is 
that the military has always been the principal organisation in the Turkish states, 
either by being the founder or administrator. This fact also caused the military to be 
politically active and ideologically divided. 
The second contribution has been explaining the factors that pushed the military into 
being a praetorian institution. As has also been elaborated in the previous chapters, 
the Turkish military was always politically keen and active, but, given the strong 
central authority in the early Ottoman Era, they were not able to affect state politics. 
Although they tried to rebel several times, they were easily supressed. Yet, it is 
largely known that, even in the rising years of the state, the Janissaries were 
politically active by favouring candidates for the throne. Accordingly, the decline of 
the state brought a weakening to both state authority and military discipline. The 
centuries between the seventeenth and nineteenth witnessed periodic Janissaries’ 
rebellions, which caused the replacement and execution of several Sultans. As a 
result, the Janissaries were replaced by the modern military institutions. Yet, this 
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process started a praetorian tradition in military culture that would continue for 
centuries. 
The third contribution has been to explain how revolutionist tradition became 
embedded in military culture. The secularised system within the military academies 
led officers to experience a major mental transformation toward revolutionism. The 
officers increased their involvements in politics with the aim of saving the state from 
decline. Eventually, the revolutionary officers founded the current Turkey under 
Kemal Atatürk’s leadership. The revolutionary ideals of the military, namely 
secularism, nationalism, republicanism, and statism have also become the founding 
dynamics of the new state, while being officialised under Atatürk’s principles. 
Accordingly, these principles would strongly embed in military culture during the 
foundation years, while causing it to preserve its praetorian tradition. 
The fourth contribution has been to indicate the foundations of the three different 
identities – revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical – that are the focus of this thesis. 
Even during the declining years of the Ottoman Empire, it is possible to observe 
these divisions. The Janissaries represent the guardian side of military culture, which 
is traditionalist, conservative, and likely to maintain the status quo. Following the 
disbandment of Janissaries, the same tradition was represented by the monarchist 
officers, later would be known as the Alaylis. The Young Turks, on the other hand, 
represent the revolutionist wing, which is modernist, secular, liberal, and supportive 
of the parliamentary regime. Lastly, the Atatürkist tradition represents the 
depoliticised legacy of military culture, which aims to make a clear separation 
between politics and the military and makes an effort to achieve the normative and 




These three different identities would continue to exist under different names and 
groups in the different periods in history, for instance: the Janissaries versus Nizami 
Cedit; the Mekteplis versus Alaylis; the Unionists versus Saviours; the Monarchists 
versus Republicans; the Juntaists versus Moderates; and so on. Yet, in this case 
study, we saw the increasing authority of revolutionist officers within the military, 
which allowed them to gain full control in the end. Following the 1908 Revolution, 
the revolutionist officers became deeply involved in politics as the guardians of the 
constitutional regime. Eventually, under Atatürk’s leadership, they organised the 
national resistance and founded the secular Turkish Republic. At this point, it may be 
necessary to maintain that Atatürk benefited from the military’s deterrent image 
while implementing his secular reforms. Nevertheless, his major intention was to 
depoliticise the military. 
By and large, the first case study has been a clear example of the positive-
undemocratic model, in which a military-dominated elite undemocratically involved 
itself in politics but, in the end, replaced an absolute monarchy with a parliamentary 
system.
640
 Hence, the process cannot be associated with Huntington’s normative 
professionalism and objective civilian control. Also, the process can neither be 
associated with the subjective civilian control, because, during the Young Turks era, 
the party did not civilianise the military. Conversely, the military under Enver 
Pasha’s leadership gained full control over the party. Nevertheless, after the 
foundation of Turkey in 1923, the military gave a distinct image. Under the 
supervision of three heroic commanders of the Liberation War – Atatürk, Inonu, and 
Cakmak – the military was subordinated to civilian rule. Yet, the process between 
1923 and 1950 is closer to the subjective control than the objective one, in that the 
                                               
640 See: Analytical Table 1, (p. 223-225). 
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military was indoctrinated with the Kemalist ideology and became the mirror of the 
Republican Party. The military’s close relations with Inonu and the Republican Party 
in the following decades evidence this. 
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CHAPTER 6: Case Study II: Turkish Officers as the 
Guardians of Regime “Radicals, Moderates and 
Professionals” (1945-1999) 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The empirical process will continue with this case study, which comprises the years 
between 1945 and 1999. This case study is particularly remarkable for a high level of 
politicisation in the military and different factions. During the Atatürk and Inonu 
rules, the main reason behind the military subordination tended to be the charismatic 
personalities of two retired commanders of the Liberation War. Accordingly, the 
military was ideologically closer to the Republican Party, due to the strong Kemalist 
tendencies of both institutions (the military and the party). Yet, the military gradually 
returned back to its political activism just after the establishment of a stable 
parliamentary regime. In 1950, the Democrat Party won the elections and remained 
in power for 10 years. The Democrat Party’s founding fathers were past members of 
Republican Party and were coming from civilian origins. The party was known for 
its liberal-orientated economic policies and relatively weakened secular discourse. 
Especially, in the rural places and villages, the party gained increasing support. The 
party’s various statements and practices against the Kemalist revolutions, and its 
increasing oppression over opponents, caused the military to take over in the 1960 
coup d’état. In the following process, the military ruled the country through the 
National Union Committee. They closed down the Democrat Party, executed Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes and his two leading ministers, arrested the party’s 
members, and created a new constitution. In the new constitution, the military 
created the National Security Council to supervise politics. The importance of this 
case study for the military culture and the notion of crossing identities is the 
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military’s evolution from revolutionism to guardianship. By ‘guardianship’, my 
purpose is to formalise the new transformation within which military culture shifted 
from its revolutionist line. During the process, capitalism and anti-Communism 
became embedded in military culture. Additionally, through the creation of OYAK 
and the rise in officers’ social status, the military became a military-industrial 
complex. Hence, Atatürkist principles – especially secularism – did not go further 
than being an excuse to legitimise military interventions in the eyes of the people. 
Through the measures that were implemented during the juntas, the military became 
the guardian of American-orientated national policies and a newly created capitalist 
regime.  
At this point, this chapter aims to make two important contributions for the purpose 
of the thesis. The first contribution is to explore why the military re-involved itself in 
politics after a process of depoliticisation. The second contribution – which is 
particularly important in answering the main research question – is analysing the 
aforementioned transition from revolutionism to guardianship. That is to say, the 
chapter will explain how the military occasionally witnessed internal strife between 
the different factions (crossing identities), how this strife affected military culture, 
and how it affected national politics. In the end, the reader will have a clearer idea 
about the relationship between military culture and Turkish politics, as this process 
will present empirical examples of the five different models. 
6.2 THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1945-1960 AND THE 1960 
COUP D’ÉTAT (27 MAY) 
The second president, Ismet Inonu – as Atatürk’s successor – faced a big challenge at 
the very beginning of his term. The Second World War had just started in 1939. 





 Yet, Inonu tackled this issue successfully by keeping 
Turkey impartial during the Second World War. Nevertheless, the Second World 
War caused important changes in Turkish foreign policy. It was the end of the long-
term Turkey-Soviet friendship built up during Atatürk’s term, and saw Turkey 
converging with the Western bloc. 
After the war, the Soviets came up with several demands, such as claiming lands in 
eastern Turkey and creating a mutual commission between Turkey and the Soviets 
for governing the Bosporus.
642
 As a result, the Soviet risk compelled Turkey to 
approach the Western front to establish closer relations with the United States.
643
 In 
addition to technological backwardness and the Soviet threat, particularly, the young 
officers were not happy with the drop in their social status and financial difficulties. 
They began to lose their trust in the Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Cakmak, and in 
President Ismet Inonu. Indeed, the first secret organisations had already appeared just 
after the end of the Second World War.
644
 The young officers considered that the 
military profession should regain its former respect within the society. Additionally, 
military technology had to be improved by new weapons, because they were in a 
severely weak position against possible foreign threats.
645
 Hence, the foundation 
purpose of the first secret juntas was indeed completely different from that of the 
later ones. They were founded to overthrow Inonu and the committee of higher 
commanders within the military. Conversely, the later juntas were established to 
                                               
641 William Hale, ‘The Turkish Republic and Its Army, 1923–1960’, Turkish Studies, 12, No.2, 2011: 
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overthrow Inonu’s rivals.646 This can give the reader a clear clue about how the 
military was highly political even during those early days of the Republic, and how 
the young officers were likely to be affected by different political trends.  
However, at that time, there were several factors that were making a military 
intervention hard to achieve: the organisations were not strong enough, and Inonu, as 
a retired commander, was very experienced compared to the young officers and 
knew military psychology very well. It was unlikely for the young officers to 
challenge him. Thus, the foundation of the Democrat Party would become a new 
hope for the young officers.
647
 Additionally, we defined the process between 1950 
and 1957 as a variable relationship, in that there were different factions within the 
military, namely the Republicans and Democrats, and the military’s impact in 
politics was not sufficiently visible yet.
648
 But, in a short period of time, with the 
foundation of the first junta establishments, the overwhelming majority of officers 
began to position themselves against the Democrat Party.
649
 
The beginning of the Cold War brought several important developments in Turkish 
CIV-MIL relations. The most important development happened in 1949: the Chief of 
the General Staff was subordinated to the Ministry of National Security. That was 
indeed symbolically very important for achieving civilian supremacy.
650
 However, 
that regulation of the Republican Party lasted only for 11 years. After the 1960 Coup, 
                                               
646 For the secret coup organisations within the military during the Second World War see: Ozdag 
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the military was irreversibly subordinated to the president. On the other hand, the 
Cold War started a long-term partnership between Turkey and the United States. 
Through the Truman Doctrine (1947) and Marshall Aids, Turkey began to receive 
economic support from the United States.
651
 Especially, after the NATO membership 
in 1952, the close relations between the two countries made important contributions 
to the military regarding technological modernisation and technical 
professionalism.
652
 In addition to these two developments, the 1950 elections became 
a milestone for Turkish democracy. The Democrat Party won the elections against 
Atatürk’s Republican Party and established the first civilian-dominated government. 
Yet, after the elections, four generals visited Inonu and asked him whether he wanted 
any move from the military to stop the Democrat Party (DP); Inonu refused this. 
Furthermore, this visitation was learned by the DP; hence, the Chief of the General 
Staff Abdurrahman Nafiz Gurman pledged that the military was respectful to the 
results.
653
 Theoretically, in this ‘historically well-known’ event, the ideological 
divisions within the military can be seen. Four commanders who have sympathy to 
Ismet Pasha (Inonu) ask him whether or not he wants a military intervention. Just 
after this event, the Commander in Chief gives a guarantee that the Turkish military 
is respectful to democracy and public choice. As a result, the two contradictory 
events give us a clear clue about the military’s high political interests – even in 
Inonu’s time – and the existence of different parties within. 
In foreign policy, the relations between Turkey and the United States also continued 
to develop during the Democrat Party rule. Turkey became involved in the Korean 
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War (1950) to help the coalition forces. In the end, Turkey became a NATO member 
in 1952.
654
 The dated Turkish weapons were replaced by modern ones. A number of 
American experts came to Turkey to train the Turkish officers.
655
 Those years were 
very similar to the military modernisation of the last Ottoman centuries. This time 
the American military system replaced the previous Prussian system. Additionally, 
the close relations with the United States enabled capitalism and anti-Communism to 
embed in military culture and distanced the military from the revolutionary ideals of 
Kemalism. In the following decades, the military interventions would design and 
protect domestic policies according to NATO interests.  
Accordingly, a professional improvement (technically) became observable among 
the younger officers after learning modern techniques from the NATO armies. In a 
short time, a mental difference had emerged separating the younger and older 
officers.
656
 Nevertheless, this development did not bring any remarkable change for 
CIV-MIL relations. The relative harmony between the military and DP government 
could only continue until 1954.
657
 Because, after the DP’s second election victory in 
1954 (by 58 per cent of the votes), the government began to be less tolerant, 
undemocratic, and more repressive against its opponents.
658
 Additionally, they 
intended to pull the military onto their side. Arguably, these first authoritarian 
tendencies of the DP triggered the establishment of first secret juntaist organisations 
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 As a result, the NATO membership perhaps improved military 
professionalism regarding technical terms, but in terms of normative professionalism, 
the military could not show any remarkable progress.  
There are significant reasons that increased the tensions between the Menderes 
government and the military. The primary reason was that the DP was not as 
sensitive as the RP as regards Atatürk’s reforms. Menderes, normally, was not 
against Kemalism and Atatürk’s reforms;660 indeed, in the earlier periods of the DP’s 
rule, they created some regulations to show their commitment to Atatürk and 
secularism.
661
 However, a number of practices to impress religious voters alarmed 
the military, such as transforming the Call to Prayer from Turkish to Arabic, opening 
religious tombs, putting religious lessons onto the education curricula, and 
establishing closer relations with the religious brotherhoods.
662
 Additionally, the 
aforementioned oppression over the opponents targeted the institutions
 
that had close 
relations with the military. Among the oppressed bodies was the Republican Party, 
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the media, the university staff and students, as well as the bureaucracy.
663
 
Additionally, the early economic success that came after the American Marshall Aids 
started to weaken and put the level of public support down.
664
 
In addition to the illegal juntaist mobilisations, a strong civilian protest increased the 
pressure over the Menderes government. However, the DP maintained its 
authoritarian manner. One event in particular furthered tensions; in 1955, history 
recorded this speech of Menderes: “You are so powerful that you can bring back the 
Caliphate if you wish.”665 In addition to this, Menderes survived a plane crash near to 
London’s Gatwick Airport in 1959. Ironically, the conservative side, including some 
media organs, promoted the event as a sign of Menderes’ “sacredness” as “a chosen 
person” by God.666 Furthermore, after the “anti-secular” regulations, such as putting 
religious teaching into schools, opening the path for the Imam-Hatip schools, 
building too many mosques, and similar developments, this led some opponents to 
consider the Democrat Party policies as “nothing less than a declaration of Islam as 
state religion” and a cancellation of the “secularism” principle in the constitution.667 
The first coup attempt by the juntaists, in 1957, is known as the Nine Officers 
Incident. The attempt was made by a secret organisation that was established by 
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some active officers – mostly lower ranks.668 That first effort was unsuccessful and 
one of the members was arrested.
669
 Yet, the protest continued to grow. On 28 April 
1960, students arranged demonstrations against the DP in the Istanbul University’s 
Faculty of Law. In a short period of time the protest prevailed around the streets of 
Istanbul. During these events, the military gave support to the demonstrators by 
stopping the police.
670
 Immediately after, martial law was proclaimed.
671
 Yet, in the 
following process, the demonstrations continued to grow. After some meetings, on 
27 May 1960 the military revealed that they had taken over the rule of the state and 
overthrown the government. This was the first coup d’état after the foundation of the 
state. The military made this statement: 
Turkish military usurped the rule of the nation to prevent brother 
fighting and the current crisis. The armed forces intend to leave the 
governance to the civilians as soon as possible after doing 
impartial and just elections under the supervision of a committee 
… we retain our loyalty to our alliances and commitments 
including NATO and CENTO.
672
 
In general, the main reason behind the intervention is considered as stopping the 
Democrat Party from undermining democracy and secularism. Hence, the military’s 
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first aim was shown as creating a new constitution that would strictly protect 
secularism and prevent possible religious propaganda in the future. Yet, once the 
military took over the rule, the crossing identities within military became observable 
from outside. The radical group (“the Fourteens”), under the leadership of Alparslan 
Turkes, offered a military government that would remain in power for a longer time 
to complete what Atatürk had started, by projecting his principles to the public.673 
The second group (Inonu supporters) offered to assign rule to the RP as soon as 
possible. Lastly, another group (moderates) suggested that they should leave the rule 
to the civilians after implementing the necessary reforms and staging an election.
674
 
The last group’s idea was accepted and implemented.675 The leader of the movement, 
Cemal Gursel, was also supporting the last idea. Gursel immediately stated that he 
was against “dictatorship”: 
[The] purpose and the aim of the coup is to bring the country with 
all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy … I want to transfer 
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This discourse indeed shows the main idea that most Turkish officers have adopted 
since the foundation of the Republic. The majority of the military authorities have 
always been against long-term junta rule, and have tended to give power to the 
civilians as soon as possible. In this regard, the rhetorical commitment of the military 
to democratic ideals can also be seen in the speeches below. Alparslan Turkes 
explains the reasons for the coup with this statement: 
For several years, we have seen that the constitution was breached, 
our democracy was under risk. The parliament did not do anything 
to prevent it. The nation doubted that the government was going to 
a dictatorship … the Turkish Armed Forces – who have the 
responsibility of protecting the state from domestic and foreign 
threats – considered that this internal strife endangered the 




Colonel Osman Köksal, a member of the movement, argued that: 
The Democratic Party rule removed social justice by implementing 
the inflationist policies, caused the majority of citizens to suffer 
from poverty, made concessions from Atatürk’s principles and 
moved to the dictatorship and thus, under these circumstances, the 
intervention of the military was an obligation.
678
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Turkes’ idea was that civil rule could not control the tension which could develop 
after the coup, and could not make the necessary reforms for the state. After a long 
speech, he stated that Turkey needed to be developed rapidly; but this was not 
possible inside a democratic regime. Returning to democracy could only be possible 
after Turkey handled its problems. However, his radical opinions brought negative 
reactions, even from the leaders of the movement.
679
 
After the intervention, the coup leaders founded the National Unity Committee.
680
 
The committee started a “cleaning” operation, targeting the military, parliament, and 
universities. The officers who were under suspicion for various reasons were forced 
to retire in August 1960. Accordingly, Turkes’ radical group “the Fourteens” was 
forced to disband, and its members were sent abroad. Additionally, 147 members of 
the academic staff of different universities were fired.
681
 In the meantime, the 
Committee created a commission, bringing together several famous academics, to 
prepare the new constitution.
682
 The new constitution was accepted on 9 July 1961 
with a majority of public votes. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and the Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were 
sentenced to death and were executed.
683
 
Some authorities consider the 1961 constitution as the most liberal and progressive 
constitution in the history of Turkey.
684
 The new constitution brought extended 
liberal rights and freedoms such as “the right to strike”, “the right to establish civil 
associations”, and also broadened rights for forming parties and religious 
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 The press became more liberal, new regulations were made for 
establishing labour unions, the judiciary became fully independent,
686
 and necessary 
steps were taken to prevent future one-party dictatorships.
687
 Additionally, the new 
constitution created new institutional bodies to increase the military’s political 
legitimacy and to increase check and balances.
688
 Firstly, by the foundation of the 
National Security Council (NSC), the military actively involved itself in the 
execution process. The NSC was founded as a consultative body to the government; 
it was designed as a mixture of civilian and military authorities. According to the 
first NSC regulations, the military was responsible for giving information to the 
government on the issues based on national security. However, after each 
intervention, the military increased its legal powers in its favour.
689
 The second new 
body was the Senate, which had been created to be the second legislative chamber, 
“to counterbalance” the Assembly.690 Finally, the Constitutional Court was created 
and was dominated with the right of deciding whether or not the party policies within 
the parliament conformed to the constitution. In the following decades, the 
Constitutional Court closed down a number of parties that had strong popular 
support. 
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In addition to the creation of NSC, the military made a new regulation in its Internal 
Service Law by adding Article 35: 
The duty of the military is to safeguard the territorial integrity and 
the nature of the Republic which is defined by the Constitution.
691
 
After its creation, Article 35 has been the main legal tool of military authorities 
whenever they intended to intervene in governmental affairs.
692
 Apart from these 
regulations, some other regulations were also implemented to strengthen the 
economic power of the armed forces.
693
 Retired officers were settled into the top 
positions in the bureaucracy, or they moved into private and state-run enterprises. 
The generals were appointed to ambassadorial positions. In 1961, the OYAK 
(Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension Fund) was founded, to give the 
military personnel some priorities in the Turkish social insurance system, to provide 
social security to the military personnel, and to enable the military to become 
involved in the business and the industry sectors.
694
 The OYAK became one of the 
largest conglomerates in the country by providing high shares to the military 
investors. The generals became a privileged, elite group in Turkish society. Their 
destiny was no longer connected to the party leaders, but to the regime itself.
695
 By 
1975, the organisation subsidised over 19,000 homes, advanced 35,000 loans, and 
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collected tax-exempt assets equal to two billion Turkish Lira.
696
 It integrated itself 
into large economic sectors including the automotive industry (Renault and 
Goodyear), stock speculation (AXA), and aircraft construction and weapons 
manufacture (Lockheed). The success of OYAK improved the living standards of the 
military elite and secured their position.
697
 Eventually, the aforementioned status of 
OYAK as a military-industrial complex gave the military a fundamental role in the 
creation of a modern capitalist state. As a result, the military’s autonomous status 
was further increased given these financial privileges.
698
  
Overall, the 1960 coup d’état and the following regulations of the NSC can be seen 
as an example of the positive-undemocratic relationship, in that the military 
intervention overthrew a growing authoritarian and anti-democratic government. 
Additionally, the military created a new constitution with more extended democratic 
rights and liberties.
699
 On the other hand, the process cannot be explained in any of 
Huntington’s theories, because the military was involved in politics, overthrew the 
government, dissolved the parliament, and created a new constitution. Additionally, 
given the NATO membership, there has been a remarkable increase in the level of 
technical professionalism. Especially, the younger officers learned the most recent 
combat technology and usage of modern weapons, but this technical professionalism 
was not supported by a normative professionalism and, therefore, the military’s 
political activism could not be stopped. Lastly, through NATO membership and the 
creation of OYAK, capitalism embedded in military culture and distanced itself from 
Kemalist statism. In the following process, the military would begin to grow as a 
military-industrial complex, and it would change national politics according to 
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capitalist and anti-Communist principles. On the other hand, the liberal 1961 
constitution perhaps became the last revolutionist act from the officers in broadening 
civil rights and democratic principles. However, shortly afterwards, the military 
authorities began to consider this new constitution as a huge mistake and became 
convinced to replace it with a more conservative one. 
6.3 THE PERIOD OF 1960-1971 AND THE 1971 
INTERVENTION (12 MARCH) 
The 1971 coup has some differences from the previous one. Unlike the 1960 
intervention, the military did not directly take over the rule, but rather forced the 
government to resign. After the 1960 coup, the domestic and foreign developments, 
as well as the relatively liberal domain that was created by the new constitution, led 
to a politicisation of the masses. Especially, the university students and labour unions 
were affected by the global political atmosphere. The mass demonstrations and 
conflicts between the left and right wing students, as well as police interventions, led 
the nation into a chaotic environment.
700
 These new events pushed the civilian 
governments into a weaker position. They became unable to prevent the anarchical 
situation that threatened public security. The military authorities tended to believe 
that the problem was the extended liberal regulations of the new constitution. The 
liberal regulations were too much for Turkey and caused polarisations between the 
people. A reformation was necessary to restrict some of its regulations. 
On the other hand, two important events – the Cyprus question and the Johnson letter 
– domestically increased the level of anti-Americanism. The existing conflict 
between the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus had been increasing every day, and 
collapsing relations between the two NATO members. The worsening relations 
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caused Turkey to consider its options for a military operation in Cyprus. But the 
American President Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish prime minister, Ismet Inonu, 
and warned him that if the Turkish military conducted an operation to Cyprus, it 
could create a conflict between the two NATO countries Turkey and Greece. 
Therefore, the United States would not allow Turkey to use the weapons given by the 
United States. The strict style of the letter created a shock effect throughout the 
country and triggered anti-Americanism, especially among the student groups: the 
Islamists and the left-wing nationalists harshly protested. The anger was transformed 
into slogans in the mass demonstrations such as “non-aligned Turkey” or “fully 
independent Turkey”. Given the political atmosphere, the Turkish War of Liberation 
was often recalled as a victory against “the imperialist West”, especially by the left-
wing groups.
701
 These years also saw a significant change in the Republican Party’s 
ideological stance. Under Bulent Ecevit’s leadership, the party adopted a more leftist 
rhetoric and became a “full” social democratic party. As a result, relations between 
the military and the Republican Party declined, because the military had to position 
itself against socialism due to its NATO alliance. Indeed, the military began to gain 
more support from right-wing people and conservatives in the following period.
702
  
By and large, the military’s influence over politics began to weaken after two 
unsuccessful coup attempts, in 1962 and 1963, by Talat Aydemir. In these coup 
attempts, the majority of the military did not give support to Aydemir and showed its 
willingness to maintain civilian supremacy.
703
 Accordingly, it is possible to observe a 
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short-term military subordination between the years 1965 and 1970, in which civilian 
rule continued without any remarkable obstacle. The military began to re-involve 
itself in politics only after the student demonstrations of the late 1960s. As a result, it 
may be feasible to define the period between 1965 and 1970 as a positive-democratic 




At the domestic level, the student movements continued to grow. Some universities 
became a type of “liberated zone”. Under the leadership of some influential 
revolutionary figures, such as Deniz Gezmis and Mahir Cayan, the leftist students 
created very effective political organisations. On the other hand, the far right 
nationalist Grey Wolfs (Ulkuculer) organised strong opposition groups against 
leftists. The Grey Wolfs attended summer camps to learn the art of the guerrilla 
warfare. The leftist students also received training from the Palestinian camps. The 
Islamists, on the other hand, created different groups to provoke jihad against the 
“imperialist West”. The situation in the campuses gradually worsened when the 
students started to access weapons and apply violence against each other and the 
police.
705
 Especially, a number of events including kidnaps, robberies, and bombings 
put the Turkish government into serious trouble by creating tensions between the 
military and the civil authority. The labour unions were also becoming more militant 
and political, demanding higher wages and better working conditions, particularly 
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through the propaganda of the Worker’s Party and the two big trade unions, the 




In the meantime, the military began to consider circumstances for a military 
intervention. The generals seemed to be convinced that Prime Minister Suleyman 
Demirel and his government did not have enough capacity to prevent the crisis. 
Nevertheless, due to the negative experiences that they had witnessed during and 
after the 1960 coup d’état, they were less willing to take over the rule directly. 
Rather, they intended to create a government that would rule according to the 
military’s demands, and that would make necessary reforms.  
On the other hand, one notable event again is important for indicating the crossing 
identities within the military. The process before implementing the 1971 intervention 
was, indeed, a typical re-emergence of the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy. The division 
(this time) was between the left- and right-orientated officers. According to this new 
categorisation, while the leftists were favouring a Marxist-orientated regime, the 
rightists were supporting more capitalist-orientated policies.
707
 According to Muhsin 
Batur, the officers were divided into four, in those days, as “the commanding elite, 
leftists, status qoists and the neutrals”.708 Related to this, the Chief of the General 
Staff, Memduh Tagmac, once stated that the military was divided into distinct groups 
as being the “progressives-conservatives” and “revolutionists-guardians”.709 
Accordingly, the first coup d’état attempt came from the left-orientated revolutionist 
wing. On 9 March 1971, the revolutionist generals, such as retired general Cemal 
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Madanaoglu –who was one of the primary leaders of the 1960 junta rule – and the 
Chief Commander of Air Forces Muhsin Batur intended to execute a left-orientated 
coup d’état; but they were unsuccessful. In the following process, some higher rank 
commanders would be fended off because of their leftist orientations.
710
 Hence, this 
unsuccessful event is also important for maintaining the guardian tradition within 
military culture. 
Three days after the unsuccessful coup attempt by the revolutionist wing, on 12 
March 1971, the Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tagmac and the Chief 
Commanders of the land, sea and air forces issued a communique to the president 
demanding his government resign.
711
 If he refused, the military would resort to non-
democratic measures, leaving Demirel with no other choice but to retire. Nihat Erim 
became the new prime minister and established a cabinet of technocrats, starting a 
new period of semi-military government by imposing martial law. The youth 
organisations were banned; the meetings, the seminars of the associations, the unions 
and the strikes were prohibited; the newspapers were suspended; the bookshops were 
prohibited to sell books that were not approved by the authorities; the intellectuals 
and the journalists were arrested; hundreds of people were detained.
712
 
In the early days of military rule, chaos proliferated. On 17 May, the Israeli consul 
Ephraim Elrom was abducted and the credit for this event was taken by the extreme 
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leftist Turkish People’s Liberation Army. After the abduction, the military further 
increased its repression, increased the arrests, and applied torture to the prisoners.
713
 
However, the military could not save Elrom; he was found dead. Additionally, two 
British and one Canadian radar engineers were taken hostage in the Black Sea. The 
army conducted an operation to save them but did not manage to do so. Immediately 
after, the military strengthened its operations, especially over left-wing activists. 
Most of them were captured, were wounded, or died during these operations. 
Accordingly, Deniz Gezmis, the symbolic leader of the left-wing students, was 
arrested and executed with two activist friends on 6 May 1972.
714
 
During the 1971 intervention, martial law was renewed by the Assembly every two 
months, in order to implement the constitutional requirements for each institution of 
the state, such as the unions, the press, radio and television, the universities, and state 
departments, as well as the courts. Indeed, the military authorities were convinced 
that the extended liberal rights in the 1961 constitution became too much for Turkey, 
insofar as the immature political culture in the society caused people to abuse these 
rights and apply violence.
715
 Additionally, the military’s supervision over the 
civilians was strengthened by increasing the status of national security. As has 
always been the case during the military interventions, the majority of people 
supported the military. The political parties also gave support to the process by 
remaining silent. The right-wing parties welcomed the new amendments while the 
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The most important result of this intervention for the purpose of this thesis is the 
military’s increasing conservatism. In other words, the military began to lose its 
Kemalist revolutionist character and adopted a status quo-ist and more authoritarian 
identity which is defined as ‘guardianship’ throughout this thesis.717 Given the 
NATO alliance, anti-Communism continued to increase its influence.
718
 
Additionally, the aforementioned influence of OYAK as a military-industrial 
complex, imposed military an important role as regards creating a capitalist modern 
state.
719
 Hence, the 1971 military intervention can be defined with the negative-
undemocratic relationship, in which the military became more political; but, unlike 
its previous interventions, it brought serious harm to democracy.
720
Lastly, it is still 
unlikely to associate the military culture with an Huntington type of professional 
ethos. Even, it is contestable, whether or not the military adopted a sufficient level of 
professionalism regarding technical terms.  
6.4 THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1971-1982 AND THE 1980 
COUP D’ÉTAT 
This coup d’état has a different character to the 1971 intervention because, the 
military again took over the rule directly and dissolved the government. In addition 
to this, many scholars consider the 1960 coup as more “progressive”, because of the 
extended liberal regulations in the 1961 constitution; the same scholars tend to see 
the 1980 coup d’état as “counter-revolutionist”. The 1982 constitution limited most 
of the individual rights that had been given to the people by the previous constitution 
and increased the authoritarian character of the state. Furthermore, many scholars 
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consider the 1980 intervention as the main reason behind the rise of the Islamist 
movement, because of the aforementioned Turkish-Islam synthesis that was created 
by military to stop leftist mobilisation. Additionally, the new constitution increased 
the military’s political legitimacy. The president’s rights were largely broadened. 
This development was strategically important for the military, because, until that 
time, the presidents – with the exception of Celal Bayar – were always being chosen 
from the military commanders.
721
 Hence, the seat of the presidency was already held 
by the military. Therefore, a strong president means strong military supervision. 
Additionally, the military’s power in the National Security Council was further 
strengthened. According to Article 118 of the new 1982 Constitution, the government 
had to give priority consideration to the decisions and recommendations (of the 
NSC). The NSC, according to the new regulations, would now be composed of five 
military members – including the Chief of the General Staff and the Commanders of 
the Army, Navy and Air Force, and also the Gendarmerie – vis-à-vis four members 
of the government, namely the prime minister, and the ministers of the Interior, 
Defence, and Foreign Affairs.
722
 
The pre-coup process witnessed some key events regarding civil-military relations 
and national politics. The first important incident is the crisis of the presidential 
election in 1973. As has been noted, the position of the presidency was important for 
the military authorities. Hence, in 1973, the military decided to make General Faruk 
Gurler (Commander of Land Forces) the next president via an election. But both the 
leader of Republican Party, Bulent Ecevit, and the leader of liberal Justice Party, 
Suleyman Demirel, acted together to prevent Gurler’s presidency. As a result, Gurler 
could not get enough votes to be elected. The event was considered a victory against 
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the military. The military remained highly disappointed by the decision, but they 
could not afford to make another intervention and stepped back. The Assembly chose 
retired general Fahri Koruturk, who was known for a more democratic personality.
723
 
The following years evidenced that the 1971 intervention could not bring a long-term 
solution to the political divisions. Polarisation and conflicts started to appear through 
the middle of 1970s.
724
 The Grey Wolves (Ulkuculer) – who were supporters of the 
National Action Party (MHP) – began to create disorder in the streets. Similarly, the 
left-wing students and the Islamists organised their own resistance groups, such as 
the Revolutionary Left (Dev-Sol) or the Revolutionary Way (Dev-Yol). The 
ideological separation also penetrated into the police forces: 17,000 right-wing police 
officers were detected against 2,000 leftist ones.
725
 The events went so far as to 
disrupt the Republican Party leader Bulent Ecevit’s meetings. Sharpening political 
terror caused a very tragic event on 1 May 1977: Labour Day. DISK (the largest 
labour union in Turkey) organised a crowded demonstration in Istanbul’s Taksim 
Square. In the middle of the meeting some unknown people shot into the crowd from 
nearby buildings; people ran in panic and caused 36 deaths and injuries to 
hundreds.
726
 Terror continued to escalate daily, causing assassinations, including 
famous writers, politicians, and academics such as Professor Bedreddin Comert and 
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the newspaper editor Abdi Ipekci.
727
 The death toll climbed to thousands until the 
military coup. 
In addition, other conflicts occurred between the Alevis and Sunnis, and between the 
Turks and Kurds. The Alevis are known as a different sect of Islam, and are 
traditionally known for their support of the secularism principle and the Atatürk 
reforms. The Alevis tend to be closer the left-wing parties, while the most Sunnis are 
traditionally closer to the right-wing.
728
 The first conflicts between the Sunnis and 
Alevis took place in Malatya, Sivas, and Bingol causing civilian losses and damage 
to buildings.
729
 However, the most tragic event happened in Kahramanmaras. The 
Kahramanmaras Incident, known as the Kahramanmaras Massacre, began when 
Sunni radicals raked and bombed a coffee house owned by the Alevis.
730
 Shortly 
afterwards, a big collision between the Alevis and Sunnis engulfed the whole city. 
More than one hundred died and many were wounded. Instantly, the military 
declared martial law in 13 provinces. Prime Minister Ecevit reluctantly accepted 
martial law, even though he was known as a democratic person who was against 
military interventions. The minister of the Interior took responsibility for the events 
and resigned from his position.
731
 
The chaotic situation led the military authorities discussing the case; the majority of 
commanders was of the opinion that a solution was possible, but again only by the 
armed forces’ own methods. In other words, it was too late for seeking democratic 
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options. Additionally, there were rumours that political polarisation began to affect 
the officers.
732
 However, Prime Minister Ecevit was still resistant and determined to 
maintain civil control, mentioning “martial law with a human face”. However, the 
opponents blamed Ecevit for not giving sufficient room for the military to move. 
Ecevit resigned on 16 October and Suleyman Demirel formed the new government 
on 12 November.
733
 During those days, the generals were meeting in Istanbul to 
discuss the right time for a possible intervention.
734
 
The chaos in Turkey also became more important for Europe and the United States 
because of the Iranian Revolution. The Islamic mobilisation following the Humeyni 
regime increased Turkey’s strategic importance for the West. The Guardian’s 
Brussels correspondent declared: 
Not surprisingly Turkey … is now seen as a zone of crucial 
strategic significance not only for the Southern Flank (of NATO) 
but for the West as a whole.
735
 
That case created another disagreement between the civil and military sides when 
Matthew Nimetz of the US State Department arrived in Turkey to negotiate the new 
US-Turkey Defence and Cooperation Agreement. Demirel did not allow the use of 
bases in Turkey by the Rapid Deployment Force and also he did not want to facilitate 
Greece’s return to NATO until Turkey’s demands in the Aegean region were 
recognised. Nimetz evaluated the case that Turkey was incapable of playing the role 
that Washington demanded from it with the existing government.
736
 Accordingly, 
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there are strong assertions that the United States supported the military intervention 
in 1980 by preserving its good relations with the Turkish military.
737
 
The generals made a defence agreement with the United States without informing the 
government and accepted giving Greece some concessions to meet Washington’s 
demands. They restored the Air Space Agreement, which had been made after the 
Cyprus war in 1974. On 29 March 1980, the government – with no other choice 
under the military pressure – signed the Turkish-American Defence Agreement.738 
By this agreement, the military changed the direction of Turkish foreign policy. The 
Economist magazine evaluated the situation as the ending of Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Russia and the non-aligned countries under Ecevit, moving its 
direction to the West again.
739
 
After some preparation, on 12 September 1980, the military finally stated that they 
were taking power. The military did not face strong resistance and took control 
instantly.
740
 The Chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren, made a statement to radio 
and television: 
The Turkish Armed Forces had no choice but usurping the rule by 
the purpose of maintaining the state unity … the rights and 
freedoms of the people … the security … the happiness and 
prosperity of the people.
741
 
As had been the case with the 1960 coup d’état, the military again stressed Atatürk’s 
principles in explaining the reasons for the coup d’état. They stated that the 
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military’s purpose was to protect and rebuild the democratic regime, not to break it. 
On 16 September 1980, Kenan Evren declared that the military was decisive to 
remove all the obstacles against true democracy in a way that would make no further 
military interventions necessary in the future. He maintained that the education 
system would be renewed to create democratic and nationalist generations loyal to 
Atatürk’s principles.742 
Accordingly, the military dissolved parliament, announced the fall of the 
government, and arrested the party leaders. All political parties were also abolished 
by law.
743
 Travelling abroad was banned, and martial law was declared in all regions. 
The new cabinet was established under the leadership of Bulent Ulusu, together with 
the chosen technocrats, the retired bureaucrats, and the generals. On 21 November 
1980, the martial law authorities announced that there had been 1,245 arrests and 
8,000 detentions since the intervention. The use of excessive force and torture 
became widespread and systematic in jails, causing the death of a number of 
prisoners under suspicious circumstances. Kenan Evren did not deny the existence of 
torture in prisons. However, he expressed that the torture was not an order that came 
from the high command, but was the fault of some guardians in the jails who were 
“mentally ill”.744 The junta rule received various reactions from abroad. While 
Europe was extensively critical of the authoritarian nature of the regime, the US 
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During the junta rule, the ideological divisions reappeared. There were two different 
groups in the military: moderates and extremists. Both sides claimed Kemalism as 
their main ideology. The moderates preferred a soft regime and wanted to give 
authority to civilian rule as soon as possible. The extremists were radical, wanting to 
restrict the system and to eliminate the old politicians. Furthermore, they were 
passionate to create a new party of their own. Kenan Evren acted as a mediator 
between the two camps.
746
 Related to this, thousands of officers -titled as the 
“Yetmissekizli Tegmenler (Lieutenants of Seventy Eight)” who were known as left 
orientated were expelled from the military.
747
 In the end, the junta rule became a 
mixture of extreme and moderate views. The junta regulations and the new 
constitution completely changed the direction of Turkish politics once again, as had 
happened after the 1960 coup; but this time toward a more authoritarian route.  
The first important political change was the new economic politics. The junta leaders 
intended to implement a more liberal model instead of maintaining a closed 
economy. Therefore, Turgut Ozal was chosen as the new deputy prime minister and 
was made responsible for the economy. Indeed, Ozal was an old member of the 
Islamic National Salvation Party. Suleyman Demirel had made him responsible for 
economic policies during his government before the coup d’état. Ozal prepared a 
programme known as the 24 January Decisions, which was a package for liberalising 
the national economy. Ozal was known for his good relations with the IMF and the 
World Bank. Hence, after the 1980 coup d’état, the junta leaders assigned him 
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responsibility for the national economy and encouraged him to complete the 24 
January Decisions to liberalise the economy.
748
 
The second important change is the Turkish-Islam synthesis. The Chief of the 
General Staff Kenan Evren considered that the nation needed new regulations to 
reduce the ideological polarisations. He considered that further divisions should be 
prevented by combining the new generations under Atatürkist ideology. He promoted 
a new interpretation of Kemalism: nationalist and “arguably” more tolerant to 
Islam.
749
 Evren created a new education system under the project, known as the 
“Turkish-Islam synthesis”, a mixture of nationalism, Kemalism and traditional Islam. 
He argued that Islam, Atatürkism and nationalism were the values that keep society 
together and prevented it from political polarisations.
750
 To achieve this goal, 
compulsory religious lessons and moral education were added to the education 
curriculum. Accordingly, Evren considered that if students learn Islam from its 
original resources, they would not get involved in violent movements.
751
 The school 
texts were reconsidered with regard to the Turkish-Islam synthesis (particularly the 
history books) in a way that promoted Turkish nationalism, unity, and religiousness, 
in order to prevent ethnic divisions and Communism.
 
The history books, this time, 
gave priority to Muslim-Turkish history instead of the pre-Islamic history that had 
been preferred in the Atatürk era.752 Relatedly, Kenan Evren presented a religious 
image by quoting passages from the Koran during his speeches. The Turkish-Islam 
project was indeed implemented to stop leftist mobilisation and to break political 
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divisions. The military authorities saw Islam and nationalism as an “antidote” against 
Communism, but, in the following decades, it made an unexpected effect by 
strengthening political Islam.
753
 The 1980-83 period of junta rule blurred the clear 
borders between state and religion, leading to the rise of political Islam. Following 
the junta, female religious students with headscarves began to appear in the 
universities, which gained a symbolic value for the Islamist movement in a short 
time and led to major tensions between the secularists and the Islamists.
754
 As we 
will see in the following sections, political Islam would become a serious threat to 
democracy, which eventually led the 1997 “post-modern coup” without directly 
taking over the rule.  
The third and perhaps the most important change within this period of junta rule was 
the new constitution. The new constitution did not only bring fundamental changes 
for the future of Turkish politics; but it also put civilians under a stricter military 
control with a number of changes in the execution, legislation and judge. These 
changes can be summarised as increasing the president’s power, restriction of 
democratic representation and political activism, supervision over media and 
education as well as increasing the military’s influence in the NSC. As has been 
mentioned before, the military authorities began to consider the extended liberal 
rights of the 1961 constitution too much for Turkey, in that the society was not ready 
to absorb such civil rights and freedoms. Hence, the military authorities limited some 
of these liberties during the 1971 intervention. Yet, this constitution, according to the 
leaders of 1980 coup d’état, should have been completely replaced with a more 
restrictive one. Hence, one year after the coup d’état, in October 1981, the National 
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Security Council appointed a consultative assembly to form a new constitution.
755
 
The new constitution was accepted by a great majority of votes on 18 October 1982. 
The new constitution has occasionally been defined as having a “Gaullist character”, 
since it has strengthened the authority of the president by conferring upon him 
important powers such as dissolving parliament and the right to call a general 
election.
756
 Kenan Evren largely benefited from these regulations by becoming the 
new president of Turkey in 1982. He remained in the position until 1989.
757
 
Additionally, the military’s supervision over the media and universities was 
tightened by the establishment of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television 
(RTUK) and the Council of Higher Education (YOK).
758
 All political parties were 
abolished and the new political organisations and parties were put under strict 
control. The leaders of the previous parties were banned from involvement in active 
politics for 10 years. The election threshold for entering parliament was lifted to 10 
per cent of the votes, to prevent the involvement of excessively ideological parties. 
They were not allowed to establish supplementary branches such as women’s or 
youth organisations. Article 69 prohibited trade unions from pursuing political 
activities or getting support from political parties.
759
 More importantly, as 
aforementioned in the beginning of this section, the National Security Council 
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became a military dominated body with new changes. Now, the NSC would be 
composed of five military members and four civilians. Additionally, with the article 




To stabilise the new regulations, the military remained in power for three years and 
completed the intended changes in politics. As a result, the 1971 and 1980 
interventions brought fundamental changes both for military culture and state 
politics. The military distinctly moved away from its Kemalist legacy by 
encouraging a more liberal economy than statism, and implementing extended 
restrictions on civilian rights and liberties. Over this process, the Turkish military 
gave a relatively more conservative, status quo-ist, authoritarian image in contrast to 
its revolutionist past. Despite the stated commitment to democracy and civilian rule, 
most of the practices during the junta rule, and the new legal regulations that they 
made, were explicitly anti-democratic, oppressive, and authoritarian. 
Indeed, the military discourse was still dominated by strong Kemalist and secular 
references throughout this process. Yet, in reality, some of the practices of the 1971 
and 1980 juntas have clear contradictions with Atatürk’s principles. As has also been 
mentioned, the Turkish-Islam synthesis and the encouragements for a more liberal 
economy are explicitly contrary to Atatürk’s statism and secularism principles. But 
the most important conclusion of this process, for the purpose of this thesis, is the 
increasing religious populism. As aforementioned, starting from the Turgut Ozal era 
in 1983, Islam would be a more promising tool for the party leaders to secure votes 
from the conservative electors. The military, ironically, became responsible for this 
development by opening the paths with its Turkish-Islam synthesis. That 
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development is particularly important, because the military’s alleged commitment to 
secular and democratic norms, at this stage, did not go further than legitimising their 
interventions in the eyes of the people and politicians. After having been an 
industrial-military complex through the creation of OYAK, and after capitalism and 
anti-Communism had become embedded in military culture, the military’s 
revolutionary attempts for intertwining secularism with democratisation weakened 
and secularist discourse became a tool for maintaining the military’s current status 
and the regime’s capitalist character. In the following decades, the Islamic Welfare 
Party would increase its votes and become one of the leading parties in Turkish 
politics. This result was perhaps unpredicted by the military authorities in the 
beginning, but, throughout the process, the Kemalist revolutionism would re-increase 
its impact in military culture, while strengthening the level of anti-Americanism and 
anti-Islamism.  
By and large, I associated the period between 1971 and 1973 with the negative-
undemocratic relationship in that the memorandum in 1971 had broken the natural 
progress of democracy and had caused severe human rights breaches. On the other 
hand, after the presidential election in 1973, we may observe a notable decrease in 
military interventions, with civilian rule continuing until the 1980 coup d’état 
without any break. Therefore, the process between 1973 and 1980 can be associated 
with the positive-democratic relationship.
761
 Nevertheless, it is not likely to associate 
this temporary depoliticisation with a Huntington type of professional military ethic. 
Indeed, it is more meaningful to see this process as a short-term retreat to see 
whether or not the civilians had the ability to handle the problems. The military’s 
gradual involvement in politics, as a result of the increasing national disorder, 
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evidences this. Additionally, with the new constitution in 1982, the military further 
increased its political legitimacy to supervise politics after stepping back. 
Accordingly, the junta rule between 1980 and 1983 again can be considered as a 
negative-undemocratic relationship because it inflicted serious harm to democracy 
by dissolving the parliament, censuring the media, and closing the political parties 
and organisations. Additionally, the 1982 constitution, made under the supervision of 
the junta leaders, noticeably limited the democratic rights and liberties that had been 
gained previously, in the 1961 constitution. Overall, the process cannot be explained 
by the objective and subjective models of Huntington. As a result, the military 
culture was still distant from absorbing a professional ethos regarding normative and 
technical terms.  
6.5 THE OZAL ERA 
The first general elections since the coup d’état were in 1983; the Motherland Party 
(MP) (Anavatan Partisi) won the elections with 45 per cent of the votes. Turgut Ozal 
became the new prime minister. Ozal’s term is known for several successful attempts 
to keep the military under civilian control. Indeed, the election victory in 1983 was 
against the military’s favoured candidate.762 Relatedly, Ozal’s term saw a silent battle 
between the military and civilians for dominance. Hence, Sarigil defines this strife 
for getting the upper hand as a tug-of-war.
763
 After coming to power, the Ozal 
government considered that some of the junta regulations were too excessive and 
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anti-democratic. Thus, Ozal argued that some regulations should be reconsidered for 
restoring civilian authority and demilitarising the decision-making.
764
 
Apart from the developments in CIV-MIL relations, the Ozal Era saw important 
social and political transformations. Ozal passed several laws to strengthen the 
liberal economy, such as encouraging small and medium business entrepreneurs in 
Anatolia. Additionally, Ozal made important attempts to strengthen civilian 
associations. That is to say, Ozal created powerful civilian bodies to challenge the 
military’s influence over domestic politics. The liberalised atmosphere following his 
economic reforms arguably led both civilian and military authorities to re-question 
the authoritarian and repressive methods of past junta rules. Hence, one can suggest 
that the liberalisation during Ozal’s government made the military more tolerant 
toward civilians and made them reconsider their main responsibilities. As a result, 
the 1980 junta became successful in one respect, because it created a politically more 
homogenous, liberal, and less politically inclined society. Yet, this time, the negative 
result came from an unpredicted source: political Islam.
765
 The rise of the above 
mentioned political Islam was tolerated by Ozal arguably because of voting 
concerns.
766
 Indeed, Ozal himself was a former member of the Islamist National 
Salvation Party, and he had refused a very detailed package which was prepared and 
suggested by the military to protect secularism.
767
 
Additionally, Ozal’s attempts for curbing the military’s influence also targeted the 
military’s rooted taboos in foreign policy. He offered alternative solutions to the 
Kurdish problem and the conflicts with Greece. He declined the military’s offer to 
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appoint General Necdet Oztorun to the position of Chief of the General Staff in 
August 1987 and instead appointed his own candidate, General Necip Torumtay. 
However, during the Gulf War, Ozal had a disagreement with the new Chief of the 
General Staff Torumtay, and this strife resulted in Torumtay’s resignation.768 
Additionally, Ozal made an agreement with the Greek Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou for halting Air Force exercises over the Aegean Sea without asking the 
military authorities.
769
 His other great challenge to the military supremacy was to be 
elected as Turkey’s eighth president in 1993, and taking this position away from the 
military. After Ozal, the presidents have always been chosen from the civilian 
population. There are also ideas that Ozal’s one major purpose was subordinating the 
military to the Ministry of Defence rather than to the prime minister. However, he 
passed away in 1993, while he was still president, without achieving that.
770
 
In general, the military’s opinions about Ozal’s policies tended to be negative. The 
sudden rise of political Islam and the Kurdish separation movement as well as the 
disagreements during the Gulf War caused serious tensions between Turgut Ozal and 
the military authorities. Accordingly, these developments made some changes to the 
political position of the military. The rise of political Islam and the Kurdish 
separation movement – particularly after the end of Cold War – arguably caused a 
remarkable increase in the number of Kemalist revolutionist officers. The rise of 
political Islam not only affected the state departments but it conceivably caused a 
significant penetration into the military by the Fethullah Gulen brotherhood. Indeed, 
the assumed Islamic penetration into the state departments and the military would 
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alarm the commanders for taking more radical measures against the rise of political 
Islam throughout the following process. Also, in the short term, the PKK would 
much increase its threat in south-eastern Turkey and would gain remarkable power in 
the region.  
In addition to these developments, the Kemalist officers began to be more sceptical 
against the United States due to its tolerance toward political Islam and the PKK. 
Specifically, a new group of officers who were later titled “Ulusalci Subaylar” 
(Nationalist Officers) increased their impact, especially among the younger officers, 
who are known as staunchly secular, arguably anti-capitalist, and with some 
sympathies for the Eurasian bloc.
771
 The growing silent tension between the two 




Lastly, it would be difficult to associate the Ozal era with a Huntington type of 
professional ethic. The military was still politically active enough to bring Ozal a 
package deal to stop the rise of political Islam. Yet, it may be worthwhile to mention 
that Turgut Ozal managed to reduce military influence over politics (at least) to a 
certain degree. On the other hand, the reducing military influence in politics led to 
the strengthening of political Islam. As a result, Ozal’s era can be defined as an 
example of the negative-democratic relationship.
773
 
6.6 INTERVENTION OF 1997 (28 FEBRUARY) 
The 1997 intervention is indirectly related to the 1980 coup d’état. This intervention 
is mostly referred to as the post-modern coup, in that the military did not directly 
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take over the rule; rather, it obliged the government to retire. Also, the military 
received large support from civil institutions, media, and TUSIAD (the Turkish 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association). The post-modern coup is related to 
the 1980 coup d’état, because the military tried to remove some of its assumed 
mistakes of the junta rule. The rapid increase in the Islamic movement allowed the 
Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Party) to come first in the 1995 elections.
774
 As has 
been noted before, some civilian and military authorities saw the junta rule under 
Kenan Evren’s leadership as highly responsible for that development. The 
encouragements for teaching traditional Islamic thoughts, the emphasis on religion in 
the national education syllabus, opening of the Imam and Preacher Schools (Imam-
Hatips), and the Quran courses naturally accelerated the rise of political Islam.
775
 It is 
also possible to think that Islam became a new hope for those in poverty, given the 
suppression of political ideologies during the junta rule. The Welfare Party was 
indeed the continuation of the disbanded National Salvation Party. The party was 
known for its anti-secular rhetoric, which promoted the unity of Islam instead of 
secular Kemalist nationalism. In this way, they also looked to gain support from the 
Kurdish people and smaller Sunni Muslim communities by excluding the Alevis and 




The aforementioned developments during the Ozal term, especially the changing 
political structure after the end of Cold War, made important changes to the 
military’s ideological position. The emphasis on Atatürk’s principles was 
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 The left-wing intellectuals and the military approached 
each other just as during the 1960 coup d’état. While the left-wing intellectuals were 
most often recalling Atatürk’s words about “non-alignment” and “anti-imperialism” 
to question the Western policies, the Nationalist (Ulusalci) Officers, in the meantime, 
were increasing their influence within the military. Some of the nationalist officers 
were explicitly pointing out their disappointment regarding the US’s assumed 
negligence against Kurdish separatism and political Islam in Turkey. Accordingly, 
throughout the 1990s, the National Security Council increased its efforts to find 
solutions to the rise of political Islam. Indeed, some of these instructions had already 
been mentioned in the package refused by Ozal in the late 1980s. 
Again, during these years, the people, particularly from urban areas, joined the local 
religious communities known as the “religious brotherhoods” (Tarikats). Some 
religious communities grew rapidly; the most famous of them was the Fethullah 
Gulen Brotherhood Movement (also known as the Cemaat or Hizmet), which 
established strong connections with every institution of the state, including the 
police, military, Assembly, media, sports, and business. This ideology was a mixture 
of moderate Islam and nationalism, which is closer to Erbakan’s National Outlook. 
The Fethullah followers are known for their alleged intention of establishing an 
Islamic state based on sharia law.
778
 Fethullah Gulen’s private schools raised a new, 
elite younger generation who are intellectual and Islam-orientated. The Islamic 
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intellectuals who were educated in the Fethullah schools later became very effective 
in politics. Simultaneously, the religious brotherhoods provided a big support for the 
Welfare Party. Indeed, in one of my interviews, the retired general from the Air 
Force Bulent Tuzcu stated that, following the 1980-83 junta rule, the Fethullah 
Organisation made a severe effort to penetrate into the military by indoctrinating 
their ideals to the young officers.
779
  
In these days, there were several assassination attempts directed at intellectuals who 
are considered as staunchly secular, including Ugur Mumcu, Bahriye Ucoklar, and 
Turan Dursun.
780
 However, the biggest Islamic attack came with the Madimak 
Attacks. In 1993, a group of intellectuals who were considered as staunchly secular, 
including the very famous left-wing writer and atheist Aziz Nesin, came to Sivas 
City to celebrate a cultural event known as the “Pir Sultan Abdal Festivals” and 
stayed in the Hotel Madimak for a couple of days. Islamists gathered and attacked 
the hotel by burning, leaving more than 30 people to die. These events demonstrated 
that the Islamic threat was now at a highly dangerous level. 
After coming to power by way of a coalition with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party 
(TPP), the Welfare Party began to show their opposition to secularism explicit ly. 
They no longer hid their criticism against the republican regime and Atatürk’s 
principles. A serious of domestic and foreign events increased the military’s fear of 
the sharia threat: in foreign policy, between 2 October and 7 October 1996, the leader 
of the Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, made visits to several Islamic countries, 
including Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria. He made an agreement with Iran for a natural 
                                               
779 Interview with Bulent Tuzcu. 
780 Ugur Mumcu was known for his investigations about illegal organisations, including Islamic ones. 
Bahriye Ucoklar was an Islamic expert who was known as a firm Muslim believer and, at the same 
time, a supporter of Atatürk’s revolutions. Finally, Turan Dursun was known for his strict criticisms 
against Islam and the prophet Mohammad. 
271 
 
gas transfer. In Libya, Kaddafi’s speech about Turkey was hardly criticised by the 
opponent parties and the press. Kaddafi accused Turkey of being a NATO member 
and repressing the Kurdish minority. He also accused Turkey of being the ally of 
Israel.
781
 In domestic policy also, on 6 October 1996, an extreme religious group 
made demonstrations in front of a mosque by shouting slogans in favour of a 
“sharia” regime.782 Again, on 10 November 1996, the Chief of Kayseri government, 
from the Welfare Party, made a formal speech promoting “jihad”.783 Finally, on 11 




These and some other events led the military commanders to arrange a meeting in 
Golcuk to discuss the future of the secular regime.
785
 This time the military looked 
for public and media support by considering the negative consequences of the 
repressive junta regime in 1980. The military found vast support from the civilians, 
including the civil society institutions, Kemalists, leftists, academics, some 
businessmen, the trade union leaders, and the media.
786
 The conditions were closer to 
the environment just prior to the 1960 coup d’état; the support for the military was 
even stronger, because the case was in favour of most of the right-wing parties, 
especially the Motherland Party. Therefore, some secular right-wing parties 
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784 For a summary of the events that led to the military intervention see: Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 
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785 Birand, The Documentary of 28 February. 
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supported the military. In addition, the attacks of the PKK caused the deaths of 
thousands and left the public angry against the government for becoming 
ineffective.
787
 On 4 February 1997, the soldiers performed a military march with 20 
tanks and 15 military vehicles in Sincan to give the message of intervention if the 
Islamists were to go further. However, some of the religious groups did not step 




On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council arranged an emergency meeting 
that lasted over nine hours. After the meeting, the military authorities spoke to the 
press using a strict tone, saying that secularism was the basic core of democracy and 
law.
789
 The National Security Council issued a list of the 18 decisions – which is 
known as the National Security Council Decisions – to the government, stressing that 
the decisions had to be put into practice to protect secularism. The 18 decisions of 
the NSC made it an obligation that the private schools of the religious communities 
(especially the cemaat of Fethullah) be supervised; the education system should be 
reformed according to Atatürk’s education reform (Tevhidi Tedrisat); the primary 
schools should continue for eight years without giving a break, to prevent transitions 
to the Imam-Hatip schools; the Quran reading courses should be under supervision; 
the religious brotherhoods should be completely removed; the Islamist media should 
be under supervision; religious-based clothes (hijab, turban, headscarf) should be 
banned in official places; the attacks over Atatürk’s personality and his revolutions 
should be blocked...
790
 These decisions were dictated to the government, leaving 
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them with no option but to sign. Therefore, some defined this intervention as a post-
modern coup or a softened coup as they did not take over the rule directly. In the 
following period, Necmettin Erbakan agreed to sign the declaration. The Welfare 
Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court.
791
 During the process, the 
military continued to benefit from a strong civil support, mostly from the Kemalist 
intellectuals, the media, and some civilian organisations. The support even caused 
some authorities to put the intervention on a democratic basis. This intervention was 
indeed theoretically conforming to the revolutionist tradition of the military, because 
the military prepared a reform package for protecting democracy from excessive 
ideologies. However, in practice, the intervention has not changed Turkish politics so 
much – apart from breaking the democratic process – because most of the 28 
February decisions were not practised by the following governments. In the end, the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP) came to power 
in 2002 as the successor of the disbanded Welfare Party. Additionally, after the 1997 
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In the final analysis, the impacts of the post-modern coup are arguable. At one point, 
the military, following the intervention, suggested an effective solution to the 
increasing Islamic threat by the NSC decisions. On the other hand, most of these 
practices could not be carried out by the subsequent governments. Additionally, the 
AKP came to power in 2002 by more than 30 per cent of the vote. Relatedly, some 
politicians who were banned, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was imprisoned 
after the intervention, came back to active politics more powerfully than before. As a 
result, the long-term effects of the military intervention did not bring any 
contribution to Turkish politics apart from breaking the natural progress of 
democracy.
793
 Overall, it is more consistent to associate the 1990s with the variable 
relationship, in which the civil-military relationship did not follow a stable line.
794
 In 
accordance with this, the civil-military relationship in this process cannot be 
explained with Huntington’s two models of civilian control and the theory of 
professional ethic. In addition to this, as mentioned by Abidin Onen, a retired colonel 
from the Air Force, following the end of the Cold War, some Turkish officers were 
sent to Europe and the United States to acquire education according to NATO 
standards. Additionally, the military were involved in a number of NATO campaigns 
and manoeuvres.
795
 Hence, one may suggest that the process saw an increase in the 
level of technical professionalism but it did not bring an increase in the normative 
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This chapter has explained an important period in the history of Turkey, in which the 
military played a leading role in shaping Turkish politics. The period starts with the 
Democrat Party rule and ends with the 1997 post-modern coup. At the same time, 
this chapter is significant toward answering the main research question, in that there 
is variability in military culture and in civil-military relations. By and large, there are 
two main contributions in the chapter. Firstly, the chapter has evaluated the reasons 
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behind military politicisation shortly after the Democratic Party’s rule. Indeed, the 
military was not depoliticised during Atatürk’s and Inonu’s presidencies. There were 
several factors preventing the military from arbitrary moves. Firstly, the military is 
both ideologically and emotionally loyal to Atatürk’s personality. Although Atatürk 
did not wear military uniforms during his time in civilian office, and presented a 
complete civilian image, still he had full control over the military. After Atatürk, 
Inonu also benefitted from his military past as a commander in the Liberation War. 
Secondly, military ideologically is closer to the Republican Party. Both the military 
and the party were already intertwined with each other in the days of the Liberation 
War, as nation builders. Additionally, Atatürk’s charismatic personality remained as 
a connective figure, bringing the military and the party to each other. Thirdly, the 
Democrat Party, arguably, put a distance between the military and the state 
administration, because that party was founded by an elite group, which mostly came 
from civilian backgrounds. Fourthly, the Democrat Party discourse tended to have 
severe differences to the military’s main discourse, inasmuch as the party’s various 
regulations presented an anti-revolutionist image. For instance, the translation of Call 
to Prayer to Arabic, putting religious lessons into the education curriculum, the 
increasing religious and authoritarian tone in the party’s rhetoric, and the increasing 
suppression over opponents made the military highly sceptical and triggered the first 
juntaist establishments. 
The second contribution is especially important to answer the main research 
question. The chapter has presented crucial examples regarding the type of civil-
military relationship in Turkey. Principally, the case study witnessed several 
transitions between guardian and revolutionist identities. The changes in military 
culture also affected Turkish politics in a variable way. In other words, the 
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changeable nature of military culture in Turkey also caused variable results in terms 
of Turkish politics. As has been noticed in the previous chapters, the Turkish 
military’s highly political nature causes its members to factionalise between different 
ideologies, depending on the political conditions of time. In the foundation years, a 
number of officers who were critical to Atatürk’s revolutions were side-lined or were 
stripped of their position. Hence, in Atatürk’s era, the officers appeared loyal to one 
single ideology, which was entitled Kemalism. Yet, the first signals of disagreements 
started just after the Second World War. The officers were divided between the 
Inonu supporters and the Democrat Party sympathisers. Throughout the 1950s, 
several juntaist establishments appeared from different backgrounds. Yet, through to 
the end of 1950s, most of the higher officers seemed unified against the Democrat 
Party for the reasons mentioned above. Nevertheless, during the junta rule, the 
officers were divided again between the moderates and radicals. The radical 
Fourteens group, under Alparslan Turkes’ leadership, was dissolved. Additionally, 
another radical juntaist Talat Aydemir’s two coup attempts failed due to his inability 
to hold full control over the military. As a result, the dominance of the moderate 
wing continued. Yet, in the following period, similar power struggles between 
different factions would continue to exist. 
In this regard, following the 1960 coup d’état, an identity change within military 
culture became observable. The Kemalist-revolutionist tendency of the military 
began to be replaced by a more conservative and status quo-ist line, which has been 
titled guardianship throughout this thesis. In contrast to the revolutionist identity, 
guardianship was more authoritarian, less democratic, anti-Communist-orientated, 
and likely to preserve the current status of the regime. Additionally, through the 
OYAK and financial privileges, the military turned into a military industrial 
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complex. Although the military ostensibly preserved its Atatürkist discourse, in 
reality, it shifted from the revolutionist line, and began to employ secularisation and 
democratisation as a rhetorical tool to legitimise its political acts. Indeed, the 1960 
coup d’état can be associated with the military’s revolutionist legacy, in that the junta 
leaders created a new constitution with broadened civilian rights and liberties. Hence, 
the intended target seemed to be creating a better democracy, with relevant changes. 
However, the extended civil rights, such as freedom of establishing political 
associations, caused the nation to rapidly politicise and made it an arena of civil 
conflicts between different ideologies. Both the 1971 and 1980 military interventions 
came on the eve of civil war. During these interventions, the military’s increasing 
oppression against freedom of speech, torture, and executions caused the military to 
receive highly negative criticism, from both domestic and foreign sources. In 
addition to the increasingly authoritarian behaviour of the military, its promotion of a 
liberal economy and the Turkish-Islam synthesis during the 1980 junta rule were 
explicitly negligent of Atatürk’s secularism and statism principles. The military 
replaced the 1961 constitution with a new one in 1982 and brought important 
restrictions to civil liberties. As a result of increasing religious fundamentalism and 
the Kurdish separation movement, the military turned back to its Kemalist line 
throughout the 1990s, and made another military intervention in 1997, this time 
against political Islam. 
Consequently, the years between 1950 and 1999 show a variable relationship 
between military culture and civil-military relations. The period witnesses four 
military interventions, driven by different political reasons and giving different 
results for Turkish democracy. In general, the impacts of coups d’état seem to be 
negative in terms of the democratic regime. Hence, the process can be seen as a 
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transition from a positive-undemocratic model to a negative-undemocratic model. 
Particularly, the changing influence between revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical 
officers caused national politics to witness several changes regarding 
democratisation. One reason behind this identity change can be given as the NATO 
membership. The Soviet threat and the alliance with the US perhaps pushed the 
military authorities to adopt a more anti-Communist and status quo-ist line, instead 
of the populist and statist domains of Kemalist revolutionism. The increase in the 
numbers of Kemalist nationalist officers following the end of Cold War can evidence 
this reality. But, in general, variability in relations seems dominant in this era. 
Although both the 1961 and 1997 interventions were allegedly made with more 
democratic purposes, their long-term effects tended to be negative for Turkish 
democracy. 
Lastly, the legacy of Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy continued to remain. This time the 
strife emerged between the leftist and rightist officers. Although both sides claimed 
commitment to Atatürk’s principles, the leftist officers were traditionally more 
sensitive in terms of maintaining the secular, statist, and populist characteristics of 
democracy. However, the US-backed rightist officers managed to suppress the leftist 
officers and hold control over the military. As a result, capitalism and anti-
Communism became embedded in military culture as the new ideologies instead of 
revolutionist ideals. After having been a military-industrial complex through the 
OYAK, the military directed the nation for being a modern capitalist state, in a 
parallel way to the Western states. However, the military’s decreasing sensitivity in 
terms of protecting secular and populist characteristics of democracy would make 
Turkish democracy vulnerable to political Islam and human rights violations. At this 
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point, the secular discourse of the military and its alleged commitment to democracy 
became the tools that legitimised their implementations.   
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CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY III: The Military Steps 
Back: “Moving Toward a Depoliticised Identity?” 
(1999-2013) 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is the third and last case study of the empirical part of the thesis. We 
started the process from the 1997 post-modern coup d’état to show the developments 
that led to the foundation of AKP. Principally, the ongoing AKP rule between the 
years 2002 and 2013 has been a time of milestones in terms of Turkish politics. 
Under the single rule of the AKP, Turkey has witnessed fundamental domestic and 
foreign policy changes. One of the most important developments is, crucially, the 
depoliticised appearance of the Turkish military. As has been elaborated from the 
beginning of the thesis, the military has always remained politically active, most of 
the time shaping the general borders of internal and external policy. Hence, the 
military’s step back became an unexpected development. Some important events 
accelerated this process, namely the reforms for accessing the European Union, the 
unsuccessful website declaration in 2007, and the Ergenekon-Balyoz indictments. 
Yet, despite all these developments, it is presumable to consider some increase in the 
military’s professional understanding (both technical and normative), but it is 
arguably not strong enough to achieve an objective control. As was argued at the 
very beginning, the term ‘professionalism’ refers to rooted political neutrality, 
passivism, and unconditional commitment to civilian supremacy within military 
cultures (professional ethos). This definition, indeed, goes hand-in-hand with Samuel 
Huntington’s ideas of the professional military ethic. However, according to 
Huntington, this professionalism is only possible when there is an objective military 
control. In other words, if there is civilian penetration into the military to subordinate 
it, that would not be a democratic method. At this point, although the Turkish army 
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has given a professional appearance from the outside, it is still perhaps premature to 
associate this process with objective control and normative professionalism. Indeed, 
there are several reasons that may cause one to think that there are some attempts by 
the AKP to control the military by civilianising it (subjective control). Yet this 
consideration is also argumentative and hard to prove at this level because of the 
very recent depoliticisation of the military. For these reasons, this chapter defines 
this current stage of military culture as ‘depoliticisation’. 
Accordingly, this chapter aims to make three main contributions. Firstly, it will 
analyse the main reasons that push the military into political neutrality. In other 
words, the chapter will discuss whether there is a mentality change toward 
professionalism or not, by taking into account other possible variables. Secondly, the 
chapter will analyse the main political changes during AKP rule by taking into 
account the military’s politicisation. Thirdly, the chapter will give the answer to the 
key research question by identifying which model best defines Turkey from the five 
different analytical models. To achieve this goal, the chapter will compare the results 
that are derived from this chapter with those that have been derived from the 
previous two, and will make a final analysis.  
Unlike the previous chapters, I will organise this chapter with reference to the Chiefs 
of General Staff under AKP rule. The reason for this different organisation is that 
this chapter analyses a shorter historical case study (1999-2013) with much more 
elaborated examples than those of the previous ones. Additionally, after each change 
in the position of Chief of General Staff within this period, the civil-military relations 
have witnessed radical changes. As a result, it can be beneficial to observe the AKP 
era by dividing the chapter into different sections by taking into account the changes 
in the position of the Chief of General Staff.  
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7.2 POST-28 FEBRUARY AND HELSINKI PROCESS 
Six months after the military ultimatum in 1997, the Necmettin Erbakan-led coalition 
government (WP-TPP) resigned, on June 1997. The military benefited from a high 
public support during the intervention, apart from the staunch supporters of the ruling 
parties. However, other states, especially the Western countries, saw the incident as 
“damage to democracy”. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned the 
Turkish military that taking further steps could breach the Turkish constitution. 
Nonetheless, she did not forget to stress that the US supports “a democratic and 
secular Turkey”.796 Additionally, the end of the Cold War removed the Soviet threat, 
and it was not conceivable that the United States could be as tolerant to an 
intervention as it had been in previous decades. Ironically, anti-Americanism was 
suddenly growing within the military, given its negligence to the Kurdish separatists 
and radical Islam. In addition to all these developments, the successor of the WF-
TPP coalition, the MP-DL (Motherland-Democratic Left), led by Mesut Yilmaz, 
showed some hesitation in implementing the 18 measures of the 28 February, which 
caused tensions between the government and the military authorities. The military 
authorities were still preserving their concerns about political Islam.
797
 As a 
consequence of this perception, they furthered their pressures on the coalition to 
force it to put radical decisions into practice as soon as possible. In response, Mesut 
Yilmaz stated that protecting the fundamental principles of the state should be the 
responsibility of the government in a democratic regime. He also implied that the 
military was responsible with defending the state against the Kurdish separationists, 
                                               
796 New York Times, ‘Albright Warns Turkey to Guard Its Democracy’, June 14, 1997. 
797 Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioglu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: 
Challenges and Prospects’, Armed Forces & Society, 31, No.3, April 2005: 446.  
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but protecting the secular regime should have been the government’s duty.798 
Furthermore, Yilmaz declared that the military was wishing to continue its privileges 
and taking its large share from the national treasury by using the Islamic and Kurdish 
threats as excuses.
799
 This speech by Yilmaz, in March 1998, increased the tensions 
between the military and the government.
800
 In response, the Chief of the General 
Staff, Ismail Hakki Karadayi, made this well-known declaration: 
Islamism and separatism would remain the primary concerns of the 
military and that the military was determined to use legal tools 




The coalition government led by Yilmaz fell in November 1998.
802
 The government 
was replaced by Bulent Ecevit’s temporary government. The early days of his 
government witnessed an improvement in CIV-MIL relations, despite the military 
retaining its concerns. However, this positive development in relations did not last 
long. The tension rose after Yilmaz (who was this time the deputy prime minister) 
repeated, on August 4 2001, that the protection of the state’s security should belong 
to civilians. He maintained that one cannot see any other example than Turkey where 
security concerns shape the “state politics”.803 As a result, this term continued with a 
CIV-MIL power struggle for the upper hand. The military often complained about 
                                               
798 For the strife between Yilmaz and the military in terms of preserving secularism see: Metin Heper 
and Aylin Guney, ‘The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish 
Experience’, Armed Forces & Society, 26, No.4, July 2000: 646. 
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 799 Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar, ‘Turkey 2002’, 313. 
800 Narli, ‘Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002’, 222. 
801The Chief of General Staff İsmail Hakki Karadayi’s response is available at: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZA/AyinTarihi/oncekiler/mart98/20-31mart98.htm. 
(accessed: March 1998). 
802 Gareth Jenkins, Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics , Routledge, 2013: 
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the government’s slow steps in implementing the 18 measures of the NSC. On 3 
September 1999, General Kivrikoglu made another well-known statement by 
declaring that the military’s battle against political Islam will continue for “a hundred 
or even thousand years” if necessary.804 
The post-28 February process saw important incidents with regard to radical Islam 
and the Kurdish separation movement. The police implemented successful operations 
against the Islamic terrorist organisation Hezbollah.
805
 The leader of the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers Party), Abdullah Ocalan, was captured on February 1999. 
Additionally, the closure of the Welfare Party and its successor’s (the Virtue Party) 
poor performance in the elections convinced many citizens that both Islamic 
fundamentalism and the PKK were weakened. Nevertheless, the aforementioned 
Islamic Fethullah Gulen movement (also is known as “the cemaat”) still remained 
the main threat, according to the military. In 2000, the military demanded a 
regulation from the government to dismiss civil servants suspected of being involved 
in anti-secularist activities; however, the decree was vetoed by President Ahmed 




In 2002, Turkey experienced a big economic deadlock after an argument between the 
prime minister and the president. The crisis put some companies into serious trouble 
while increasing interest rates and unemployment. Additionally, Bulent Ecevit’s 
worsening health caused a political ambiguity, which led to early elections.
807
 As a 
result of the elections on 3 November 2002, the Justice and Development Party 
                                               
804 Yeryuzu Haber, ’28 Subat Kararlari Tamamen Askiya Alindi’ (Decisions of 28 February have been 
cancelled). Available at: http://www.yeryuzuhaber.com/28-subat-kararlari-tamamen-askiya-alindi-
haberi-62889.html (accessed: 19 August 2013). 
805 Milliyet, ‘Nefes Kesen Operasyon’ (Breath-taking operation). Available at: 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2000/01/18/haber/hab00.html (accessed: 18 January 2000). 
806 Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 66. 
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(AKP) won the elections with 34 per cent of the vote, which enabled it to form a 
government without any coalition partner.
808
 
7.3 AKP AND THE CHANGING RHETORIC OF 
NATIONAL OUTLOOK 
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is the last representative of the Islamic 
National Outlook ideology created by Necmettin Erbakan. The first representative of 
that ideology was the National Order Party (NOP) (1970-1971), which was founded 
by Erbakan. The NOP was replaced by the National Salvation Party (NSP) (1972-
1980), which was itself replaced by the Welfare Party (WP) (1983-1998).
809
 These 
three parties were all closed down for “violating the constitution”. The Welfare Party 
was succeeded by the Virtue Party, led by Recai Kutan, in 1998. However, the Virtue 
Party showed a poor performance in the 1999 elections, with only 15.4 per cent.
810
 
Nevertheless, the AKP, as the latest successor of National Outlook, gained a huge 
success by becoming the most successful Islamic party in Turkish history. The AKP 
was established in 2001 by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and enjoyed an unexpected 
victory by coming to rule as a “single-party government”, 15 years after Ozal’s 
Motherland Party. Hence, in the following process, it may be worthwhile to analyse 
what reasons brought this success to the Islamic wing. In other words, why did the 
AKP became so successful after the Virtue Party had failed? To give an answer to 
this question, it is necessary to see the differences in the AKP’s policies when 
compared with its predecessors.  
                                               
808 Gareth Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 
International Affairs, 83, No.2, 2007: 347.  For a schematic analysis of the process see: Analytical 
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In fact, most of the founders of the AKP were old members of the Welfare Party. 
Moreover, some of its founders, including Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had been banned 
from politics during the 1997 intervention. Principally, the members of the AKP 
came from the reformist wing of the Welfare Party. Indeed, their first party 
programme showed similarities with the Motherland Party’s programme during 
Turgut Ozal’s era. Rhetorically, the previous National Outlook parties had been 
known for their strong anti-American and anti-capitalist emphases. Additionally, the 
traditional National Outlook parties were giving more importance to “nationalism”. 
In other words, their foreign policy was based on establishing closer relations with 
the Islamic states and creating a bloc against the “Christian-Western Front”. Hence, 
Turkey must be the leader of the Islamic world in this “holy war” against the West, 
as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, their statements contained strong 
references to the Ottoman Empire’s most successful periods by implying that Turkey 
must go back to those glorious years.
811
 They were known for their objection to 
European Union membership and to other Western organisations. Although they 
periodically implied their loyalty to the democratic regime, their discourse would 
include strong anti-secular images. They were also regularly showing their 
disagreement with Atatürk’s revolutions by implying their negative impacts on 
Turkey’s Muslim identity. One may argue that the regime that the National Outlook 
was offering was some kind of Islamic democracy, but there were also more radical 
members of the party demanding a sharia regime.
812
 
The ideological vision of AKP showed important differences to its predecessors. 
Thus, analysing their ideological line could be helpful to understand why it became 
                                               
811 William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of 
the AKP, Routledge, 2009: 36. 
812 Hale and Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, 34-35. 
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more successful. Additionally, the change in CIV-MIL relations during the AKP era 
was mostly driven by the change in AKP’s policies than those of its predecessors. 
This was because the AKP came to power in an environment wherein citizens from 
all ideologies, including secularists, Islamists, and nationalists, shared a certain belief 
that the military was the main obstacle against the Islamist threat. This belief was 
perhaps much stronger than it had been during the previous decades. The AKP 
presented itself as a typical conservative right-wing democratic party – with religious 
sensitivities, but committed to democracy and the Republic. They mentioned their 
loyalty to Atatürk and his principles – particularly secularism and nation’s unity – 
from the very beginning. Furthermore, they indicated European Union membership 
as their first and foremost foreign goal.
813
 The changes in their rhetoric caused the 
secular liberals to define the AKP as a “moderate Islamic party”, which is 
democratic, liberal, and secular and promotes the liberal economy, unlike most of the 
Islamic regimes in the Middle East.
814
 The same group also considered that the 
AKP’s moderate Islamic image could enable Turkey to be a “role model” for the 
other Islamic countries in the region. In other words, Turkey could give a message by 
showing that democracy and Islam do not conflict with each other. This rhetoric 
enabled the AKP to gain bigger support than the previous Islamic parties. They had 
                                               
813 Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt, ‘The Turkish Military’s Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform 
Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DECAF)’, Turkish Studies, 11, No.3, 2010: 393.  
814 Murat Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, 
Muslims and Secular Democracy’, Third World Quarterly, 28, No.7, October 2007: 1272; Murat 
Bardakci, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Under the AKP Government, 2008: 25; Meliha Benli 
Altunisik, ‘The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 27, 
No.1/2, January 2005: 56 (In this article, it is argued that Turkey became an example of ‘modus 
vivendi’ by connecting democracy and Islam under AKP rule.); For an analysis of how Turkey can be 
a democratic role model for the Middle East see: Seymen Atasoy, ‘The Turkish Example: A Model 
for Change in the Middle East?’, Middle East Policy, 18, No.3, 2011: 86-100.  Also, for a detailed 
analysis of how Recep Tayyip Erdogan adopted a moderate discourse by separating religion from 
politics see: Metin Heper, ‘The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in 
Turkey’, 2005 (In this article, Heper made an interesting analysis by claiming that Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan comes from the Sufi Islam tradition, which is known as moderate and tolerant.); Jeffrey 
Haynes, ‘Politics, Identity and Religious Nationalism in Turkey: From Atatürk to the AKP’, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 64, No.3, 2010: 312-27. 
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support not only from the Islamist voters but also from right-wing liberals, including 
businessmen, journalists, and intellectuals. Accordingly, the AKP’s party 
programmes promoted democratic and universal values such as “human rights, 
democratic rights, state of law, pluralism, tolerance to different opinions, and 
freedom of religion”.815 Additionally, the party programme stated their commitment 
to Atatürk and his reforms: 
Our Party constitutes a ground where the unity and the integrity of 
the Republic of Turkey, the secular, democratic, social state of law, 
and the processes of civilianisation, democratisation, freedom of 
belief and equality of opportunity are considered essential … Our 
Party regards Atatürk’s principles and reforms as the most 
important vehicle for raising the Turkish public above the level of 
contemporary civilisation and sees this as an element of social 
peace … Secularism is a principle which allows people of all 
religions and beliefs to comfortably practice their religions, to be 
able to express their religious convictions and live accordingly, but 
which also allows people without beliefs to organise their lives 
along these lines. From this point of view, secularism is a principle 
of freedom and social peace … Universal standards for rights and 
freedoms of women, children and labour shall be fully implemented 
in our country…816 
                                               
815 Hale and Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, 57. For an analysis of the 
AKP’s political line see: Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar, ‘Turkey 2002’, 325-328. (In this article, the 
writers argue that there was a reformist-moderate wing within the National Outlook’s Welfare Party 
that included Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The reformists’ main aim was to establish a new party that 
would avoid making strict Islamic references. Eventually, the reformist group established itself as the 
AKP.) 
816 See: The AKP Party Programme, ‘Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’. Available at: 
https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_ (accessed: 2016). 
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The AKP was formed by a younger and educated group of people, some of whom 
originally came from Ozal’s Motherland Party. Naturally, they gained a lot of 
experiences from the past and agreed on more realistic political goals. They realised 
the disadvantages of following anti-secular policies, and perhaps some members of 
the party believed in the importance of secularism in democratic regimes. What is 
more, one may argue that the events during the 1997 intervention – closing parties 
and banning politicians – enabled the Islamists to see the benefits of being closer to 
the European Union, to defend their political rights and freedom of opinion.
817
 The 
AKP tended to refuse the National Outlook ideology and gave an impression of 
being “conservative democrat”; furthermore, they rejected using the “Muslim 
Democrat” identity.818 The AKP’s softened discourse, compared with its 
predecessors, convinced many citizens that they were very close to the traditional 
democratic-liberal right-wing parties, such as the Democrat Party, Justice Party, 
Motherland Party, and the True Path Party.
819
 
However, an important part of the society, particularly the left-wing Kemalists, the 
military commanders, and the judiciary, remained strongly susceptible to the AKP’s 
liberal and secular image from the very beginning.
820
 Particularly, the nationalist and 
extremely Kemalist wing of the military (Eurasian/Avrasyaci officers) were not only 
                                               
817 Hale and Ozbudun, ibid.: 42; Atasoy, ‘The Turkish Example’, 92. (In the article, the author argues 
that the AKP’s support for the EU reforms created a picture that had not been observed before; now, 
the religious conservatives appeared as the progressive side, struggling for the EU and 
democratisation, while the Kemalists appeared as the side resisting the change, because, after previous 
experiences, the Islamists saw the EU, human rights, and democratisation as the best solution for 
defending their rights against the pressures from the military and secularists. He also argues that, 
ironically, both the military and the EU pushed the AKP through democratisation for its survival, 
through their ‘carrots and sticks’ approach.) 
818 Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change’, 348. Meliha Benli Altunisik, ‘The Turkish Model and 
Democratization in the Middle East’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 27, No.1/2, January 2005: 50. (In this 
article, the AKP’s ideological line is associated with the ‘Christian Democrats’ in Europe and Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan presents himself as being both ‘Muslim’ and ‘secular’, in his own 
words.);Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar, ‘Turkey 2002’, 327. 
819 Hale and Ozbudun, ibid.: 57. 
820 Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey’, 1272; Jenkins, ibid.: 348. 
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against the AKP but were also against any type of coalition with the West, including 
the EU. NSC Secretary General Tuncer Kilinc’s words in March 2002 are worth 
mentioning: 
The EU will never accept Turkey … Thus, Turkey needs new allies, 
and it would be useful if Turkey engages in a search that would 
include Russia and Iran.
821
 
Indeed, the existence of Euro-Asian officers is important to understand crossing 
identities tradition that still continues within the military. According to Gerassimos 
Karabelias, there were two different groups within the military during the foundation 
years of AKP: ‘Kemalist Democrats’, who supported the EU membership; and 
‘Kemalist-Republicans’, who were more strictly nationalist and considered that EU 
membership could be dangerous for the state’s unity.822 
On the other hand, the Kemalist wing – such as the Republican Party and the Labour 
Party – accused the AKP of doing Takiyye (acting tactfully). The word Takiyye 
became very famous during those days to define AKP’s “insincerity”.823 Indeed, 
some thought that the AKP borrowed the Kemalists’ and military’s Westernist 
ideology by supporting the EU membership to defeat them by their own “tool”. This 
case left the military in a paradox, because if they showed resistance to the AKP 
reforms they could be stuck in a position that was entirely opposite to their own 
principles.
824
 Additionally, Kemalists assumed that, by using the EU card, the AKP 
                                               
821 Murat Gurgen, ‘Orgeneral Kilinc: Avrupa Bize Uymaz’ (Europe Does Not Conform Us), Radikal. 
Available at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=31291 (accessed: 8 March 2002). Also 
see: Gerassimos Karabelias, ‘Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Ozal 
Decade, 1993–2003’, Turkish Studies, 9, No.3, 2008: 462. 
822 Karabelias, ibid. 
823 Hale and Ozbudun, ibid.: 62; Sami Faltas, The General, The Prime Minister and The Imam: Civil-
Military Relations in Turkey Today, p.136. 
824 Frederic Misrahi, ‘The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces: An Analysis of 
Recent Developments in Turkey’, Perspectives: Review of International Affairs, No.22 (2004): 24 
(The article argues that the AKP borrowed the military’s EU discourse and used it ‘as being its own 
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would have an opportunity to restrict military autonomy and break the biggest 
obstacle against the Islamic regime.
825
 Most often they referred to Tayyip Erdogan’s 
“alleged” previous speeches in the 1990s, such as: “Islam is my reference”; 
“Democracy is not the purpose but it is a tool for the main purpose”; “The system 
that we want to bring cannot be against the system of Allah”; “People cannot be 
secular”; “I banned alcohol, because I believe that I am the doctor of this society”; “I 
am against abortion”; “We have always stating that we are not Atatürkist, but we are 
adopting his principles”; “It is not possible to be both Muslim and secular”; “If 
citizens do not want a secular regime, you cannot prevent this”.826 However, Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan and his cabinet became successful in convincing most of the citizens 
that their worldview had changed a lot over the passing years. 
7.3.1 Civil-Military Relations under AKP Rule 
The AKP has been in power for 14 years and Turkey has seen many different 
domestic and foreign events within this period. During its term, CIV-MIL relations 
witnessed a major change, which perhaps has not been seen for many decades. It is 
the first time since the foundation of state that the military has remained in such a 
subordinated position.
827
 Indeed, this subordination had already begun during the EU 
reforms, but complete political passivism came after the 2007 website declaration 
and the Ergenekon-Balyoz operations. There may be several reasons behind this 
development, but the one likely reason, which is related to the purpose of this thesis, 
is the possible increase in the number of officers who have a more depolitical 
                                                                                                                                     
goal’ by recontextualising it.); Additionally: Zeki Sarigil describes this paradoxical position of the 
military as ‘rhetorically entrapped’ in which the military cannot show resistance because of its 
Atatürkist legacy, in: (Sarigil 2012). 
825 Mathew Davies, ‘The Legacy of Atatürk: The Limits of Conditionality in Turkish European Union 
Membership Negotiations’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67, No.4, August 2013: 512. 
826 For the ‘alleged’ speeches of Erdogan see: Hale and Ozbudun, ibid.: 40.  
827 The aforementioned subordination of military during the Atatürk and Inonu eras were mostly 
driven from the presidencies of two retired heroic commanders of Liberation War. Because of that, 





 Additionally, the early years of AKP rule can be given as an example of 
the positive-democratic relationship, in which the democratic regime worked 
properly and the military’s subordination led to several positive developments in 
national politics, such as the EU candidacy, economic development, and several 
radical changes in foreign policy.
829
 
Indeed, there have always been some officers who were against military involvement 
in politics. Traditionally, Atatürk himself was one of the officers who supported 
civilian supremacy. Given the strong Kemalist tradition, perhaps Atatürk’s idea of 
civil-military separation has somehow affected the Turkish military. That is to say, 
the Turkish military has never completely broken its ties with democratic and liberal 
ideals. For instance, most officers have always remained critical of long-term junta 
rule, and have tended to pass governing to civilians as early as possible. At least one 
military intervention, in 1960, was made to protect democracy. Also, the military has 
always remained in close relationships with the professional NATO armies.  
More importantly, there is a correlation between Turkey’s EU membership and 
depoliticisation of the military. Indeed, the military has been a firm supporter of EU 
membership, believing that it was a necessity for a mature political culture in Turkey. 
As aforementioned, there is a relationship between military interventions and 
political cultures. Hence, an improved democratic order after adopting the EU 
system, would make citizens politically conscious enough to guard democratic and 
secular dynamics of state without needing the military’s deterrent image. That also 
means the military would not need to leave their barracks in the future. In this regard, 
the AKP’s increasing statements and efforts for entering in the EU made the military 
                                               
828 See: Metin Heper, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?’, Turkish Studies, 
12, No.2, 2011: 242. 
829 For a schematic analysis of the process, see: Analytical Table 3, (p.343-345). 
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authorities tolerant toward Islamic rhetoric of the government. Additionally, the EU 
authorities explicitly stated their opposition to the military’s supervision over 
politics. Accordingly, in the earlier terms of AKP, most of the military’s legal 
powers in politics were restricted by the EU reforms. The military did not show a 
serious resistance because they did not want to block EU membership process.  
Additionally, after witnessing the negative results of military interventions and their 
failure in solving problems, it is reasonable to assume that the number of depolitical 
officers has much increased in comparison to previous decades. Naturally, the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz trials accelerated this process by making important changes in 
the commanding elite. Indeed, the first significant signals of depoliticisation 
appeared during Hilmi Ozkok’s term (2002-2006). But most importantly, the years 
between 2010 and 2013 have not seen any serious reaction from the military 
regarding political incidents. Furthermore, the military remained silent during the 
famous Gezi Parki protests. Accordingly, the military has moved in harmony with 
the AKP government in both domestic and foreign issues. The military has 
occasionally stated its politically neutral position on its website, and harshly 
criticised the so-called attempts at pushing the military inside political strife. Indeed, 
an outside observer can find similarities between Huntington’s professional military 
ethic and the Turkish military, as well as the objective control model and Turkish 
civil-military relations. Yet, as aforementioned, it can be premature, at this stage, to 
define this development as professionalism. 
7.3.2 Hilmi Ozkok Term and the EU Reforms 
Hilmi Ozkok was Chief of the General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces between the 
years 2002 and 2006. Ozkok is known as a democratic person who comes from the 
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moderate wing of the commanding elite.
830
 Especially, the one party rule and the EU 
reforms created conditions suitable for military depoliticisation in his term. 
Principally, EU membership has been supported by the majority of generals, because 
they associated this goal with Atatürk’s goal of “catching up the contemporary 
civilisations”. They considered that membership might accelerate a liberal 
transformation within the society and strengthen the democratic political culture. 
Therefore, the military saw the EU as the ultimate and most effective cure for 
stopping religious mobilisation and backwardness.
831
 In this way, the modernisation 
process that had been started by Atatürk would be completed. Furthermore, because 
of the aforementioned EU membership, the military might not be in the position of 
“guardian of secularism”, because citizens might embrace democratic values better. 
Ozkok defined Kemalism as a line of thinking which is “open to changes and new 
interpretations”. Referring to Atatürk’s Revolutionism principle, he maintained that 
Atatürkism was not a dogmatic system.832 He avoided using military clichés, such as 
the “guardian of secularism”, and maintained that the officers should develop their 
“visions” according to the new requirements of the current age, and should restrain 
                                               
830 See: Toktaş and Kurt, ‘The Turkish Military’s Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in 
the 2000s’, 393-394; Mehmet Bardakci, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP 
Government’, March 2008: 20; Satana, 2008: 388. (Satana defines the 2000s as a ‘new force structure 
policy’ of the TAF, which aims to create a more modern and ‘professional’ armed forces.) 
831 Bardakci, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government, 23; see Huseyin 
Kivrikoglu’s statement in: Guney and Karatekelioğlu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military 
Relations’, 455; Ozkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, ‘‘Civilianization’ in Greece versus 
‘Demilitarisation’ in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the 
European Union’, Armed Forces & Society, 32, No.3, April 2006: 417; Heper and Guney, ‘The 
Military and the Consolidation of Democracy’, 451-452; Sami Faltas, ‘The General, the Prime 
Minister and the Imam: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Today’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 11, 
No.1, 2012: 136 (The article discusses whether the AKP was sincere in its commitment to the EU 
membership or not.); Mathew Davies, ‘The Legacy of Atatürk: The Limits of Conditionality in 
Turkish European Union Membership Negotiations’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67, 
No.4, August 2013: 520; Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU 
Membership? Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006: 79. 
832 Bardakci, ibid.: 25;For a detailed analysis of the civil-military relations during the Hilmi Ozkok era 
see: Metin Heper, ‘The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey’, 
Turkish Studies, 6, No.2, 2005: 215-31;  
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themselves from being “repetitive”.833 He also criticised the military’s Kemalist 
rhetoric as an excuse for legitimising their interventions since 1960.
834
 In an 
interview with Fikret Bila (a famous journalist), Hilmi Ozkok argued that there was a 
specific group of people who defined themselves as Kemalist, but, in reality, they 
were either not Kemalist or they did not know the meaning of Kemalist: 
There is a group of so-called Kemalists within the military, those 
people demand … a commanding elite who permanently disagrees 
with the government … which is entirely opposite to actual 
Kemalism … Atatürk … resigned from the military during the 
Liberation War, unlike other leaders who took advantage from 
their military positions … Do you think Atatürk had imagined a 
Turkey with continuous conflicts among civilians and the military 
during the 2000s? Atatürk’s principles tell us to solve the problems 
with logic; but not with quarrel … These so-called Kemalists give a 
big damage to Kemalism … The actual Kemalism means 
interpreting his principles according to today’s conditions and 
making what Atatürk could do if he lived today …835 
Ozkok was thinking to create a new education curriculum for the military academies 
and schools, toward a new generation of officers who are more ‘professional’ and 
have more trust and tolerance for the people’s choice.836 Once, Ozkok summarised 
his opinions about the military interventions with these words: 
                                               
833 Heper, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 242. 
834 Ibid. 
835 The interview is in: Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, Detay Yayıncilik, 2007: 188. Also see his 
speech in Heper, The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy, 2009: 41. 
836 Heper, ibid. As has been mentioned in the previous chapters, Ozkok’s idea of redesigning the 
education curriculum indeed supports our idea that the best way of embedding a professional ethos 
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The military intervened on May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971), and 
September (1980). Were these interventions successful? No! If they 
could be successful, the banned politicians … could not return to 
politics. The banned politicians … later became the prime 
ministers and the president. This shows that the military 
interventions are not a panacea. From now on we should have 
greater trust in the people’s judgement.837 
Additionally, in the interview below, Hilmi Ozkok’s support for European Union 
membership is explicit: 
Seventy per cent of the population wants the EU membership. 
Nobody can resist this kind of majority … we are ready to 
compromise (with the government) and undertake risks (that limit 
our powers) to harmonise with the EU values.
838
 
Following the elections, the AKP gained strong public confidence after handling the 
economic crisis.
839
 The AKP government followed an economic programme by 
taking the support of the International Monetary Fund. In a short time, successful 
results were seen: the rate of inflation decreased and the level of exports increased.
840
 
The early economic success obliged the military to be more careful about avoiding 
open conflicts with the government. Accordingly, the military mostly remained in a 
conciliatory position. However, the military was still protecting its classical position 
                                                                                                                                     
into military cultures is preparing an academic programme according to the idea of civilian 
supremacy. 
837 Hurriyet, ‘Ozkok Pasa: Mudahale Care Degil’ (Ozkok Pasha: Intervention is not a Panacea) 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ozkok-pasa-mudahale-care-degil-167658 (accessed: 26 August 2003). 
838 Internet Haber, ‘Atina’ya Tarihi Mesajlar’ (Historical Messages to Athens). Available at: 
http://www.internethaber.com/atinaya-tarihi-mesajlar-1041202h.htm (accessed: 18 October 2003). 
839 Bardakci, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government’, 23. 




in certain issues, namely “guardianship of Atatürk’s revolutions and principles”, 
particularly “secularism” and “national unity”. 
The earliest tensions between the military and the AKP were caused by “the 
headscarf ban”. Rhetorically, the military always states its respect for religions. 
Nevertheless, the headscarf has been considered as a “symbolic” icon that shows the 
power of the “Islamic” movement. The military thought that any concession from the 
headscarf ban may cause more serious demands from the Islamists, at the expense of 
secularism. The ban is based on Atatürk’s revolution of dress. According to the dress 
regulation, religious clothes (turban, takke, and fez) cannot be used in formal places, 
including state departments, offices, and schools.
841
 The military has always been 
sensitive in this issue by considering it as “vital” for preserving the secular regime. 
Relatedly, some noticeable events caused tensions between the military and civilians: 
on 20 November 2002, the AKP spokesperson Bulent Arinc attended a state 
ceremony with his wife. In reaction, the military commanders remained silent for 
three minutes because Bulent Arinc’s wife participated in the ceremony with a 
headscarf.
842
 On 23 April 2003, the generals again boycotted the opening ceremony 
of the Assembly after they learned that Arinc’s wife had not removed her 
headscarf.
843
 Additionally, on 5 May 2003, the military made a statement to the press 
                                               
841 The Law of Dress is mentioned in Article 174 of the ‘1982 Constitution’ under the title of ‘The 
Law of Hat’. Additionally, the issue of whether turban, fez, takke and other religious-based clothes are 
actually an order of Islam or not is problematic for the religious experts. Some of the modern 
interpreters of Islam state that these so-called ‘religious clothes’ are not mentioned in the Quran as an 
‘obligatory’ rule. Indeed, some religious experts argue that covering the head is not an Islamic 
obligation for women. For instance, see: Huseyin Atay, Kuran Uzerine Arastirmalar (Studies on 
Quran, Book: 1-7), Atay Press, 2013; Yasar Nuri Ozturk, Islam Nasil Yozlastirildi? (How Islam was 
damaged?), Boyut Yayinlari, 2001. 




defining the military as “the greatest guarantee of the secular … characteristics of the 
Turkish Republic”.844 
An interview with Hilmi Ozkok (after his resignation) in 2007 also shows that he is 
personally against wearing the turban in the universities. He considers that the 
military statements about the turban and the Imam-Hatips (Imam and Preacher 
Schools) cannot be seen as an intervention in politics, because these statements are 
part of the military’s constitutional obligations.845 In the same interview, he also 
makes a comment about the president’s (Abdullah Gul) wife who wears a headscarf: 
I do not have problem with his (Abdullah Gul) personality … 
(However) if a journalist asks me what I think about a president 
whose wife has a turban, I tell him that it was “disturbing”… The 
Turkish military has some unwritten rules, because some rules are 
not decided by laws and procedures. Both sides can discuss 
whether those unwritten rules can change or not … But, if the 
president’s wife removes her headscarf, there will not be any 
remarkable problem between the civilians and the military.
846
 
In that statement, Ozkok arguably refers to military culture and the ‘military-nation’ 
assumption by mentioning some “unwritten rules”. He suggests that the government 
and the military should come together and discuss whether these unwritten rules can 
change or not. This point is important for the main argument of the thesis; because, if 
one considers these unwritten rules as the main ethoi of military culture, Ozkok 
clearly says that a civilian supremacy is only possible by reinterpretation of the 
                                               
844The Turkish General Staff, ‘Statement’. Available at: 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/bashalk/aciklama/2003/ao8.htm (accessed: 17 February 2007). 
845Misrahi, ‘The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces’, 28; Bila, Komutanlar 
Cephesi, 186. 
846 Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, 184-185. 
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military ethoi. Additionally, Ozkok finds a connection between the turban issue and 
the unwritten rules of the military, which can give us an idea about the military’s 
ideological position. 
On the other hand, Hilmi Ozkok’s conciliatory behaviour received some criticisms 
from the radical nationalist (Ulusalci) wing of the military, particularly after the 
government made some changes in the education system in favour of the Imam-
Hatip Schools (Imam and Preacher).
847
 According to the nationalist officers, Hilmi 
Ozkok had to give a stronger reaction, but he failed. Therefore, some top 
commanders showed their reaction directly to the press. On 14
 
October the Deputy 
Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug stated that the state creates 25,000 graduates 
from the Imam Hatip Schools per year, which was too excessive, because the state’s 
need for Imams was about 5,500. That sudden reaction from Basbug caused the AKP 
to postpone the education reforms.
848
 However, the 28 March 2004 elections brought 
the AKP much greater confidence because they increased their votes from 34 per 
cent to 41.7 per cent. Following the elections, in May 2004, the AKP came up with a 
new education reform proposal. As a reaction, on 6
 
May the military gave a more 
powerful official statement to air its doubts about the future of the secular regime and 
democratic principles: 
The general manner … of the TAF about the Republic’s basic 
characteristics as being “democratic, secular and social state 
                                               
847 Imam Hatips are schools giving religious education and raising Islamic clerics: the Imams, 
Muezzins, and Hafizs. The new regulations aimed to make it easier for the Imam Hatip graduates to 
enter into universities, which made the military and secularists anxious about possible Islamic 
penetration into the state departments and important positions (Jenkins, 2007: 350).  
848 Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change,’ 350. 
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The mentioned education reforms were implemented by the Grand National 
Assembly on 13 May 2004; nevertheless, President Ahmed Necdet Sezer vetoed the 
package because of its inconsistency with the secularism principle of the 
constitution. Although the constitution enabled the president to veto only once, the 
government did not submit the offer again. This indicates that the AKP became very 
patient to make the reforms they had been planning to do. Arguably, they waited 
until the right time, when the military’s influence on politics would have 
disappeared, and thus evading direct conflict with the generals. Erdogan’s sentences 
indicate how they were cautious to avoid a possible military intervention: “As a 
government, we are not ready to pay the price”. (The price here is explicitly a 
possible direct or indirect intervention.)
850
 
On the other side, the military was cautious because it did not want to be the main 
institution blocking EU membership in the eyes of the public.
851
 On 3 October 2005, 
Turkey was accepted to start negotiations with the EU. Certainly, one of the main 
reasons that convinced the EU to take this decision was the reforms restricting 
military supremacy. Naturally, this success protected the AKP’s remaining support 
from the citizens and important civil institutions, including businessmen, particularly 
from the members of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD). The 
greater part of the Turkish media, the journalists, and the enlightened class also 
                                               
849 The Turkish General Staff, ‘TGS Press Statement No. BN-07/04 of 6 May 2004’. Available at: 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/bashalk/aciklama/2004/ao7.htm (accessed: 17 February 2007). 
850 ‘Erdogan: YOK’u Zorlamayiz’ (We Will Not Make Pressure on the YOK), Radikal, 4 July 2004. 
851 See: Bardakci, ibid.: 23. 
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showed their admiration. Hence, the growing support for the AKP from the public 
made a military intervention far harder to achieve.
852
 
7.3.3 EU Reforms and Restricting the Military’s Legal Powers on 
Civilian Rule 
As has been mentioned, the EU reforms indeed had a crucial role in taming the 
military into a depoliticised position by the AKP government.
853
 Although, the 
military occasionally indicated its discontent with the AKP’s attempts for allowing 
headscarf and opening Imam-Hatip schools, the military did not go further than 
performing silent protests and giving formal statements. In the same extent, the 
military preserved its deliberation in the Cyprus issue and Kurdish rights. But still, 
they did not show a coercive resistance to the government during the negotiations of 
Annan plan and extension of Kurdish minority rights. The reforms restricting 
military supremacy have been made by following the EU reports (Acquis 
Communitarie). The reforms created an important change in the CIV-MIL relations 
as regards the legal procedures. The primary reforms can be summarised as follows: 
 The State Security Courts were abolished.854 
 The number of civilians within the National Security Council was increased 
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 The NSC became no more an institution whose recommendations would be 
prioritised by the civilian government. With an amendment to Article 118, the 
new status of the body is “assessed by the views conveyed to it”. The new 
regulation reduced its role to an “advisory/consultative body”.856 
 The Secretariat of the NSC’s executive powers were restrained; among these 
powers were: requesting reports from the government, making inspections, and 
supervising the implementation of NSC decisions. Other duties of the 
Secretariat were automatically terminated by the abolishing of several 
departments in the Secretariat, such as the Community Relations Presidency.
857
 
 The requirement that the Secretary General of the NSC be a military member 
was abolished and the first civilian Secretary was appointed in October 2004.
858
 
 The overall number of the NSC personnel was reduced by 25 per cent, and the 




 The civilian supervision over defence expenditure was expanded by increasing 
the rights of the Court of Auditors to check the budget.
860
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 The representation of the military in the Council of Higher Education and the 
Supreme Communication Board was abolished.
863
 
 The jurisdiction powers of the military courts were restricted, and eventually 
their rights to judge civilians during peacetime were abolished.
864
 
7.3.4 Foreign Policy Events and the Military (2002-2006) 
AKP’s foreign policy is defined as “Neo-Ottomanism” by some scholars. The reason 
is that the foreign policy plan is largely based on (former minister of foreign affairs 
and current prime minister) Professor Ahmed Davutoglu’s thesis of “Strategic 
Depth”. His views were published in a book, of that name, which sold a large 
number of copies. In this book, he puts forward a formula known as “zero problem 
with neighbours”. Davutoglu assumes that Atatürk’s foreign policy of “peace at 
home and peace abroad” was adopted by all of the previous governments, including 
the AKP, since Atatürk’s time. However, as a result of the changing international 
conjuncture, Turkish foreign policy needs to be reconsidered in several cases. For 
instance, Turkish foreign policy had remained too “introvert”, without making much 
effort to intervene in foreign policy events with its closer neighbours. Therefore, 
Ahmet Davutoglu suggests that Turkey – as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire – 
should play a more effective role in the ex-Ottoman lands, including the Middle East, 
North Africa, Caucasia, and the Balkans. That means that Turkey should both work 
for the EU membership but should also be in good relations with the Islam 
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Conference, Russia, Central Asia, and China. That can be defined as a “leadership” 
role within the post-Ottoman territories.
865
 
In addition to the European Union membership, there are other important foreign 
policy issues that influence the Turkish CIV-MIL relations.
866
 The most important of 
them are the Cyprus case and the Kurdish problem. After the US intervention, 
northern Iraq became an area of conflict between the Kurds, Shias, and Arabs. 
Naturally, Turkey remains in a risky position because of its conflict with the PKK. 
Thus, any destabilisation in the area worsens the situation at the expense of Turkey. 
On 1 March 2003, the Assembly refused to send Turkish troops to northern Iraq in 
support of the US forces. It is largely considered that most of the commanders and 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan were willing to accept; however, the majority thought the 
opposite.
867
 The 1 March proposal worsened relations between the United States and 
Turkey. This event was followed by “the hood event” on 4 July 2003: some Turkish 
soldiers in northern Iraq were captured by US troops and their heads were covered by 
hoods. Hilmi Ozkok describes the hood event as a “humiliating event” for the 
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 The event triggered strong reaction from the Turkish media and 
citizens while increasing anti-Americanism.
869
 On 25 January 2005, Ilker Basbug 
declared that the military would not remain non-active if the Iraqi Kurds attempted to 
control Kirkuk and threatened the Turkmen in the area. 
The second important case is the Cyprus issue, which became vitally important for 
Turkey’s EU membership. Although Turkey has still a long way to go to fulfil the 
Copenhagen criteria, the Cyprus issue is the most important obstacle against 
Turkey’s EU membership. There has been a deadlock since the Turkish military’s 
operation in Northern Cyprus. Since that date, the Turkish army has remained there 
and the de facto Northern Cyprus state continues to exist, despite not being 
recognised by the United Nations. That situation causes international problems such 
as: trade with other states, opening of harbours and airports, and the commodities of 
the Greek citizens. The problem became more serious when EU membership for 
Cyprus came onto the agenda. The United Nations’ Secretary General Kofi Annan 
offered a solution, known as the Annan Plan, to make the island a unique state by 
uniting the two sides. The plan was accepted by the Northern Cyprus citizens, but 
refused by the Southern side. Eventually, Cyprus became an EU member and the 
Northern side remained in an isolated position as a result of its non-recognised status. 
Although Cyprus became a member of the EU as a whole, the citizens on the 
Northern side could not benefit from the advantages of the EU membership because 
of the existence of the Turkish army. That case finally blocked Turkey’s EU 
negotiations, because some packages cannot be open to negotiation unless the 
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Northern Cyprus harbours and airports are open to the Southern Cyprus citizens.
870
 
The surveys show that the Cyprus question and the EU’s approach to the Kurdish 
and the Armenian issues raised the level of Euro-scepticism among the citizens, 
while decreasing the support level for the EU.
871
 
Cyprus and northern Iraq are the issues that the military has considered very 
important for the state’s unity and strategic position. Firstly, the Cyprus issue is 
important because of its strategic position. Given the fact that Greece controls the 
Aegean Islands, Turkey will be surrounded by the Greeks from both sides if it leaves 
Cyprus. Therefore, the military’s silence during the Annan Plan and the referendum 
became the first serious examples that the military were giving concessions in its 
Cyprus policy in favour of civilians.
872
 Secondly, the northern Iraq issue is sensitive 
because of state unity. The military commanders considered that if the Kurds have a 
strong position in the area, such as controlling Kirkuk – or further, founding an 
independent state – the Kurdish separation movement will have a stable support base. 
Additionally, there are other issues toward which the military showed sensitivity 
during the EU negotiations, such as liberating Kurdish education in schools and 
establishing a Kurdish television channel. The military was concerned that these kind 
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of privileges for the Kurdish people may threaten state unity.
873
 During the Ozkok 
era, the military showed its limits in these issues with these declarations: on 25 
January 2005, Ilker Basbug declared that the military would not remain non-active if 
the Iraqi Kurds attempted to control Kirkuk and threaten the Turkmen in the area.
874
 
For the Cyprus case, on the same day, he also declared that none of the Turkish 
troops on Northern Cyprus would be withdrawn unless both sides agreed on an 
ultimate solution. Huseyin Kivrikoglu’s (a retired Chief of the General Staff) 
statement below indicates the military’s general stance in those days: 
The EU always mentions “Kurd”, “Kurdish” … “Education in 
Kurdish”… If the Kurdish become free in media and education, 
who will protect the national integrity … there is no end of these 
demands. When one step was taken, another demand will come … 




Hilmi Ozkok’s comments on the 1 March proposal, the hood event, and the Kurdish 
issue are also important to see the military’s general considerations over these 
matters in those days. Hilmi Ozkok accepts that the Kurdish issue is a reality, but it 
needs to be investigated under three different categories: 
Some part of our citizens consider themselves as “Kurdish” and 
this is a reality … Since the time of the Ottomans, our people did 
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not make any discrimination toward our Kurdish citizens and 
accepted them as their own part … Thus, the Republican laws did 
not take the Kurdish citizens as “minority” and considered them as 
the part of Turkish society. 
There is a Kurdish ideology. Most of our society do not take into 
account their ethnic origins when they are making their political 
choices. But still, there are serious efforts which aim to promote 
the Kurdish ideology. 
(Finally), there is the armed Kurdish movement, the PKK; this is 
indeed the armed version of the Kurdish ideology.
876
 
Ozkok’s categorisation actually reflects the military’s general consideration of the 
Kurdish issue. The military authorities argue that they are not against the rights of the 
Kurdish citizens and there is no way for assimilating them by dictating to them that 
they are in fact “Turkish”. It is their natural right to reveal their ethnic identity. 
Nevertheless, the military commanders state that their tolerance for Kurdish 
nationalism ends if it turns into a political ideology. Hilmi Ozkok considers that 
Kurdish education is not possible in the schools; however, the Kurdish citizens can 
learn their language in private courses. He assumes that Turkey should be strict in 
some certain cases, such as Kurdish education, because if they allow the Kurdish 
education, then they can claim other demands.
877
 Therefore, the generals consider 
that Atatürk’s nationalism is the key principle that keeps the nation together. Hilmi 
Ozkok’s speech below indicates that issue: 
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Atatürk once stated that the “Turkish nation” are the Turkish 
people who founded the Turkish Republic. Thus, Atatürk’s 
definition of Turkish comprises every citizen who participated to 
the Turkish Liberation War. The Armenians are also within this 
definition. Atatürk created this comprehensive formula to preserve 
the state’s unity … There was not any alternative solution other 
than the nationalism principle. The unity cannot be preserved by 
using religion… Islam cannot be a unitary tool; the case of 
Pakistan is the most visible example of this.
878
 
Hilmi Ozkok’s ideas about the nationalism principle, above, is not much different 
than the position of the other commanders. In addition to this, Hilmi Ozkok believes 
that the AKP missed an important opportunity by rejecting the 1 March proposal. He 
assumes that Turkey could have gained a better strategic position in northern Iraq if 
it had moved along with the United States. Additionally, his statement proves that the 
military obeyed the Assembly’s decision, although it did not agree with the decision: 
Is it possible to disobey the parliamentary decision? If I had 
revealed my opinion in front of the public, they could have said that 
he put pressure on the civilians … What happens if the Assembly 
said “no” to the military’s offer, can you imagine the military’s 




This speech proves Hilmi Ozkok’s determinacy in avoiding the military coming into 
direct conflict with the civilians. He considers that open pressure on parliament is too 
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risky for the military’s image, because if parliament refuses the military’s suggestion, 
that could place the military in a weak position in the eyes of the public. 
Nevertheless, Hilmi Ozkok considers that the 1 March proposal and then the hood 
event became the turning points in Turkish-US relations. He assumes that the long-
term partnership of the two NATO allies in the region has declined after the event, 
because the military’s main purpose was to control the Kurdish mobilisation and the 
PKK by preventing Kurdish penetration into southern Turkey. However, after the 
parliamentary refusal, the Kurdish forces found an opportunity to establish closer 
relations with the US army, and have gained strategic advantage in northern Iraq: 
If the Assembly could accept the proposal, the Turkish military 
would not be staying there for longer … our intention was 
preventing possible migrations and conflicts among the groups … 
the US troops would not be staying in Turkey, they would be 
crossing the border and passing to the northern Iraq … We (the 
military) gave support to the proposal. Our aim was to control the 
mobilisations in northern Iraq … the only way of achieving this 
was acting together with the US forces … (However), the Kurds 
made this cooperation with the US troops and supported them…880 
As noted, Hilmi Ozkok’s reaction to the government’s policies in domestic and 
foreign affairs received strong criticisms from the nationalist generals. They accused 
Ozkok of not being decisive enough against the Islamic threat. Additionally, some 
went so far as to state that Hilmi Ozkok was a pious man in his private life, and this 
was causing him to act emotionally, being too soft in preserving secularism.
881
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Therefore, some generals considered that he should be replaced by a more “decisive” 
figure in protecting the republican principles. As a reaction, Ozkok defended himself 
by claiming that he warned Erdogan periodically about the future of secularism, but 
still most commanders did not seem convinced. In any case, through to the end of 
Ozkok’s term, the generals were worrying about the future of political Islam. In 
addition to this, the secular President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s term was also coming to 
an end. As a result of these developments, the majority of the top commanders 
approached Yasar Buyukanit to take the position of Chief of the General Staff. Until 




Overall, this earliest term of the AKP can be defined with the positive-democratic 
relationship in that, except for several issues such as the headscarf and Imam-Hatip 
schools, the military generally appeared in harmony with the government. Indeed, 
the military subordination in key foreign issues such as EU membership, the Kurdish 
issue, the Iraq War, and the Cyprus policy evidence this. Similarly, the military 
subordination enabled the AKP to carry out important reforms for strengthening the 
democratic mechanisms, in step with the EU standards, including the restriction of 
military supervision, broadening the Kurdish rights and freedoms, and broadening 
religious freedoms. On the other hand, the term was not a complete example of 
objective control, because the military presented serious reactions to the government 
in some sensitive issues including the headscarf and Imam-Hatip issues.  
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7.3.5 Yasar Buyukanit Era (2006-2008) and the e-memorandum of 
2007 
During the Yasar Buyukanit era, the military strengthened its voice against political 
Islam, but this could not take longer. The military declaration known as the e-
memorandum of 27 May 2007 did not make any remarkable impact on civilians; 
rather, it accelerated the depoliticisation of the military.
883
 In earlier days, Yasar 
Buyukanit gave a series of statements to remind people that the military was the 
ultimate guardian of Atatürk’s reforms. However, he was not forgetting to add that 
the last words should belong to civilians in an ideal democracy. Indeed, Yasar 
Buyukanit’s main aim was to give an impression that he was not as moderate as 
Hilmi Ozkok toward the alleged Islamic mobilisation: 
Protecting the fundamental principles of the Republic is not a 
matter of domestic politics, it is the army’s duty (August 2006).884 
The Turkish Armed Forces is obliged by the relevant legislation to 
take action against all groups who target the unitary system of the 
state and act as the guardian of premises of the Turkish Republic, 
which are stipulated in the first three Articles of the Constitution. 
The military does not have the luxury of deciding itself which of its 
duties it will perform and which ones it will not (August 28, 2006).  
Turkey is a democratic, secular, social and unitary state. There is 
no power which can divert Turkey from this path and there never 
will be. The Turkish Republic is the republic founded by Atatürk 
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and this republic with endure, with its regime, with its founding 
principles until the end of time.
885
 
There is no doubt that the individual is important. However, while 
deifying the individual how … reasonable it would be to weaken 
the state? One should not forget what our sublime leader Atatürk 
once said: “If what is at stake is the fatherland, other 
considerations can be overlooked” (October 1 2007).886 
In these speeches, Yasar Buyukanit clearly states that it is a legal obligation for the 
military to preserve the secular regime and state unity. Therefore, the military 
interventions in politics could not be a non-democratic action. Furthermore, in 
September 2006, the commanders of the Turkish Land, Navy, and Air Forces gave 
public statements to warn citizens against Islamic fundamentalism. Buyukanit stated 
that the military will not allow anybody to erode secularism.
887
 
Buyukanit’s determinant image in terms of Kemalist ideology positively affected the 
‘Kemalist-nationalist’ commanders. For instance, the Ex-Chief of the General Staff 
Huseyin Kivrikoglu once stated that, “At last our silence has been broken”.888 Thus, 
the military support for Buyukanit became even stronger in the following days.
889
 On 
the other hand, Yasar Buyukanit clearly declared that the military’s main intention 
was to work in harmony with the government. In addition to this, Buyukanit repeated 
the military’s determined support for EU membership and its will to be in harmony 
with the government on this issue. Accordingly, in the statements below, 
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Buyukanit’s support for EU membership and his intention to present a democratic 
image is observable: 
(For the) reform package, we conveyed our views to the 
government. Some are accepted, others are not. Now that the 
parliament enacted them into law, it is our duty to comply with 




(TAF is the) unyielding defender of … (the) secular and democratic 
state. This fundamental stance of the military is in full concert with 
the EU world view.
891
 
These two statements demonstrate that the military’s general stance for the EU 
membership continued under Yasar Buyukanit. As with his predecessor Hilmi 
Ozkok, Buyukanit took EU membership as the ultimate aim of Atatürk’s Westernist 
vision, and the most efficient way of embedding secular and democratic values into 
the entire Turkish society.
892
 The speech also shows that the military conforms to the 
EU’s main principles, such as liberty, human rights, and equality. However, 
Buyukanit gave the impression that he was more sensitive about secularism than 
Ozkok. 
Before the presidential elections, some rumours alarmed the military – particularly 
rumours about removing the headscarf ban completely in the universities and 
replacing the constitution with a new one. Even these issues caused the opponents 
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and civil societies to organise rallies to protest against the “Islamist threat” on the 
eve of the elections.
893
 As a result, on 27 May 2007, the military issued a website 
declaration. 
Instead of Ahmed Necdet Sezer, the AKP government was considering Abdullah Gul 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs) as their candidate for the presidency. Abdullah Gul was 
known with his Islamic tendencies and if he became the new president, the military 
authorities assumed, there would be no obstacle against the AKP implementing any 
legislation they needed.
894
 Until that date, the military saw Ahmed Necdet Sezer as 
the balance against Islamic fundamentalism, because he stopped or postponed some 
proposals by using his power of veto.
895
 The website declaration was as follows: 
The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is 
focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are 
concerned about the recent situation. ... The Turkish Armed Forces 
are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of 
secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to 
those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude 
and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary ... Those 
who are opposed to Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's 
understanding “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk” are 
enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish 
Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out 
their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable 
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The declaration of 27 April 2007 can be seen as the most serious ultimatum by the 
military in the new decade. By this declaration, the military explicitly stressed that 
they are the guardians of secularism and they would not hesitate to move if there was 
a threat against secularism. They also mentioned that protecting republican ideals is 
the obligatory task of the military, as arranged in the constitution. Nevertheless, the 
memorandum did not make any deterrent impact, as the previous interventions had. 
Moreover, the government’s spokesperson, Cemil Cicek, responded harshly, in an 
unprecedented manner, unlike the previous governments: 
In a democratic state governed by rule of law, it is unconceivable 
that the General Staff – which is subordinated to the prime minister 
– (can) make a statement against the government.897 
Ironically, the government applied to the same discourse with the military, because 
the military declared that it is their constitutional obligation to protect the democratic 
regime if there was a threat. However, the government replied by using the same 
excuse – by stating that Turkey was already a democratic state, and it was 
unreasonable in democratic states for a military to interfere in the domestic sphere. 
This can be seen as an ingenious move by the AKP: beating the military with its own 
weapon. All scholars agree that the e-memorandum and the government’s response 
highly accelerated the military’s depoliticisation. After that, the military rapidly 
isolated itself from making political statements. 
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In the next elections, the AKP increased its power even further by getting 46.6 per 
cent of votes. In addition to this, the AKP’s candidate, Abdullah Gul, was chosen as 
the next president. The military remained silent and could not show any resistance to 
his presidency.
898
 The presidency of Abdullah Gul epitomised a major change in 
Turkish politics. The military stepped back and presented an image of being weaker 
than the civilians, in the eyes of public. In March 2008, the Constitutional Court 
received an indictment from Turkey’s Chief Prosecutor to close the AKP and to ban 
71 of the leading AKP officials, including Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. The 
indictment accused the AKP of violating the secularism principle. However, the 
indictment was refused by the Court. While the closure case was receiving support 
from the opponent parties – particularly the Republican Party – it was harshly 
protested by the EU.
899
 
After the election, the military’s political influence began to fade faster than before. 
Moreover, most of the left-wing citizens and the Republican Party explicitly showed 
their disagreement with any type of military interventions in many cases. Slogans 
such as “no coup, no sharia” became popular in the left-wing meetings.900 Since the 
1970s, this is perhaps the first time the ruling party and the main opposition parties 
were in agreement against military coups. Maybe because of this heavy pressure 
against military politicisation, the military tended to work in harmony with the 
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elected president. Indeed, the military accepted civilian supremacy in important 





 October 2007, the prime minister asked our opinions for 
the operation … we submitted our opinions on 1st November 2007 
… The Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are 
currently working on these proposals … Now, the authority resides 
with the government … If they deem that an operation is necessary 
… we will do what is necessary according to that directive. There 
is no delay in the process.
902
 
Nevertheless, the military still continued to present itself as the “guardian of 
Kemalism” for a while, in its formal declarations. Ultimate political isolation came 
after the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases.
903
 
By and large, the Buyukanit term is important for indicating increased civilian 
supremacy. The AKP’s determinant manner after the website declaration in 2007 
obliged the military to step back and to obey civilian rule. This event was perhaps the 
most determining resistance to the military involvement in politics to date. As a 
result, the process is associated with the positive-democratic relationship. On the 
other hand, the civil-military relations still had important weaknesses in terms of 
achieving objective civilian control, because the military continued to make harsh 
statements against some of the governmental policies. 
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7.3.6 Ilker Basbug and Isik Kosaner Eras, Ergenekon and Balyoz 
Cases (2008-2011) 
Ilker Basbug is known as a committed secular person and a Kemalist who has a good 
intellectual background.
904
 Therefore, when he became the Chief of the General 
Staff, everybody thought that he would become decisive in preserving the Kemalist 
ideals. Accordingly, he showed the military’s commitment to Atatürk’s principles in 
some of his earlier speeches. At an inauguration ceremony in August 2008, Basbug 
stated that: 
The concepts of … nation state and secularism were defined as the 
founding principles of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. Hence, the Turkish Armed Forces are always responsible 
for protecting and preserving Atatürk’s principles.905 
In the statement above, Ilker Basbug recalls the military’s traditional guardianship 
role. But the incident in the following period would oblige Basbug to be more 
cautious while speaking about guardianship and government. This notorious incident, 
during his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, is known as the Ergenekon Case. 
According to the Ergenekon investigations, some retired generals, retired officers, 
and non-commissioned officers allegedly prepared plans to overthrow the AKP 
government. In a short period, the Ergenekon situation turned into a big operation 
that involved people from different backgrounds, such as the military, politicians 
from opposition parties, journalists, writers, and media people.
906
 The interesting 
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point is that most of the people in charge were known as “the AKP opponents” 
(mostly from the Republican Party, Nationalist Action Party, and Labour Party). 
Ilker Basbug would also be arrested later, but he was released, as were many of the 
people who were arrested during the process. As has been pointed out, the trials 
forced Basbug to act carefully in his public statements, declaring that the military’s 
aim was to work in harmony with the government and to accept civilian supremacy, 
as in all other democratic states. The statements of Basbug, below, indicate his 
purpose of achieving military professionalism. Additionally, Basbug considers 
Huntington’s objective model as the true definition of professionalism: 
Democracy is the most important characteristic of the Republic. 




According to Huntington, the most effective control over the 
military is “objective control”. Objective control means rendering 
the military a professional institution and thus putting a distance 
between the military and politics ... The military’s duty should be 
determining the military’s needs and formulating policy options 
and proposing them to the civilian government, and implementing 
the relevant decisions made by the government (April 14, 2009).
908
 
It is not appropriate to perceive the Turkish Armed Forces as an 
obstacle to pluralism (April 14, 2009).
909
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These statements clearly show that Basbug is theoretically against military 
interventions in democracy and wishes to keep the military out of civilian spheres. 
The most important point within these statements for the direction of the thesis is 
Basbug describing professionalism with Huntington’s definition. In the following 
part of the statement, Basbug considers that Huntington’s definition of 
professionalism enables the military to focus on its own responsibilities to become 
ready for war. Basbug maintains that Huntington’s theory enables the military to 
make recommendations to the government, but that it should leave the last word to 
the civilians. Accordingly, it was noted that Basbug held weekly negotiations with 




In particular, during the Ergenekon affair, Basbug acted carefully while giving public 
statements. Although he tried to protect the military’s image, he avoided attacking 
the government. Yet, many people criticised the media for being too offensive and 
prejudiced toward the military during this period.
911
 At the same time, the AKP 
government became careful while speaking about the military’s image. Erdogan 
implied that actual Turkish officers were not involved in these type of illegal moves, 
by separating the Ergenekon trials from the Turkish military. Naturally, no politician 
could take the risk of being in conflict with the military, because they knew that the 
military had a special place and was still the most trusted organisation in the eyes of 
the public. Therefore, the prime minister once made this statement: 
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If some people in an institution are engaged in some wrong-doings, 
that institution as a whole should not be held responsible.
912
 
In addition to the prime minister’s speech above, President Abdullah Gul made this 
statement: 
Sometimes when engaged in a debate and/or expressing 
themselves, some people go beyond what are proper limits. This is 
particularly the case when it comes to the military. We should all 




The Ergenekon and Balyoz indictments caused a decrease in the level of public trust 
for the military. The surveys show that the military is still the most trusted 
organisation, but there is a significant decline in the findings.
914
 As has been argued 
in Chapter 3, public support is the most important factor in the military’s 
interventions in politics; it has always elaborated the citizens’ reaction before making 
its previous interventions. Therefore, the assumed decrease in public trust can be one 
reason that compelled the military to retreat from politics. Accordingly, Ilker 
Basbug’s and his successor Isik Kosaner’s references to the “military-nation” idea 
during this period can be seen as an attempt to repair relations: 
The fundamental source of power for militaries are the weapons. 
For the Turkish military, however, it is the nation’s trust and love 
for the military (Ilker Basbug, 2008).
915
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The TAF cannot be compared to the armed forces of any other 
country due to our country’s geographic location, its proximity to 
crisis zones, the threats and risks it faces, its socio-cultural 
structure; and the national and sentimental values of our public 
(Isik Kosaner’s inaugural speech, 2010).916 
In these two statements, the commanders remind their listeners of the military-nation 
assumption, to recall the military’s special position for the public. Additionally, 
Kosaner recalls Turkey’s strategic structure and its security concerns as being the 
other factors that give the military roles beyond those of other militaries. 
On the other hand, the weakening popular support was not the only factor that forced 
the military to stay away from politics. The trials of Ergenekon and Balyoz, the 
interrogations and arrests caused a big change in the General Staff. The top 
commanders of the Land, Naval and Air Forces, as well as the Chief of the General 
Staff, were replaced by other commanders. 
Some of the famous people who were interrogated, detained, and tried were: Hursit 
Tolon (retired general), Tuncay Ozkan (TV presenter), Mustafa Balbay (journalist), 
Esref Ugur Yigit (retired navy general), Mehmet Haberal (TV station owner), Veli 
Kucuk (retired general), Bedrettin Dalan (owner of Yeditepe University and the ex-
governor of Istanbul), Levent Bektas (retired major), Dursun Cicek (major), Saldiray 
Berk (retired general), Ilhan Cihaner (3
rd
 Army Commander), Soner Yalcin 
(journalist), Nedim Sener (journalist), Ahmet Sik (author), Yalcin Kucuk (author), 
Hanefi Avci (author), Muzaffer Tekin (retired captain), Kemal Kerincsiz (lawyer), 
Dogu Perincek (Head of the Labour Party), Hasan Igsiz (retired General-Commander 
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 Army), Sener Eruygur (retired General-Commander of the Gendarmerie 
Forces), Arif Dogan (Commander of the Gendarmerie Forces), Fikret Emek (retired 
soldier from the Special Forces Command), Oktay Yildirim (Member of the Special 
Warfare Department) and Ilker Basbug (Chief of the General Staff). Some of these 
people were released without punishment, but some, including Chief of the General 
Staff Ilker Basbug, were sentenced to life imprisonment.
917
 
As aforementioned, Ergenekon was followed by the Balyoz (Sledgehammer) 
operation in 2010 during the new Chief of the General Staff Isik Kosaner’s term. 
Balyoz is, just as the Ergenekon, an investigation into some military officers who 
allegedly intended to topple the government. The alleged plot was revealed by the 
Taraf newspaper, which claimed that the purpose of the plan was bombing some 
civilian places, such as mosques, to create chaos. Then, the military would find an 
opportunity to intervene. During the Balyoz process some other important military 
personnel were arrested, including: Cetin Dogan (retired general and Commander of 
the 1
st
 Army), Ibrahim Firtina (retired general and Commander of the Air Forces), 
Ozden Ornek (retired admiral and Commander of the Navy), Engin Alan (retired 
general and Chief of Special Forces of the Turkish Army), Sukru Sariisk (retired 
general and the Secretary General of the National Security Council). The arrest of 
these key figures within the military can indeed be seen as the final act before 
complete military depoliticisation. The Chief of the General Staff decided to resign 
after the trails because he felt guilty at not being defending the rights of the military 
personnel: 
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It has become impossible for me to continue in this high office, 
because I am unable to fulfil my responsibility to protect the rights 
of my personnel as the Chief of General Staff.
918
 
Isik Kosaner still continued to make statements to imply the military’s guardianship, 
and he was explicitly in an opponent position to the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
operations. Therefore, he refused to maintain his duty. Finally, Kosaner was 
succeeded by Necdet Ozel (2010-2015) as the new Chief of the General Staff. Under 
Ozel’s command, the military ended making statements about politics. Except for 
small incidents, the military worked in harmony with the government and accepted 
civilian supremacy. However, because of the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations, 
the opponents harshly criticised the government and the secret Fethullah organisation 
to create a Kumpas (which means “Trap”) to eliminate the opposition. According to 
the retired generals, the left-wing activists, and the main opposition parties, the 
government used this process as an excuse to break the power of the military and 
opposition, in order to remove the obstacles against a Sharia regime. They claim that 
the biggest proof of this trap was that they not only arrested the military commanders 
but they also arrested journalists, lawyers, politicians, and media spokespersons to 
suppress all the opposition moves. Additionally, the opponents objected to the trials, 
because they claimed that there were not clear proofs to support the accusations and 
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the indictments. They also accused the media of being sympathetic to the AKP, and 
of attacking to the military and opposition unfairly.
919
 
Furthermore, the detentions, trials, and imprisonments were cautiously followed by 
the foreign media. The US Ambassador Joseph Ricciardone also stated that the 
United States had some concerns about the detainments and the imprisonments of 
journalists by stating that this was not good for the freedom of speech. Additionally, 
the EU Commissioner Stefan Fule stated that the European Union was following the 
process with concern. In Turkey, the civil society organisations, intellectuals, 
journalists, businessmen, and media representatives struggled to increase their voice 
against the arrests. Strong protests were organised by the citizens, particularly in the 
big cities. Indeed, some liberal right-wing intellectuals, who are against military 
interventions, also showed their reactions to the arrests.
920
 
As a result, one may argue that the Ergenekon and Balyoz process greatly damaged 
the military’s constant supremacy over politics.921 Similarly, the military’s reaction 
to the operations supported that argument, because they did not make any further 
movement to break the trial process and accepted awaiting the judgement of the 
courts. During the process, the military gave several statements to show its concerns 
for the true working of the legal mechanisms, but it did not take any further action, 
such as using force or pressure.
922
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As has been noted before, opposition to military coups increased even among the 
Kemalists and opposition parties. Although the main opposition parties – particularly 
the Republican Party – were extremely suspicious of the allegations, they clearly 
showed their support for a liberal model of CIV-MIL relations. More interestingly, 
the Republicans came with a proposal to limit the military’s power over the civilians. 
The party programme stated that: 
Any force other than the democratic institutions and rules provided 
in the laws. In this scope, CHP (Republican Party) opposes … the 
military’s interference in politics. The armed forces should be 
under the control of civilian authority. To this end CHP starts out 
with an extensive demilitarisation programme.
923
 
The party’s proposal included radical changes toward the liberal CIV-MIL model: 
 Full control of the Armed Forces by the civilian government. 
 Revision of Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, 
which gives the military the duty to protect and look after Turkish territory 
and the Republic. 
 Enhancement of professionalism in the military.  
 Reduction of military service to six months for everyone. 
 Narrowing down of the jurisdiction of the military courts in general. 
 Abolition of the Military High Administrative Court that reviews 
administrative cases involving military personnel, and which can currently 
overrule the decisions of the civilians if it wishes.
924
 
                                               




The proposal was broadened by the Democracy Report of the party by offering 
further ideas about the military, conscription, and the defence budget. According to 
some of these suggestions, parliament had to be more effective in detecting military 
expenditures, the military should be directly responsible to the Ministry of Defence, 
the Military Court of Appeals should be abolished, and the people who were 
responsible for the 1980 junta rule should be judged.
925
 That proposal is highly 
interesting, because it came from the main opposition party to the AKP. As one can 
notice, the proposal offered a complete democratic CIV-MIL model with all details. 
Interestingly, the Republican Party’s proposal conformed with the AKP’s previous 
attempts to restrict military power for toward the goal of EU membership, and even 
brought further suggestions. Also, it is worthwhile to mention that Kilicdaroglu 
asked why Yasar Buyukanit was not judged during the Ergenekon process, because 
he was the Chief of the General Staff during the website declaration in 2007.
926
 
On the other hand, the second opposition party, MHP (the National Action Party), 
objected to these proposals for restricting military power over civilians. In parallel 
with their strong nationalist ideal, they strictly supported the military’s privileged 
position. Ideologically, the MHP is closer to “militarism”; however, their ideology 
conflicts with the Kemalist legacy. Especially, some radical supporters of the MHP 
often refer to the successful days of the Ottoman Empire by glorifying it along with 
the jihad concept. Therefore, they are usually not as sensitive as the military about 
the secularism principle. Indeed, there were times when the MHP came closer to 
Islamist ideology. However, this time the conditions were different, because state 
unity and the Kurdish separation movement were the main concerns of the party 
programme, and they defended the view that only a strong military could preserve 
                                               




the state from dissolving. Indeed, the MHP’s main conflict with the AKP has never 
been on matters related to secularism and Kemalist reforms, but rather the Kurdish 
separation movement. The MHP criticised the AKP strictly because of their softened 
policy toward the Kurdish separatists. As a result, during the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
process, the party became supportive to the military.
927
 
However, both the CHP and MHP strongly objected to the trials, interrogations, 
punishments, and the conditions of imprisonment during the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
period. Kilicdaroglu even stated that Erdogan created an “empire of terror” by 
suppressing freedom of expression. He explicitly declared that he did not believe in 
the existence of that organisation. Additionally, the CHP’s former president, Deniz 
Baykal, presented himself as the “advocate of Ergenekon trials”. Furthermore, he 
maintained that the AKP was creating its own “deep state” by appointing its 
sympathisers to the higher positions within the state departments.
928
 Similarly, the 
MHP Group Deputy Chairman Mehmet Sandir stated that it was not possible to 
create a true and advanced democracy by putting journalists in prison.
929
 Both parties 
criticised the process by claiming that the military’s combat skills were weakened 
because its commanders were in prison and the state remained open to foreign 
attacks. Indeed, they went further by nominating some Ergenekon and Balyoz 
suspects for their election lists.
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As a result of the developments above, before the 2011 elections, parliament 
witnessed a tactical war between the government and the main opposition parties in 
terms of CIV-MIL relations. Although the main opposition parties criticised the 
developments within the Ergenekon and Balyoz processes, they had some worries 
because of the past experiences. They did not want to be in a position of being too 
persistent in defending the military, because the AKP could benefit from this by 
increasing its votes, as they had after the e-memorandum in 2007.
931
 On the other 
hand, the AKP also adopted a similar policy with the opposition parties, by declaring 
that they would continue to make liberal reforms to restrict the military’s autonomy, 
but they would also preserve the military’s image. The AKP also declared several 
times that they would be very careful in sustaining the impartiality of the judiciary 
and would not intervene in any circumstances. Therefore, the government attacked 
the opposition by claiming that the opposition affects the impartiality of the judiciary 
by making statements and by giving support to the “juntaists”.932 Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan strictly criticised the opposition for giving their back to the juntaists to 
remain in power: 
When they could not find candidates from the outside they 
transferred candidates from the prison. I want to ask to the MHP 
and CHP … are you representing the nation’s will or the will of the 
gangs, mafia and junta? Are you taking your strength from the 
nation or from the gangs, mafia, and dark organisations?
933
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This speech also indicates that Prime Minister Erdogan was apparently convinced 
that the accusations were true, and that there was an illegal juntaist organisation. 
Nevertheless, the AKP appeared to be in harmony with the military during this era. 
They had the military’s advice on important issues, particularly in foreign policy, and 
they opposed the CHP’s proposal of shortening military service through payment. 
However, the military’s periodic criticisms of the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
investigations, and its statements concerning the impartiality of the judiciary from its 
official website, were creating tensions between the military and the government. 
Once, Erdogan made a statement against the formal declarations from the military’s 
website: 
My wish is that the (TAF) should not have made such a statement 
from their website. I assume that it was a mistake … After the final 
decision was made, they can criticise it. But I do not find it 




However, the last strife between the military and civilians ended in a short time. The 
military’s reactions were limited to website declarations, but, in a short period of 
time, these formal declarations also disappeared. Indeed, Erdogan stated how he was 
happy that the military were not intervening in politics anymore, and only replying to 
the issues that directly concern them. He noticed this development as a great step 
toward democratisation, and invited the media to be supportive to the military in this 
liberalisation process.
935
 Furthermore, Erdogan defined the separation of the military 
                                               




from politics as one of the greatest achievements of the government in an interview 
to an American channel.
936
 
To sum up, the website declaration in 2007 and the Ergenekon-Balyoz prosecutions 
became a major turning point in civil-military relations. Starting from this period, the 
depoliticised transformation of the military gained momentum. On the other hand, 
the trials and replacements of the Kemalist commanders with allegedly more 
moderate ones, as well as the presumed Fethullah penetration into the military, may 
cause one to think that the AKP attempted to subordinate the military by 
“civilianising it” (subjective control). Yet, this possibility is also debatable given the 
limited empirical evidence. Overall, the process between Buyukanit and Necdet Ozel 
can be defined as a negative-democratic relationship. The prosecutions undermined 
the military’s political influence and image, and this development arguably enabled 
the AKP to increase its anti-secular and oppressive policies. 
7.3.7 Necdet Ozel Era: Toward Depoliticisation?  
As has been noted in the previous pages, the depoliticised image of the military 
started with the EU reforms. However, a complete depoliticisation became the case 
after the resignation of Isik Kosaner. After Kosaner, Necdet Ozel became the new 
Chief of the General Staff. During Ozel’s term in 2011-2015, Turkey did not see any 
remarkable political statement or activity from the military.
937
 It worked, at least 
ostensibly, in harmony with the government, in line with the advanced democratic 
models. Indeed, one may find similarities between the process and Huntington’s 
objective control model. However, according to Huntington, the civil and military 
spheres should be distinct, and the military should be professionalised in its own 
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Protests in 2013, because the same observable harmony continued to exist in the following process. 
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autonomous sphere to achieve this model. Therefore, it is still doubtful whether the 
current civil-military relations are exactly meeting those standards or not. Indeed, by 
taking into account the previous case studies and the crossing identities argument, 
one may associate the process with the subjective model, because events such as 
Ergenekon-Balyoz and the replacement of top commanders with new ones might 
cause one to think that the AKP side-lined or stripped of the opponent officers and 
replaced them with the AKP sympathisers. The assumed Fethullah penetration and 
its ideological closeness to the Islamist parties strengthen this argument. However, 
this approach is again questionable at this level due to the closeness of the case. 
On the other hand, the above-mentioned harmony also continued in foreign policy 
issues, such as the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. In addition to these developments, the 
military occasionally used its formal website to prevent speculative news.
938
 Indeed, 
most military statements during Ozel’s term were about the military’s own 
(technical) professional obligations, such as campaigns, operations, ceremonies, and 
national holidays. The statements about political events were very limited, and they 
were mostly to mention the military’s political neutrality. Apart from these, the 
public statements about politics almost disappeared. Moreover, a nationwide 
constitutional referendum took place in 2010 to change some articles of the 1982 
constitution. One of these articles was Article 15, which banned the trial of the 1980 
junta leaders. The referendum was accepted by the majority of the public and Article 
15 was changed. The change opened the way to try the junta leaders for interfering in 
democracy and toppling the government. This change and the trial of the generals 
                                               
938 For instance, shortly after the Gezi Protests, during a corruption allegation for the AKP 
government (17 December 2013), the military made a statement on its website to say that any attempt 
to pull the military inside the political strife would be unsuccessful because the military would 
preserve its politically neutral position. See: ‘TSK’dan 17 Aralik Operasyonu Icin Aciklama’, 
(Statement by the Military for the Operation of 17 December), CNN TURK. Available at: 




became a significant movement to break the military’s immunity, because that article 
had a symbolic meaning, which indicates the military’s autonomous position.939 
Despite all these positive developments in terms of military depoliticisation, a 
remarkable increase in the AKP’s authoritarian behaviour occurred. Especially, 
Prime Minister Erdogan strengthened his authoritarian and threatening tone in his 
speeches against opponents. In particular, some regulations of the AKP government 
were found to be anti-secular and anti-democratic by the opposition, such as the 
alcohol ban.
940
 Hence, if one considers a mutual relationship between the decreasing 
military supervision in politics and the increasing AKP authoritarianism, one may 
define the process as a negative-democratic relationship, in which the military 
stepped back but this retrenchment brought negative impacts for the democratic 
regime. In the absence of the military’s traditional “guardianship of the regime” 




The political passivism of the military also continued during the Gezi (Parki) protests 
in June 2013. This is especially remarkable because, in previous decades, it was 
hardly imaginable that the military would remain silent in such a kind of event. The 
mentioned incidents began with small protests against the government’s attempts to 
establish a big shopping centre over a public park, which is known as “Gezi Parki”. 
The demonstrations immediately turned into a big public demonstration toward the 
AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, through the impact of social media. It started with 
a big participation in Istanbul’s Taksim Square and rapidly spread to Istanbul’s major 
centres, and to Ankara, Izmir, and the other cities. The main complaints of the 
                                               
939 Ariana Keyman, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, May 21 2012. 
940 For the alcohol ban see: Hurriyet, ‘Basbakandan Onemli Aciklamalar’ (Important statements by 
the prime minister). Available at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakandan-onemli-aciklamalar-
23357568 (accessed 24 May 2013). 
941 See: Analytical Table 3, (p.343-345). 
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demonstrators were the oppressive methods of the government and the limitations to 
individual liberties and on the media. On the first day, the demonstrations gave 
liberal and democratic messages to the international media. The movement received 
positive reactions from the European Union and United States – particularly, huge 
support from the EU. However, after several days, marginal groups, such as the 
extreme left and right groups, penetrated into the demonstrators and applied 
vandalism. The police responded to the vandalism by using tear gas, plastic bullets, 
and batons. The number of demonstrators was arguably over a million (perhaps 
more), all around the country.
942
 One of the most interesting aspects of the 
demonstrations, for perhaps the first time since the Turkish Liberation War, was that 
different people from different ideologies came together, including Kemalists, Grey 
Wolfs (ultra-nationalists), socialists, Islamists, Alevis, atheists, feminists, and 
Kurdish groups, as well as famous academics, artists, journalists, writers, and so on. 
For instance, when a group of religious people, who are known as the “anti-capitalist 
Muslims”, were praying during the Friday Prayer, the left-wing activist groups, 




The impact of the Gezi Protests is still being felt today. Around 10 demonstrators and 
one police officer died during the events, and many demonstrators are still under 
charge and being tried. Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the majority of the AKP strictly 
refused to admit that the demonstrations were democratic and peaceful. Some even 
                                               
942 The official number is not known. 
943 For the Gezi Protests, see: The Economist, ‘Democrat or Sultan’, June 8-14 and ‘Timeline of Gezi 
Parki Protests’, Hurriyet Daily News. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/timeline-of-
gezi-park-protests .aspx?pageID=238&nID=48321&NewsCatID=341 (accessed: 6 June 2013).  
‘Anti-Capitalist Muslims’ is a political Islamist movement under the leadership of religious studies 
expert Ihsan Eliacik, who interprets Islam as a religion that is against the capitalist system and very 
close to socialism. For instance see: Ihsan Eliacik, The Critique of Capitalism in the Light of Quranic 
Verses. Available at: http://www.ihsaneliacik.com/2015/10/01/the-critique-of-capitalism-in-the-light-
of-quranic-verses/ (accessed: 1 October 2015). 
340 
 
claimed that the demonstrations were organised by “foreign actors”. The most 
important indication of the event, for the purpose of the thesis, is that the military did 
not make any statement. During the police intervention for dispersing the masses, 
some people were concerned about the military’s reaction. However, the military 
remained silent and made no move or statement about the Gezi Park situation.
944
 
Apart from all these events, the military’s Kemalist references still continued to exist 
throughout Ozel’s term – at least symbolically – such as: commemorating Atatürk in 
ceremonies; putting his pictures, sayings, and statutes on every corner; and defining 
Atatürk as “the true guide and eternal leader”. On the other hand, these rituals have 
not gone further than being procedural, and the military has not made any statement 
to imply “guardianship”. Beyond all these developments, the most important reform 
for civilian supremacy was the change in Article 35. The main article in the 
military’s Internal Act Service was replaced by a new amendment (in July 2013) 
which stipulates: 
The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the homeland against 
threats and dangers to come from abroad, to ensure the 
preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner that 
will provide deterrence, to fulfil the duties abroad….945 
The change to the aforementioned Article 35 of military’s Internal Service Act is 
perhaps the most radical step toward military depoliticisation, because now the 
military does not have a strong legal tool to legitimise its involvements in politics. 
Previously, the Article 35 had been offering the military an obligation of protecting 
                                               
944 There is no formal evidence to demonstrate the military’s general stance toward these events. 
There is some ‘gossip’, which is social media-based and informal. Therefore, it is not known what the 
military thinks about the demonstrations in general. 
945Hurriyet Daily News, ‘Turkish Parliament Oks Coup Pretext Article’. Available at: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-oks-change-on-coup-pretext 
(article.aspx?pageID=238&nID=50706&NewsCatID=338 (accessed: 19 July 2016). 
341 
 
the constitution against the internal and external threats. The military interventions 
after the 1960 had always been carried out with reference to this article. 
Nevertheless, according to the new regulation in the Internal Service Act, the 
military’s responsibilities are limited to defence of the state from external threats, by 
following governmental instructions. During the negotiations, the AKP received 
some criticisms from the opposition. Oktay Vural from the MHP (former Minister of 
Transport) objected to the changes in the Internal Service Act by assuming that the 
new regulation would weaken the military’s national identity by making it an 
ordinary profession such as a “doctorate or carpentry”.946 On the other hand, with 
this change, the military lost its main formal power to defend possible future 
interventions. 
In the final analysis, although the overall analytical concerns of this research ends 
with the Gezi protests in 2013, the same stability in civil-military relations continued 
until the end of Necdet Ozel’s term in 2015. In general, the recent depoliticisation is 
the result of a transformation that was started by the European Union candidacy in 
1999. However, the developments, namely the unsuccessful website memorandum in 
2007 and the Ergenekon-Balyoz processes, considerably accelerated this process.  
Normally, the current harmony between the government and military along with the 
military’s political passivism, lead one to think that the Turkish military absorbed the 
professional ethos to maintain a Huntington line of objective control. However, as 
aforementioned, this depolitical image is very recent and vulnerable. If one considers 
the Turkish military’s praetorian legacy, associating this process with a Huntington 
type of normative professionalism can be premature and wrong. Therefore, instead of 
professionalism, I prefer to define this stage of military culture as ‘depoliticisation’. 
                                               
946 Hurriyet, ‘35. Madde Degistirildi’ (The Article 35 has been changed). Available at: 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tsk-35-madde-degistirildi-23718265 (accessed: 13 July 2013). 
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There are several reasons to associate this stage with subjective control in that, 
following the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations, the key military figures who were 
closer to the Kemalist-revolutionist wing have been replaced by new commanders. 
At this point, by taking into account the Fethullah Gulen attempts to penetrate into 
the military, one may think that the AKP intends to make the military ‘the mirror of 
state’ by ‘civilianising it’, as suggested by Huntington’s subjective model. Yet, this 
consideration would also be speculative and premature at this level due to the 
absence of clear evidences.  
Related to this, since the end of Cold War, it has been suggested that there is an 
increase in the level of technical professionalism. The campaigns and training 
sessions with the NATO armies and the military’s recent depoliticisation could have 
increased the level of technical professionalism. However, I argue that the Turkish 
military still has a long way to go for achieving technical and normative 
professionalism to reach Western standards. Lastly, I associated the process with the 
negative-democratic relationship, in that the military adopted a politically passive 
stance that seems stronger than the previous depoliticisations, but presumably the 
absence of military supervision as the traditional guardian of secularism enabled the 
AKP government to apply more authoritarian and oppressive policies, as happened 
during the Gezi Protests.  
Last but not least, while the Turkish military was passing through a depoliticising 
process, theoretically in line with achieving a normative professionalism, the 
military’s efforts for intertwining secularisation with democratisation became far 
from successful with regard to its earliest revolutionist ideals. The recent depolitical 
status of the military arguably left Turkish democracy vulnerable to religious 
populism and authoritarianism. The main reason behind this failure is the shift in 
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military culture from revolutionism to guardianship, following NATO membership. 
After absorbing capitalism and anti-Communism as new ideologies, replacing 
Kemalist statism and populism, the liberal and progressive tendency of the military 
was replaced by a more conservative and authoritarian stance. At this point, each 
military intervention further closed Turkey to the Western bloc to be a modern 
capitalist state and also turned the military into a military-industrial complex. As a 
result, secularism and democratisation became an excuse for legitimising the military 
interventions. Especially, after promoting the Turkish-Islam synthesis and 
implementing a restrictive constitution, the 1980-83 Junta opened the path for 
political Islam and single-party authoritarianism. As a result, in the twenty-first 
century, while the military was gradually stepping back from politics, the Islamic-
based AKP further increased its oppression by undermining the secular dynamics of 
the state. 
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This has been the third and final case study of the empirical section of the thesis, 
which has analysed the years between 1999 and 2013. The history of the Turkish 
military has witnessed transitions between three distinct identities, which have been 
coded as revolutionism, guardianship, and depoliticisation. This chapter saw a 
process in which depolitical behaviour suppressed the other two identities and 
dominated military culture during the (ongoing) period of AKP rule. Indeed, there 
have always been some groups of officers in the military that were above politics 
(neutral) since the 1908 Revolution (the Declaration of the Second Constitutional 
Monarchy), but they have remained relatively limited in number. In previous 
decades, the officers who have had a more neutral political position, and who 
believed in civilian supremacy, tended to be named as moderate, neutral, or democrat 
officers. To the same extent, I have identified these neutral officers as depolitical 
throughout the thesis. Interestingly, the first significant representative of professional 
behaviour (both normatively and technically) in the military was Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, with regard to his statements and writings. Accordingly, I have associated 
depolitical/depoliticised identity with the Kemalist legacy, which has prevented the 
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generals from applying long-term junta rules and has sustained their willingness for 
NATO and EU memberships. 
As has been mentioned in the introduction, this chapter has made three important 
contributions to the thesis. Firstly, it has evaluated the main variables that pushed the 
military into a depoliticised position. One possible reason for depoliticisation can 
arguably be a possible increase in the number of officers who have a more neutral 
mentality. As was indicated above, the Kemalist legacy, which is deeply embedded 
in military culture, has preserved the Turkish officers’ sensitivities in terms of 
maintaining the democratic and liberal dynamics of the Turkish state, in that an 
overwhelming number of officers have remained critical against long-term junta 
rules. Also, the military has always promoted Westernisation by decisively 
supporting the NATO and EU memberships. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that 
the end of the Cold War, the failures in the previous coups d’état, and the long-term 
relationships with the NATO armies have made a new generation of officers more 
professionally orientated. Yet, it is worthwhile to mention that the unsuccessful 
website memorandum in 2007 and the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials accelerated the 
military depoliticisation by causing the replacement of the commanding elite with 
more moderate generals. 
The second contribution of the chapter has been an exploration of the policy changes 
during the AKP tenure, in accordance with the military depoliticisation. Indeed, the 
military’s increasing efforts for depoliticisation became observable during Hilmi 
Ozkok’s tenure as Chief of the General Staff (2002-2006). Apart from some major 
events, such as the turban and Imam-Hatip Schools controversies, the military 
worked in harmony with the AKP, in both domestic and foreign policies. Most of 
these tensions remained at the level of giving statements to the media or showing 
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silent reaction by turning down formal invitations and leaving ceremonies. For 
instance, once the military authorities protested about the AKP government’s 
spokesperson, Bulent Arinc’s wife, because she did not remove her headscarf. Also, 
the head commanders boycotted the Assembly’s opening ceremony for the same 
reason. Additionally, the military periodically showed its discontent with the opening 
of Imam-Hatip schools. Yet, Ozkok’s reaction toward both the turban case and the 
Imam-Hatip schools remained at a relatively weaker level than in the previous 
decade. Indeed, Ozkok was occasionally criticised by the other commanders because 
of “his tolerance” to the Imam-Hatips.  
On the other hand, these regular reactions to the government policies did not give 
serious harm to the military’s increasing depolitical status because both the military 
and the civilians abstained from challenging each other at this level. The growing 
popular support for the AKP, as well as the increasing possibility of EU membership, 
made it harder for the military to challenge the government. As a result, the Hilmi 
Ozkok era can be seen as a transition to a more stable and harmonic civil-military 
relationship in which the civilian and the military sides did not cross each other’s red 
lines. Arguably, the military feared the public support behind the government and 
appeared respectful to public sovereignty. On the other hand, the government also 
feared the military’s weaponry power and past interventions and aimed to give a 
more secular, democratic, and Atatürkist image. Hence, Ozkok’s term saw relatively 
increased depolitical behaviour.  
In the following years, the military’s subordination and civilian supremacy – for the 
reasons stated – were further strengthened. In this regard, there were important 
domestic and foreign policy changes during this process, which can arguably be 
associated with the demilitarisation of Turkish politics. If one considers that the 
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military has always remained the principal guardian of a secular regime, one may 
suggest a positive relationship between the increasing AKP authoritarianism and 
decreasing military supervision. Indeed, this case can be considered as one clear 
example of the negative-democratic relationship, in which the military adopts a more 
democratic attitude, but the results of this attitude tend to be negative in terms of the 
democratic regime.
947
 As mentioned above, during the AKP rule, Turkey saw 
important foreign policy changes that were seen as taboos by the military. Firstly, the 
AKP’s decisive attempts to enter the EU caused the military to be more tolerant to 
the government, given their traditional support for Westernisation. However, in the 
following process, arguably in accordance with the military’s decreasing influence, 
the AKP slowed its earlier intense efforts toward EU membership. Indeed, the AKP 
has made radical attempts to increase its regional influence in the previous Ottoman 
lands by taking into account a foreign policy goal titled “the new Ottomanism” by 
the authorities. According to this goal, Turkey was approaching the Islamic world 
and attempting a kind of leadership or mediator role in the Middle East and the 
Balkans, in parallel with the United States’ efforts of making the AKP a role model 
of moderate Islam for the Muslim states. Naturally, the AKP’s approach to the East 
by slowing its efforts for EU membership was a new kind of policy, which had been 
strictly refused by the military authorities in the previous decades. Lastly, the AKP’s 
efforts for uniting Cyprus by following the Annan Plan, and the Kurdish Initiative 
Process, herald the breaking of past military taboos in foreign policy. 
The final contribution of the chapter is in giving the answer to the key research 
question, namely defining the type of relationship between the military culture and 
Turkish politics. To do that, we divided the empirical process into three 





chronological chapters. In general, the Turkish case indicated a typical example of 
the variable relationship, in that the previous terms have presented examples of the 
five different models, depending on the time and political circumstances.
948
  
In Chapter 5, the positive-undemocratic relationship was the dominant relationship, 
in which the revolutionist transformation and politicisation in military culture led 
Turkey to be a secular-democratic state. In Chapter 6, the variable relationship 
became the dominant model, because there were sudden transitions from one model 
to another, given the ideological divisions within the military culture between the 
guardians and revolutionists, as well as the unstable nature of Turkish politics. In 
Chapter 7, there is a growing depoliticisation within the military culture, which leads 
to the model that we have titled the negative-democratic relationship, in which 
increasing military depoliticisation makes democratic dynamics vulnerable to the 
AKP’s growing authoritarian manner. As a result, the Turkish model of civil-military 
relationship shows variability, depending on term and conditions. 
There are some noticeable reasons behind this variable relationship. Firstly, given 
the roles and meanings that have been imposed on the military and militarism by the 
Turkish people centuries ago, and given the military’s nation builder status because 
of the Liberation War, the Turkish military has had a highly political character. 
Secondly, because of these roles and meanings that society imposed on the military, 
a strong linkage appeared between the military and society that meant any change in 
military culture made consequent fundamental changes in the national politics. 
Thirdly, because of the highly political nature of the military, different ideologies 
and strife have always appeared among the officers. It is a historically rich and 





unique set of circumstances that has led, in the twenty-first century, to this variable 
military culture and variable civil-military relationship. 
Overall, after elaborating this thesis from beginning to the end, a fundamental change 
within Turkish civil-military relations is observable. Although Turkish military 
culture has shown variability since the Ottoman period, the recent depoliticisation of 
the military will arguably be more permanent than that seen in previous decades. 
Hence, the changes in national politics as a result of military depoliticisation can also 
be more radical and stable. In this regard, to stabilise and maintain the military’s 
current depoliticised status, one main offering of this thesis is to embed the 
professional ethos into military culture by making necessary changes in the academy 
curriculum. 
Considering my interviews and the statements of senior commanders, one may argue 
that the principle of civilian supremacy, political passivism, political neutrality, and 
sympathy for democratic and liberal values (professional ethos) should be absorbed 
by the officers to stabilise and transform current military depoliticisation into a form 
of normative professionalism. Related to this, the curricula should be broadened by 
the relevant civil-military theories, including Samuel Huntington’s objective control 
and professional military ethic. In this way, the officer candidates will not only have 
an academic background in terms of civil-military theories, but they will also 
develop their own theoretical contributions to the relevant field. A similar 
enhancement to current educational practice should also be made in the military 
colleges for non-commissioned officers and in the military barracks for the privates. 
Additionally, the instructions, textbooks, and lectures should be inspected by the 
relevant civilian authorities to observe whether the military education is conforming 
to the principle of civilian supremacy or not. However, this civilian inspection should 
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be limited only to those instructions that are related to the civilian sphere, to prevent 
subjectivity. In other words, the military should have full autonomy in their own 
technical matters including combat training, war strategies and tactics, and so on. 
On the other hand, if current military depoliticisation continues to remain, it can 
bring two different scenarios for the future of Turkish politics. The positive scenario 
is that, in the absence of military interventions, Turkey will implement a more stable 
democratic regime and will not experience periodic breakdowns. To achieve this 
positive scenario, the AKP (or its possible future successor) should decrease its 
recent authoritarian behaviour and should adopt a more tolerant policy toward 
individual rights and liberties. The negative scenario is that the AKP’s increasing 
authoritarianism will continue to grow and the government will undermine the 
secular dynamics of the state. The main solution to this problem can arguably be the 
absorption of a stronger democratic political culture by the Turkish electors, to 
prevent any possible abusing by the civil authorities. In this regard, the military 
depoliticisation can be a good opportunity for the Turkish people to adopt a higher 
political culture.  
Given the military’s so-called position as the ultimate guardian of the Republic in 
previous decades, the Turkish people perhaps absolved themselves from taking 
responsibility in preserving the democratic dynamics of the state. Now, however, the 
Turkish people are in the position of being the ultimate defenders of democracy. 
Perhaps this case will obligatorily increase the people’s interest in politics and will 
cause a maturity in Turkey’s political culture, to the extent that the electors will need 
no further undemocratic measures such as military interventions in order to maintain 





Turkish military culture has been an arena of strife between three crossing identities 
namely the revolutionists, guardians, and depoliticals. The foundations of this 
division dates back to the first decade of twentieth century. The existence of the 
infamous Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy between the revolutionists and guardians was 
the first example of the crossing identities within the military culture. Following the 
1908 Young Turk Revolution, this division continued under different titles and 
political ideologies, but the unchanging fact was that one group has always been 
more progressive, liberal, and (mostly) left-orientated and the other group has been 
conservative, status quoist, authoritarian, and right-orientated. Also, the third group 
that has been defined as depolitical officers has been known as politically passive or 
neutral. Interestingly, the dominant group has always changed the direction of 
Turkish politics in parallel to their political ideals. In addition to this, the dominant 
group has benefited from every opportunity to side-line or to expel the active officers 
who belonged to the opposite wing. Hence, that strong and mutual relationship 
between the military culture and the Turkish politics can offer rich case studies to a 
civil-military researcher wishing to analyse military culture and the main ethoi that 
shape it.  
At this point, the main purpose of this thesis was to explore the type of relationship 
between Turkish military culture and Turkish politics. To answer the research 
question, the thesis was divided into two distinct sections. The first section (Chapters 
1-4) gave the necessary theoretical and conceptual backgrounds to use in the 
empirical process. Then, in the second section (Chapters 5-7) the thesis divided the 
puzzle into three case studies, which had been chosen according to the main 
transformations within military culture. The empirical chapters were analysed under 
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three titles: the revolutionist era (1908-1945); the guardianship era (1945-1999); and 
the depolitical era (1999-2013). The case studies were observed by employing the 
comparative historical analysis method. In this way, the thesis divided the case 
studies into different time periods and conclusions were drawn by employing the 
analytical framework. In general, Turkish military culture and its impacts on civil-
military relations show a variable relationship, in which the mutual interactions 
between military culture and Turkish politics continues without breaking; but the 
impacts of this relationship can be either positive or negative with regard to the 
dynamics of the democratic regime.  
Principally, the first part of the thesis gave essential theoretical and conceptual 
backgrounds about the relevant issues before tackling the main research questions. 
After giving a brief introduction to the main elements of the thesis, such as its 
importance, propositions, methods, and contributions, the Chapter 2 analysed the 
background literature around the definition of military culture and military 
professionalism. Chapter 3 specified the military culture context by discussing its 
relationship with Turkey, considering the ideas of Atatürk and the military-nation 
concept. Lastly, in Chapter 4, we elaborated on Atatürk’s principles as being the 
main tenets of Turkish military culture were, by taking into account the relevant 
literature. Consequently, the first section provided the necessary information as a 
foundation before starting the empirical study. 
The main ideas that are derived from the theoretical section can be summarised as 
follows. Military culture can be defined as the combination of specific martial ethoi, 
namely ideas, values, norms, rituals, objects, and ideals that embed themselves in the 
institution deeply, and shape its characteristic behaviours toward outside and inside 
variables. Military culture can be employed for understanding any kind of military 
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activity, including politics. Naturally, military cultures tend to be in close interaction 
with the social and political cultures, national ideals, and geopolitical vulnerabilities 
of the state. Arguably, because of the existence of more than one resistive variable 
that shapes them, military cultures tend to be resistant against changes and 
innovations. In other words, even during major national crises, including wars, 
economic deadlocks, and disasters, military cultures still tend to protect their main 
martial ethoi. 
One important impact of military cultures is determining the officers’ approach to 
politics. That is to say, the martial ethoi that shapes military culture simultaneously 
determines the military’s position between praetorianism and professionalism. 
Praetorian armies involve themselves in politics in two different ways: either for 
preserving the status quo (guardian armies), or establishing a new regime to replace 
the old one (revolutionist armies). On the other hand, professional armies do not get 
involved in politics, in that the martial ethoi that shapes their military cultures are 
dominated by liberal and democratic ethoi, such as civilian supremacy, military 
subordination, political neutrality, and passivism. According to Samuel Huntington, 
the professional military ethic preserves the professional officer from involving 
himself in politics, because the officer ethically considers that the military’s 
responsibility is protecting the state by following governmental instructions, and they 
do not have a right to take arbitrary decisions. To achieve a professional military 
ethic, Huntington suggests objective military control, which renders an autonomous 
sphere for the military and professionalises it within its own area. If civilians 
interfere in the military sphere to inject their own values, it becomes subjective 
control and undermines the military’s professionalism by civilianising it.  
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Related to this, in Chapter 3 the thesis argued the main tenets of Turkish military 
culture by considering the ideas that had been derived from Chapter 2. The main 
contributions of Chapter 3 are establishing that there is a close linkage between the 
Turkish military and society. This close linkage dates back to the Central Asian 
Turks, a civilisation in which every member of society grew up under military 
discipline. Hence, every member of society was a warrior. This legacy was inherited 
by the following Turkish societies, in which the military has always been in a central 
position in the state establishments, as being the founder or ruler. Due to this close 
linkage, the military has always remained highly political. This chapter also explored 
three different cultural transformations within Turkish military culture since the 
foundation of Republic, which can be termed revolutionism, guardianship, and 
depoliticisation. Hence, this part became an introduction to the Mektepli/Alayli 
dichotomy and the crossing identities notion within the military culture. Another 
important contribution of the chapter was exploring Atatürk’s ideas on civil-military 
relations. According to Atatürk’s writings, statements, and practices, the military 
should be subordinated to the civilians for a sustainable parliamentary regime and 
better combat power. Indeed, it is possible to observe similarities between 
Huntington and Atatürk on the relevant issues. 
Chapter 4 analysed Atatürk’s principles, namely secularism, republicanism, 
populism, nationalism, statism, and revolutionism. Secularism, according to Atatürk, 
does not only aim to remove religious impact from the social domain but also aims to 
liberate people’s minds from dogmatism. Nationalism aims to create a collective 
identity of Turk within the current borders of Turkey, without considering ethnic and 
religious differences. Populism aims to benefit the whole society in its laws and 
regulations without considering any differences, and without making any 
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discrimination among the different social groups. Republicanism refers to the 
principle of creating a regime based on public sovereignty. Hence, there is a natural 
connection between the republicanism and populism principles, in that a republican 
regime would be maintained by elected deputies who were chosen by the people’s 
votes without consideration of ethnic, religious, and gender differences. Additionally, 
statism refers to the mixed economic model, namely the combination of state and 
private sectors. Hence, statism allows for private entrepreneurships, but it also 
suggests that the state should supervise any type of economic activities within its 
national borders. Lastly, revolutionism refers to the obligation of renewal depending 
on the changing circumstances of the time. This chapter basically brought two 
contributions. Firstly, it questioned whether the military was consistent or not while 
associating its interventions with the guardianship of Atatürk’s principles. Indeed, 
the chapter showed that, during the periods of junta rule, the military occasionally 
acted against Atatürk’s principles. Hence, that case indicates that Kemalist principles 
sometimes did not go further than being an excuse for the military authorities to 
legitimise their interventions. Secondly, the chapter became beneficial for the 
empirical chapters, in that most of the terms that were used in the analytical process 
are based on these principles. 
The second part of this thesis, the empirical part, started in Chapter 5, which 
analysed the revolutionary transformation within military culture in parallel with 
Turkish modernisation by elaborating the background events that created the 
crossing identities notion. The chapter is particularly important for indicating the 
Mekteplis and Alaylis division between the revolutionist and guardian officers. Thus, 
the main results that came from the chapter can be summarised as this: there has 
always been a close relationship between military and civilian cultures in the Turkish 
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states. Also, the Turkish military has always remained highly political. Therefore, 
there have always been different ideological orientations among the officers. Thirdly, 
starting from the military reforms in the nineteenth century, revolutionism gradually 
became embedded in military culture, which suggests that the officers should involve 
themselves in politics and protect the Empire from collapsing. At this point, the 1908 
Revolution was taken as a turning point for the military culture wherein the 
revolutionist identity began to dominate it. The revolutionist officers eventually 
founded the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Marshall Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. Lastly, Chapter 5 gave a clear example of the positive-undemocratic model, 
in which the military involved itself in politics in an undemocratic way, but in the 
end created a secular parliamentary regime. 
Chapter 6 analysed the period between 1945 and 1999, which witnessed a 
transformation from revolutionism to guardianship, wherein the military authorities 
gradually adopted a more conservative and status quo-ist ideology. That is to say, the 
military did not only protect the regime that it had founded but occasionally it gave a 
very different image to that of its revolutionist past. In these years, capitalism and 
anti-Communism became embedded in military culture in place of Kemalist 
populism and statism. After creating the OYAK, the military did not only become a 
military-industrial complex, but changed the direction of Turkish politics to make 
Turkey a modern capitalist state in parallel with the Western states. Additionally, the 
junta rules were hardly criticised because of their anti-democratic, oppressive 
practices and human-rights breaches. In the process, the military created two 
constitutions, in 1961 and 1982. Interestingly, these constitutions have different 
characteristics. In contrast to the 1982 constitution, the 1961 constitution is known 
for its extended individual rights and tolerance for political activism. However, the 
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military authorities found the 1961 constitution too liberal for Turkey, in that the 
extended individual rights caused Turkey to become an arena of conflicting civilian 
groups from different ideologies. Hence, in 1982, the military authorities created a 
new constitution which restricted some of the individual rights and liberties that had 
been gained by the 1961 constitution. Furthermore the promotion of a Turkish-Islam 
synthesis detached the military from Kemalist secularism. The increasing Islamic 
references in the new regulations to create a balance against Communism ironically 
undermined the secular characteristics of democracy and strengthened political 
Islam. As a result, the Chapter 6 gave us important evidences to indicate variable 
civil-military relations in Turkey, as the military created a more democratic 
constitution, which is an example of the positive-undemocratic model, and then 
introduced another new constitution, this time restricting the liberal rights that it had 
created, which is the example of the negative-undemocratic model. 
Chapter 7 analysed the period between 1999 and 2013 – the years in which the 
military gradually isolated itself from politics and adopted an identity that has been 
defined as depolitical throughout this thesis. The process starts with Turkey’s 
acceptance as a candidate for being a European Union member, and continues with 
the AKP’s single-party rule until 2013. During the process, the military gradually 
steps back from politics and adopts a politically passive and neutral image. The 
aforementioned military depoliticisation gains momentum after a number of events, 
such as the EU negotiations, the 2007 website declaration, and the Ergenekon and 
Balyoz indictments. Accordingly, this process also gives us an example of the 
variable civil-military relationship, wherein, in the early terms of the AKP, the 
military subordination gives positive results regarding the democratic regime, which 
is indeed the model that has been defined as the positive-democratic relationship. 
359 
 
Yet, in the later terms of the AKP, the military’s apolitical position arguably enables 
the government to implement more authoritarian and anti-secular policies, which 
conforms to the negative-democratic model. As a result, Turkey has been giving a 
typical example of the variable relationship, in which all five typologies of civil-
military relationship have been observed in its history. Indeed, sometimes more than 
one model can be observed simultaneously. The main reason behind this variable 
relationship is the highly political nature of the Turkish military, which allows for 
the existence of different ideological trends among the officers at the same time. 
Also, Turkey’s unstable democracy and political culture can be viewed as another 
reason behind this relationship. As has been mentioned by Samuel Finer, in mature 
political cultures, military interventions are less likely to happen. Hence, Turkish 
democracy and democratic political culture, perhaps, has not reached a high enough 
stage of maturity thus far to maintain a democratic civil-military relationship 
(positive-democratic model).  
By and large, this thesis has brought two main contributions to the relevant studies, 
namely conceptual, and analytical contributions. The conceptual contribution is to 
the study of military culture with reference to the Turkish case. Although the military 
culture concept has significantly increased its importance in the civil-military 
literature, the Turkish case still requires further analysis in that sense. Hence, this 
thesis brought a new approach to the relevant studies by positioning military culture 
at the centre of the Turkish civil-military problematic. The difference in this thesis, 
as distinct from the relevant studies, is in observing military culture more technically, 
by taking into account relevant academic theories. Additionally, the thesis makes a 
new contribution by separating modern Turkish military culture into three different 
identities: revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical. Moreover, the thesis identified a 
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typology of five different civil-military relationships by considering the impacts of 
military culture on democratic regimes.  
Additionally, the thesis employed Samuel Huntington’s theory of professional 
military ethic to test professionalism in the Turkish military culture. After 
elaborating Huntington’s theory, and the alternative definitions, the thesis separated 
the definition of professionalism into two namely normative and technical 
professionalism. The main reason for making this separation is the general criticism 
against Huntington’s theory. According to the critical authors, professionalism in 
some militaries did not prevent them from involving themselves in politics. For 
instance, the Greek, Turkish, Chilean, German, and Japanese armies became more 
political after professionalising, in contrast to what Huntington had suggested. That 
case requires us to separate normative professionalism from technical 
professionalism. In other words, an army can have perfect professional education 
within the military academy, but it can still be politically active, because its military 
cultures have not yet been ethically professionalised. That is to say, military cultures 
should absorb the professional ethos irreversibly as a normative requirement. In 
some cases, some armies can be technically quite professional but ethically not. For 
instance, the Prussian Army was shown as a model of professionalism with its 
technical expertise and warfare discipline, but the same army at the same time was 
highly political, and this continued until the end of the Second World War. On the 
other hand, the British and American armies have had normative and technical 
professionalism at the same time and have remained politically neutral. 
On the other hand, the aforementioned typology of five different civil-military 
relationships simultaneously became the analytical contribution of the thesis. The 
models have been drawn by considering the possible impacts of military cultures on 
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the civil-military relationship and the democratisation process. At this point, the first 
model is the positive-undemocratic relationship, in which the military tends to be 
political but its involvements in politics brings positive results for democratisation, 
such as creating a parliamentary regime or protecting an existing parliamentary 
regime. The second model is the negative-undemocratic relationship, which refers to 
the case in which the military is political and its involvements make negative impacts 
on democratic regimes. The third model is the negative-democratic relationship, 
which means the military becomes subordinated to the civilians but its political 
passivism brings negative results for the democratisation process, perhaps by making 
the regime vulnerable to outside or inside threats. The fourth model is the positive-
democratic relationship, in which the military becomes politically neutral and 
passive, and the impacts of this political passivism also become positive for 
democratisation. The last model is the variable relationship, which refers to a case 
wherein there is more than one of the aforementioned models evident at the same 
time; or, rather, different types of relationship are likely to be seen in the same case 
periodically. To understand which model best explains a chosen case study, the 
researcher may follow two different paths. Firstly, the researcher can analyse the 
case historically, from the beginning to the end, and then come to a conclusion; 
secondly, the researcher can divide the case into different time periods, then analyse 
each case separately and then come to a final conclusion. The second way, naturally, 
is more applicable if there is variability in the relationship. 
One proposition of the thesis is that the best way of embedding the professional ethos 
into military cultures (normative professionalism) is designing military curricula 
according to the liberal and democratic ethoi. In other words, the lectures, textbooks, 
and seminars can be designed according to the professional ethos, encompassing 
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civilian supremacy, political passivism, and political neutrality. Additionally, the 
officer candidates can receive a basic academic education in terms of civil-military 
theories, including Huntington’s. That gives officer candidates the opportunity to 
make their own contributions to the literature, and to maintain civilian supremacy. In 
this way, the officer candidates can deeply absorb military subordination as part of 
professional military discipline. Naturally, this type of embedding requires periodic 
supervision by the civilian authorities. That is to say, the civilian authorities can 
regularly check the course books and lecture discussions to see whether the officers 
are trained according to the professional ethos, or are shirking. This type of civilian 
control over military academies should not be considered as subjective control, in 
that the civilian supervision can be limited only to the instructions that are related to 
politics, and not the parts which are specifically relevant to the military’s own 
autonomous technical area. 
Ultimately, Turkish civil-military relations have entered into a new process. The 
military’s current depoliticisation seems more decisive and permanent than any 
changes witnessed in previous decades. On the other hand, it is still early to explain 
the current status of military culture with a Huntington model of normative 
professionalism. As has been mentioned several times in this thesis, military cultures 
are not likely to experience major changes in short periods. Hence, considering the 
strong praetorian legacy of the Turkish military, it is not easy to expect a sudden 
professionalism in such a short period. Additionally, considering the traditional 
Mektepli/Alayli conflict and previous identical transitions, one possibility can be the 
replacement of the commanding elite by the AKP sympathisers. Especially, the trials 
and arrests of the key military figures, that are known as Kemalist and left-orientated, 
as well as the alleged Islamic penetration into the military by the Fethullah 
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organisation, might cause one to think that a subjective control has happened by 
civilising the military and making it the mirror of the state. Yet, this suggestion can 
also be premature at this stage because we do not have clear empirical evidence. As a 
result, I preferred to describe this stage of military culture as depoliticisation. 
On the other hand, recent depoliticisation and efforts for being a Western type of 
professional army leave an unanswered question: despite all the warnings and 
statements from the military for half a century, Turkish democracy is still far from 
being intertwined with secularisation. As was illustrated in Chapter 4, secularism is a 
crucial matter for Turkish modernisation in that it protects both democracy and 
human rights from authoritarianism and religious manipulation. As we have seen 
how the DP and AKP benefitted from peoples’ religious sensitivities to increase and 
maintain their oppression over opponents, the depoliticisation of the military – as the 
major deterrent power against political Islam – would be a serious risk for the future 
of Turkish democracy. Ironically, the military itself is responsible for the current 
situation. After shifting from its revolutionary line, the junta rules became a tool for 
suppressing leftist moves. Furthermore, during the guardian era, the military’s 
alleged commitment to Kemalist principles enabled it to maintain its political 
legitimacy. As a result, the current status of the regime indicates that the military’s 
ostensible efforts for intertwining democracy with secularism have become a failure. 
That is to say, while the military was stepping back from politics, political Islam 
strengthened. At this point, current status of military can bring two different 
consequences for the future of Turkish politics. The first possible scenario is that 
Turkish democracy will strengthen in the absence of periodic military interruptions. 
The second scenario is that the AKP’s current authoritarianism will continue to grow 
and undermine the democratic and secular characteristics of Turkey. To prevent this 
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negative scenario, there are two important requirements that are expected to happen: 
firstly, the AKP (or its possible future successors) will adopt a more democratic and 
tolerant policy, as they (AKP) did in their earlier years; secondly, the political culture 
of Turkish electors will develop enough to protect the fundamental dynamics of the 
democratic regime. Arguably, the current military depoliticisation can be a good 
opportunity for the Turkish people to absorb a more democratic political culture, 
because, in previous decades, the military’s so-called status as the ultimate guardian 
of revolutions perhaps prevented the electors taking a more serious responsibility in 
this regard. In addition to this, the military’s current depoliticised status can be an 
opportunity for the officers to achieve normative and technical professionalism, 
because now the military can focus on its own responsibilities instead of interesting 








Definition A.1: This is the envelope of the letter that was sent to the Presidency of 












Definition A.2:  
 
This is the formal letter that I sent to the Presidency of the General Staff. The letter 
starts with a short summary of my educational background and continues with a brief 
explanation of the title and purpose of the thesis. Then, it requests permission to 
carry out interviews with the active officers and a formal answer to the five questions 
above. The questions can be summarised as follows: 
1-) How do you define professional soldier? According to the Western resources, 
professional soldier remains politically neutral and implements the duties that he was 
ordered from the civilian governments without questioning and conditioning. Do you 
agree with this definition? 
2-) Considering the definition above, can we assume a shift from interventionism 
(preatorianism) to professionalism in the Turkish military culture? 
3-) Assuming that the Turkish military culture has been constructed according to 
Atatürk’s revolutions and principles, is it possible to see a shift from these ideals? 
4-) Does the Turkish military feel a responsibility on itself to guard Atatürk’s 
revolutions and principles? 
5-) Are there specific instructions to the officers and non-commissioned officers in 
the military academies and schools, related to Atatürkism and importance of 
protecting Atatürk’s revolutions and principles, which are different than those in civil 







Definition A.3: This is a formal document from the Turkish Organisation of Post 
and Telegraph (PTT), which confirms that the letter was delivered to the Presidency 








Definition A.4: This is the formal response from the Presidency of the General Staff 
to my aforementioned five questions. The answer states: “I confirm that the 
permission request for ensuring the Turkish Armed Forces’ institutional view about 
the issues mentioned in the related letter for employing in the PhD thesis ‘Turkish 














The form that related to the appointment of the Chief of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly his highness Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the position of Commander in Chief 
by the Ballot no: 5/8/27 of the Turkish National Assembly has been obtained. 
Ismet       Fevzi 
The Commander of the Western Front  The Chief of the General Staff 
FORM 
The regulation related to the appointment of the Chief of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly his highness Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the Commander in Chief: 
1-) The Turkish Grand National Assembly as being the only decision-maker for the 
issues related to the national destiny has charged its own chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha 
with the duty of Commander in Chief. 
2-) The Commander in Chief (Mustafa Kemal) has the authority to use all the legal 
rights of the Turkish Grand National Assembly related to the issues that could 



















     FORM 
 
Due to the kindness of presenting the duty of Commander in Chief to my own 
personality by the Turkish Grand National Assembly ... I am extremely grateful to 
every member of the military, all the deputies of the Assembly and every person of 
the nation ... I have a crucial belief that the nation, with this kind of faith and 
bravery, will gain its independence back with the Lord the most merciful’s wish. 










Definition B.4: This is the formal copy of the original telegraph by Mustafa Kemal 












25/7/1324     The Ottoman State’s 
 
       Representative of Commander in Chief 
        
Branch: 1 No: 4250 
 
 
There are rumours that a national congress has been organised in the Eastern Region 
and some local military units have also been involved in this process. The disastrous 
results of the military’s previous political interests, especially in the last ten years, 
have already become known (by the authorities) ... Hence, it should be reminded that 
the (military’s non-political status) should be considered as a responsibility and a 
matter of honour (that should be preserved). 
 
       Declaration 
 
      To the Military Commandership  
 









Definition C.2: This is the original copy of the telegraph that has been mentioned in 




















      The Ottoman Minister of War 
 
    To the Head of Eighth Army 
 
It has been reported by the city administrator Mr Rahmi that some members of the 
military attempted to involve themselves in (political parties). (Therefore), the 
relevant legal mechanisms and regulations should be carried out for the soldiers who 
showed political interests in the least possible time without showing any hesitation. 
 
19 Tesrini 1334 
 
The Ottoman Grand Vizier and Minister of War 
 












From Nazir Pasha, the Minister of War The Ottoman Chief of the  
 
 General Staff  
 
 Branch No. 
 
It should be remembered what kind of disastrous consequences the military’s 
participation in politics had brought in the recent past. If some members of the 
military continue to maintain their ongoing political activities or if they involve 
themselves in politics in the future, it should be considered that the related laws and 
regulations will punish those people with the heaviest sanctions. 
The Minister of War  
 
To the Head of Army Corps 
 
 
To the Inspectorship of the Ministry of War 
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    OCCASSION 27 July 1325 
 
To the Second Army Inspectorship in Konya 
   
To the First Army in Edirne 
   
To the Second Army in Sivas  
 ............................... 
  To the 57
th
 Legion  
 
For the rumours related to the attempt of organising a national congress in the 
Eastern Region and the assumed military involvements in this mentioned process ... I 
should remind that the military involvements in politics caused disastrous 
conclusions in the previous terms. Hence, I declare that the military should avoid 
itself every kind of political activity and attempt for the sake of military honour.  
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This long report is completely related to the collection of the National Taxes 
(Orders), which had been prepared by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and which were sent to 
the related administrative authorities (Kaymakams) of relevant cities and villages. As 
has been mentioned in Chapter 5, the 10 orders obliged people to deliver a particular 
quantity of their commodities including clothes, foods, vehicles, weapons, and other 
relevant necessities to the city governors for meeting military requirements. In the 
letter above, a city governor (Kaymakam) and a tax inspector give detailed 
information to the relevant military authorities about the collecting process. The 
information mentioned includes relevant details such as the collection of food and 
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